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PREFACE 
 
WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY AND LITERARY STUDY: A DEFINITIONAL PRELUDE 
 
 Why write about literature and the world-system?  The question is certainly a valid one.  
After all, isn’t world-systems theory passé, a clunky model for navigating world space and a 
reductive one for literature to boot?  What value could its abstracting notions of core, periphery, 
and semiperiphery hold for literary study?  Or, for that matter, what interest do its quantitative 
analyses of long waves and cycles of accumulation hold for a discipline more prone to treat 
numbers with a healthy dose of skepticism than jubilant celebrations?  Where, in the disciplinary 
chasm separating the social sciences from the humanities, does world-systems theory find the 
space to speak to humanistic categories like culture, art, and emotion? 
 The most obvious answer to these questions would be that world-systems theory offers a 
comparative lens to literary study.  By treating the world as an interconnected system, we can 
begin to see homologies, parallels, and dialogues that are obscured by reading literature within 
national paradigms or through lines of direct influence.  Thus Affective Transnationalism uses a 
world-systemic model to compare two literary traditions rarely placed into dialogue with one 
another: Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature.  I argue that by placing these two 
literatures within a fading Atlantic plantation/mine economy we can gain an insight into how 
literary and economic forms spoke to one another during the “long” twentieth century (1880-
1980).1 If literary history has traditionally treated generic forms as containers of particular class 
interests, rising, falling, and struggling on alongside the fortunes of those particular classes,2 the 
genres I study here – the Anglo-Irish Big House novel, the South African plaasroman/farm 
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novel, and the South African mine novel – demonstrate a much more discontinuous trajectory, 
emerging, disappearing, and reemerging at periodic intervals closely tied to the economic cycles 
of the world-system.  I propose that these discontinuous histories can best be explained by 
attending to Anglo settler classes’ roles within the British Empire’s Atlantic economy: as 
semiperipheral mediators between metropolitan commodity markets and peripheral labor 
reserves and, later, between rising nationalist movements and a modernizing British financial-
professional sector with little use for their services, these classes were more directly tied to the 
formal networks binding together the world-system than to the narrative of progressive 
modernization that has undergirded both capitalist ideology and the history of the novel.   
As I show, twentieth-century Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature familiarized 
readers with the emotional forms of mediation that replaced transatlantic trade when the world-
system transitioned from a British imperial Atlantic economy to a post-imperial global economy.  
If plantation and mine novels emerged in periodic waves – the 1880s/1890s, the 1930s, and the 
1970s/1980s – I contend that this speaks to their efforts to formulate emotional dispositions that 
could reconcile subjects to both autonomous nation-states and a transnational global economy, 
binding these contradictory institutions into a systematic network through the space of the 
individual subject.  This project therefore looks at a series of Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South 
African writers from across the long twentieth century – Bernard Shaw, Olive Schreiner, 
William Plomer, Sarah Gertrude Millin, Elizabeth Bowen (by way of J. M. Keynes), and J. M. 
Coetzee – showing how their fiction developed a set of stylized, mediatory affects within the 
vocabulary of a fading Atlantic plantation/mine economy.  Tracing these fictions alongside a 
shifting amalgamation of economic and political institutions, I argue that Anglo-Irish and Anglo-
South African fiction provided the formal epistemology of emotion that organized a disparate 
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group of contradictory economic systems into a functional world-system.  Thus, this dissertation 
speaks back and forth across the literary/economic divide, revealing how world-systems theory 
can provide a philosophy of history for semiperipheral literary activity and at the same time 
illustrating how literature contributes to the construction of economic forms. 
A second way to answer the question, “Why write about literature and the world-
system?” would be to defend the relevance of world-systems theory’s methodology to literary 
study.  I have already alluded to world-systems theory’s concern with economic cycles, which 
plays a central role in the following chapters, and which I will deal with on a more extensive and 
theoretical level in chapter 1.  But on a more general level, world-systems theory is most often 
associated with a structural model of cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries.  In this model, 
“core” zones are those which possess the most highly developed, powerful, and influential 
economies – the locations where profits abound, and from which elite classes can impose their 
vision of economic life onto the rest of the globe.  In contrast, the periphery includes those zones 
whose labors and products are continually co-opted by core interests, whether this entails 
providing raw resources for core consumption, cheap labor for industrial manufacturing, or illicit 
commodities foreclosed from formalized economic networks (e.g., recreational drugs, migrant 
labor).  The semiperiphery stands poised between these two zones, acting as a buffer zone 
communicating between incompatible economic systems, social mores, and ideologies.  It is the 
network that translates persons, goods, and ideologies into forms that can be passed across the 
core/periphery divide: money, commodities, credit, and so on. 
In the field of literary studies, two persistent critiques have dogged this methodology: that 
it is too abstract and thereby reduces the complexity of literary works, and that it confirms the 
very divide between center and periphery that it seeks to describe.  Susan Stanford Friedman 
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supplies an excellent summation of these critiques in “World Modernisms, World Literatures, 
and Comparativity.”  In the first case, the center/periphery model “articulate[s] patterns and 
forces underlying literary history [that are] decontextualized from any other historical 
conditions” (502).  The “laws” that govern these patterns seem too abstract for the sort of 
historicization that New Historicism enshrined in literary studies: a narrativized historicism built 
around the singularity of the anecdote.  As Stephen Greenblatt explains, “The anecdote has at 
once something of the literary and something that exceeds the literary, a narrative form and a 
pointed, referential access to what lies beyond or beneath that form.  This conjunction of the 
literary and the referential… functions in the writing of history not as the servant of a grand, 
integrated narrative of beginning, middle, and end but rather as what ‘introduces an opening’ into 
that teleological narration” (Learning to Curse, 5).3 According to New Historicism, narrative 
supplies detail, nuance, and particularity to history, while macrocosmic history merely 
“integrates” texts as details into a larger narrative.  As for the second critique – that world-
systemic models reinforce distinctions between the center and periphery – Friedman is once 
again illustrative: “The danger for modernist studies of the center/periphery model of world 
literature should be self-evident: at its heart lies the reassertion of the ‘old’ internationalism… 
The West… is the site for discursive creation, while the non-West is ‘local materials,’ a 
center/periphery binary that ignores the long histories of aesthetic production among the 
colonized” (502-3). 
I do not want to dismiss Friedman’s skepticism about certain uses of world-systems 
theory – indeed, I find her critiques of Franco Moretti and Pascale Casanova’s literary 
“Darwinism” to be both insightful and productive.  But I would like to make a case for the 
descriptive power of world-systems theory, especially when it is placed into a firmer historical 
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context than studies like Moretti’s Graphs, Maps, Trees or Casanova’s The World Republic of 
Letters provide.  Core, periphery, and semiperiphery are not static, geopolitical terms operating 
as shorthands for “the West and the rest.”  Instead, these terms describe inequitable power 
relations existing on a myriad of spatial and institutional levels, power relations which are 
themselves constantly shifting across the granulated surface of the globe.  Thus we can think of 
the core and periphery as geopolitical (the West and the rest, or the global North/South), national 
(say, England vs. Zimbabwe), regional (urban vs. rural), classed (venture capitalists vs. migrant 
laborers), familial (husband/father vs. wife/children), occupational (managers vs. unskilled/semi-
skilled labor), and so on.  The result is a palimpsest of multiple cores and peripheries intersecting 
in singular ways that cannot be reduced to a reified binary opposition, e.g. “the West and the 
rest.”  Even in the larger geopolitical climate of macroeconomics, multiple cores jockey for 
hegemony at any given moment – say, the United States, the European Union, and China today; 
or Britain, France, and Germany during the late-nineteenth century Scramble for Africa.  In 
actual practice, even megalopolises like London and New York contain multiple cores and 
peripheries: the city’s own “core” business zones and “peripheral,” poverty-stricken inner city; 
the class divide between cosmopolitan business executives and minimum-wage service jobs; 
migrant laborers whose wages support families still living in “peripheral” countries; and shifting 
populations and business communities that are constantly realigning how these cities interact 
with transnational flows of people, commodities, and capital.  This is in large part why I focus on 
the semiperiphery and not “core” or “peripheral” zones.  In a changing world, where every space 
is an uncertain conglomeration of core and periphery, the semiperipheral networks joining these 
heterogeneous relationships together more accurately reflect the ambiguities and transformative 
potential of the world-system than do the polarizing terms “core” and “periphery.”  A truly 
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historical exploration of the world-system, such as Immanuel Wallerstein constructs in The 
Modern World-System, or as I attempt in this dissertation, thus aims at “a contingency-filled 
account [of] what a system is,” refusing to reify the world-system into static categories or 
teleological narratives, as Friedman fears center/periphery models may do, and instead using 
world-systems theory as a descriptive vocabulary for talking about contingency in a theoretical 
manner.4 
Cultivating such a vocabulary is particularly pressing in our current critical climate, when 
a depoliticized “world literature” has to a great extent replaced postcolonial studies as the central 
critical frame for reading non-Western literature.  As elaborated by David Damrosch, Emily 
Apter, Wai Chee Dimock, John Pizer, and Franco Moretti, the “new” world literature builds 
upon Goethe’s call for a weltliteratur characterized by foreign contact and exchange.5  
Eschewing the national context that informs much of postcolonial criticism – devoted as it is to 
delineating empire’s retreat and the rise of national particularism – these critics focus instead on 
the circulations of texts, international collaboration, and networks of exchange that are obscured 
by nation-centered postcolonial models.  Implicit in each of their respective approaches is a 
sense that postcolonialism’s binary distinction between colonizer and colonized fails to supply a 
global model for literary activity.  None necessarily argue that postcolonialism is “wrong” in its 
reading of decolonization and lingering imperial influence, but they do suggest that, in a 
globalizing world where colonizer/colonized distinctions are murky, networks of circulation may 
allow for a more nuanced articulation of world literary space.   
But what is lost in this transition from postcolonialism to world literature is the 
politicized undertone to postcolonialism, which saw the diagnosis, investigation, and rectifying 
of national, ethnic, and gender inequalities as its primary mission.  Networks, after all, may 
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decenter the privileged centers of literary production, relativizing cultural meccas as ephemeral 
way stations in literature’s longue durée (Dimock), or relativizing canonical texts as mere blips 
in a sea of literary texts (Moretti), but they lack postcolonialism’s transformative vision of a 
world where structural inequalities between colonizer and colonized would be finally swept 
away and sequestered in the past.  World-systems theory, as I treat it in this dissertation, supplies 
a vocabulary for returning a political valence to world literature’s circulatory networks.  Its 
central terms diagnose inequitable distributions of economic power within global networks, 
showing how transactions among the core, periphery, and semiperiphery are a source of 
continuing material inequality.  More important, they expand this political vision outside of the 
direct, military dominance imposed by imperialism and the postimperial hegemony discussed by 
postcolonial discourse analysts like Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha, and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak.6 Inequalities are not only produced by direct imperialism, or the “colonial mentality” 
investigated by Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi,7 or lingering imperial influences in the 
economy or the state; according to world-systems theory, these disparities are encoded within the 
structure of networks themselves, as systemic constraints.  The network-centered language of 
core, periphery, and semiperiphery thus enables us to talk about networks as having a politics of 
their own, a politics whose technologies (trade, immigration, economic modernization, 
international investment, artistic influence, global Anglophone publishing) exceed the singular 
apparatus of empire. 
A third and final way to answer the question, “Why write about literature and the world-
system?” would be to state the case for world-systems theory’s relevance to our own historical 
moment.  Emily Apter makes the case that “Wallerstein’s world-systems theory… assumes 
enhanced relevance in the post-9/11 era, in which the militarization of border patrol, information, 
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and intelligence further compounds economic definitions of oneworldedness” (“On 
Oneworldedness: Or Paranoia as a World System,” 365).  We might add to Apter’s claim the 
observation that the globe also feels more interconnected than in the past.  After all, despite the 
celebratory rhetoric of globalization that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, global flows of 
capital, goods, and persons only reached their pre-World War I levels in the late 1990s.8 It 
seems, rather, that the “time-space” compression David Harvey attributes to “postmodernity” has 
internalized the world’s closeness within our very consciousnesses (Harvey, The Condition of 
Postmodernity, 201-325).  The speed with which persons, capital, and commodities cross borders 
lends a sense of nearness to even remote quarters of the globe, while the proliferation of digitized 
images seems to eradicate vast distances and flatten them into a set of circulating representations.  
We might, that is, point to how globalization has become less about “projections of the world as 
an ideologically bicameral, yet fatally integrated single community,” or about “the homogeneity 
of culture produced under capitalism,” and more about “a delirious aesthetics of systematicity… 
[a] match between cognition and globalism that is held in place by the paranoid premise that 
‘everything is connected’” (Apter 366). 
This aesthetic dimension to globalization has generated a surge in ambitious models of 
world literary space, a trend that speaks to the resonance world-systems theory holds within a 
“globalizing” world.  And yet, most of these studies have used world-systemic models to isolate 
literature from the social, economic, technological, and even cultural developments driving 
globalization.  For example, Casanova’s The World Republic of Letters transparently employs 
world-systemic notions of center and periphery in constructing a “rivalrous” model of world 
literary space, but she then abstracts literature away from the material social and economic 
realities that had generated world-systems theory in the first place.  “This world republic of 
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letters has its own mode of operations: its own economy, which produces hierarchies and various 
forms of violence; and, above all, its own history, which, long obscured by the quasi-systemic 
national (and therefore political) appropriation of literary stature, has never really been 
chronicled.  Its geography is based on the opposition between a capital, on the one hand, and 
peripheral dependencies whose relation to this center is defined by their aesthetic distance from 
it” (Casanova 10; my emphases) World literary space, in Casanova’s eyes, perfectly parallels 
global economic space, but remains “autonomous” from its workings.  When mixing between the 
literary and the economic does occur – such as among those wicked materialists, the British, 
whose Booker Prize, according to Casanova, ratifies a cultural recreation of empire through the 
economics of Anglophone publishing – this interaction is dismissed as insufficiently “literary” 
(120-1).  Though without voicing his move away from the social and economic determinants of 
literary production in such stark terms, Franco Moretti’s program of “distance reading” echoes 
Casanova’s belief in the autonomy of literary space.9 By looking only at quantitative charts of the 
novel’s growth and dissemination, Moretti removes novel writing from the socioeconomic 
conditions that nurtured its development, making it appear that aesthetic production has its own 
internal laws free from socioeconomic determination.  In a slightly more guarded vein, Wai Chee 
Dimock also cordons off literature’s longue durée from the world-systems theories from whom 
she borrows the term: “Only a ‘world-system’ can bear the explanatory weight of deep structural 
transformations… I would like to suggest, [in contrast to Wallerstein], that there are other 
phenomena, not reducible to capitalism, that also unfold against long durations, requiring scale 
enlargement for their analysis… This is the case with long-lasting genres, such as epic and 
novel” (Through Other Continents, 5). 
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The reasons for the gap separating literary and economic models of the world-system 
might best be understood in the terminological distinction between the “transnational” and the 
“global.”  The recent “transnational turn” in literary studies can certainly be traced to a general 
feeling that we are living in an increasingly globalized world, and that literary criticism therefore 
needs to develop a methodology capable of explaining culture’s international circulations, flows, 
and exchanges.10 But while globalization may be an impetus to investigating “the transnational,” 
most literary and cultural accounts of the transnational stress how its circulations differ from the 
perceived homogenizations of globalization.  Thus Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity at Large: The 
Cultural Dimensions of Globalization distinguishes the “transnational” “micronarratives of film, 
television, music, and other expressive forms” from the economic “Globalization [that] has 
shrunk the distance between elites, shifted key relations between producers and consumers, 
broken many links between labor and family life, [and] obscured the lines between temporary 
locales and imaginary national attachments” (9-10).  For Appadurai, “globalization” is the 
homogenizing, systemic politico-economic branch of modernity, while the “transnational” is its 
pluralized cultural sphere, the site for “the mobilization of group identities” – the site, that is, of 
“difference… difference in relation to something local, embodied, and significant” (12-3).  
Appadurai’s scale of value is quite clear: transnational “culture” is the embodied form of 
particularity cultivating individuated identity and habits, whereas the “global” destroys the 
singular nuances that are the object of literary study.  Globalization’s culture is 
McDonaldization; transnationalism’s cultures are the new, hybridized identities produced 
through the collision of discrete national spaces.  The two therefore must be kept rigidly 
separate, lest the exciting new cultures created by transnationalism become swallowed up by 
McDonaldization. 
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But, as I have been arguing, economic globalization is not necessarily homogenizing.  
Indeed, the world-system’s structural networks depend on difference: class differences, national 
differences, regional differences, occupational differences, ideological differences, and so on.  
The very fact that a global network can preserve and entrench economic inequalities indicates 
that globalization has always been as much about difference as about sameness – even if, as 
Walter Benn Michaels has often pointed out, we tend to be much more aware of cultural 
differences (“diversity”) than economic ones (“inequality”).11 The following project therefore 
takes as its starting point the insistence that the social sciences and the humanities can speak to 
each other, and that literary study is the better for this.  The “harder,” more abstracting language 
of world-systems theory can provide us with insight into the material conditions of production 
that helped shape literary production – especially the transnational literary productions of the 
British Atlantic – while literary studies can reveal the cultural forms that accommodated 
individuals, classes, and nations to particular economic forms.   
My dissertation thus agrees with Franco Moretti in one respect: abstraction is good.  
“Distance,” Moretti explains, “is… not an obstacle, but a specific form of knowledge: fewer 
elements, hence a sharper sense of their overall interconnection” (Graphs, Maps, Trees, 1).  
Interconnection, in my view, is the central theme to take away from Moretti’s “abstract literary 
history.”  By widening our perspective to the literary and economic forms – the global networks 
tying together discrepant national economies; the ebb and flow of genres across time – we can 
begin to see how they interconnect on the more abstract plane of the world-system.  After all, as 
Fredric Jameson famously argues in The Political Unconscious, literary form is inherently social, 
and so we might expect the more abstract level of literary and economic form to be the site 
where the two meet and interact.  But in contrast to Moretti, I focus more on what Immanuel 
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Wallerstein calls “the unexcluded middle”: that perspective from which one can see both the 
individual particularities of history (individual texts, persons, cultures) and the deep structures 
underlying them (“Time and Duration,” 160).  Moreover, I contend that literary texts are 
constantly moving back and forth between the two – that the intimate, affective space of 
narrative molds economic forms as much as economic forms mold literary ones.  This affective 
space is what literature, and literary studies, tackle best; and it is the space where the following 
pages linger in the hopes of describing a literary world-system. 
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1 My years for the “long” twentieth century are taken from Giovanni Arrighi, The Long 
Twentieth Century, which I discuss in chapter 1. 
 
2 Some of the more influential of these study would include György Lukács, The Historical 
Novel; Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious; Michael McKeon, The Origins of the 
English Novel, 1600-1740; and Ian Watt, The Rose of the Novel. 
 
3 Greenblatt is glossing Joel Fineman, “The History of the Anecdote: Fiction and Fiction.”  Eric 
Hayot notes that neither the singularity of the anecdote nor its referential status should be taken 
at face value: “One need only image the effect of [the] same sentences cited and commented on 
separately over the course of a few pages to get some sense of how the experience of these 
sentences as a “single event” depends on the way in which Greenblatt cites them and makes them 
such a shocking, powerful thing to read” (The Hypothetical Mandarin, 43). 
 
4 David Palumbo-Liu, Bruce Robbins, and Nirvana Tanoukhi elaborate on what a “contingency-
filled account” of the world-system might look like in their introduction to Immanuel Wallerstein 
and the Problem of the World: System, Scale, Culture. 
 
5 See Damrosch, What is World Literature?; Apter, The Translation Zone: A New Comparative 
Literature; Dimock: Through Other Continents; Pizer, The Idea of World Literature: History and 
Pedagogical Practice; Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature” and “More Conjectures”; and 
Valishini Cooppan, Worlds Within: National Narratives and Global Connections in Postcolonial 
Writing. 
 
6 See Said, Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism; Bhabha, The Location of Culture; and 
Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics and A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: 
Toward a History of the Vanishing Present. 
 
7 See Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth; Memmi, the Colonizer 
and the Colonized. 
 
8 Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a 
Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy, and Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons 
from the Great Depression, present two of the more comprehensive and insightful accounts of 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century “globalization.” 
 
9 Moretti lays out his project of “distance reading” in “Conjectures on World Literature” and 
“More Conjectures.”  For examples of “distance reading” in action, see Moretti, Atlas of the 
European Novel, 1800-1900 and Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History. 
 
10 The transnational turn was heavily influenced by work in sociology, geography, and 
economics, including David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity; Arjun Appadurai, 
Modernity at Large: The Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, and Michael Hardt and Antonio 
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Negri, Empire.  Within literary studies, important contributions to the transnational turn include 
Bruce Robbins, Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress, and Franco Moretti, The Modern 
Epic.  For an excellent overview of the transnational turn, see the essays collected in Liam 
Cornell and Nicky Marsh, eds., Literature and Globalization. 
 
11 See in particular Michaels’s The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity 
and Ignore Inequality. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
AFFECTIVE WORLD-SYSTEMS AND THE ATLANTIC ECONOMY 
 
We can always pinpoint differences, it is the easiest of all scholarly tasks, since everything is 
always different in some ways from everything else across time and space.  What is harder and 
takes priority is to discover similarities. 
- Immanuel Wallerstein 
 
 
 In 1960, Aidan Higgins returned from a two-year stay in South Africa to his native 
Ireland.  Higgins’s journey to South Africa had been a formative one: there, he had met his first 
wife, Jill Anders; and his imagistic diary of these years, Images of Africa, would remain one of 
his finest pieces of travel writing.  But Higgins’s trip to South Africa more than likely would 
number among the lost annals of literary history if not for the fact that it while there he began 
drafting his first novel, Langrishe, Go Down (1966).  Though most famous for being blisteringly 
attacked by Seamus Deane as an index of “the poverty of the Irish novelistic tradition,” 
Langrishe, Go Down was also the opening salvo in a widespread reinvention of the Anglo-Irish 
plantation house novel – more commonly known as the “Big House” novel (Celtic Revivals, 32).  
For Higgins, the Big House was less the fading “aristocratic” fantasy Deane condemns than the 
epicenter of the final death throes of European cultural supremacy.  Borrowing liberally from his 
diaries and travel sketches, Higgins translated what he viewed as an aging, “carbonized,” 
Afrikaner civilization “at world’s end” into the setting of the 1930s Anglo-Irish plantation 
(Images of Africa, 17).  Projecting the traits he found in the Dutch-Germanic Afrikaners onto the 
figure of Otto Beck, a self-exiled German intellectual with fascist leanings, Higgins hints that 
arid scholasticism, like European colonialism, has finally reached a decadent impasse.  As the 
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narrative progresses and Otto initiates an affair with Imogen Langrishe, the youngest daughter of 
the ailing Langrishe line on whose estate Otto is living, Higgins increasingly draws out the 
overlap between Otto’s studies and an imperialist mindset.  Imogen’s masochist desire to be the 
“abject slave of her foreign conqueror” mixes together with Otto’s prejudices about “culturally 
inferior nations” and “‘culturally insignificant’ individuals” to produce an image of a culture 
eagerly awaiting violation (159-60).  Imperialism, racism, and misogyny are all shown to be the 
predicate of an intimate will-to-destruction whose prime exemplar may have been Nazi ideology, 
but whose logical correlates include European imperialism.  And the consequences of this death 
drive are the familiar hallmarks of twentieth-century Irish and European history: the end of the 
Anglo-Irish Ascendency (Imogen is the only member of her family alive at novel’s end), the 
retreat of European imperialism, and a cultural legacy that, post-Holocaust, seems untenable as a 
universal model of Enlightenment. 
At the same time, Higgin’s reworking of Afrikaner colonialism within the confines of the 
Anglo-Irish farm produces an ambivalent tension between the end of imperialism and the Anglo-
Irish plantation’s continued sociocultural relevance.  On the one hand, press clippings from the 
novel’s final pages narrate the end “of the mighty Empire of the Habsburgs” and its new 
“existence as a Nazi state,” drawing a parallel between the decline of the Austrian aristocracy, 
the twilight of Big House culture, and the rise of the rationalized nation-state (245).  Neither 
ethnically Irish nor a modern, rationalized professional class, the Anglo-Irish appear doomed to 
be “wiped out” entirely in the transition from territorial empire to an economic world-system 
structured around autonomous nation-states (250).  On the other hand, Otto and Imogen’s 
sadomasochist relationship ultimately points to a détente between global institutions – whether 
politico-imperial or economic – and the sovereign nation-state.  Symbiotically wounding one 
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another while also wanting to be wounded in turn, Otto and Imogen’s alternating destructiveness 
and asceticism reconcile Nazism’s global (and racialist) pretensions with Ireland’s isolationism, 
allowing each ideology its insistent, totalizing sway while syncopating their exchanges into a 
harmonious, if volatile, balance.  And by enacting this titanic yet intimate struggle in the 
plantation’s isolated expanses, Higgins suggests that these rhythmic negotiations take place, not 
in Europe’s urban metropolises, but “at world’s end” – at those outposts suturing together 
Europe and the colonial periphery. 
What Higgins’s novel seems to intimate is that even if the Anglo-Irish plantation and 
British imperial enterprise have collapsed, other types of emotional mediation have surged in to 
fill the void between global and national institutions in the former British Empire.  These 
emotional syncopations may differ in kind from the sorts of transactions that had dominated life 
for centuries on the colonial plantation, but they nevertheless possess a structural kinship with 
their imperial predecessors.  We could label this kinship “neocolonialism,” as has been done by a 
Marxist-revolutionary tradition stretching from Kwame Nkrumah’s Neo-colonialism, the Last 
Stage of Imperialism to dependista theory.  Or we could understand it under the heading 
“modernization,” as the gradual generalization of capitalist institutions first established in 
Europe, spread to the colonies via imperialism, and now ensconced as the norm for economic 
activity across the globe.  Or we might even think of it as the Freudian uncanny come back to 
haunt the decolonizing British Empire at the very moment it begins to disavow its imperial 
nature. 
Affective Transnationalism investigates this structural kinship between emotional 
mediation and the economic transactions of certain transnational colonial enterprises – 
plantations and mines foremost among them.  My aim in doing so is not simply to show how 
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globalization restages imperialism, or how imperialism had always been a cipher for capitalist 
practices of accumulation, but rather to specify the ontology behind such formal similitudes: 
What forces shape radically disparate objects (imperialism, the national welfare state, the global 
economy) into common formal arrangements within the capitalist world-system?  What 
temporalities govern the emergence of these structures in and across epochal revolutions in 
statecraft, economic organization, and technological development?  Under what terms can we 
conceive of the dialectic of unity and difference present in structures which seem to have their 
own logic independent of content?  And most important, through what objects, activities, or 
persons do these formal structures materialize? 
In pursuing this line of inquiry, I argue that Higgins’s translation of South African 
colonialism into the Big House plantation testifies to the mutual role both nations and their 
literatures played in developing and maintaining the formal networks binding together an 
Atlantic imperial and, later, post-imperial economic world-system.  If, in Higgins, the Big House 
novel and the Anglo-Irish plantation produce emotional dispositions capable of mediating 
between rising nation-states and an international politico-economic order, this syncopation 
revisits what might be considered the founding gesture of settler colonialism: the installation of 
transnational Anglo classes joining labor-intensive, export-oriented ventures (plantations, mines) 
together with metropolitan commodity markets.  Following world-systems theorists like 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and Stephen Shapiro, I will be calling both these 
plantations and mines and the Anglo classes managing them “semiperipheries”1: transitional 
zones that translate one economic logic (racialized, coercive, hierarchical) into an incompatible 
economic logic (liberal, egalitarian, individualistic) by building up trade and communication 
networks.   
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Under British imperialism, this Atlantic semiperiphery was neatly spatialized into a 
mercantile economy: the imperial metropole was consolidated in Britain, the periphery was 
located in the hostile expanses of Africa and the Americas, and the semiperiphery included those 
coastal outposts and developed stretches of the colonial interior joined to them.2 But after 
decolonization, the symmetry between political and economic geographies waned at the same 
time as new technologies of speed waxed,3 creating a more ambiguous space in which global 
economic flows traveled within and across national borders.  Mediations between the periphery 
and metropole now entailed less a spatial journey back and forth across the Atlantic than a 
subjective journey through asymmetrical institutions and their associated ideologies: Keynesian 
welfare states tying economic life to national wealth; international trading blocs like the British 
Commonwealth that imposed regional trade patterns on national economies; international 
monetary systems like Bretton Woods and the sterling bloc that tied national currencies to 
international exchange mechanisms; and a finance capitalism speculating on and investing in 
industries across the globe without respect for national class borders or class hierarchies. 
This study proposes that navigating between national political life and an economic 
world-system required ambivalent emotional dispositions that were first codified within the 
literature of two fading Anglo settler classes: the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South Africans.  If this 
pairing seems surprising, or the scope of my claims incommensurate with the place these 
literatures have traditionally occupied in literary history, I will be arguing that this has less to do 
with these texts themselves than with our own critical preconceptions about what the world-
system is, how it evolves, and how twentieth-century literature participates within it.  Where the 
canonical accounts of twentieth-century modernity have stressed capitalism’s progressivist 
ontology,4 world-systems theorists from Immanuel Wallerstein to Andre Gunder Frank to 
 6	  
Giovanni Arrighi proffer a model of capitalist history characterized by formal repetitions, 
cyclical expansions, and structural unevenness.5 That is so say, the “creative destruction” 
championed by Marxist and Schumpeterian critics is only one half of a dialectic,6 the other half 
of which shapes economic institutions, trade flows, and class systems into consistent forms: a 
stable North/South geography dividing the haves from the have-nots, oscillations between 
imperial and national-corporate organizational structures, and periodically recurring stages of 
production.  By comparing Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature, I will be suggesting, 
we can uncover a general set of aesthetic technologies directed more at molding the world-
system into recurring structures than with the endless march of new styles, movements, and 
innovations.7 And by turning to the economic forms underlying the trade, communication, and, 
most of all, emotional networks cultivated by these transnational settler classes, we can see how 
literature helped to produce the epistemological conditions of possibility necessary for such 
forms to flourish. 
 My archive consists of three literary genres rarely treated in relation to one another, 
despite their concern with similar semiperipheral spaces: the Anglo-Irish Big House novel, the 
South African plaasroman/farm novel, and the South African mine novel.  Each of these genres 
provides numerous examples of authors developing new structures of feeling in order to mediate 
between nascent nation-states and economic globalization, from Bernard Shaw and Olive 
Schreiner’s concerns with harnessing sentiment in the interests of impersonal state economic 
institutions (chapter 2), to Sarah Gertrude Millin’s use of envy to claim inclusion in a 
transnational financial community (chapter 3), to Elizabeth Bowen’s use of affective fluctuations 
to rationalize a cyclical, nation-centric historiography for the Anglo-Irish plantation (chapter 4).  
But what makes these texts central to a literary-critical analysis of the world-system is the way in 
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which they allegorize emerging transnational structures of feeling within the vocabulary of older, 
more familiar networks.  By “allegory,” I mean to allude to the narrow definition Walter 
Benjamin assigns this term in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History”: aesthetic images that 
seize on a similitude between past and present and eradicate the distance between them (“Theses 
on the Philosophy of History,” 263).  Such allegories, by their very nature, hypothesize a 
philosophy of history centered around repetition, and identify artistic forms as the media which 
visualize these repetitions (Baucom, Specters of the Atlantic, 14-31).  In other words, if Anglo-
Irish and Anglo-South African writers might be accused of nostalgically clinging to the old 
spaces of imperial rule, their stoic descriptions of the collapse of the Atlantic economy in which 
they thrived also posit an historical similitude between the formal structure of this economy and 
nascent transnational structures of feeling.  And as these texts flood across the long twentieth 
century in regular waves – the 1880s/1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s/1980s – they provide an 
archive for tracing the fluctuations of the world-system’s formal networks – for tracing, that is, 
the temporality guiding the world-system’s deep structures. 
 The authors I treat in the following pages have often been associated with a British-based 
literary tradition held together by an openness to colonial writers, an unsteady mixture of 
dissenting and privileged politics, and an often-feminized interest in the novel form.  This line 
first takes shape in the middle-class socialism of the Fabian Society (Bernard Shaw) and New 
Woman feminism (Olive Schreiner), finds its high point in Bloomsbury’s welcoming salons 
(Elizabeth Bowen, J. M. Keynes, William Plomer, and, to a lesser degree, Sarah Gertrude 
Millin), and gradually migrates to the Anglo-American academy (J. M. Coetzee).8  I focus on 
these authors for two reasons.  The first reason is geopolitical.   As the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-
South Africans were cut adrift from a fading Atlantic plantation economy, they faced a troubling 
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double-bind.  Unlike majoritarian settler classes in Australia, Canada, or the United States, 
nationalism spelled marginalization for the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South Africans.  At the same 
time, Britain’s modernizing transformation from imperial power to financial hub and medium-
sized welfare state was one of the engines driving the destruction of its imperial plantation 
economy.  Fortunately for writers from these classes, aesthetic enclaves like the Bloomsbury 
Group supplied havens from which to express a cosmopolitan sensibility spanning both Britain 
and its colonies, a sensibility that was rapidly vanishing in the colonies themselves.  To the 
extent that colonial writers’ attraction to the Fabians, Bloomsbury, or the Anglo-American 
university reflected an investment in the continued existence of colonial cosmopolitanism, it 
might be categorized as a broadly conservative effort to reinvent class hegemony within cultural, 
rather than economic, networks.  But as the heterogeneous collection of political positions held 
by these authors reveal – from Bowen’s Burkean conservatism and Millin’s racial prejudices to 
Schreiner’s feminism and Shaw’s socialism – these class-consolidating gestures proved 
efficacious precisely because they were able to negotiate between metropolitan and colonial, 
progressive and conservative, and dissenting and privileged political positions. 
 My second reason for looking at these authors concerns the specific mechanisms through 
which they negotiated this transnational position, and speaks to the literary dimension of this 
dissertation.  The British literary tradition I investigate here is noteworthy for having developed a 
formalist approach to emotion best emblematized by Clive Bell’s notion of “significant form.”  
“Significant form,” for Bell, was a formal arrangement of lines, colors, and objects that produced 
a specific emotional response in its viewer.  Valuing abstraction in their principles, Bell’s art 
writings pushed art away from representation and toward a Platonic understanding of affective 
response.  What figure one saw was less important than how one felt upon seeing the painting’s 
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formal system of colors and shapes.  For the colonial and ex-colonial elites associated with the 
Fabian-New Woman-Bloomsbury matrix, this formalist understanding of emotion provided a 
way to establish, in theoretically nuanced terms, the changed substance of their transnational 
position.  No longer economic brokers between metropolitan and peripheral economies, they 
were now emotional brokers between, to quote Elizabeth Bowen, the “democratic” colonies and 
“the European idea” – a transnational class teaching English and colonists alike how to “subdue 
their feelings” to the “impersonal” institutions governing social life (“The Big House,” 29).  As 
Bowen intimates, institutions, like art, have their own formal arrangements, particularly those 
dictating the relationship between “democratic” national-political institutions and universalizing 
“European ideas” like imperialism and the global economy.  And like Bell, Bowen and her 
fellow Anglo settlers viewed art in general, and literature in particular, as the ideal medium for 
revealing the significance of emotion to its audience.  We are “creatures of feeling,” remarks 
Bowen, and “Creative art…cannot but illuminate, intensify and to a degree transmute what it 
dwells upon” (“The Bend Back,” 58-9). 
 The world-system that I am describing here is what Lauren Berlant would call a “post-
traumatic” one (Cruel Optimism, 1-21).  In contrast to the numerous excellent studies that have 
taken Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic as their model for an Atlantic world-system,9 this project 
focuses on the non-traumatic affects that orient subjects toward political and economic 
institutions and help them to cope with the clashing ideologies these often profess.  The risk in 
such a gesture is that it may obscure Gilroy’s central breakthrough in Black Atlantic: that 
because, for Gilroy, modernity is trauma, the African diaspora’s dislocations can be seen as the 
representative image of modernity.  The more ambivalent emotions I am discussing, then, would 
perhaps appear as the legacy of a class who provoked, rather than experienced, racialized 
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exploitation; and a modernity based on these emotions might, perforce, distance colonized 
peoples who were violently conscripted into modernity.  As a response to this sort of critique, I 
would point to a heterogeneous collection of philosophers, literary critics, and anthropologists 
who have begun to conceive of modernity more as an affective promise than as either trauma or 
material development.  Ian Baucom, for example, argues that modernity should be understood as 
a dialectic between “an abject … horizon of expectation and desire” simultaneously “distanced 
and no longer distant” from its observers (“Township Modernism,” 237).  For Baucom, that is, 
modernity is the promise of a modernization that can be seen and desired but not inhabited, or 
what he calls “the view from the township” – those shantytowns surviving on the edge of 
developed metropolises (237).  The anthropologist James Ferguson makes a similar point when 
he observes that “modernization theory [has] become a local tongue” on the Zambian 
Copperbelt: workers structure their work-lives around the promise they detect in “western-style 
industrial modernity” (Expectations of Modernity, 84).  My study builds on these critical 
provocations while expanding their scope beyond individual subject positions to a more systemic 
and historicizable structure.  Using the insights of affective theory to talk about the structures of 
feeling underlying the world-system, I characterize economic structure as an ongoing dialectic 
between institutions (economic, political, and cultural) and emotional life.  As I show, even if 
modernity is, at its most basic, an affective promise, the form this promise takes shifts alongside 
the world-system’s rhythmic tempos; consequently, investigating the world-system entails 
analyzing the “structure of relationality” secreted in each phase the world-system passes through 
(Berlant 13). 
 If the dialectic between institutions and emotion forms the core of this project, the 
discontinuous history of literary genre we can glean from the Big House novel, the 
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plaasroman/farm novel, and the mine novel constitutes its central payoff.  Many recent studies of 
twentieth century, postcolonial, and world literature have employed discontinuous, multiple, or 
conflicting temporalities as a way of rewriting the canonical histories of the novel.  This 
dissertation suggests that the world-system’s structural rhythms provide an understudied 
materialist supplement to the utopian and psychoanalytic methodologies that usually drive 
analyses of non-linear literary histories.10 In a sense, this project resonates with Wai Chee 
Dimock’s observation that “different investigative contexts might need different time frames” 
(Through Other Continents, 5).  But where Dimock is primarily concerned with changing the 
scale through which we read literary history, I am proposing we alter the temporal structure 
through which we do so.  As I show in the remainder of this chapter, the world-system evolves 
according to a cyclical temporality variously described as waves, repetitions, and oscillations.  
By tracing Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature against the world-system’s 
movements, I argue that we can uncover an essential connection between literary form and such 
world-systemic oscillations.  Big House novels, farm novels, and mine novels appear when the 
world-system abruptly changes course, providing a medium through which writers can develop 
the emotional orientations necessary for new structural alignments between local, national life 
and the global economy.  And if this philosophy of history seems a touch deterministic, we might 
recall, along with Slavoj Žižek, that in capitalism it is “the form of the relation of production 
which drives the development of productive forces – that is, of its ‘content’” (The Sublime 
Object of Ideology, 52).  In other words, if these genres flood in as convenient tools through 
which to imagine new affective mediations in the language of older transatlantic networks, the 
solutions they develop are not given in advance, but instead form the epistemological conditions 
of possibility for the world-system’s new dispensation.11 
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 The remainder of this chapter sketches the historical and theoretical narrative that will 
underlie the close readings contained in my subsequent chapters.  The first section notes how 
nationalist class narratives have provided a muddled template for Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South 
African historiography.  Treating these classes as condemned to a steady decline, such narratives 
fail to explain why Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African degeneration appears to repeat at 
regular intervals across twentieth century, nor why this decline should be focalized in a small set 
of conventional genres.  The second section introduces world-system theory as a corrective to 
nationalist class narratives.  I focus in particular on how and why the semiperiphery is uniquely 
responsive to the world-system’s structural rhythms and what exactly these rhythms look like.  
The third and forth sections then offer a world-systemic reading of the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-
South African classes, showing how they acted as a transnational semiperiphery under British 
imperialism, the changes decolonization wrought during the twentieth century, and the ways in 
which their literature paralleled the world-system’s oscillations.  The final section then steps 
back to consider the epistemology of emotion found in plantation and mine novels.  Tracing their 
representations of emotion to a modernist epistemology of form and emotion, I conclude by 
showing the relevance of present-day affect theory to world-systems analysis. 
 
The Twilight of Settlement: Problems in Literary Historiography 
 Theorizing the literature of the semiperiphery requires us to see the Anglo-Irish and 
Anglo-South Africans as transnational classes.  And yet, cultural analysis in the Anglo-American 
academy has been resistant to reading class across national borders.  The postwar New Left 
enshrined class at the heart of the Cultural Studies movement, but their nativist frame also 
indigenized working class culture and the class system as uniquely English objects.  For 
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Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, and E. P. Thompson, class could only be read as a 
totalizing national system cordoned off from a larger world-system.12 Thus Thompson makes a 
concerted effort in The Making of the English Working Class to celebrate the “peculiar 
resonance” the class system acquired in English life (831).  England’s “traditions, value-systems, 
ideas, and institutional forms” were all shaped, according to Thompson, by a working class that 
“was present at its own making” – an indigenous, autotelic culture sequestered from foreign 
influences (9-10).  This reluctance to see how imperialism and national culture dialectically 
informed one another – not to mention a similar myopia to gender and racial inequalities – 
encouraged a younger generation of political and cultural theorists (Stuart Hall, Etienne Balibar, 
and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe) to relativize class as one among an array of markers of 
social difference.  But while many of these studies were directly sparked by Soviet imperialism, 
their broader effect was to align class with identity politics. In the wake of the second-wave New 
Left’s critique of class, the concept ossified into one term in a longer string of contested 
identities – the famous trio of race, class, and gender/sexuality around which late-century radical 
politics have revolved.13 Peter Hitchcock’s description of class is representative of this wider 
turn: “To the extent that no human subject is formed along a single trajectory of identity, 
working-classness is partial being” (“They Must Be Represented?” 29). 
 In keeping with this turn to identity, transnational literary studies have tended to approach 
class through the lens of the individual and his or her relation to culture.  Indeed, while one of 
the critical truisms of class analysis is that it has enjoyed much less attention than race, gender, 
and sexuality, it might be more accurate to say that literary studies have internalized class to the 
point that historicizing authors and their work demands declaring their class entanglements.  To 
take an exemplary case: Rebecca Walkowitz’s Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the 
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Nation identifies in cosmopolitanism a modernist stylization of the subject, one in which 
“cultural strategies of posture” “coincide with new ways of thinking about political critique” (17, 
8).  Walkowitz’s focus on narrative posture juxtaposes official “social categories” – of race, 
gender, nation, and morality – against the subject’s ability to manipulate his or her commitments 
to these categories (36).  But despite her turn to aesthetic self-fashioning, which would seem to 
eschew objective social conditions in favor of individuated political stances, Walkowitz 
meticulously positions her authors within twentieth-century Britain’s social hierarchies.  For 
example, according to Walkowitz Virginia Woolf’s evasive narration captures her material 
privileges and dependencies as an upper-class woman writer: “the mundane activities of an 
upper-class woman, but also the activities and existence of servants, immigrants…educated 
working women…and the dissident or angry” (81).  Self-stylization in Woolf, then, becomes a 
matter of refining the visibility of one’s class determinants, in effect claiming them as 
components of one’s identity and producing a political ethic from that observation. 
 However, as a corollary of this turn to identity, the broader class narratives deployed by 
humanist scholars in the last several decades have been largely imported from nation-based 
historiographic and sociological models.  When situating Woolf in the dissenting upper-class 
milieu of Bloomsbury, or early-twentieth century African writers as a professionalizing 
intelligentsia centered around missionary schools, or present-day Indian and African anti-
globalization writers in the context of the “invisible” labor being done on tea plantations and gas 
works,14 literary critics frame their discussions of class within tried and true Marxist divisions of 
labor.  These models often differ in the particular weight given to certain social strata or in their 
structural dynamics – by focusing, for instance, on the rise of indigenous colonial bourgeoisies 
and their development of the nation-state, or on the subaltern classes passed over by national 
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development through a Gramsci interpretation of hegemony15 – but they share a class paradigm 
determined by, conditioned alongside, or contested through the nation-state.  This has especially 
been the case after the fall of the Soviet bloc, after which internationalist and universalist 
approaches to class lost their prestige in academic circles.16 In the absence of an alternative 
international arrangement to global capitalism, the nation-state has become, as Pheng Cheah 
observes, “a normative source for defending peoples in the South against the vicissitudes of 
capitalist globalization” at the same time as it has been “contaminat[ed] by [inequitable/classed] 
economic and political forces” (Inhuman Conditions, 12). 
 
Anglo-South Africans, the Plaasroman, and the Mine Novel 
 For the Anglo settler classes investigated in this study, such nation-centered class 
narratives have produced a series of incoherent historical trajectories.  For example, Anglo-South 
Africans have always been something of a lacuna in twentieth-century South African 
historiography.  The triumphalist versions of nationalist history celebrating the country’s passage 
from apartheid to the democratic “Rainbow Nation” represent the last century as a titanic 
struggle between a racist, totalitarian, and Afrikaner state and a black resistance movement 
slowly growing toward political consciousness and full-scale revolution.17 Within this narrative, 
Anglo-South Africans appear less as a distinct class or ethnicity than as citizens of a pan-white 
South African state or as followers of a discredited liberalism.  This failure to distinguish 
between Anglo-South Africans and Afrikaners derives in large part from the emergence in the 
early 1900s of “South Africanism,” which substituted a common Anglo-Afrikaner national 
project for the ethnic tensions, imperial loyalties, and Afrikaner republicanism that had divided 
Anglo and Afrikaners for the previous half-century.  As nationalism deepened, Anglo ethnic ties 
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were deemphasized by Anglo-South Africans and Afrikaners alike, each of whom stressed their 
common “European” (read: white) heritage as the foundation for a South African state protective 
of Afrikaner culture but amenable to other “European” ethnicities.18 Because of this dispersal of 
ethnic identity within a pan-white national identity, when a sizeable portion of Anglo-South 
Africans began to actively question apartheid’s racialized nationalism and totalitarian 
governmental structure in the 1950s and 1960s, they differentiated themselves from Afrikaners 
by emphasizing an alternative political tradition – constitutional liberalism – rather than ethnic 
characteristics.19 As the most vociferous liberal advocate during these years, Alan Paton’s 
definition of liberalism is emblematic of an Anglo-South African social bloc struggling to find 
terms to articulate their dissent: “By liberalism…I mean a generosity of spirit, a tolerance of 
others, an attempt to comprehend otherness, a commitment to the rule of law, a high ideal of the 
worth and dignity of man, a repugnance for authoritarianism and a love of freedom” (Alexander, 
Alan Paton, 383). 
But if liberalism seemed a feasible political goal for midcentury thinkers like Alan Paton, 
it has more frequently been critiqued for failing to deliver South Africa from apartheid to 
majority-rule democratic governance.  Indeed, if liberalism has traditionally served as a 
metonym for Anglo-South Africans, the most remarkable trope present in popular narratives of 
liberalism is their encoding of failure and decline as constitutive components of liberalism and 
Anglo-South Africa, but without being able to specify a singular moment when liberalism 
definitively capitulated.  This can be seen quite clearly if we look at three texts – Nadine 
Gordimer’s 1970s interviews with Johannes Riis and Diane Cassere, Zakes Mda’s Heart of 
Redness (2000), and Olive Schreiner’s Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland (1897) – which 
disagree as to when liberalism in fact collapsed. 
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According to Gordimer, Anglo liberalism deteriorated during the 1970s, when black 
radicalism began to highlight liberalism’s inability to alter apartheid’s socioeconomic edifice.  
As she explained in a 1979 interview with Johannes Riis: “You see, during the 1950s, we 
[liberals] believed very strongly in the personal relationship, in the possibility that in changed 
circumstances blacks would view us as fellow human beings – face to face, acknowledging all of 
us as individuals: the Forsterian ‘only connect’ lay behind what we did and believed in.  But we 
underestimated the strength of the government, we floated I rarefied air; we did not recognize the 
economic forces we were up against and willy-nilly represented” (Bazin and Seymour 102).  
Gordimer is more sympathetic to her youthful liberalism here than in the early 1970s, when she 
categorically dismissed liberalism as a “failure” that “contained only our goodwill” (Bazin and 
Seymour 56); but even with the benefit of retrospect, she acknowledges that liberalism’s greatest 
boom – its sympathetic handling of interracial relationships – was also its constitutive limitation.  
Liberalism rejected the language of racial typification present in apartheid ideology, finding in 
sentiment a way to “connect” with individual black Africans outside of racial stereotypes, but 
only insofar as it shifted focus away from the systemic and toward the personal.  In other words, 
because liberalism isolated the “personal relationship” from systematizing racial descriptions, it 
restricted its field of effectivity to the inner realm of the emotions, where “goodwill” seemed the 
ultimate measure of political accomplishment.  Indeed, by the 1970s growing radicalization 
among both white students and black Africans (e.g., the Black Consciousness movement, which 
I examine in chapter 5) had identified liberalism’s limitations for all to see: the “government” 
and “economic forces” liberalism struggled against operated on a more widespread, systemic 
plane than did individual emotion, and it remained unclear whether noble feeling could translate 
into meaningful political action on this scale. 
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Mda’s Heart of Redness echoes Gordimer’s skepticism about liberalism, but traces its 
decline to the early apartheid era.  The lone Anglo-South African in Mda’s novel, John Dalton, 
rails against his fellow Anglos for fleeing South Africa after the first democratic elections in 
1994, seeing in their retreat an indictment of midcentury liberalism.  “‘Yes, you prided 
yourselves as liberals,’ admits Dalton. ‘But now you can’t face the reality of a black-dominated 
government.  It is clear that while you were shouting against the injustices of the system, secretly 
you thanked God for the National Party which introduced and preserved that very system for 
forty-six years’” (140).  Dalton’s tirade unravels rhetorical utterances from their social effects in 
order to discredit liberalism at the supposed height of its popularity.  Far from distancing Anglo-
South Africans from Afrikaners, liberalism, according to Dalton, eradicates the ideological 
differences separating the two white ethnicities, enabling Anglos to voice their dissent but still 
reap apartheid’s material advantages.  From this perspective, liberalism’s failure is coextensive 
with the post-WWII establishment of apartheid legislation: its inability to propose an alternative 
social, political, or economic frame to apartheid signals a hollowing out of the liberal project, its 
extinction as a viable political system and translation into mere rhetoric.  The paradox, then, that 
Dalton locates at the heart of midcentury liberalism is that liberalism morphed into an 
oppositional language at the same time as it stopped being an oppositional political system in 
practice: its oppositional rhetoric displaced political activism onto language, which the apartheid 
government used to harmlessly co-opt liberal unrest into itself. 
Our last history of liberal degeneration comes from Olive Schreiner, who locates 
liberalism’s demise all the way back in the late nineteenth century.  In Trooper Peter Halket, the 
narrative’s eponymous protagonist spends the novella’s first half defending Rhodesian 
imperialism to a Christ-like “stranger.”  As Peter explains to the “stranger,” “We don’t come out 
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here to work…we’ve come out here to make money; and how are we to make it, unless you get 
the niggers to work for you?” (28).  Peter assents to removing political rights from black 
Africans because he associates political liberalism with economic inefficiency: “If we get the 
British Government here, they’ll be giving niggers the land to work on; and let them have the 
vote, and get civilised and educated and all that sort of thing; but Cecil Rhodes…he’s going to 
parcel them out, and make them work on our lands whether they like it or not” (28).  As the 
novella progresses, the Christ-stranger eventually wins Peter over to his side by demonstrating 
the superiority of Christian-liberal principles to brute economic greed, but in the process he 
confirms Peter’s sense that political liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism undermine each 
other’s aims.  And while Peter ultimately chooses political equality over economic opportunity, 
the shift in narrative focalization from Peter (in the novella’s first part) to the members of his 
company (in the second part) suggests that acquisitiveness has triumphed over liberal 
egalitarianism.  In the story’s final pages, Schreiner even goes so far as to bury (political) 
liberalism alongside Peter, whose death at the hands of his regiment signals the foreclosure of 
liberalism in southern Africa and its relocation within a Messianic future of collective 
redemption, one in which, as an unnamed Englishman reflects, “I hardly know…whether it is 
better for him than for us” (69). 
Schreiner’s fiction marks a turning point for Anglo liberalism in South Africa.  Not only 
does she initiate a self-critique of liberalism’s founding mythology that will resonate throughout 
the twentieth century, but she does so by repurposing two genres intimately linked with British 
adventure-imperialism: the farm novel and the mine novel.  During the same period Schreiner 
published Trooper Peter Halket (a novella revolving around Rhodes’s incursion into 
Mashonaland to secure mining rights), Undine (1929; published posthumously, and set on the 
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Kimberley diamond mines), and Story of an African Farm (1883), her celebrated farm novel, 
popular romances turned to African farms and mines in order to legitimate British rule by 
imagining idyllic landscapes eagerly awaiting European domestication.  The paradigmatic 
example of this trend is H. Rider Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mines (1885), in which Allan 
Quatermain and his fellow adventurers stave off war among the Kukuana, defeat the venomous, 
nightmarish mother-figure Gagool, and are rewarded with the bountiful riches contained in King 
Solomon’s mines, whose fruits spring, without the application of labor, directly from the earth, 
and in which the Kukuana apparently have no interest.  Similarly, if King Solomon’s Mines can 
be said to aestheticize the 1880s’ New Imperial expansionism by making military excursions 
look desirable and by effacing the labor performed on diamond mines, farm novels like Harriet 
Ella Ernle Money’s A Little Dutch Maiden (1887) and Mary Ann Carey-Hobson’s The Farm in 
the Karoo; or, What Charley Vyvyan and His Friends Saw in South Africa (1883) confirmed 
Africa as a site for masculine adventure and added a sense of its amenability to English-style 
country estates.  Less grandiose than their metropolitan models, but also supplying a more robust 
testing ground for aspiring English patriarchs, Money and Carey-Hobson’s farms blend 
domesticity and titillating danger, indigenizing the English estate within Africa while retaining 
the mysterious allure Africa entertained in the late Victorian imagination. 
While Schreiner may have been the first to expose the critical potential inherent in the 
farm and mine novel genres, her recourse to these genres was far from unique.  What is so 
remarkable about twentieth-century farm and mine novels is the extent to which they shadow one 
another’s development, each erupting in a series of waves corresponding to moments of 
perceived liberal decline (see figures 1 and 2).   
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Figure 1: Plaasromans/Farm Novels, 1880-1990 
 
* Designates an academic text. 
Figure 2: South African Mine Novels, 1880-1990.  Note how both the farm novel and the mine 
novel disappear from roughly 1900-1925 and 1945-1970. 
 
  
For example, while Schreiner’s novels demonstrate a deep-seated anxiety over the compatibility 
of adventurist imperialism and liberal ideology, the post-WWII collusion between Anglo 
liberalism and the apartheid state Mda identifies in Heart of Redness was foreshadowed by 
1930s-era Afrikaner plaasromans and English mine novels that circumscribed the scope and 
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efficacy of liberalism in South Africa.  As I show in chapter 3, mine novels like Sarah Gertrude 
Millin’s The Sons of Mrs. Aab (1934) intimated that liberal notions of credit, personhood, and 
recompense faltered when confronted with the boom-and-bust economics of mining.  This 
disjuncture between South Africa and commercial liberalism was deepened in the 
contemporaneous plaasroman, in which Afrikaner novelists like C. M. van den Heever (Laat 
Vrugte, 1939), D. F. Malherbe (Die Muelenaar, 1926), and Jochem van Bruggen (Ampie, 1924-
1942) framed a competing vision of South African pastoralism that stressed its Romantic-
nationalist ties to the land and disavowed any participation in liberalized trade networks.  
Chapter 5 traces the same overlap between mines, farms, and liberal decline forward to 1970s 
and 1980s, when writers like Gordimer (The Conservationist), J. M. Coetzee (In the Heart of the 
Country; The Life and Times of Michael K), and André Brink (A Chain of Voices) parodied the 
plaasroman’s exclusionary tropes and limiting vision, and South African academics began 
investigating the capitalist system underpinning mines’ racialized labor system.  In doing so, 
both novelists and academics proffered a metacritical analysis of the systemic features (generic, 
linguistic, economic) informing apartheid at the same moment as liberalism was coming under 
attack for its failure to provide just such an assessment. 
Farm and mine novels might be said to operate as inverted but conjoined genres, the 
former imagining an oasis untouched by liberalism’s failures and the latter materializing them 
for all to see.  This relationship should be thought of less as a stable opposition than as a shifting 
matrix migrating across ideological, national, and generic boundaries: the farm novel drifts from 
English pastoralism to Afrikaner nationalism to anti-apartheid critique, while the mine novel 
progresses from fictionalized complaints about liberalism’s shortcomings to social scientific 
treatises on the mine’s deep structural forms.  Through all these permutations, each evidences a 
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continued concern with liberalism’s terminal decline, and each stages this decline in 
discontinuous waves spread across the long twentieth century. 
 
The Anglo-Irish and The Big House Novel 
A similar confusion between a pervasive sense of decline and an uncertainty about when, 
exactly, degeneration teetered over into death, haunts Anglo-Irish historiography.  However, in 
contrast to Anglo-South African liberalism, there is little doubt as to what precipitated Anglo-
Ireland’s decline or what its most spectacular events were.  The Protestant Ascendancy, first 
established in the wake of the Elizabethan Nine Years’ War (1594-1603) and entrenched during 
the English Civil War, replaced an older Anglo-Norman settler class (the “Old English”) who 
had more or less assimilated to native Irish customs and culture with a new wave of English and 
Scots landlords.  These landlords were granted large plantation-style estates by Elizabeth I, 
Cromwell, and, later, William of Orange for their loyalty, as well as with one eye toward 
punishing the “Old English” for rebelling alongside the Irish and the other toward taming the 
combative Irish themselves.  In their initial years, the Anglo-Irish governed these plantations 
from the comfort and security of Dublin, where the English had maintained a tenuous purchase 
in Ireland for centuries.  During the eighteenth century in particular, Dublin became the center of 
a flourishing commercial, political, and intellectual culture.  Edmund Burke and Jonathan Swift, 
two of the eighteenth century’s most celebrated writers, were both born in Dublin and educated 
at Trinity College; revolutionary republican movements, sparked by the American and French 
Revolutions, garnered significant support from fellow Anglo-Irish Dubliners like Wolfe Tone 
and Robert Emmet; and under Henry Grattan’s leadership, the Anglo-Irish wrested limited 
parliamentary autonomy from England for a short spell between 1782 and 1800.  But as 
 24	  
commercial success bred fantasies of lavish living amid aristocratic splendor, the Anglo-Irish 
began to erect immense Georgian mansions on their estates and migrate into the country, styling 
themselves as a country aristocracy overseeing feudal plantations manned by Irish laborers (see 
figure 3).  This mass retreat from Dublin to the “Big Houses” of Anglo-Irish lore culminated in 
the 1800 Acts of Union, in which Grattan’s Parliament dissolved itself and merged into the 
English Parliament in return for more lands and financial considerations from England. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Bowen’s Court.  An excellent example of the Georgian-style Big House, 
Bowen’s Court was the family estate of Elizabeth Bowen (pictured here). 
 
 
If Anglo-South Africans have been treated under the label “liberalism” rather than class 
or ethnicity, twentieth-century Anglo-Irish historiography shapes itself around this aristocratic 
dream.  Heavily influenced by the literature of the Celtic Twilight and Irish Literary Revival – 
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Standish O’Grady’s monumental History of Ireland (1878-81), W. B. Yeats’s poetry and plays, 
and Douglas Hyde and Lady Augusta Gregory’s translations of Irish folklore – literary critics, 
historians, and novelists have read Anglo-Irish history as a steady narrative of decay centered 
around three spectacular moments: the Acts of Union; the late nineteenth century Land War and 
subsequent Land Acts, which abolished Anglo-Irish control over by funding tenant purchases of 
land; and the burnings of Big Houses that took place during the Irish War of Independence 
(1919-1921).  The general parameters of this vision of decline were first consolidated in Yeats’s 
paean to the Big House, “Ancestral Houses”: 
Surely among a rich man’s flowering lawns, 
Amid the rustle of his planted hills, 
Life overflows without ambitious pains… 
 
…though now it seems 
As if some marvelous empty sea-shell flung 
Out of the obscure dark of the rich streams, 
And not a fountain, were the symbol which 
Shadows the inherited glory of the rich… 
 
…What if the glory of escutcheoned doors, 
And buildings that a haughtier age designed, 
The pacing to and fro on polished floors 
Amid great chambers and long galleries, lines 
With famous portraits of our ancestors; 
What if those things the greatest of mankind 
Consider most to magnify, or to bless, 
But take our greatness with our bitterness? 
 
Like O’Grady’s History of Ireland and later Story of Ireland, which hypothesized Ireland’s 
degeneration from the “heroic age” of Irish folklore to its present disenchanted state,20 Yeats 
represents Anglo-Irish history as a degeneration from an “overflowing” “fountain” – with all its 
connotations of fertility, abundance, and continuity – to an emasculated, barren, “empty sea-
shell.”  Yeats’s goal, in this respect, would appear to be to circumvent English colonialism and 
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dispossession so as to fashion Anglo-Ireland as an Ireland in miniature: its aristocratic mien 
restages the nobility of Ireland’s mythic heroes; its decline into bourgeois philistinism, Ireland’s 
own fall into modernity.  
But rather than convince his fellow Irishmen that Anglo-Irish were not only Irish but, 
moreover, a metonym for the Irish nation writ large, Yeat’s history of aristocratic decline has 
more often been used as a rationale for excluding the Anglo-Irish from Irish history post-
independence.  After all, if the Land War and the War of Independence focalized Anglo-Irish 
regression, these were also the valorized events upon which the modern Irish state staked its 
claims to popular support and modern political consciousness.  During the first years of the 
twentieth century, as Irish politics swung from cultural nationalism and its Romantic stylizations 
to a modern-oriented, mass political movement, writers, politicians, and activists began to 
deemphasize backward-looking projects of cultural recovery and stress instead the evolution of 
the modern Irish state.  As a result, Yeatsian distinctions between an aristocratic past and a 
philistine mob reversed their critical valences, with modernity now appearing the valued term 
and aristocracy an anachronistic holdover from feudalism.  Julian Moynahan encapsulates how 
this line of thinking marginalized the Anglo-Irish from modern Irish nationalism when he 
reflects that the Land Acts “assured the virtual extinction of the [Anglo-Irish] proprietors as a 
distinct, privileged, and exploitative class” (The Anglo-Irish, 11).  Nor is he alone in contrasting 
a Yeatsian history of the Anglo-Irish to an evolving Irish nation-state.  The canonical histories of 
modern Ireland – Terence Brown’s Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, J. J. Lee’s Ireland 
1912-1985: Politics and Society, and R. F. Foster’s Modern Ireland, 1660-1972 – all fall silent 
about the Anglo-Irish shortly after independence, implicitly endorsing both the nascent Irish 
state’s sense of itself as Gaelo-Catholic and the story of endemic Anglo-Irish decline. 
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However, despite the broad currency given to this historical trajectory, Anglo-Irish 
novelists have returned again and again to purported scenes of their demise, seeking to answer a 
single question: if Anglo-Ireland perished, most spectacularly in the Big House burnings, what 
do we make of their apparent living-on in the Irish nation?  These investigations take place 
primarily within the confines of the Big House novel, which in the years following Union had 
become a shorthand for Anglo-Irish identity, ideology, and class history.  Early Big House 
novels like Maria Edgeworth’s The Absentee (1812) and Sydney Owenson’s The Wild Irish Girl 
(1806) used marriage between an English lord and an Irish woman to figure Union as a benign 
consummation between the two nations.  In doing so, they voiced a self-interested and 
aestheticized alibi for Anglo-Irish hegemony at the same time as this class was retreating from 
national political leadership.  This contradiction was jarring even to Anglo-Irish writers, leading 
later Big House novelists to introduce an ominous, Gothic atmosphere to their tales.  As Vera 
Kreilkamp and Margot Gayle Backus argue, marriage, patriarchal descent, and the Big House 
edifice itself all demonstrate debilitating weaknesses in the post-Union Anglo-Irish novel.  
Marriage degenerates from sentimentalized romance to institutionalized violence, rape, and the 
(often literal) consumption of women by men in sensational Gothic tales like Charles Maturin’s 
Melmoth the Wanderer, Sheridan Le Fanu’s Uncle Silas, and Bram Stoker’s Dracula.  Sexual 
reproduction stalls out in the arid lines of deracinated landlords in Charles Lever’s The Martins 
of Cro’ Martin and Edith Somerville and Martin Ross’s The Real Charlotte.  And the Big House 
itself crumbles through profligate spending and neglect in Edgeworth’s Castle Rackrent. 
Twentieth century Big House writers seize on this Gothic imagery and concentrate it 
through recent traumas (the Land War, Big House burnings).  But these texts spread across the 
late nineteenth and twentieth century in regular waves, distending the narrative of decline found 
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in Yeats and Gothic fiction and relativizing its totalizing explanatory power (see figure 4).  Thus 
we find an explosion of Big House texts in the immediate wake of the 1880s Land War: 
Somerville and Ross’s The Real Charlotte, George Moore’s A Drama in Muslin, Anthony 
Trollope’s The Landleaguers, Bernard Shaw’s John Bull’s Other Island, and even, in a more 
allegorical form, Stoker’s Dracula.  As I show in chapter 2, these fin-de-siècle Big House novels 
differed from their predecessors in the attention they displayed to the economics of Anglo-Irish 
life, often finding in transnational institutions (dilettantish consumerism, British and colonial 
parliaments) a paradoxical source of renewal offsetting Gothic decline.  As I show in chapter 4, 
this amalgamation of Gothic decline and (potential) rebirth surfaces again in the 1930s.  For 
example, Elizabeth Bowen and Molly Keane each elliptically reference Big House burnings in 
their fiction, Bowen engulfing the country estate of Danielstown in flames in a disconnected 
epilogue to The Last September (1929) – implying that the enervated social class whose self-
enclosed tennis parties and balls she has documented over the course of the novel cannot even 
summon the energy to destroy itself – and Keane razing Aragon to the ground in Two Days in 
Aragon (1941) as a conscious “atonement for her [Keane’s] contemporaneous attitude” toward 
the Irish independence movement (Devlin ix).  Most notable, Bowen and Keane’s Big House 
fictions were generated not by despair, but by a sense that the Big House could play a vital role 
in post-independence Ireland.  Bowen makes this case in her 1940 article “The Big House”: “I 
believe [the Big House] could [justify its existence] now as never before…[Th]e idea from which 
these houses sprang was, before everything, a social one.  That idea, although lofty, was at first 
rigid and narrow – but it could extend itself, and it must if the big house is to play an alive part in 
the alive Ireland of today” (29).  Two Days in Aragon confirms this recuperative impulse by 
fantasizing about a rebuilt Aragon in a utopian future moment – the mythic “second day” absent 
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from the space of the narrative itself – and this refrain would later be taken up by a younger 
generation of Anglo-Irish writers in the 1970s (John Banville, J. G. Farrell, William Trevor, 
Jennifer Johnstone), each of whom employed the Big House frame as a way of reassessing 
Catholic-Protestant relations during the Northern Irish Troubles.  We might say, then, that 
whereas Anglo-South African liberalism’s failure cannot be identified with one dramatic event, 
and is therefore continually pushed backward or pulled forward in time, Anglo-Irish literature 
grapples with an inverse problem: if the Land War and Big House burnings supposedly 
exterminated the Anglo-Irish, how does one explain their continued existence? 
Making sense of these convoluted temporalities requires us to shift our perspective away 
from the nation-state and onto the multi-part capitalist system in which Anglo-South African and 
Anglo-Irishman alike operated – importing British political, social, and economic institutions 
into the colonies, “modernizing” indigenous production, linking metropolitan and colonial 
economies through trade, and channeling local nationalisms into economically “efficient” forms.  
As even this (admittedly brief) overview of Anglo-South African and Anglo-Irish historiography 
Figure 4: Big House Novels, 1880-1990.  Similar to the South African farm and mine novel, Big 
House novels virtually disappear from 1900-1925 and from 1945-1965. 
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reveals, these two groups shared not only a common preoccupation with narratives of decline, 
but also a common set of years around which these narratives clustered.  Schreiner’s rapacious 
Rhodesian capitalist finds its correlate in the Land War’s tumultuous redistribution of farmland; 
Mda’s cordoning off of liberalism in the pre-WWII period, Bowen and Keane’s interwar 
depictions of (already destroyed) Big Houses; and the 1970s radicalization of Anglo-South 
Africans, the Northern Irish Troubles that lent an impetus to reassessing Anglo-Irish 
marginalization.  By taking the modern world-system as our scale of investigation, we see how 
its formal structures provided a fertile ground for these (highly literary) narratives of decline, 
one in which deterioration was less a teleological goal in its own right than a medium through 
which transnational Anglo classes negotiated a shifting set of economic and political systems: 
nationalism and imperialism, the national-welfare state and economic globalization, 
territorialized industrialism and disembodied finance capital.   
In other words, in making the leap from the nation-state to the world-system, we abandon 
those terms firmly ensconced in nationalist teleologies and replace them with structural 
categories more responsive to discontinuous temporalities.  Where aristocratic decline 
immediately summons images of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, or liberalism the 
progression from imperialism to paternalistic liberalism to anticolonial militancy, a world-
systemic perspective positions these same occurrences within circulatory, dialectical, or cyclical 
temporalities: the back and forth of translation and communication, the cyclical expansion of 
capitalist production, and the alternation between intensive and expansive modes of production.  
If Anglo-South Africa and Anglo-Ireland seem especially sensitive to these world-systemic 
flows, I will be suggesting that this was primarily a consequence of their being wedged between 
metropolitan and peripheral economies – by acting, that is, as a “semiperiphery.” But first, we 
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need to step back and a say a little more about world-systems theory in general and the role the 
semiperiphery plays in it. 
 
Long Waves, Repetitive History: Structure and Temporality in the World-System 
 World-systems analysis, as described by its most influential practitioners, is all about 
structure.  The first rudiments of world-systems theory were developed during what Eve 
Sedgwick calls the “structuralist moment”: “not…that mistaken thing that happened before 
poststructuralism but fortunately led to it, but rather…a rich intellectual ecology, a Gestalt 
(including systems theory) that allowed it to mean more different and more interesting things 
than have survived its sleek trajectory into poststructuralism” (Touching Feeling, 105).  
Reflecting on his four-volume Modern World-System – in essence, the founding manifesto for 
world-systems theory – Immanuel Wallestein suggests that the détente it inaugurated between 
history and structuralism may be its most lasting contribution to social science: “Social reality is 
always and necessarily both historical (in the sense that reality inevitably changes every 
nanosecond) and structural (in the sense that social action is governed by constraints deriving 
from the historical social system within which the described activity occurs)” (The Modern 
World-System IV, xi).  For Wallerstein, the shifts from the nation-state to the world-system and 
from episodic, personal, and generational time frames to capitalism’s longue durée presuppose a 
sedimented structure evolving according to its own rhythms and tempo.  Events that, when 
approached in national contexts or shorter historical spans, appeared to indicate a profound 
rupture – the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, European imperialism, globalization 
– become in Wallerstein’s world-system mere blips, “no more significant than several previous 
and several subsequent blips” (The Modern World-System IV, xv).  Drained of their singularity, 
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these events constitute instead a means for tracking “blips,” for speaking about them as having 
their own historical ontology and their own systemic structure. 
 In the larger architectonics organizing these blips, Wallerstein’s world-system is 
permeated by Marxian concepts and theory: it demonstrates an “axial division of labor” between 
core and peripheral “zones,” is wracked by “structural crises,” and driven by class divisions (xiii, 
xvii).  And as with any good Marxian paradigm, its philosophy of history is broadly dialectical: 
diachronic history – the content of modernity, its new technologies, political creeds, and social 
customs – conforms to structural constraints: the form of modernity, its geographic and class 
hierarchies, and long-term cyclical trends.  At the same time, content pushes back against those 
forms, slowly refining the world-system’s structure into new dispensations.  Wallerstein’s 
“structure,” then, is not the timeless framework posited by Saussurian linguistics or Straussian 
anthropology, but the formal pole in a dialectic that is constantly moving through historical time.  
Wallerstein calls this understanding of structure “an unexcluded middle”: a “duration…that time 
affects only slightly and maintains over a long period” (“Time and Duration,” 162, 164-5).  
Though of a different time scale from chronological history, which Wallerstein calls “duration,” 
structure is nevertheless a form that slowly, imperceptible changes as it dialectically interacts 
with what we normally think of as diachronic “time.” 
This dialectical component has been central to recent literary-critical analyses of the 
world-system.  As Franco Moretti explains, world-systems theory “allowed us to ‘see’ a new 
literary genre [the modern epic] – and not just any genre, but the one trying to represent the 
world as a totality: a possibility that our discipline had never envisioned, because it lacked the 
concepts to do so” (“World-Systems Analysis,” 67; Modern Epic).  Fredric Jameson has 
provided an even more expansive and self-consciously dialectical reading of the world-system, 
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seeing in the Hegelian concept of totality a way to compare Western and non-Western literatures.  
Drawing on Ernst Bloch’s notion of the “non-simultaneity of the simultaneous” – that is, that 
multiple stages of social and economic development coexist simultaneously across the globe21 – 
Jameson superimposes the famous Hegelian master-slave dialectic onto a mercantile division of 
labor, wherein peripheral societies produce raw goods for value-adding operations in the 
metropole.22 On the one hand, Jameson’s metropolitan “master” acquires “material benefits 
befitting his supremacy” (i.e., material goods from the periphery), but because he has no 
experience in producing these objects for himself he lacks a fundamental awareness of “the 
economic system as a whole” (“Third-World Literature,” 85; “Modernism and Imperialism,” 
157).  Cut off from a vital realm of collective economic life, trapped in his own solipsistic 
subjectivity, the metropolitan writer seeks to compensate for his lack by grasping toward an 
aesthetic form – “modernist ‘style’” – that could “become the marker and substitute…of the 
unrepresentable totality” (“Modernism and Imperialism,” 163).23 On the other hand, since he 
toils for his own and his metropolitan “master’s” survival, “the slave [i.e., peripheral laborer] can 
attain some true materialistic consciousness of his situation” (“Third-World Literature,” 85).  
Where the metropolitan-master’s version of totality is an enchanting, meticulously polished, but 
ultimately false illusion, the slave experiences “a grisly and terrifying objective real world 
beneath the appearances of our own [First World] world: an unveiling or deconcealment of the 
nightmarish reality of things, a stripping away of our conventional illusions or rationalizations 
about daily life and existence” (“Third-World Literature,” 70).  But as with the metropolitan-
master, there is a dialectical twist to this insight: for the “objective real world” perceived by the 
peripheral worker is developed in fictional literature “out of predominately western machineries 
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of representation,” machineries whose forms impose certain ideological distinctions (private vs. 
public, poetic vs. political, sexuality vs. economics) common to the global North.24 
Jameson’s thoughts on non-Western literature have been roundly critiqued for everything 
from their rash assumptions about the “experience of colonized peoples” (Ahmad 76), to their 
dismissal of heterogeneous interactions “between categories like gender, sexuality, nationality 
and class” across “the public-private split” (Howes 11), to their oddly inappropriate choice of 
exemplary texts.25 And while I find some of these critiques more persuasive than others, the way 
in which Jameson filters his Hegelian reading of literary form through a mercantile division of 
labor has (unjustly, in my mind) seldom been confronted.  For Jameson, the formal features of 
“First-World” and “Third-World” texts can be compared on the basis of their inverse positions in 
the world-system: as in mercantile economics, the “Third World” produces raw, objective 
“content” for literature, while the “First World” distances itself from the material operations of 
the world-system and manufactures unfinished goods into enticing forms – luxury items, the 
commodity form, and High Literature.26 Jameson’s critical breakthrough is his insistence that 
these geo-economic scenarios exist in dialectical tension with one another: since form and 
content are both present in the Hegelian dialectic, struggling, like the master and the slave, 
against one another, metropolitan “form” and peripheral “content” will always be connected to 
one another, even if only as one another’s disavowed “unconscious.” But in developing this 
argument, Jameson collapses several types of form (capitalist structure, the novel, and the formal 
pole of the dialectic) and equates them all with one particular geopolitical bloc (the “First 
World”).  And from this confusion flows a string of dubious analogies: “like” the novel form, 
capitalist form disseminates from the metropole to the periphery; “like” the Hegelian slave’s 
“objective” relationship to the “real world,” formalism is antithetical to peripheral labors; and 
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“like” the master-slave dialectic, formalism and concrete reality separate into different objects 
(different geographical locales, different forms of consciousness, and different types of 
literature). 
Jameson’s dialectical approach to the world-system has been extremely influential, 
having been taken up by numerous Marxist and formalist scholars and, more implicitly, by 
Morettian scholars tracing the diffusion of the novel form from Europe to the rest of the globe.27 
But “structure” in world-systems theory proper possesses a much different valence than it does in 
Jameson’s theoretical reworking of the world-system.  For both Wallerstein and the dependistas 
branch of world-systems theory (Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank),28 structure is a holistic, 
relational phenomenon.  As Frank explains in one of the founding statements of world-systems 
theory, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” capitalist structure relativizes “economic 
development”: though “regions experience what may…appear as economic development,” the 
“structure and development of the capitalist system on the world scale as a whole” hierarchizes 
nations into “underdeveloped” “satellite states” and “now-developed metropolitan countries” (8, 
5).  If there is a dialectical ontology to this world-system, it is less one in which metropolitan 
forms meet and converse with peripheral content, than one in which systemic structures provide 
formal constraints for both metropolitan and peripheral modernization projects.  So-called 
“development” in both regions – from feudalism to agrarian capitalism, from agrarian capitalism 
to industrialism, and from industrialism to service economies – represents one half of a dialectic, 
the other half of which binds these regions into stable roles: peripheral regions supply the 
manpower for labor-intensive enterprises (in the eighteenth century, plantations and mines; in the 
late-twentieth, industrial factories); “core” regions house the markets, finance capital, 
corporations, managerial professionals, and consumers that buy, sell, and circulate commodities; 
 36	  
and semiperipheral regions translate between the two, exporting commercial products for sale on 
the world market and importing capital and technology for the development of export-oriented 
industries.   
Most important for Frank, this global structure shapes how and why particular national 
economies grow, such that peripheral regions will always be “underdeveloped” vis-à-vis 
metropolitan ones.  Even as they evolve from feudalism to export agriculture to industrialism, 
peripheral nations’ export-oriented economies ensure their dependence on more mature 
metropolitan markets and the continuing impoverishment of their own markets.29 For this reason, 
Frank, like Wallerstein, refuses to see a connection between a given country’s dominant mode of 
production or its socioeconomic institutions and its relative level of “development.”  Instead, his 
argument ignores technological, institutional, and political revolutions in favor of an unchanging 
set of structural functions that shadow development, as its unacknowledged dialectical twin. 
For our own purposes here, world-systems theory’s concern with structure over content 
signals two broad theoretical breaks, each of which speak to how Anglo-Ireland and Anglo-
South Africa become encoded within tropes of decline, and why these tropes proliferate across 
the twentieth century.  We could label these breaks as: 1) a radically new philosophy of capitalist 
history; and 2) a structuralist account of the world-system’s “semiperiphery” as a mediator 
between incommensurable economic systems. 
In terms of its historical imaginary, world-systems theory replaces “successivist” models 
of history with primarily cyclical ones: “long” waves, “cycles of accumulation,” and alternating 
“structures of accumulation.”  The most commonly studied and debated of these cycles are so-
called Kondratieff – or “long wave” – cycles, which witness a 25-30 year expansionist phase 
followed by a 25-30 year period of stagnation.  But the underlying philosophy remains the same 
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regardless of whether one is investigating 60-year Kondratieff cycles, two-hundred-year-long 
“logistics” (Cameron), three-hundred-year-long cycles (Snooks), or five-hundred-year-long 
cycles (Frank 1992; Frank and Gilles 1993).  An initial “A-phase” produces new inventions, new 
opportunities for investment, and economic expansion, while the subsequent “B-phase” removes 
impediments (inefficient labor systems, archaic technologies, and ailing industries) that had been 
preventing the full realization of these new developments.  These cycles then recur one after the 
other in a series of interlocking waves, highlighting the paradox underlying their historical 
progression: on the one hand, the oscillation back and forth between a creative A-phase and a 
destructive B-phase drives capitalist expansion; on the other hand, expansion only occurs 
because of the regular oscillation between these phases, their inability to deviate from a rigid 
historical cycle.  Thus we could think of the key works on twentieth century modernity – David 
Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last 
Man (1992), Anthony Gidden’s The Consequences of Modernity, Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity 
at Large, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire, and Jameson’s Postmodernism or, The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism – as documenting the transition from one cycle to another – a 
rupture ushering in a passage from “imperialism” to “Empire” (Hardt and Negri), or to a world 
beset by acute “time-space compression” (Harvey), but a rupture that replays, in a newly-
intensified form, earlier breaks (the rise of liberal capitalism, the industrial revolution, and so 
on).  In other words, the formal, structuralist epistemology of world-systems theory is not static 
or ahistorical so much as oriented toward temporal laws of repetition, laws that function 
irrespective of historical period or content. 
Stephen Shapiro and Ian Baucom, two of the few humanistic scholars to extensively 
engage with world-systems theory’s theoretical foundation, reveal the relevance of this 
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philosophy of history to literary studies.  “Because a world-systems perspective recognizes the 
spiral of capitalist history, where each long wave has both recurring and particular features,” 
Shapiro explains, “it allows for a new comparative study based on the analogy of similar 
moments in different long waves, rather than one anchored to a theory of teleological stage 
development, temporal continuity, or spatial contiguity” (35).  What such a methodology would 
look like is hinted at in Baucom’s Specters of the Atlantic.  Glossing Giovanni Arrighi’s The 
Long Twentieth Century, Baucom stresses how the world-system’s oscillations are tied to 
“epistemological condition[s] of possibility…which enable and clear the ground for…form[s] of 
capital which are an intensification and a wider practice of [particular modes of representation]” 
(21).  Baucom’s main interest is in what he calls “theoretical realism,” a “speculative culture” 
that he associates with recurring periods of finance capitalism – in particular, those which took 
place during the eighteenth century financial revolution and during the latter half of the twentieth 
century (32).  Both eighteenth and twentieth century “theoretical realisms,” he argues, train 
readers in the types of “fictional” value and objects – money, credit, insurance – necessary for 
“speculative transactions and mobile property” (32).  They therefore coalesce around moments 
when “capital seems to turn its back entirely on the thingly world, sets itself free from the 
material conditions of production, and revels in its pure capacity to breed money from money – 
as if by a sublime trick of the imagination” (27).30  
But this begs a further question: if one can reconstruct an epistemology of “speculative” 
objects through the rhythms of the world-system, objects that are nothing more than fictitious 
forms made visible and endowed with concrete agency, could one do the same for the world-
system’s formal structure itself?  Could one, that is to say, find in fictional forms a historicizable 
connection to, and engagement with, the formalized ebbs and flows of the world-system? 
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I would argue that we can, and that Anglo-South African and Anglo-Irish decline – and 
the genres in which they are articulated – provide precisely the fictional forms necessary to do 
so.  The reason for this convergence can be found in world-systems theory’s second major 
breakthrough: namely, its theorization of the semiperiphery.  One consequence following from a 
structuralist world-system divided between “developed” “core” economies and 
“underdeveloped” peripheral ones is that each region operates according to different economic, 
cultural, and political principles.  For example, while core economies like Britain and France 
bounded into industrial production during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, peripheral 
economies not only “remained” mired in feudal agricultural societies; subsistence farmers, 
communal modes of wealth (agricultural reserves, common grazing land), and alternative trade 
patterns were forcibly conscripted into large export-oriented ventures, supplying dearly-needed 
produce and minerals to industrial hubs unable to feed their growing populations.31 Similarly, 
during the twentieth century Europe and North America leaped into a post-industrial service 
economy by jettisoning industrial production onto the periphery, where Asian factories mass-
produced the computer technologies fueling the finance and informatics revolutions.32 In each of 
these cases, different modes of production also entail cultural, political, and ideological 
divergences: the egalitarian liberal politics emerging alongside European industrialism jar with 
the hierarchical labor regimes and despotic governance permeating feudal economies, and the 
mass regimentation present in Asian manufacturing clashes with post-Fordism’s ethic of flexible 
individualism.  And as these examples indicate, if core and peripheral economies evidence a 
consistent economic, cultural, and ideological gap, what exactly this gap is changes across time – 
the differences between liberalism and feudalism, export agriculture and consumer industrialism, 
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and post-Fordist flexible labor and mass production cannot be specified under any single 
rubric.33 
Enter the semiperiphery.  As Stephen Shapiro explains,  
Because the social action of the core is too incommensurate with that of the 
periphery, the world-system requires a calibrating zone that can mediate and 
“translate” the cultural and commodity economies of one sphere to another.  It 
receives, monetizes, and forwards two kinds of commodities: the core’s 
“fictional” ones of credit, insurance, and contractual property and intellectual 
rights and the periphery’s labor power and natural resources. (37) 
 
The semiperiphery in effect resides in the interstices between metropolitan and peripheral 
economies, guiding their disparate economies into a single, holistic structure.  Better yet, the 
semiperiphery is the world-system’s form: its translations channel metropolitan and peripheral 
products into outlets that will be useful for one another (usually for the benefit of the metropole), 
and so provide both the means and the structure through which the globe’s economies can be 
unified into a world-system.  As a result, the semiperiphery, even more so than core or peripheral 
zones, troubles any attempt to map it onto national space.  Nevertheless, such a mapping is 
slightly easier for the eighteenth and nineteenth century world-system than the twentieth-century 
one investigated by this study.  There, its representative spaces are those isolated outposts joining 
metropole and periphery into trade and communication networks: the plantations and mines 
where indigenous labor extracts natural resources for export to Europe and North American, and 
where settler colonies purchase luxuries from metropolitan merchants in return;34 or the coastal 
trading cities where merchant classes exchanged credit and goods in plenty, making possible the 
flows of goods, money, and property between neofeudal zones of primitive accumulation like the 
plantation and the laissez-faire, contract-based, money economies found in Europe and North 
America.35 Its representative classes are the settler classes and/or professional functionaries 
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managing mines and plantations and the urban merchant elites directing the distribution of 
commodities and capital.36 Its favored industries are sizeable import and export enterprises: the 
slave trade, sugar and cotton farming, and silver and gold mining.37 All of which is to say, in 
extended terms, what Shapiro proposes in a more abstract lexicon: the semiperiphery is the hinge 
connecting incompatible economies, the zone of communication between systems and persons 
who fail to speak the same language, the network binding varying modes of production into a 
total system. 
 If we combine this notion of the semiperiphery with world-system’s cyclical temporality, 
we find precisely the sort of historical epistemology necessary for uncovering fiction’s 
contributions to, and representations of, the world-system’s structural forms.  My hypothesis is 
that, like Baucom’s “speculative” objects (insurance, credit), the world-system’s formal 
arrangement also needs to be worked out in advance through fictionalized forms.  But where for 
Baucom’s eighteenth century world economy it was fictitious forms of value that needed to be 
established in order for trade to function across great expanses,38 distance was no longer an issue 
in the twentieth century, by which time “speculative” values were already familiar objects, and 
new technologies of speed had all but eradicated distance (a point which I take up in more detail 
in chapter 2).39 Instead, as Baucom observes, “the once emergent [finance capital] restages itself 
as the now dominant,” such that finance capitalism pervades the global economy, bridging time 
and space and swallowing everyone into a worldwide, hyper-fast global economy that eventually 
came to be known, in the latter decades of the century, as globalization.  Where eighteenth 
century semiperipheries sutured peripheral labor and resources together with metropolitan 
commodity markets, the twentieth century world-system witnessed the collapse of British 
imperialism, the marginalization of minoritarian settler classes Britain had exported to oversee 
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peripheral spaces and integrate their labor into capitalist trade and production,40 and the rise of 
self-governing nation-states.  The particular form that semiperipheral mediations took in the 
twentieth century therefore had less to do with physically transporting natural resources and 
commodities back and forth between the colonies, than with developing individual subjective 
orientations that could move back and forth between autonomous nation-states and a 
transnational global economy, one with seemingly no respect for political borders. 
 Furthermore, because semiperipheral classes build up the formal networks orchestrating 
separate economies into a systemic whole, and because this holistic structure conforms to a 
regular, cyclical rhythm, we can identify the fictional forms refining such subjective orientations 
within the literature produced by semiperipheral classes, as well as trace these fictional forms 
against the world-system’s cyclical tempos.  Specifically, I will be arguing that genres 
representing an older, fading nineteenth century semiperiphery – the Anglo-Irish Big House 
novel, the South African plaasroman, or farm novel, and the South African mine novel – 
supplied a conventionalized vocabulary of familiar semiperipheral mediations in order to 
articulate what were now primarily affective mediations between national political life and a 
global economic space: sentimental attachments that naturalized the global economy as a 
welcome sublimation of empire (chapter 2), or envious yearnings that indigenized global 
consumerism within the language of nationalism (chapter 3).  In other words, these genres pick 
up on the formal similarity between two discontinuous historical moments – nineteenth century 
export production and twentieth century globalization – and encode this similitude within what 
Walter Benjamin calls an “allegory.”  The decline of plantations and mining thus signals an end 
to nineteenth century settler culture, but also a reinterpretation of transnational mediation within 
new forms and between new objects.  We might say that Big House novels, plaasromans, and 
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mine novels make visible the formal rhythms of the world-system, tracking the parallels between 
past and present capitalist structures in their return to the mine and plantation.  For this reason, 
their generic histories are closely tied to systemic crises in the world-system, those moments in 
which the gap between emerging global markets and local nationalism is shifting most violently. 
 Emotion, genre, decline: these are the three terms through which, I am proposing, we can 
read the structural rhythms of the twentieth-century world-system.  And in order to see the 
effectivity of these figures most clearly, we need to shift our focus away from metropolitan 
innovations and peripheral exploitations, and focus instead on semiperipheral locations rarely 
accorded a world-historical role.  Locations like the Anglo-Irish plantation, South African farm, 
or South African mine. 
 
Anglo Settlement and the Atlantic Semiperiphery 
 One of the often-overlooked oddities of both South African and Irish literary and 
historical scholarship is the degree to which systemic accounts have proven more effective than 
postcolonialist ones in explaining these countries’ colonial position.  After all, one of the first 
and most lasting critiques of postcolonial discourse analysis has come from the South African 
literary theorist Anne McClintock, whose “The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term ‘Post-
Colonialism” notes how postcolonialism erases “continuities in international imbalances in 
imperial power,” subordinates “politics differences between cultures…to their temporal distance 
from European colonialism,” and “prematurely” celebrates the passing of imperialism (Imperial 
Leather 13).41 The relevance of this critique to South Africa is not hard to see.  Would the 
country’s “postcolonial” moment begin in 1910, when the Act of Union created a “white colonial 
state” of Boers and Britons?  Or would it rather begin in 1948, when the Afrikaner National 
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Party came to power, thus completing the project of anti-imperial Afrikaner nationalism?  Or 
could it have started in 1994, when the first countrywide democratic elections finally ended 
white minority rule?  What initially seemed to designate a moment of rupture increasingly slides 
into the ambivalent repetitions we have already seen in South African liberalism, undermining 
the explanatory power of “postcolonialism” on two fronts: first, its inability to adequately name a 
historical period; and second, its inability to draw distinctions between forms of colonialism and 
how they impacted particular cultures (i.e., presumably the Afrikaner experiences of imperialism 
and postcolonialism would be quite different from those of black Africans). 
 The same discomfort with postcolonialism has surfaced in Irish studies debates over 
whether or not Ireland can be said to be a colony at all.  David Lloyd, Declan Kiberd, and Joe 
Cleary have all advocated for “regarding Ireland in a postcolonial frame,” seeing in 
postcolonialism a methodology for critiquing “state-oriented nationalisms and their modernizing 
institutions” (Lloyd, “Regarding Ireland in a Postcolonial Frame,” 41).42 But their calls for an 
Irish postcolonial method have been countered by revisionist scholars who see Ireland less as a 
colony and more as a co-partner in the imperial project.  These skeptics point to Ireland’s unique 
co-constitutional status with Britain under the Union, its participation in the British military and 
overseas immigration to colonial territories, and its historical tendency to identify dissent in the 
languages of republicanism and radicalism rather than in anticolonial terms.43 Others have tried 
to balance these perspectives, adopting terms like “semicolonial” (Attridge and Howes) and 
“metrocolonial” (Valente, Dracula’s Crypt) to describe Ireland’s ambiguous colonial position.  
The sticking point in this debate seems to be the ethical implications involved in labeling Ireland 
a colony: that is, whether Ireland can and should adopt a vocabulary of injured subjecthood 
similar to those present in African and Asian historiography, one which provides implicit 
 45	  
sanction to radical IRA nationalists; or whether such a position obscures their complicitous 
collaboration in British imperialism. 
 I find Joe Cleary’s approach to this issue to be the most persuasive of the aforementioned 
critics, in large part because he contextualizes Ireland’s colonial status within a multi-national 
Atlantic economy.  As Cleary himself observes, “Atlantic archipelago” historians were among 
the first to develop a nuanced account of English colonialism in Ireland, years before the rise of 
postcolonialism as a field.  Where nationalist history portrays the English as a foreign occupier,44 
and where revisionist historians point to productive exchanges and collaborations between the 
two countries,45 Atlantic historians such as David Beers Quinn and Nicholas Canny show how 
early modern plantations in Ireland resembled contemporaneous plantation systems in North 
America.46 Both Irish and American plantations were managed by minoritarian settler classes 
overseeing more plentiful Irish, Indian, and African workers; both plantation systems were 
export-oriented ventures; and both Anglo-Irish and Anglo-Americans were conspicuous 
consumers of English luxuries items.  For Cleary, if Ireland is to be understood as a “colony,” it 
is in this narrow sense of plantation colony, in which Ireland was linked together with a 
transatlantic plantation economy stretching from England and Ireland to North America, Latin 
America, and even southern Africa.  Or, to be even more specific, if  “Ireland is included in the 
category of settlement colonies…then it evidently belongs to a quite limited set of situations 
where the settler population did not over time become a demographic majority.  South Africa 
(partially settled in the same historical epoch as Ireland was), Algeria, Rhodesia, Kenya, and 
Palestine (all settled in a much later epoch, when industrial capitalism had already developed in 
Europe) are other major examples” (36).47 
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 Cleary’s observation that South Africa may be the best point of comparison for a world-
systemic reading of Irish colonialism is supported by the salience world-systemic models have 
traditionally held in African studies.  Wallerstein began his career as an Africanist scholar and 
gradually moved toward world-systems analysis as a way to explain the peculiar mix of 
modernization and backwardness he found in many African societies.  During the same period, 
Samir Amin began to work out his own theories on structural dependency and the world-system 
in relation to northern Africa.  And most important for our own purposes, the first sustained 
attempts to elaborate on the nebulous concept of the semiperiphery were elaborated in relation to 
South Africa, in the hopes of defining the social, cultural, and economic conditions that paved 
the way for apartheid.48 Indeed, from the postindependence disillusionment that settled upon 
African intellectuals during the late ’60s and early ’70s, and which was so perceptively captured 
in Wole Soyinka’s The Interpreters (1965) and Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautiful Ones Are Not 
Yet Born (1968), to more recent discussions highlighting the failure of the African “postcolony” 
to guarantee its subjects’ welfare, one of the guiding concerns of Africanist scholarship has been 
why nation-centric modernization policies have seemingly collapsed in much of Africa, and how 
a world-systemic model could explain these failures.49 
 So how, then, can we position South Africa and Ireland within a world-systemic frame?  
The most obvious place to start would be with the transatlantic plantation system that Cleary 
identifies in his work on Irish colonialism.  Prior to English colonization, Irish agriculture had 
operated according to a Gaelic system of communal landowning known as “clachan,” in which 
family land holdings were scattered in a patchwork across numerous different types of farmland: 
for example, fertile land for potato farming, or mountainous regions where sheep could be 
grazed.50 The clachan system was ideal for subsistence farming and small-scale, local trading, 
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providing Irish families with the assorted lands necessary to produce a balanced diet, but was 
poor for profit-oriented capitalist agriculture, which needed much larger swaths of land to 
produce agricultural commodities in bulk.  For this reason, hostile English observers such as 
Charles Trevelyan, Assistant Secretary to the Treasury during the Great Famine, denounced the 
Irish as constitutionally unfit for capitalism.  According to Trevelyan, the miraculous nutritive 
powers of the potato, staple of the Irish diet, ensured that “the people had no incitement to be 
industrious” (quoted in Bigelow 120). “[A]griculture of every description was carried out in a 
negligent, imperfect manner,” bemoans Trevelyan, while “the Irish smallholder lives in a state of 
isolation, the type of which is to be sought for in the islands of the South Sea, rather than in the 
great civilised communities of the ancient world” (quoted in Bigelow 121).  As Trevelyan’s 
contemporary, Archbishop Richard Whately, observed, what the potato and clahcan system 
seemed to do more than anything was to cultivate an innate aversion among the Irish to “the 
necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life…obtained by labor” (Easy Lessons on Money Matters, 
43).  In short, they alienated Irishmen from the sorts of cost-benefit analysis and consumer 
desires spurring (English) capitalist production.51 
 If the native Irish were viewed as anti-modern holdovers unable (or unwilling) to 
acclimate themselves to capitalism, settlement solved this difficulty by establishing a mediatory 
class in between Irish farming and English commodity markets – in other words, what I, 
following Wallerstein, have been calling a semiperiphery.  Because of the potato’s nutritious 
qualities, Anglo-Irish landlords were able to lease their estates at high costs, which large tenants 
farmers satisfied by devoting the majority of their labor to market-oriented export crops.  In this 
way, the Anglo-Irish sutured Ireland into British capitalist markets on two levels.  First, and most 
obvious, their system of rent-based landownership encouraged tenants to sell grain and livestock 
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on English commodity markets.  Not only did this nurture more “efficient” production and 
monetize Irish labor into hard cash; it also exported food products desperately needed by an 
industrializing Britain, whose population was rapidly migrating from the country to the industrial 
hubs of London, Manchester, and Liverpool and growing at an astonishing rate.52 After the 
American colonies broke away from the British Empire, robbing it of its largest source for 
agricultural products, Ireland became what Kevin Whelan has called “the larder of the First 
Industrial Revolution”: the “ghost acres” that compensated for Britain’s shortfall in foodstuffs 
and thereby enabled massive urban centers to spring up across England, cities which otherwise 
could not have supported factory production (Whelan, The Killing Snows, 5; Belich 445).  
Shipping, farming, and the livestock trade all shifted toward Britain in the early 1800s, all made 
possible through the exceptional space of the Anglo-Irish plantation. 
 Integrating peripheral labor and resources into metropolitan markets and industrial 
production, export agriculture may be the most recognizable feature of the world-system’s 
semiperiphery.  But Anglo-Irish landowners also – and this is the second level of “mediation” –
purchased luxury items from Britain with the cash they obtained from rents, thus expanding the 
scope of Britain’s markets beyond its borders.  Compared to the elevating rhetoric of “labor” and 
“industry” permeating calls to agricultural production, consumption proved harder to situate 
within a moralistic vocabulary.  Indeed, one of the most infamous characters to haunt Irish 
literature during the nineteenth century was the absentee landowner, a profligate spendthrift 
whose sole purpose in life appears to be to indulge in as many hedonistic pleasures as possible 
among London’s fashionable districts.  From Jonathan Swift’s attack on absentees as a “Mongril 
Breed/who from thee sprung, yet on thy Vitals feed…And waste in Luxury thy Harvests there” 
to Maria Edgeworth’s Sir Kit Stopgap, who wastes every penny he possesses before bolting to 
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Bath, absentee landowners drew the collective ire of Anglo-Irish writers, who regarded them as 
irresponsibly abandoning their (perhaps illusory) enlightened estate governance (quoted in 
Kreilkamp 53).   
At the same time, the hysterical note these pieces strike suggest that the absentee may 
simply be an extreme caricature of the Anglo-Irish landowning class more generally – their 
compulsion to endlessly spend less a symptom of degeneration or insanity than a necessary 
supplement to British industries that were rapidly outgrowing their domestic market.  Since the 
Irish, according to observers like Trevelyan and Whelan, lacked the necessary drive to stimulate 
either labor or consumption, the Anglo-Irish replaced them as a vibrant consumer class, 
recirculating the money they obtained in rents and thereby tying Ireland more tightly together 
with Britain’s Atlantic economy.  The Anglo-Irish thus staged in miniature what mercantilism 
and, later, laissez-faire trade enacted on a more global scale: they cultivated a semiperipheral 
zone containing new outlets for luxury goods outside of Europe’s core economies, one which 
could orchestrate commodity flows back and forth across the metropolitan-colonial divide. 
South Africa followed much this same pattern, and thus provides us with a comparative 
case through which to draw out the semiperiphery’s essential features.  Britain wrestled control 
of South Africa from the Dutch in 1806, but Anglo settlement did not take off until 1820, when 
the first wave of British colonists joined an already flourishing Boer community of Dutch, 
German, and French Huguenot descent.53 Despite having lived in South Africa for upwards of a 
century and a half, the Boer economy, much like the native Irish, was primarily subsistence-
based.  The original community had replenished Dutch East India Company ships’ supplies, but 
remained otherwise isolated from transnational commodity trades; and when the British seized 
the Cape of Good Hope and began to prepare its lands for commercial agriculture, the Boers fled 
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inland in what came to be called the “Great Trek” of the 1830s, choosing isolated autonomy over 
co-participation in British laissez-faire capitalism.  The new Anglo settlers were thus left alone to 
build an export-oriented semiperipheral economy relying on wool, wine, and, beginning in the 
late nineteenth century, gold and diamonds.  As with the Anglo-Irish, these plantations and 
mines operated according to a two-pronged principle: on the one hand, they exploited local 
resources and labor power in order to cultivate agricultural and mineral products desperately 
needed in Britain’s industrial hubs; on the other hand, they commissioned vast public work 
initiatives – railroads, housing, steamship transportation – that laid the infrastructure for the 
young settlements and connected them to global commodity markets (Belich 373-86; Lester, 
Imperial Networks).  Once again, then, we see an emerging semiperiphery whose role appears to 
be translating between incompatible economic systems: Anglo-South Africans direct African 
labor toward English markets, while at the same time stimulating a colonial consumerism which 
otherwise would not have existed, given the distance separating black Africans and Boers from 
modern, luxuries-dominated “civilization.” 
Perhaps most surprisingly, pro-settlement boosters represented Anglo emigration less as a 
“civilizing mission” directed at black Africans than as a response to the Boers’ failures as a 
settler class.  Other British possessions in Africa (Nigeria, Egypt) tended to be administered 
through local tribal chieftains or Westernized elites rather than settler colonialism (Mamdani, 
Citizen and Subject).  But to the British, the Boers were a perversely regressive European culture 
who were not only less “civilized” than Britons, but who actively fought against modernization.  
Thus the Reverend C. Usher Wilson, writing during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), 
condemned the Boers as “nothing more nor less than a low type of the genus homo… In self-
sought isolation they have tried to escape the tide of civilization” (quoted in Krebs 117).  If a 
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class of Anglo farmers and miners linked to both metropolitan and colonial economies was 
viewed as a necessity in South Africa, this was in large part because Boers were understood to be 
diverting black African labor into an inefficient, isolated agrarian economy when they should 
have been tutoring them in “civilized” market principles.  This point of contention became ever 
more apparent when the British and Anglo-South Africans found themselves in need of plentiful 
African labor after the discovery of gold on the Rand.  As Bernard Shaw acerbically remarked, 
the “Boers [are]… a small community of frontiersmen totally unfitted to control the mineral 
assets of South Africa” (quoted in Lawrence James 266).  At this time, Boers’ ill-treatment of 
African workers – beatings, poor wages, and political disenfranchisement – emerged as 
controversial topics in both the British and South African press (Krebs 1-54).  Since the Boers 
had proved, like the Irish, to be staunchly resistant to capitalist modernization, Anglo settlement 
and entrepreneurialism became the means through which a world-systemic form was imposed on 
the South African economy, as the “civilizing mission” that would coordinate between 
metropolitan and colonial modes of production. 
However, as the nineteenth century sped to a close, the British world-system would 
abruptly begin to transition from a territorial, imperial-based mode of capitalist accumulation – 
one in which settler classes were an indispensible cog in the flows of goods and services between 
metropole and colonies – to a post-imperial world-system dominated by sovereign nation-states 
and a transnational global economy.  Within this scenario, the semiperiphery experienced a 
holistic overhaul not simply in what it was mediating – say, agricultural goods and luxury items 
versus finance capital and industrially-produced crops and commodities – or in who it was 
mediating between – say, scattered farm laborers and industrial barons versus professionally-
organized workers and financiers – but, more important, in how it was mediating between these 
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persons and objects.  A new, affect-based form of semiperipheral mediation emerged during this 
period, one in which literature, more than settlement or trade, trained individuals in how to 
reconcile their proximate environment to a decentered, globe-spanning economic network.  And 
the parameters for this new mode of mediation were first articulated by these same 
semiperipheral Anglo classes, whose literary productions allegorized affective mediations 
between local productions and global markets through the representative spaces of an older, 
nineteenth century semiperiphery. 
 
Vanishing Mediators: Transnational Feeling, the Global Economy, and Literature 
The rupture I am proposing to contextualize within the interlocking waves of the 
capitalist world-system’s formal rhythms fits nicely within the standard historical trajectories of 
both modernism and imperialism.  Historians have generally marked the Berlin Conference of 
1884, during which statesmen from Britain, Germany, France, Portugal, Belgium, and other 
European nations parceled out Africa amongst themselves, as a turning point in European 
imperialism: imperialism now entailed an intensified struggle for a shrinking number of 
territories, with European empires frequently colliding with one another in skirmishes that 
augured the global warfare of World War I.  Similarly, 1890 or thereabouts has long been seen as 
the general starting point for British modernism, inaugurated by such diverse figures as Sigmund 
Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche, the French Impressionists and Post-Impressionists, and British 
Aestheticism.   
But each of these movements was also influenced by, and an indispensible actor within, a 
contemporaneous economic revolution.  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, British 
investors began to extend their direct control over colonial ventures, to the exclusion of local 
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settler classes.  J. A. Hobson’s Imperialism (1902) and Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital: A 
Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (1910) each described the mechanics of this 
process to contemporary audiences: small coteries of British investors exported capital to 
underdeveloped nations, who in turn modernized their facilities and returned a share of the 
profits to their foreign investors.  This finance-based capitalism proved controversial insofar as it 
uncoupled a collective national-imperial project from a capitalist one.  No longer was British 
capitalism a single, smooth system clearly benefiting all Britons, albeit in a hierarchical manner 
– the capitalists who owned and managed factories, the settler classes who supplied them with 
raw materials from their plantations, and the workers who toiled on the factory floor.54 Instead, 
imperialism appeared to be operating exclusively for what Hobson termed a “parasitical” class of 
investors who themselves did nothing productive for either nation or empire.  Profits abounded, 
but seemed to bypass the multiple levels of mediations that had previously organized trade and 
production, as investors stretched their hands across the globe directly from a booming financial 
sector housed in London (John Marx 20; Cain and Hopkins 384-5).   
As I show in more detail in chapter 2, Britain’s so-called New Imperialism and its 
finance-based investment schemes placed Anglo-South Africans and the Anglo-Irish in a 
troubling double-bind.  On the one hand, direct investment in overseas enterprises eroded the 
nuanced class hierarchies upon which Anglo settler classes depended for authority.  As David 
Cannadine argues, “the imperial constructions and transoceanic visualizations that resulted [from 
imperialism] were primarily (and unsurprisingly) the mirror images – sometimes reflected, 
sometimes refracted, sometimes distorted – of the traditional, individualistic, unequal society that 
it was widely believed existed in the metropolis” (Ornamentalism xix).  In other words, 
according to the imperial imagination, every nation possessed a parallel class hierarchy, be it the 
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Indian caste system, African chieftains and their subjects, or, in the case of Ireland and South 
Africa, small Anglo settler classes governing primitive, racialized working classes, whose elites 
then in turn traded with one another.  But the logic of direct investment constructed an 
alternative vision of empire, one in which British capitalists, working through new technologies 
of speed like the steamship and telegraph, could form a proximate, unmediated connection to 
colonial working classes: for instance, in the gold and diamond mines English adventurer-
capitalists founded in southern African, or in the British government’s decision to finance and 
sell Anglo-Irish plantations to native Irish tenant farmers.  The anachronistic inflection this lent 
Anglo settler classes was best summed up by George Moore, whom Herbert Howarth called the 
“annalist of the death of the landlords”: “We are a disappearing class, our lands being 
confiscated, and our houses are decaying or being pulled down to build cottages.  All that was 
has gone or is going” (quoted in Moynahan 144; Vale, 245).  Where in the nineteenth century 
Anglo settler classes seemed to mediate modernity, now they were treated more as archaic 
holdovers impeding further waves of modernization. 
On the other hand, an immersion within local nationalisms could not palliate settlers’ 
declining socioeconomic position.  Both Boer and native Irish nationalist movements identified 
the British and their settler enclaves as the source of collective injuries and political suppression.  
Skilled rhetoricians like Paul Kruger expressed a litany of grievances against the wrongs, 
injustices, and oppressions Boers had suffered at the hands of “the Britons,” using these abuses 
as a rallying cry for Boer separatism (Giliomee 234).  If anything, Irish nationalists were even 
more aggressive in their rhetoric.  The specter of “Captain Moonlight,” a mythic figure who was 
alleged to murder uncooperative landlords and slaughter their cattle, pervaded Fenian speeches 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Though such “outrages” were rare, the violent 
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rhetoric underlying the “Captain Moonlight” myth nevertheless lent an air of general anxiety and 
insecurity to Anglo-Irish society. 
Chapter 2, “Fictions of Devolution: Olive Schreiner, Bernard Shaw, and the Sentimental 
Administration of Empire,” focuses on one particularly effective response to this double-bind, a 
response that will be restaged at regular intervals throughout the “long” twentieth century.  As I 
show, Bernard Shaw’s John Bull’s Other Island (1904) and Olive Schreiner’s Story of an African 
Farm (1883) employ the imagery of fading Anglo-Irish plantations and South African wool 
farms – as captured in the Anglo-Irish Big House narrative and the South African farm novel, 
respectively – in order to develop a new, transnational vocabulary of sentimental administration 
founded upon, and mediated through, colonial constitutions.  Of course, neither author is so 
naïve as to suppose that colonial plantations are free from the narrative of decline I sketched in 
this chapter’s first section.  Rather, their imaginative refashionings of these spaces depend upon a 
radical break from the (supposedly) transparent sentimental bonds joining feudal lords and their 
loyal vassals.  Both writers suggest that the different levels of development scattered across the 
British Empire make it impossible to transparently communicate sentiment between nations, 
classes, or genders; and as collective sentiment lapses, more immediate, individuated emotions – 
for Shaw, consumer desire; for Schreiner, personal sympathy – subconsciously connect subjects 
with a global “organism” of which they form but one part.  For both Shaw and Schreiner, such 
individuated emotions splinter modernity into rival lines of evolutionary development: male and 
female, parasitic and productive, metropolitan and colonial.  But if the decline of sentiment 
seems to spell disaster for neofeudal plantations, parliamentary devolution supplied an 
alternative form of local administration, one in which Anglo professionals organize these 
incongruous sentiments into a well-orchestrated system through their familiarity with liberal 
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jurisprudence and statecraft.  Boers may not “feel” the right way about the English, nor the 
English the Boers; the commodities the English and Irish want might not be best for them; but 
the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South Africans, more familiar with each nation than the other is, can 
help guide these feelings into an effective system. 
The Anglo settlers sketched by Schreiner and Shaw might best be described as 
“vanishing mediators”: supplemental classes training individuals how to coordinate their feelings 
toward both national-political and transnational economic institutions – erecting, in the process, 
an interlocking world-system through emotion’s multidirectional forms – but classes who 
themselves remain outside the ambit of modernity, fossilized in an eternal stasis of mediation.  
By invoking the notion of the “vanishing mediator,” I mean not only to call attention once again 
to the overlap among Anglo settler classes, the semiperiphery, and a formal structure relatively 
independent of modernity’s specific content, but also to allude to perhaps the most famous 
“vanishing mediator” in postcolonial studies, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “native informant.” 
As Spivak explains, the native informant lends his cultural experience to Western Knowledge-
with-a-capital-K, but he can only speak within intellectual circles as a fellow academic or 
through another academic voice – his experience of being a “native informant” is foreclosed in 
the transition from lived experience to factum of knowledge (A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 
6).  Shaw’s Anglo-Irish and Schreiner’s Anglo-South Africans present in effect the dialectical 
inverse of this native informant.  For a fading, embattled minority, Schreiner and Shaw’s Anglo 
settlers are surprisingly visible: their consumerist proclivities and sympathetic affections are 
almost pathologically reiterated in plays, novels, journalism, and political propaganda.  But the 
very verbosity attending their demonstrations seems designed to counter any lingering suspicions 
that they might not have anything of their own to say, that their schizophrenic attachments to 
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nationalism and globalization alike cover over a lack of social, cultural, and economic substance 
on their own part – that, in Bowen’s words, “Like Flaubert’s ideal book about nothing, [they] 
sustain [themselves] on [themselves] by the inner for of [their] style” (Bowen’s Court, 21). 
 As both my earlier literary history of Anglo decline and my methodological excursus on 
world-systems theory show, the transition Shaw and Schreiner document took place through a 
series of interlocking waves, rather than in any sort of linear fashion.  Thus the ambivalent 
recuperation of Anglo settlers’ transnational class position we find in their writings is worked out 
again and again throughout the twentieth century, as the world-system progresses through its 
cyclical historical structure: waves crest and fall, new economic systems emerge as old ones 
perish, and the emotional dispositions needed to mediate between global economic institutions 
and national-political ones change accordingly.  What I am proposing, in other words, is that 
those declensionary narratives that repeat in regular waves across twentieth-century Anglo-Irish 
and Anglo-South African literature – stories of liberalism’s failure to embed itself in the mines 
and farms peppering the South African landscape, or of the Big House’s destruction at the hands 
of incensed nationalists or calculating modernizers; stories that echo across the 1880s, 1930s, 
and 1970s – these narratives provide the staging ground for new emotional stylizations 
negotiating between autonomous nation-states and a global economy operating without respect 
for their borders.  Decline, that is, becomes a way for these authors to think through new 
semiperipheral mediations: the Big House novel, the plaasroman/farm novel, and the mine novel 
constitute rhetorical devices through which Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African writers 
document the transition away from a trade-based semiperiphery and toward an emotionally-
mediated semiperiphery – the destruction of Anglo-centered trade networks and their formal 
continuity with a decentered, finance-based global economy.  From this perspective, the Anglo-
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Irish and Anglo-South Africans’ tenuous position between nationalism and globalization 
becomes a sort of felix culpa, the reason why they are still able to act as transnational mediators 
– albeit “vanishing” ones – organizing the world-system into functional formal arrangements. 
 In mapping these generic histories onto the world-system, I use Giovanni Arrighi’s 
schema of the twentieth-century world-system in The Long Twentieth Century as my historical 
template.  According to Arrighi, the capitalist world-system oscillates between two forms of 
“cycles of accumulation”: a “cosmopolitan imperial” one that expands through extensive 
territorial accumulation, and a “corporate-national” one that expands through intensive 
consolidations of markets and corporate hierarchies.  Arrighi explains the back and forth of these 
by concluding that each cycle of accumulation reaches a certain point at which the existing 
configuration of capitalist production can no longer profitably expand, at which time capital must 
remonetarize in order to flow to a new center (and mode) of accumulation.55 He then charts this 
dynamic through four distinct cycles: a Spanish/Genoese “cosmopolitan imperial” one, a Dutch 
“corporate-national” one, yet another “cosmopolitan imperial” cycle (this time British), and 
finally an American “corporate-national” one just now beginning to fade.  Moreover, each of 
these cycles of accumulation demonstrates its own cyclical temporality, featuring an initial phase 
dominated by finance capital, followed by a period of material expansion and commodity 
production, and finally concluded by yet another period of financialization.56  
 Arrighi’s model has a much narrower sense of core and periphery than much of world-
systems theory (or than the model I have been outlining here), but the cycles he identifies 
nevertheless prove useful in tracing literature against the world-system’s rhythmic tempos.  In 
particular, Arrighi associates the turn from a “cosmopolitan imperial” system emblematized by 
plantation and mine capitalism and toward the twentieth century’s “corporate-national” one with 
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three moments of crisis.  These crises map onto his finance capital-commodity production-
finance capital historical structure, and broadly correspond to the moments of decline I have 
been tracing through Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature – the 1880s/1890s, the 
1930s, and the 1970s.57 The first crisis consists of the Long Depression of 1873-96, when 
investors began to pull their wealth out of the traditional industrial centers and colonial 
enterprises that had dominated the British cycle of accumulation and shift it to American- and 
German-style corporations; second, the Great Depression of the 1930s, during which the last 
vestiges of extensive-imperialism collapsed, to be replaced by a new Fordist production system 
and Keynesian welfare state; and third, the sudden fall of Fordism in the 1970s, the ensuing 
return of finance capital, and the first glimmerings of yet another systemic transition, this time 
from a “corporate-national” cycle of accumulation back to a (perhaps Sinocentric) “cosmopolitan 
imperial” one.58 Each of these crises deepens the transition from imperial capitalism to a 
corporate-national world-system: the Long Depression signals an initial break between the 
geographies of capital and empire; the Great Depression, the rise of national self-determination 
and the welfare state; the 1970s recession, the increasing centrality of global capital over the 
nation-state and the need to distinguish this form of globalization from that of empire.  But the 
particular historical conjunctures that this post-imperial world-system travels through, and the 
objects it uses to coordinate discrepant economic activities into a holistic world-system, vary 
across these periods – a world-system characterized by asymmetrical imperial and economic 
geographies, after all, is a completely different arrangement than one divided into isolationist 
welfare states, or one where globalization is seemingly eroding the authority of any state form, 
whether national or imperial.  The transition from British imperialism to a post-imperial world-
system, that is, takes place neither through a single rupture or a steady tide, but through a 
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discontinuous series of breaks ushering in new structural relations between the global economy 
and national political life, a series of breaks centered around, and formed by, global economic 
crises. 
  The following chapters use Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature to track these 
crises across the long twentieth century, showing how Big House novels, plaasromans/farm 
novels, and mine novels generated the emotional dispositions that paved the way for 
amalgamations of devolved governance and global economic communities, nationalism and 
transnational economic institutions, and rooted industrialism and global financial flows.  I have 
already mentioned that my second chapter investigates how Olive Schreiner and Bernard Shaw 
sought to reconcile the New Imperialism and local separatist movements with continued Anglo-
South African and Anglo-Irish sovereignty, finding in colonial constitutions a supplemental 
technology for the sentimental administration of empire.  My third and fourth chapters extend 
this line of inquiry into the 1930s, asking how Anglo settlers accommodated their countries’ 
isolationist and anti-imperial rhetoric within British-centered transnational economic institutions 
and the inequitable trade relations joining their countries to Britain. 
 My third chapter, “Envious Professionalism: Literary Internationalism, Anglo 
Citizenship, and the South African Novel between the Wars,” shows how professionalism 
became a site for debates over the diffusion of British enlightenment to South Africa and 
Britain’s continuing economic influence within the country.  Beginning with an analysis of how 
the term “race” focalized disagreements between middlebrow writers like Sarah Gertrude Millin 
and avant-garde experimentalists like William Plomer and Roy Campbell over what an African 
professionalism was and should be, I argue that Plomer’s Turbotte Wolfe understands this 
category as an unstable, ontologically ambiguous phenomenon – a fleeting metropolitan form 
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repeatedly pulverized by the destructive primitive energies native to Africa.  At the same time, 
envy provides Plomer with a subjective orientation capable of installing professionalism in a 
middle ground halfway between reality and fantasy – as an object absent from one’s immediate 
environment (and so desired), but one which, in being desired, molds subjects into temporary 
professional forms, forms which are themselves destined to be eradicated by Africa’s destructive 
energies and recovered only in the retroactive shine of memory or derangement.  The second half 
of the chapter then shows how Sarah Gertrude Millin seizes on this envious mode of 
professionalism in order to defend a conservative Anglo brand of South African citizenship at a 
moment when Afrikaner nationalists were increasingly denouncing transnational, British-
centered economic institutions as pseudo-imperial agents.  I suggest that Millin’s 1934 novel 
about the decrepit diamond diggings outside of Johannesburg, The Sons of Mrs. Aab, uses envy 
as a figure for documenting the paradoxical circulation of South African citizenship through 
transnational professional institutions (the sterling bloc, transnational insurance corporations), 
one in which South Africans’ covetousness toward British wealth sutures them into speculative 
finance mechanisms.  In the process, South African nationality itself emerges as a speculative 
identity, one affirmed and valorized by feeling a deficiency vis-à-vis British economic 
institutions and speculating, within those institutions, upon this very lack. 
 Where chapter 3 discusses the productive tension between transnational finance and the 
isolationist welfare state, chapter four explores how the world-system’s cyclical tempos were 
rhetorically internalized within particular nations, classes, and persons.  “Toward a 
Depressionary Theory of History: Bowen’s Court, The General Theory, and Gothic Equilibrium” 
situates Elizabeth Bowen’s memoir about her family’s Big House estate, Bowen’s Court, and 
John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money within a joint 
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British and Irish attempt to recast the global economy’s cyclical flows within impermeable 
national boundaries.  Both Bowen and Keynes seize on a Gothic vocabulary of affective 
fluctuations borrowed from Big House literature to explain the periodic moments of turbulence 
that characterized both the British world economy and colonial classes.  For these writers, I 
argue, the fact that economic downturns could be attributed to hysterical outbursts aligned them 
with the isolationist rhetoric of national self-determination, while also making such disturbances 
familiar, comforting, and open to correctable action by a knowledgeable professional elite.  But 
where Keynes’s theory of emotional oscillation envisions an advanced, cosmopolitan class of 
intellectuals, Bowen uses the same rhetorical maneuvers from a conservative perspective to 
proffer the Anglo-Irish as a group whose experience of affect-induced successes and setbacks 
prepared them for social and political leadership.  By placing these two figures together, then, I 
highlight the degree to which the affective terminology elaborated by Keynesian welfare 
economics owes a debt to the Gothic tropes and temporalities of the Anglo-Irish Big House 
novel. 
 Chapter 5, “From the Plaasroman to Neomodernism: J. M. Coetzee and Formalist 
History,” concludes this project by turning to 1970s South Africa and the fiction of J. M. 
Coetzee.  I place Coetzee’s attraction to modernist aesthetic practices and ideologies within a 
post-Fordist redistribution of industrial labor and language-centered services across the world-
system, one in which industrialism was increasingly jettisoned onto peripheral locales while 
metropolitan production co-opted the modernist language of individualism, autonomy, and 
liberation within new service occupations.  If the anticolonial language of liberation continued to 
hold sway in South Africa long after it had fizzled out in Europe, the United States, and the rest 
of Africa, I argue that this utopian discourse has to be seen as structurally distinct from its earlier 
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manifestations.  Using Coetzee’s lecture on the Eliotic classic, “What Is a Classic?”, and his 
neomodernist homage to Beckett, the parodic plaasroman In the Heart of the Country, I show 
how poetic ecstasy provides Coetzee with a way of bridging racial, class, and linguistic divides – 
namely, through a modernist vocabulary of transcendence cast within the mold of the ’60s 
radical movements.  At the same time, as this ecstatic language mediates between separate races, 
classes, and genders, it manages to communicate between the modernist-inflected service 
economy centered in Europe and the United States and the racialized labor hierarchies present in 
South Africa, suggesting, by association, that liberation from racial-industrial capitalism is also a 
liberation to a post-Fordist language economy, one characterized by the modernist stylistic 
brilliance of a Coetzee.  But if this seems to implicate Coetzee and his fellow exilic/post-exilic 
intellectuals with the sort of conservative Anglo mediation I have described in my earlier 
chapters, I argue that his writings also relativize the lure of modernity by calling attention to the 
formal similarity between his socioeconomic position and that depicted in the interwar 
plaasroman.  To put it another way: his parodic use of genre uncovers the repetitive temporality 
guiding the world-system and stages it for all to clearly see, revealing how, for the 
semiperiphery, modernity is only ever a transient object passing through it. 
 These chapters do not exhaust all the world-systemic motions that can be found in any 
given period or country; nor do they aim at comprehensively documenting how any one literary 
genre functions within the world-system.  Instead, I treat different aspects of the world-system 
and distinct genres in each chapter, in order that a full understanding of the world-system’s 
formal motions may emerge from their intersection.  Thus chapter 2 focuses on the growth of 
autonomous national-political institutions and their relation to a globalizing economy; chapter 3 
situates transnational professionalism alongside the development of the welfare state, while 
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chapter 4 reverses the previous chapter’s extra-national perspective and asks how the world-
system’s cyclical rhythms were internalized in turn by the nation-state; and chapter 5 explores 
the ontology behind semiperipheral mediumhood.  Each chapter also deploys different terms for 
the world-system’s rhythmic tempos: syncopation (chapter 2), circulation (chapter 3), cycles 
(chapter 4), and repetition (chapter 5).  My purpose in using this varying set of terms is to bridge 
individual authors’ own partial perspectives on the world-system and my own theoretical 
apparatus.  For this reason, I phrase each writer’s engagement with the world-system in terms 
that would have been familiar to them, or in terms that are compatible with their own, allowing 
the conceptual similarities between them to speak for their common insights into the world-
system. 
 
Formalist Emotion: Literature in the World-System 
 This leaves us with one last theoretical question, a question that might be considered the 
knot tying together literature and the world-system in my project.  If, as I have been arguing, the 
disjuncture between a post-imperial global economy and self-governing nation-states called for 
emotions that could orient individual subjects toward both of these objects simultaneously, why 
was emotion, specifically, able to negotiate between these objects, and why would literature be 
the central medium through which individuals did so?  I have already hinted at two answers – 
namely, that emotion is able to feel toward multiple objects in the same space, and that fiction 
allegorized new emotional mediations within the language of older, spatial ones.  But we still 
need to specify how the internal, personal, and individuating tenor traditionally associated with 
emotion operates on anything like a systemic scale and, similarly, how individual literary works 
possess anything like a systemic field of effect.  The answers to these questions, I will be 
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suggesting, are one and the same, and concern the epistemology of emotion developed by a 
particular strain of literary modernism closely associated with the Bloomsbury Group, its 
precursors, and its disciples – one in which emotion conveys implicit stances toward particular 
objects, stances which themselves are conceived and captured in the work of art. 
 The figures who developed, codified, and disseminated this epistemology of emotion 
read like a who’s who of modernism.  Arthur Symons and W. B. Yeats’s symbolist aesthetics 
first recuperated a neoromantic discourse on emotion, defining emotion as an ineffable, transient 
experience given form and solidity by the artwork.  As Yeats put it in “The Symbolism of 
Poetry” (1900): “Because emotion does not exist, or does not become perceptible and active 
among us, till it has found expression, in color or sound or in form, or in all of these, and because 
no two modulations or arrangements of these evoke the same emotion, poets, painters and 
musicians…are continually making and unmaking mankind” (137; my emphases).  In other 
words, for Yeats art does not just express emotion; it concretizes emotion into a form and, in 
doing so, frees feeling from its monadic interiority and unleashes it upon the social world, where 
it can become “active among us.”  Moreover, in a move anticipating the later arguments of Roger 
Fry and Clive Bell, he suggests that art does so through its formal “arrangements”: particular 
collections of colors, sounds, and forms elicit specific emotions, thus implying an essential 
connection between interior affect and one’s external environment. 
The emotional expressions championed by Symons and Yeats gained even more traction 
in the wake of Impressionism and Post-Impressionism.  Writing in dialogue with one another, 
Joseph Conrad and Ford Madox Ford each produced “impressionist” manifestoes that insisted 
fiction “appeal to [the reader’s] temperament” and endow its subject matter with “the emotional 
atmosphere of the place and time” (Conrad, “Preface to The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus,’” 132).  
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Ford in particular, like Yeats, saw literature as recording a palimpsestic conglomeration of 
“superimposed emotions.”  But Ford departed from Yeats’s belief in the absolute equivalence 
between form and emotion by hypothesizing that emotions were habitually layered one upon the 
other, exploding in multiple directions at once: “It is, however, perfectly possible that a piece of 
Impressionism should give a sense of two, of three, of as many as you will, places, persons, 
emotions, all going on simultaneously in the emotions of the writer.  It is, I mean, perfectly 
possible for a sensitized person, be he poet or prose writer, to have the sense, when he is in one 
room, that he is in another, or when speaking to one person that he may be absent-minded or 
distraught” (“On Impressionism,” 325).  Though Ford does not go quite so far as to deny the 
Yeatsian dictum that one particular form will command one given emotion, even the minimalist 
scenarios he narrates are too cluttered with places, persons, and emotions to disentangle one from 
the other.  Rather, Impressionism seems to presuppose for him an author and his audience’s 
being irretrievably embedded in a complex environment, one in which the writer does not evoke 
ideal, Platonic emotions so much as lead his reader through a morass of multivalent emotions. 
If Yeats, Conrad, and Ford all contributed to a budding discourse on art and the emotions, 
the authors, artists, and art critics associated with the Bloomsbury Group produced the most 
definitive and lasting statements on art and the emotions.  Bloomsbury has been both embraced 
and critiqued for the Kantian formalism propagated in their art criticism, relying as it did on a 
distinction between the “pure” emotions imparted by art’s purposeless purposiveness and 
political, social, and economic “actions.”59 But Bloomsburians also shared an interest with Yeats 
and Ford in how objects could be construed not simply as physical containers but also as formal 
arrangements of emotion.  Clive Bell’s thoughts in “The English Group” are representative: 
“Forms and relations of form have been for them [the Post-Impressionists], not means of 
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suggesting emotion, but objects of emotion.  It is this emotion they have expressed” (193).  What 
in Yeats and Ford was an intersubjective dialectic between a work and its audience here becomes 
an inherent property of the artwork; and if Bell’s article descends into vagueness at times – it 
remains uncertain how a form could “be” emotion without an audience to supply that feeling – it 
also paradoxically detaches emotion from the self and places it onto form itself.  Rather than 
being a medium through which emotion is evoked, form is emotion for Bell: their unity exists in 
a transcendental, Platonic realm outside of everyday life. 
However, while Bloomsbury’s engagement with form and emotion entailed a 
multidisciplinary dialogue between artists, poets, and fiction writers, the colonial precursors who 
influenced their work and the colonial disciples who adopted their program did so most 
frequently (though not exclusively) through the novel.  Thus, while the texts I investigate range 
from journalism and propaganda to memoirs and economic treatises, most of the authors treated 
in this study were novelists first and foremost, or were so during the period I am looking at: 
Olive Schreiner, William Plomer, Sarah Gertrude Millin, Elizabeth Bowen, and J. M. Coetzee.  
And for good reason.  British poetry was much more firmly rooted in the exclusive halls of 
Oxford and Cambridge, and those colonials who managed to gain entrance to these circles 
tended to come from the heavily Anglicized echelons of colonial society.  (Oscar Wilde, Cecil 
Day Lewis, and Louis MacNeice would probably be the best-know examples, but Roy Campbell 
also gravitated toward Oxford before failing to gain admittance.)  In contrast, Bloomsbury 
presented a much more open, egalitarian, and fluid institutional space, one in which ex-colonial 
transplants like Elizabeth Bowen could move freely in spite of their gender, race, or education, 
and in which aspiring authors like William Plomer could publish work for which their native 
countries lacked a domestic market.  Furthermore, by the time that Bloombury had become a 
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well-known critical orthodoxy across the empire, Virginia Woolf’s novels and her and Leonard 
Woolf’s Hogarth Press had shifted the Group away from art criticism and toward fiction and 
nonfiction prose.60  When for example Plomer sized up Bloomsbury as “a more variegated world 
in which ideas and talent counted more than property or background,” he was reacting more to 
its 1930s prose culture than to its earlier forays into the art world (51). 
As a result, as this modernist epistemology of emotion migrated from Britain to its 
colonies, it became more tightly associated with the novel form and with the Bloomsburian 
aesthetics popularizing it in the colonies.  We can see this Bloomsburian legacy operating quite 
explicitly in this project’s latter three chapters: Plomer and Bowen moved and worked within 
Bloomsbury’s circle; Millin corresponded with many of Bloomsbury’s leading figures; and 
Coetzee’s female heroines openly claim inclusion in a Woolfian tradition of female authors.  But 
we can also trace this genealogy backwards to Shaw’s Fabian Society, whose middle-class 
socialism anticipated Bloomsbury’s own dissenting attitudes toward nationalism, imperialism, 
and patriarchy, and to New Woman writers like Olive Schreiner who paved the way for 
Woolfian feminism.61 Compared, then, to poetry and drama, each of whose institutions of 
circulation and canonization tightly conform to national contours in Ireland and South Africa, the 
colonial/postcolonial novel is a more transnational object, but also one more firmly tied to 
socially, economically, and culturally privileged cosmopolitan aesthetes.62 One need only think 
of the Abbey Theatre’s role in Gaelic cultural nationalism, Johannesburg’s Market Theater’s 
antiapartheid activist productions, or the izibongo (“praise poetry”) lauding national heroes and 
their exploits to witness poetry and drama’s nationalist orientation63; but one could also point to 
the relatively belated rise of the novel across the colonial world, which left novel writing mainly 
in the hands of settler elites during nations’ colonial periods.64 Regardless of the social, cultural, 
 69	  
and political reasons for this bifurcation, its lasting consequence was that a Bloomsburian 
epistemology of emotion coalesced within a particular class (Anglo settler elites) and within a 
certain genre (the novel). 
By tracing this epistemology drift outwards from the British metropole to the colonies, I 
am proposing a spatial correlate to Tyrus Miller’s argument that late modernism opened up 
modernist aesthetic forms to history (Late Modernism).  As I show in the following chapters, 
what differentiated the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South Africans’ adaptations of emotion from their 
Bloomsburian counterparts was how they translated this discourse from the realm of aesthetics 
and philosophy to that of socioeconomic life.  Where for Bloomsbury, Conrad, Ford, and Yeats 
emotion possessed an ideal connection to certain formal arrangements of persons, objects, and 
social situations, the writers I investigate deploy emotion as a way of negotiating between formal 
arrangements of concrete, historically-contingent economic and political institutions.  My 
understanding of emotion as a social phenomenon thus owes much to Raymond Williams’s 
notion of “structures of feeling.”  For Williams, a structure of feeling is a “social experience 
which is still in process” and not yet “built into institutions” (Marxism and Literature, 132).  
Because of their ability to express inchoate social investments, structures of feeling appear 
frequently during a “contraction, fracture, or mutation within a class,” such as the one I have 
been arguing occurred to minoritarian settler classes in the transition from imperialism to a post-
imperial world-system (134).  Since imperialism’s retreat removed the political institutions 
connecting a transnational economy with particular nations, structures of feeling flooded in to fill 
this role, particularly among those transnational classes that decolonization cut adrift from both a 
modernizing economy and anti-Anglo nationalization projects.  At the same time, as Williams 
notes, these structures of feeling also reflect “emergent formations” struggling to develop; or, to 
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put it in the language I used earlier when discussing Ian Baucom, structures of feeling could be 
said to be the epistemological conditions of possibility upon which later capitalist institutions are 
built, the types of mediation necessary in the absence of a formalized imperial world-system. 
For Williams, literature reveals these inchoate social experiences by presenting “a 
significant number of cases of this present and affective kind, which cannot without loss be 
reduced to belief-systems, institutions, or explicit general relationships” (133).  But the particular 
epistemology of literary emotion I am interested in orients individual subjects toward existing 
institutions in a way that remains undertheorized in Williams.  Not simply a linear, 
developmentalist evolution from one type of object (affect) to another (institution), the emotional 
discourse I analyze here is more concerned with acclimating individuals, classes, and nations to 
certain formal configurations of economic and political institutions.   
To this end, I follow affect theorists like Sara Ahmed and Lauren Berlant and critics of 
professionalism like Bruce Robbins and Lisa Fluet who describe social, economic, and cultural 
institutions as soliciting particular emotions and emotional orientations.65 My methodology can 
therefore be said to be descriptive and phenomenological.  Like Sara Ahmed, I treat emotion as 
“an orientation toward something” that affects how “we move toward and away from objects” 
(The Promise of Happiness, 24).  In other words, emotions incorporate the objects we feel 
something toward, while pushing other objects outside their field of effect.  And like Ford’s 
blurred impressionist jumble, affects can orient persons toward multiple, contradictory objects at 
one and the same time in ways that codified ideologies simply cannot.  In particular, ambivalent 
emotions like the ones I confront in the following pages – envy, hysteria, ecstasy, and even 
sentiment – tend to cement weaker attachments to objects than revolutionary passions like anger, 
hate, or love, and therefore are more susceptible to lasting structural contradictions (Sianne Ngai, 
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Ugly Feelings, 3-8.).  But despite these weaker attachments, ambivalent emotions still possess a 
structural logic, imparted through the orientations they make possible, that can be used to chart 
how individual subjects inserted themselves into the interstices of political and economic 
institutions.  They can, that is, be used to trace how groups resolve competing attachments to, 
investments in, and desires for the nation-state and the global capitalist economy into a workable 
formal arrangement.  
As my preceding discussion may indicate, my project is less concerned with theoretical 
distinctions between emotion and affect than in how the two intersect in subjective orientations.  
Where Brian Massumi and other affect theorists distinguish affect – an immediate, subconscious, 
and indescribable “intensity” – from affect’s subjectivization and insertion into narrative 
meaning as emotion, I deal with the self-stylizations transforming affect into emotion – that is, 
with the circuit joining the two together.66 In this respect, this dissertation builds on recent 
scholarship by Amanda Anderson, Rebecca Walkowitz, and Leela Gandhi that analyzes how 
aesthetic or asketic self-cultivation influences larger political, scientific, or ethical 
commitments.67 But my approach to a specifically emotional process of subjective orientation 
entails that these stances are filtered through a phenomenological lens capable of reading the 
retroactive temporality Massumi assigns to emotion.  Because emotion retroactively names 
diverse intensities gathered into a given subjective orientation, it remains a trace through which 
we can read the labor of orientation itself, but only when we understand that orientations produce 
the world we see, inhabit, and most of all feel.  They provide the formal substratum guiding 
radically incommensurate objects, intensities, and ideologies into human worlds – personal 
worlds, national worlds, classed worlds, and even capitalist worlds. 
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In drawing a connection between emotional orientations and the formal movements of the 
world-system, I am not suggesting a deterministic model so much as a dialectical one produced 
in the collision between individual activity and the world-system.  In the Hegelian logic 
underlying dialectic materialism as well as in affect theory, the owl of Minerva flies at dusk: 
knowledge is acquired in retrospect and tends to represent what did happen as the only 
foreseeable outcome.  But if the Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African classes I investigate in the 
following chapters were the pyrrhic victors of modernity, successful in reinventing their 
transnational position within an emotional lexicon even as this shift signaled an end to their 
commercial hegemony, theirs were not the only emotional stylizations present during the long 
twentieth century.  Indeed, much of the existing scholarship on affect and early twentieth century 
literature has focused on how modernist and colonial melancholia resuscitated past social 
formations that had been marginalized by the onrush of modernity: indigenous systems of 
agriculture and communal housing (David Lloyd), or forms of racialized subjectivity (Jonathan 
Flatley).68 But my project does suggest that by paying too close attention to melancholic 
attachments to failed social forms, we have yet to develop a fully realized narrative about the 
role emotion played in defining the contours of the twentieth-century world-system – and, as a 
consequence, the role that literature also played in capitalism’s twentieth-century evolution. 
If such a project entails giving attention to a more conservative set of emotions than the 
messianic, utopian overtones informing recent work on modernism and the emotions, it also risks 
unifying a diverse set of ideological persuasions, writings, and political activities under a broadly 
conservative rubric.  Within such a framework, Shaw’s imperialist socialism meets Bowen’s 
Burkean communitarism, Millin’s pro-apartheid racism meets Coetzee’s anti-apartheid pan-
racialism, and Schreiner’s intimate, feminist economics meets Keynes’s nation-centric 
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macroeconomics.  But this, after all, is precisely what emotions do.  They articulate complicit, 
ambiguous, and sometimes unwanted investments, disrupting political idealism and activism but 
also habituating us to the time of the world.  They describe how we live, feel, and act in 
situations whose complex dynamics exceed the individual, institutional, or ideological.  In short, 
they orient us toward systems beyond our own selves. 
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1 Wallerstein deals with the specificities of the semiperiphery in his classic The Modern World-
System.  See esp. vol. 1, ch. 2, for an in-depth historical examination of the emergence of the 
semiperiphery.  A more targeted overview of the semiperiphery can be found in Stephen Shapiro, 
The Culture and Commerce of the Early American Novel, 35-40. 
 
2 See Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the 
European World-Economy, 1600-1750. 
 
3 By “decolonization,” I mean the longer period from 1880-1970 when Britain ceded 
independent governance first to the white Dominions and then later its Indian and African 
colonies, rather than the narrower period of Indian and African decolonization from 1945-1970.  
Some of the more important mercantile technologies were the telegraph, which created a 
decentered, international news network (Simon Potter, News and the British World); the 
steamship and railroad, which linked distant lands through shipping lanes and rail lines rather 
than physical contiguity (James Belich, Replenishing the Earth, 94-99); and computer 
technologies, which made possible a decentered network of transnational finance capital 
(Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 284-307). 
 
4 Which is not to say that there is any consensus about why capitalism is progressive, or whether 
this is desirable.  The most common approach argues that capitalism is, at its most essential, 
perpetual innovation, a system of “creative destruction” marching ever onward (Joseph 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy).  Marxists critics like David Harvey (The 
Spaces of Global Capitalism) and Fredric Jameson (The Political Unconscious; Postmodernism 
or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism) stress instead capitalism’s inherent contradictions, 
which drive capital to an ever-evolving series of ephemeral solutions.  Others turn instead to 
teleological readings of the self-realization of an ideal “free market,” such as Francis Fukuyama 
does in The End of History and the Last Man. 
 
5 The central works of world-systems theory include Wallerstein, The Modern World-System; 
Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age; Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: 
Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times; and Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos 
and Governance in the Modern World System. Other noteworthy works include Janet Abu-
Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, and Kenneth 
Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy. 
 
6 Both Marxist and Schumpeterian critics discuss creative destruction but often draw entirely 
inverse conclusions from it.  According to David Harvey, “Both Karl Marx and Joseph 
Schumpeter wrote at length on the 'creative-destructive' tendencies inherent in capitalism. While 
Marx clearly admired capitalism's creativity he [...] strongly emphasised its self-destructiveness. 
The Schumpeterians have all along gloried in capitalism's endless creativity while treating the 
destructiveness as mostly a matter of the normal costs of doing business" (The Enigma of 
Capital, 46). 
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7 Fredric Jameson notes that the modernist ideology of literary form advocates an “inner dynamic 
of perpetual innovation, which – like the restless and irrepressible expansion of capitalism itself 
– necessarily pushes ever further beyond its own boundaries, into new ‘techniques’ as well as 
new kinds of content” (A Singular Modernity, 151).  This is the definition of modernity typically 
deployed in investigations of world literary space, as for instance in Pascale Casanova’s World 
Republic of Letters: “Modernity’s connection with fashion is a sign of its instability.  It is also 
inevitably an occasion of rivalry and competition: because the modern is by definition always 
new, and therefore open to challenge, the only way in literary space to be truly modern is to 
contest the present as outmoded – to appeal to a still yet more present present, as yet unknown, 
which thus becomes the newest present” (91). 
 
8 Even for male writers like Shaw and Coetzee, feminism, or a women’s tradition of novel 
writing, are central concerns of their politics and fiction.  In addition to Shaw’s strong female 
protagonists (Major Barbara, Saint Joan, Ann Whitefield), one could point to his Intelligent 
Women’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism as a sustained, if sometimes patronizing, attempt to 
connect socialism with feminism.  As for Coetzee, his female narrators and protagonists (Magda, 
Susan Barton, Elizabeth Curren, Elizabeth Costello) actively rewrite the masculine canon 
(Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Joyce’s Ulysses) in the hopes of discovering an alternative, female 
novelistic tradition. 
 
9 The essays collected in the South Atlantic Quarterly special issue on “Atlantic Genealogies” 
(ed. Ian Baucom) contains a representative sampling of recent work on the black Atlantic.  Laura 
Chrisman criticizes Gilroy’s black Atlantic for “a new form of new World or diasporic 
vanguardism” that obscures the “circuits of capital within and against which African and 
diasporic black peoples operated.”  Of particular concern to Chrisman is how Atlantic “influence 
was heavily mediated, modified, and interrogated by local and national strains in South African 
political cultures” (an interested shared by the present project) (Postcolonial Contraventions, 8-
9).  Peter O’Neill and David Lloyd’s recent collection The Black and Green Atlantic: Cross-
Currents of the Africa and Irish Diasporas, attempts to place Ireland into dialogue with Gilroy’s 
black Atlantic. 
 
10 Specific approaches to non-linear literary history differ, but some of the more prevalent 
include psychoanalysis (Cooppan, Worlds Within), the longue durée (Dimock, Through Other 
Continents; Peter Hitchock, The Long Space: Transnationalism and Postcolonial Form), 
Benjaminian historicism (Ian Baucom, Specters of the Atlantic; David Lloyd, Irish Times: 
Temporalities of Modernity; Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics 
of Modernism), textual circulation (Damrosch, What Is World Literature?), and millennialism 
(Jennifer Wenzel, Bulletproof: Afterlives of Anticolonial Prophecy in South African and 
Beyond). 
 
11 While the structural has normally been understood as a deterministic frame effacing 
contingency and individual agency, scholars working on both gender/queer studies and world 
literature have begun to outline a more nuanced, dialectical notion of structure.  For example, 
Joseph Valente argues that Victorian masculinity functioned as a “discordia concours… which 
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can only be understood in structural terms… [It is] a deep structure irreducible to the contents 
that it organizes… [But] it is not impossible to delineate, provided one finds the appropriate level 
of abstraction” (The Myth of Irish Manliness 4).  It is precisely this sort of flexible, auto-
organizing structure that I will be tracing across Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature. 
 
12 For a fuller discussion of the English exceptionalism present in the Cultural Studies 
movement, see Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island, 182-98, and Peter Kalliney, Cities of Affluence and 
Anger, 11-20. 
 
13 Laclau and Moufee’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics is usually taken as the canonical example of the move away from class and toward 
identity politics.  But a full history of this turn would trace it both backwards to Louis Althusser 
and Nicos Poulantzas’s uncoupling of Marxism’s historical ontology from class and forward to 
Balibar and Wallerstein’s Race, Nation, Class and Hall’s “Race, Articulation and Societies 
Structured in Dominance.” 
 
14 My examples allude to the New African petit-bourgeois intelligentsia within which Tim 
Couzens and Jennifer Wenzel situate H. I. E. Dhlomo (Couzens, The New African; Wenzel, 
Bulletproof) and Rob Nixon’s excellent literary-critical study of environmental damage and 
poverty, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. 
 
15 I have in mind Ranajit Guha (The Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency) and the 
Subaltern Studies movement that he helped inspire. We might also note that a presumed 
isomorphism between the middle-class, the nation, and the novel has become a dominant 
paradigm for much of literary studies – for example, in Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the 
English Novel, Ian Watt’s the Rise of the Novel, and Nancy Armstrong’s Desire and Domestic 
Fiction. 
 
16 We seem to be exiting this period in the last decade or so.  Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, Etienne 
Balibar, and Jacques Rancière have all embraced universalism as a foundation for radical 
democratic politics.  Badiou’s work on St. Paul bests sums up this critical trend and calls 
attention to the Christian undertones often inflecting such works: “What matters, man or woman, 
Jew or Greek, slave or free man, is that differences carry the universal that happens to them like 
a grace” (Saint Paul: The Foundation for Universalism, 106). 
 
17 Some of the more popular and influential of these studies include Nancy L. Clark and William 
H. Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid; Heather Deegan, The Politics of the 
New South African: Apartheid and After; Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa; and 
William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa. 
 
18 According to Saul Dubow, “Geared to the needs of a unified white nation-state, [South 
Africanism] stressed virtues of moderation and conciliation.  Emphasis was laid on the need to 
create broadly based institutions and to nurture a shared national culture as a counterpart to 
successful state-building” (A Commonwealth of Knowledge, 5-6).  See also Belinda Bozzoli, The 
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Political Nature of a Ruling Class, and M. Cardo, “Culture, Citizenship and White South 
Africanism, c. 1924-1948.” 
 
19 Of course, I am not arguing that all Anglo-South Africans were liberals – such a statement 
would be patently absurd, and would contradict the very real segments of Anglo-South Africa 
who supported apartheid.  But I am claiming that to the extent that Anglo-South Africans did 
distance themselves from a more general, and usually pro-apartheid, “white South African” 
community, this was done through the trope of liberalism. 
 
20 The turning point in Irish history, according to the Unionist and anti-Catholic O’Grady, was 
the arrival and dissemination of Christianity in Ireland.  The early Christians, he avers, 
demonstrated “a lack of straightforward, bold and honest dealing, which afterwards became a 
national vice, so that many of our great saints were also great liars, and fell under the scorn and 
contempt of those who had no religion at all but simply preserved the old instinctive Pagan 
abhorrence of falsehood and doubledealing” (The Story of Ireland, 64). 
 
21 Jameson’s “singular modernity” model is often compared to the “alternative modernities” 
model popularized by Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., Alternative Modernities.  The main point 
of contention between Jameson and Gaonkar is whether a “singular modernity” model conscripts 
non-Western nations into a Eurocentric modernization project, or whether “alternative 
modernities” in fact cover over systemic inequalities by erasing them underneath the figure of 
multicultural “difference.”  The Jamesonian position would argue that, as Nicholas Brown 
observes, “the identification of capitalism with ‘the West’ – the elevation of a heuristic into an 
explanatory concept – is a mystification that serves to moralize what is an essentially systemic 
phenomenon” (Utopian Generations, 7).  I will be arguing that, since the semiperiphery’s 
“modernity” involves mediating between disparate economic systems, it necessitates a singular 
modernity approach.  But rather than claiming that the singular model is the only acceptable way 
to read capitalist modernity, I would point out that the singular and alternative modernity models 
possess different heuristic values in different national contexts.  See n. 49 for one such 
comparison. 
 
22 This value-adding can take many forms: the polishing of raw materials into finished goods, the 
transformation of mere objects into salable commodities, or the consumption of agricultural 
goods as fuel for other forms of industrial production.  
 
23 Jameson takes E. M. Forster’s Howards End as his exemplary metropolitan text.  His full 
explication of Forster’s “modernist style” is as follows: “The other pole of the relationship that 
defines him fundamentally and essentially in his “imperial” function – the persons of the 
colonized – remains structurally occluded, and cannot but so remain, necessarily, as a results of 
the limits of the system, and the way in which internal national or metropolitan life is absolutely 
sundered from this other world henceforth in thrall to it.  But since representation, and cognitive 
mapping as such, is governed by an “intention towards totality,’ those limits must also be drawn 
back into the system, which marks them by an image, the image of the Great North Road as 
infinity: a new spatial language therefore – modernist “style” – now becomes the marker and 
substitute… of the unrepresentable totality.  With this a new kind of value emerges (and it is this 
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which is generally loosely and misleadingly referred to as modernist aestheticism): for if 
“infinity” (and “imperialism”) are bad or negative in Forster, its perception, as a bodily and 
poetic process, is no longer that, but rather a positive achievement and enlargement of our 
sensorium” (“Modernism and Imperialism,” 163). 
 
24 I am combining two of Jameson’s essays here: “Third-World Literature in an Era of 
Multinational Capitalism” and “Modernism and Imperialism.”  Because each of these essays 
concerns only one half of the world-system’s dialectic, extrapolating a unified model of the 
world-system from them requires treating them together.  Indeed, I would argue that the tension 
in Jameson’s work between sweeping generalizations and individual close readings demands 
such cross-referencing.  At the risk of over-systematizing a complex oeuvre, we could trace 
Jameson’s more recent writings on literature and the dialectic all the way back to The Political 
Unconscious, as Nicholas Brown does when he notes that “ Third-World… ‘social allegory” is 
not substantially different from the mode of interpretation as ‘socially symbolic act’ that he 
recommends for European texts in The Political Unconscious (Brown, Utopian Generations, 8). 
 
25 One of the most puzzling aspects of Jameson’s influential “Modernism and Imperialism” essay 
is his use of Forster’s Howards End as his prototypical modernist text – a stretch, given Forster’s 
fairly conventional narrative style vis-à-vis more canonical modernists like Conrad, Woolf, and 
Joyce.  For persuasive critiques of Jameson’s overly rigid distinctions between First and Third 
World, see Aijaz Ahmad, “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‘National Allegory’” and 
Majorie Howes, Yeats’s Nations: Gender, Class, and Irishness, 10-15.  For guarded defenses of 
Jameson’s readings of imperialism and non-Western literature, see Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island, 
23-28, and Nicholas Brown, Utopian Generations, 7-12. 
 
26 For an overview of mercantile economics and their role in peripheral underdevelopment, see 
Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the 
European World-Economy, 1600-1750; and Samir Amin, “Underdevelopment and Dependence 
in Black Africa – Origins and Contemporary Forms.” 
 
27 For Jamesonian treatments of literary form and the world-system, see Neil Lazarus, 
Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World, and Nicholas Brown, Utopian 
Generations: The Political Horizon of Twentieth-Century Literature.  For diffusionist models of 
the literary world-system, see Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees; and Casanova, The World Republic 
of Letters. 
 
28 See Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral 
Capitalism; Eurocentrism; The Law of Worldwide Value; and Andre Gunder Frank, World 
Accumulation, 1492-1789; The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (with 
Barry K. Gills); and ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age.  Because he believes the 
world-system preexists capitalism and is more Sinocentric than Eurocentric, Frank prefers the 
singular “world system” to Wallerstein’s plural “world-systems” label.  This difference has 
implications for pre-capitalist history – does it conform to cycles of development, just like 
capitalism does? – and future prognostications – are we exiting the parenthetical “European age” 
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and returning to the normative “Asian age”? – but few for capitalist history proper (c. 1450-
present). 
 
29 See Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” 14, and Samir Amin, Unequal 
Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. 
 
30 Baucom aligns his work with a long tradition of scholarship linking the novel to mobile 
property, the middle class, and emerging capitalist markets.  See Michael McKeon, The Origins 
of the English Novel, 1600-1740; Catherine Gallagher, Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of 
Women Writers in the Marketplace, 1670-1820; Leonard J. Davis, Factual Fictions: The Origins 
of the English Novel; and Deirdre Shaun Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market 
Culture, and the Business of Inner Meaning. 
 
31 See Belich 437- 55; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the 
Making of the Modern World Economy.  Belich and Pomeranz’s work is to some extent 
anticipated by Rosa Luxembourg, who in The Accumulation of Capital describes the integration 
of peasant agricultural economies into metropolitan grain markets during the nineteenth century. 
 
32 On the dispersion of production throughout the developing world, see Harvey, The Enigma of 
Capital. 
 
33 Other, one might say, than the rubric of “difference” itself; or, of course, the definition of 
structure that I am describing here. 
 
34 For an example of how colonial luxury consumption revolutionized the Atlantic economy, see 
William Gervase Clarence-Smith and Steven Topik, eds., The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, 1500-1989 (esp. Topik, “The Integration of the World Coffee 
Market”).  
 
35 On the importance of port cities to the Atlantic economy, see Franklin W. Knight and Peggy L. 
Liss, eds., Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650-1850 
and David Harris Sacks, The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700. 
 
36 John Darwin characters the British Empire as “the core of a larger British ‘world-system’ 
managed from London,” one which directed investments and credits outward from London 
across the Empire (The Empire Project, 1).  Like Darwin, P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins locate 
British imperialism’s lasting legacy in London’s financial distinct, in which London “become the 
center of a system of global payments that continued to expand right down to the outbreak of war 
in 1914” (Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 468). 
 
37 On slavery in the Atlantic, see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed 
Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic; on 
sugar and cotton farming, see Philip D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: 
Essays in Atlantic History; on silver and gold mining, see Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient. 
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38 Adam Smith captures the psychosocial dynamics underlying credit’s fictional values in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments: “The fall from riches to poverty, as it commonly occasions the most 
real distress to the sufferer, so it seldom fails to excite the most sincere commiseration of the 
spectator” (144).  In a transnational mercantile economy premised on credit, Smith believes that 
all merchants must possess a sympathetic connection to one another; otherwise, profit-mongering 
would tempt merchants to disregard credit and effectively ruin one another.  Of course, such 
considerations are not extended to the lower classes: “We despise a beggar; and, though his 
importunities may exhort an alms from us, he is scarce ever the object of any true 
commiseration” (144).  Smith’s focus is on a transnational bourgeoisie who transfer credit 
between each other, rather than with economic equality or blanket human compassion. 
 
39 On the newly intensified speed of the global economy, and the technologies that made it 
possible, see Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, and Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics. 
 
40 As I will explain in more detail below, I mean to distinguish these minoritarian settler classes 
from ones in which Anglo settlers eventually became they governing majority, as they in the 
United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
 
41 Interestingly, McClintock uses Northern Ireland as one of her three primary examples of a 
location for which the term “postcolonial” seems entirely unsuited (the other two being South 
Africa and the West Bank) (Imperial Leather, 12). 
 
42 See Lloyd, “Regarding Ireland” and Anomalous States; Cleary, Outrageous Fortune: Capital 
and Culture in Modern Ireland; and Kiberd, Inventing Ireland. 
 
43 See Thomas Bartlett, “What Ish My Nation?”, and Joe Cleary, Outrageous Fortune 20-22, for 
an overview of these objections. 
 
44 Irish nationalist history has often been a more popular than academic discipline.  Much of Irish 
nationalist history is taken from the work of Eoin MacNeill, the “father” of modern Irish 
historiography.  But MacNeill’s work was usually vulgarised by non-academic historians eager 
to fit it into a tidy narrative of Irish patriots fighting heroically against English colonialism.  John 
Hutchinson explains that “teachers in the new state were instructed to stress the continuity of the 
separatist idea from Tone to Pearse and to imbue their pupils with the national idealism of 
Thomas Davis and Patrick Pearse” (“Irish Nationalism,” 100). 
 
45 See Conor Cruise O’Brien, Writers and Politics: Essays and Criticism; F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland 
Since the Famine; and R. F. Foster, Paddy and Mr. Punch: Connections in English and Irish 
History. 
 
46 Some of the more relevant of Quinn and Canny’s works include Quinn, Ireland and America: 
Their Early Associations, 1500-1640 and Canny, Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-
1800 and Kingdom and Colony: Ireland and the Atlantic World, 1560-1800. 
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47 Amy Clukey places Anglo-Irish literature within a transatlantic plantation culture in 
“Plantation Modernism: Irish, Caribbean, and US Fiction 1890-1950.”  For a more economic 
analysis of Ireland’s role in an Atlantic world-system, see Denis O’Hearn, The Atlantic 
Economy: Britain, the US, and Ireland. 
 
48 See, for example, R. Milkman, “Contradictions of Semiperipheral Development: The South 
African Case.” 
 
49 The resonance world-systemic models find in South Africa and Ireland points to a world-
systemic explanation for the uneven success singular and alternative modernity models have 
achieved in different geographical regions.  In countries like Ireland and South Africa, where the 
gap between highly developed and underdeveloped economic formations are glaringly apparent, 
it is hard not to see the contradiction that Nirvana Tanoukhi identities in alternative modernities 
discourse: “If…the ethos of development is the historical condition that allowed the two terms 
“alternative” and “modernity” to be sensibly conjoined, what seems most troubling about the 
anachronistic redeployment of “alternative modernities” is that it should bear some trace of the 
actual decomposition that befell the paradigm of development, and which broke the once 
reassuring tie between cultural ascendance and economic progress” (“The Scale of World 
Literature,” 17-8).  In contrast, Pheng Cheah observes that alternative modernities discourse has 
been most successful in Asia, where a newly renascent China has sought to articulate its growing 
economic strength within an image of modernity that circumvents the traditionally Eurocentric 
overtones of “modernity” (Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights, 120-
141). 
 
50 My discussion of the clachan system is indebted to David Lloyd, Irish Times, 40-45, and 
Kevin Whelan, “Pre- and Post-Famine Landscape Change,” 19-33. 
 
51 Whately’s economic writings first returned to critical attention with Thomas A. Boylan and 
Timothy P. Foley’s Political Economy and Colonial Ireland, which remains one of the best 
analyses of Whately’s thought and its relation to colonial economics.  For a comparison of 
Trevelyan and Whately’s views on Irish consumerism, see Bigelow 61-4 and 119-22. 
 
52 In a fascinating and ambitious study, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the 
Rise of the Anglo World, 1783-1939, James Belich describes how settler colonies and urban 
metropolises reinforced one another’s growth during the long nineteenth century.  According to 
Belich, urban metropolises like New York and London funded “Anglo booms” – sudden colonial 
expansions to new territories – which soon “busted” and were afterwards developed into niche 
markets for urban consumers.  The two thus acted as a sort of feedback loop: the more 
metropolises invested (in funds and colonists), the more territories became niche producers for 
cities, and the more those cities themselves grew.  I talk about the periodic waves governing 
these expansions in more depth in chapter 2. 
 
53 In this study, I use the labels “Boer” and “Afrikaner” when historically accurate for the time 
period.  The terminological change from “Boer” to “Afrikaner” took place in the early decades of 
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the twentieth century, coinciding with the rise of the South African Union and Afrikaner cultural 
nationalism. 
 
54 One of the common anti-imperial critiques of the British working class is that it was buoyed 
by imperial prosperity and thereby co-opted into the British imperial mission.  See Troy M. 
Boone, Youth of Darkest London: Working-Class Children at the Heart of Victorian Empire. 
 
55 See The Long Twentieth Century, esp. pp. 15-31. 
 
56 For Arrighi, these moments are intended to map onto Marx’s formula for capital expansion, 
M-C-M1 (money-commodity-money1).  Periods of finance capitalism correspond to M and M1, 
while periods of commodity production correspond to C.  Marx’s famous analysis of the formula 
M-C-M1 can be found in Capital, vol. 1, ch. 4. 
 
57 Ernst Mandel cites similar periods of capital growth and economic crisis to Arrighi’s in Long 
Waves of Capitalist Development, 28-48.  Arrighi distinguishes his “systemic cycles” from the 
Kondratieff cycles Mandel, Frank, and Wallerstein employ, but this theoretical distinction has 
more importance for earlier, longer cycles of accumulation than it does for the twentieth century.  
Since Arrighi and Mandel agree on the broad contours of capitalism’s twentieth century history, 
I will be using Arrighi’s cycle of accumulation and other world-systems theorists’ Kondratieff 
cycles interchangeably. 
 
58 Both Arrighi and Frank believe China is in the process of supplanting the United States as the 
global economic power.  See Frank, ReOrient, and Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing. 
 
59 See, for example, Roger Fry’s “An Essay in Aesthetics.” On the Kantian formalism underlying 
this essay, see Rachel Teukolsky, The Literature Eye: Victorian Art Writing and Modernist 
Aesthetics, 192-234. 
 
60 See John H. Willis, Leonard and Virginia Woolf as Publishers: The Hogarth Press, 1917-41. 
 
61 The essays collected in Ann L. Ardis and Leslie W. Lewis, Women’s Experience of Modernity, 
1875-1945 reconstruct a line of women’s fiction stretching from the New Women to Bloomsbury 
and beyond.  See also Rita Felski, The Gender of Modernity; and Elaine Showalter, A Literature 
of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Brontë to Lessing.  On the Fabian influence on 
Bloomsbury, see Michael Holroyd, “Bloomsbury and the Fabians.” 
 
62 For studies that tie the novel to transnational institutions rather than national ones, see 
Margaret Cohen and Carolyn Dever, eds., The Literary Channel: The Inter-National Invention of 
the Novel; Margaret Cohen, The Novel and the Sea; Mary Helen McMurran, The Spread of 
Novels: Translation and Prose Fiction in the Eighteenth Century; and Rebecca Walkowitz, “The 
Location of Literature: The Transnational Book and the Migrant Author” and “Comparison 
Literature.” 
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63 There is a growing body of scholarship on the Abbey Theatre’s nationalist politics.  See Cathy 
Leeney, “Violence on the Abbey Theatre Stage”; Lionel Pilkington, “The Abbey Theatre and the 
Irish State”; P. J. Mathews, Revival: The Abbey Theatre, Sinn Féin, the Gaelic League, and the 
Co-operative Movement.  On the connection between South African theater and nationalism, see 
Loren Kruger, The Drama of South Africa: Plays, Pageants and Publics Since 1910.  The link 
between Irish nationalism and poetry has been explored most thoroughly in relation to W. B. 
Yeats.  See Marjorie Howes, Yeats’s Nations: Gender, Class, and Irishness, and Anthony 
Bradley, Imagining Ireland in the Poetry and Plays of W. B. Yeats: Nation, Class, and State.  
The scholarship on South African poetry and nationalism is much sparser, but the nationalist 
orientation of South African verse comes across clearly in the anthologies seeking to define a 
peculiarly “South African” poetic tradition.  See, for example, Denis Hirson, The Lava of This 
Land: South African Poetry, 1960-1996. 
 
64 Much of the reason for this revolved around the colonial publishing industry.  After the Act of 
Union, the Irish book trade effectively collapsed and would not recover until well into the 
twentieth century (Charles Benson, “Printers and Booksellers in Dublin 1800-1850”; Terry 
Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger, 145-7).  Meanwhile, printing in early twentieth-
century Africa revolved around small missionary presses circulating magazines and newspapers 
rather than books; and even today African printing produces far more trade and technical 
manuals than novels (Charles Larson, The Ordeal of the African Writer). 
 
65 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness and The Politics of Emotion; Berlant, Cruel Optimism; 
Robbins, Upward Mobility an the Common Good: Toward a Literary History of the Welfare 
State; Fluet, “Hit Man Modernism” and “Immaterial Labors: Ishiguro, Class, and Affect.” 
 
66 Massumi develops this argument in Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, 23-
45.  Lawrence Grossberg makes a similar distinction between emotion and affect: “Unlike 
emotion, affective states are neither structured narratively nor organized in response to our 
interpretations of situations” (we gotta get out of this place, 81). 
 
67 Anderson, The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment; 
Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the Nation; Gandhi, “After Virtue: Notes on 
Early-Twentieth-Century Antimaterialism” and “Spirits of Non-Violence: A Transnational 
Genealogy for Ahimsa.” 
 
68 Lloyd, Irish Times: Temporalities of Modernity; Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and 
the Politics of Modernism.  Both Lloyd and Flatley’s studies are working off of Benjamin’s 
outline of a messianic historical scholarship in “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and The 
Arcades Project. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
FICTIONS OF DEVOLUTION: OLIVE SCHREINER, BERNARD SHAW, AND THE 
SENTIMENTAL ADMINISTRATION OF EMPIRE 
 
 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, writers from across the British Empire 
became widely preoccupied with a most unliterary topic: colonial constitutions.  In Ireland, 
debates over whether Ireland should be granted its own devolved parliament (the so-called Home 
Rule controversy) spilled over into literary works by Edward Maeve (The Town), George Moore 
(A Bending of the Bough), and Anthony Trollope (The Landleaguers), while important historical 
and literary works (such as Standish O’Grady’s monumental History of Ireland: Heroic Period 
and Early Bardic Literatures of Ireland, Douglas Hyde’s The Necessity of De-Anglicizing the 
Irish Nation, and Lady Augusta Gregory’s retellings of Irish folklore) provided a vocabulary of 
national particularity that political activists like Maud Gonne and Arthur Griffith exploited in 
their calls for Irish legislative autonomy.1 Similarly, in the build-up to the second Anglo-Boer 
War, Olive Schreiner – then the leading artistic and intellectual voice in the Cape Colony – 
authored a number of pamphlets and journal articles condemning British mining magnates’ 
erosion of the liberal principles contained in the Cape Colony’s constitution.  In this, she was 
countered by a flood of propagandistic fiction from pro-imperial Britons who pointed to the 
Boers’ inability to treat Africans humanely as an index of their inability to be ruled by any other 
than despotic measures.  Arthur Conan Doyle, for instance, lauded the chivalry of British 
soldiers during their occupation of the independent Boer republics of the Traansvaal and the 
Orange Free State in The War in South Africa: Its Cause and Conduct, and Rudyard Kipling took 
similar stands in his equally jingoistic “A Sahib’s War” and “The Captive.”2 
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 However, despite the pervasive presence of constitutionalist discourses in fin-de-siècle 
colonial fiction, literary critics have had a difficult time contextualizing the more progressive 
elements of Home Rulism.  In short, Home Rule constitutionalism entailed a demand by settler 
classes and rising native bourgeoisies from across the British Empire that legislative control over 
domestic matters be ceded to devolved local parliaments.  Most often, critics treat the individual 
Home Rulists who made these demands as cultural nationalists uneasy about majority rule 
(Moore, Yeats, Schreiner) or as closet imperialists (Bernard Shaw, Bram Stoker, John X. 
Merriman).  Otherwise they are seen as idiosyncratic mixtures of contradictory or archaic 
political factions, such as “Tory radical” (Roy Foster’s term for Charles Stewart Parnell), 
“Anglo-Celtic” (Valente’s for Stoker), or “colonial feminist” (McClintock’s for Schreiner).3 The 
reason for this incoherence, I suggest, is that scholars have read Home Rule constitutionalists 
within the frameworks of nationalism, postcolonialism, modernization theory, or humanitarian 
internationalism, frameworks which themselves obscure the transnational networks informing 
these movements.4 Reading constitutionalism as a harbinger of the nation-state precludes from 
discussion the alternative, non-teleological temporalities instituted by devolution – what Derrida 
would call the “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present” (Specters of Marx, xviii). 
Indeed, if we are to see constitutionalism outside of its most pejorative, limiting terms – as a 
problematically conservative movement, either “not yet” fully nationalist or troublingly 
“derivative” of imperial political forms (Chakrabarty and Chatterjee) – we have to recognize 
constitutionalism as a contested, liminal, and creative site whose dialectical engagement with 
fictional forms (both borrowing from and contributing to) reflects its geocultural role.  This is not 
to suggest that geopolitics and global economics take precedence over local nationalist concerns, 
or that they overdetermine fictional productions.  Instead, a geocultural perspective analyzes how 
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the contradictions contained within colonial constitutionalism, and particularly those 
ambivalences worked through in fictional engagements with constitutionalism, act as cultural 
hinges translating the incompatible values, ideas, and socioeconomic vocabularies of one region 
to another while imagining those discrete systems as an orchestrated totality. 
Colonial constitutionalists were at least as concerned with articulating a continued place 
for local Anglo elites within Britain’s late-nineteenth century “New Imperialist” expansionism as 
they were with laying the legal foundation for future nation-states.  Citing John Burrow, Saul 
Dubow explains that “the attachment of the new English settlements across the Atlantic to 
ancient constitutionalism was to be perhaps more deep-seated and lasting than in England itself,” 
adding that “respect for parliamentary sovereignty was closely bound up with recognition of and 
respect for [the colonies’] status and achievements” (Burrow 236-7; Dubow 130).  Given that 
colonies were held in a state of exception outside British legal norms and subject to the arbitrary 
power of autocratic decisions from the Colonial Office, the rights and powers designated by 
colonial constitutions served as an important check on British despotism in the colonies.5 Though 
Britain still oversaw the foreign affairs, military obligations, and international trade 
arrangements of these colonies, constitutional devolution provided them with authority over 
domestic issues, curtailing Britain’s legal right to interfere in the day-to-day proceedings of local 
administration.   
Over the period stretching from roughly 1879 to 1903, however, the British government 
increasingly removed social, economic, and political power from local Anglo elites and took a 
more direct hand in administering the subject peoples and material resources of numerous 
colonies, foremost among them Ireland and South Africa.  While the form in which this was 
accomplished differed drastically from country to country, the underlying concept was 
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nevertheless the same.  For example, in Ireland the Land Acts that ended the widespread agrarian 
unrest of the Land War (1880-1892)6 stripped the Anglo-Irish gentry of final say over the 
distribution of Ireland’s farmland, establishing in its place the British government’s right to 
guide transactions between tenants and landlords.  Likewise, in South Africa imperial protection 
for capitalist adventurers such as Cecil Rhodes tacitly endorsed the right of “foreign” or 
“Uitlander” Englishmen to expropriate South African wealth for the metropole without regard 
for local imperial hierarchies.  It is important, in this regard, to understand that when Anglo-Irish 
and English South Africans complained about autocratic imperial decisions – such as when Isaac 
Butt lamented that “misgovernment has driven [men] into revolt” – the anger was rarely directed 
against imperialism in itself but rather against a particular guise that, like the Land Acts and 
adventurist capitalism, circumvented Anglo settler institutions in its search for a more profitable 
imperial dispensation (quoted in Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, 141). 
 And yet paying too much attention to the admonitory quality of many pro-constitutional 
utterances risks effacing the utopian promise embedded in constitutionalist discourse, which 
existed in an uneasy tension with its language of dissent. During the final three decades of the 
nineteenth century, and in response to the mounting imperial competition from Germany, Russia, 
and the United States, British and colonial pro-imperialists began to reconceive of the British 
Empire as a plural “network of [quasi] self-governing nations” known as “Greater Britain.” In 
doing so, they initiated a debate as to whether all Anglo settler colonies could accede to 
responsible government in a multi-national Greater Britain and, if so, what form such a 
collectivity would take.  Significantly, if devolution was to be seen as a first step on the path to a 
new, second-order, post-imperial unity, Greater Britonists believed that in the absence of 
common governmental institutions a “strong” “connection between our Colonies and ourselves” 
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could exist, as Joseph Chamberlain put it, as “a sentimental tie, and a sentimental tie only” 
(quoted in McMahon 186).  Unsurprisingly, among Greater Britonists there were serious doubts, 
most of which revolved around the troublesome territories of Ireland and South Africa, as to 
whether colonies with a minimal Anglo presence could develop the sentimental competency 
necessary for self-government.  For example, for Sir George Campbell, the former Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, Ireland possessed  “race difficulties in the way of self-governing institutions 
with which we are familiar in other colonies, but in a more aggravated form” (quoted in Dunne 
163).  Ireland was thus “in a position more analogous to that of the South African colonies, in 
which only British authority prevents collision between a colonist majority and a native 
minority” (Dunne 162). 
 This chapter explores the role that Home Rule constitutionalists’ fiction played in 
reconciling the multiple – and often conflicting – valences in which constitutionalism was 
articulated: as a utopian promise of imperial regeneration whose political form was unsuitable to 
semiperipheral regions; as governmental decentralization that was the obverse of socioeconomic 
expansion; and as a sentimental community whose claims to reciprocal affection seemed to falter 
outside of racially homogenous British settlements.  But rather than treating these ambivalences 
as a pathology particular to Anglo-South Africans’ and the Anglo-Irish’s “metrocolonial” 
(Valente, Dracula) position vis-à-vis British imperialism, I focus instead on how Anglo-Irish and 
Anglo-South African fiction mediated between liberal-devolutionary ideology and economic 
neocolonialism.  By articulating a complex synchronization of asymmetrical sentiments, Anglo-
South African and Anglo-Irish writers were able to translate these incoherencies into a unified 
image that allowed Britons and colonials alike to conceive of the empire as a dynamic but 
nevertheless integrated whole.  To this end, I compare Irish and South African affective 
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economies as opposite extremes of a boom-and-bust cycle that consolidated the British world-
system at the same time as it differentiated particular territories into varying asymmetrical 
relationships with the British metropole.  The intensity with which these two regions were thrust 
into new socioeconomic co-dependency with British capitalism highlighted the failure of 
constitutionalism to construct the sentimental bonds necessary for an organic, neo-British global 
community; but, by exacerbating those deficiencies, Britain’s “syncopated” economic 
expansionism in Ireland and South Africa also enabled Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African 
writers to imagine a “devolved” modernity whose varying levels of development, liberal 
institutions, and asymmetrical sentimental attachments could be managed by the very object they 
seemed to preclude: local Anglo constitutions. 
  The fiction of two progressive Anglo constitutionalists—George Bernard Shaw and 
Olive Schreiner—dramatizes sentiment’s inability to mold disparate classes, races, and regions 
into a homogenous and equitable totality.  Both understood emotional deficiencies as expressive 
of a more fundamental impasse between “parasitical” and healthy occupations: in Shaw’s case, 
the “parasitic” landlords who siphoned off wealth without working versus the productive worker; 
in Schreiner’s case, “parasitic” women living off the spoils of men’s activity.  This organic 
imagery provided each with a vocabulary for explaining how and why modernization appeared 
to be failing, as well as for explaining how colonial devolution could eliminate “parasitical” 
groups.  In order to contextualize the overlap between organicism, parasitism, and 
constitutionalism in Shaw and Schreiner’s writings, the first part of this chapter explores the 
historical and theoretical concerns informing fin-de-siècle constitutionalism.  It highlights in 
particular the urgency constitutionalism assumed in South Africa and Ireland during the period 
between the two Anglo-Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-1902).  I then turn to Shaw’s “post-Big 
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House” play, John Bull’s Other Island (1904), and Schreiner’s Story of an African Farm (1883).  
These texts attempt to rehabilitate liberal notions of individualism, labor, and self-government by 
shifting their vantage from spontaneous bursts of emotion to impersonal institutions tasked with 
managing asymmetrical affections: the liberal-socialist state, global consumer markets, and 
secularized humanitarianism.  But they do so by simultaneously staging emotional management 
on a thematic level and self-consciously performing fiction’s singular affinity for orchestrating 
affective responses.  Both demonstrate how certain stock forms – particularly the marriage plot 
and the parable – transform “parasitic” leisure classes into “productive” cogs in the social 
organism.  By suggesting that the marriage plot can direct England’s erotic energies toward 
building up Ireland, or that the parable can express sympathy across gender, class, and 
“civilizational” divides, Schreiner and Shaw suggest that parasitical formations can be eradicated 
through the enlightened coordination of sentiment.  Fiction, like the state, can syncopate 
emotions and mold them into a “healthy” organism, blending together sentiment and aversion, 
advanced civilization and stunted primitivism.  Poised in between “parasitic” and healthy classes, 
nations, and genders, Schreiner and Shaw’s fictions stage the sort of asentimental guidance they 
believed colonial constitutions could interpose between discrepant levels of metropolitan and 
colonial development – and, naturally, between the sentiments these levels of developments 
entailed. 
 
Constitutionalism Between the Anglo-Boer Wars 
The final decades of the nineteenth century were a time of great anxiety for pro-imperial 
apologists.  The Long Depression of 1873-96 sent prices plunging and sparked fears that the long 
period of the Pax Brittanica was finally coming to an end.  At the same time, increased 
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competition from cheaper-produced American and German goods put pressure on Britain to find 
new outlets for its industrial commodities and to maximize efficiency.  Britain responded by 
aggressively expanding its imperial reach in Africa and Asia in hopes of finding new markets for 
its products, bringing it into conflict with emerging rivals Germany and Russia.  But this 
geopolitical competition only deepened anxieties that Germany would establish its own global 
empire and ultimately undermine the British Empire’s international security.  Even more 
troubling, the highly publicized failures of the first and second Anglo-Boer Wars and the Battle 
of Khartoum highlighted just how tenuous Britain’s occupation of its colonies territories was, as 
well as raised questions about the potential degeneration of the English racial stock.7  
One result of this interlocking series of crises, as evident in “imperial Gothic” tales like 
Stoker’s Dracula and Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, was a pervasive 
concern with the degeneration of Britain’s empire.8  But this was far from the only reaction to 
imperial unrest.  Many political economists, historians, and travel writers also began to consider 
what form a rejuvenated empire might take, and how the traditional strengths associated with the 
British people – liberty, individualism, and the entrepreneurial spirit – might be able to create 
new form of empire. 
The solution that a number of (mostly conservative) writers seized on was a multinational 
conglomeration of (white) self-governing nations known as “Greater Britain.”  For thinkers like 
Sir Charles Dilke, J. R. Seeley, and J. A. Froude, the colonies were budding “little Britains” 
whose youth and vibrancy provided a much needed counter to the enervation permeating the 
British metropolis.  But these colonies’ natural “courage, national integrity, steady good sense, 
and energy” were impeded by the hierarchical administrative structure of the empire, which, 
according to Dilke, more resembled the “democratic autocracy of Russia” than the 
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“constitutional democracy of Great…Britain” (Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, 2).  For 
Dilke, Seeley, and Froude, this contradiction lay at the heart of the British Empire’s decline 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and this obstacle could only be surmounted, they 
believed, through the transfer of legislative authority to local parliamentary bodies.  While there 
was some disagreement regarding the process of parliamentary devolution – Seeley believed that 
a federal world state was necessary to bind the British Empire into a supra-national collectivity; 
Dilke, in contrast, assumed that British racial ties would unite the settler colonies with Britain 
more effectively than state structures9 – all agreed that a network of autonomous nations would 
preserve the key liberal principle of self-government for the constituent parts of “Greater 
Britain.”10 By breaking the empire apart into a decentered network of autonomous nation-states 
and unburdening them of the clunky administrative apparatus of empire, these nations would be 
free to pursue their interests in a more efficient manner without sacrificing the numerical 
advantage that a community of British nations possessed over even massive imperial states like 
Russia.11 
Countering the threat of a centrifugal drift away from Britain, Greater Britainists believed 
that sentimental ties could reconcile conflicting interests between newly-independent colonies 
and Britain itself.  “We laugh at sentiment, but every generous and living relationship between 
man and man, or between men and their country, is sentiment and nothing else,” writes J.A. 
Froude.  “If Oceana [his name for Greater Britain]12 is to be hereafter” received “as an accepted 
article of faith,” then this “organic union” will have to be bound by sentiment (Oceana, 349).  
That sentiment was seen as a medium capable of establishing a harmonious relationship between 
distant countries implies not just that each nation feels an affinity for the other, but also that each 
has been schooled in the emotional responses necessary for self-government.13 That is, far from 
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indicating the “breakup of Britain” into cultural particularism, as Tom Nairn prophesized with 
respect to the United Kingdom in the 1970s, devolution for Greater Britainists entailed parallel 
projects of self-governance that confirmed each country as a modern nation: sentimental 
attachments retroactively legitimated these nations as worthy of self-government (The Break-Up 
of Britain).  One could theoretically become “independent” of Great Britain through 
parliamentary devolution, but unless one’s sentimental regard for the freedom-loving character 
of Great Britain and other former British colonies encouraged one to continue working for their 
collective best interests, self-governance was more chimerical than actual. 
We can thus think of Greater Britainism as a geopolitical analogue to Slavoj Žižek’s 
postmodern theory of “individualization through secondary identification.”  For Žižek, the 
modern subject individualizes him- or herself by shifting allegiance from an “organic” 
community to an “artificial” or “mediated” one, but this very shifting of allegiances allows the 
subject to define him- or herself as an individual vis-à-vis his former “organic” community (even 
while he or she is becoming a type of that second, “artificial” community).14 Under 
postmodernism, and in response to the universalizing of the world market, Žižek believes that 
secondary identifications are becoming increasingly “formal,” with individuals looking for 
identification in smaller, more proximate forms of identification, such as religion or ethnicity 
(“Multiculuralism,” 166-8). But rather than restrict this formalization of secondary identification 
to a postmodern historical moment, we might generalize Žižek’s thoughts on the nation-state’s 
failure to engender a meaningful sense of community to include all periods when governmental 
institutions suffer from decreasing ideological legitimacy.  After all, as Arrighi notes in The Long 
Twentieth Century, the waves of globalization experienced by the world-system in the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century and in the 1970s and 1980s (the heyday of postmodernism) 
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were strikingly similar in content: both created new world markets (grain/electronics), both saw 
an upsurge in global financial speculation, and both corresponded to a renewed series of 
imperial/neo-imperial military conflicts (238-40).  In the case of Greater Britainism, the 
increasing angst over potential imperial degeneration felt by both Britons and pro-empire 
colonials encouraged them to view the empire as a formal system of governance lacking the 
“organic” sentimental allegiances shared by individuated nation-states.  Devolution, then, 
represented a way to replace the increasingly reified – and “inauthentic” – political structures of 
empire within local communities with a more naturalized connection to them.  In doing so, 
responsible government divided British liberalism into multiple nationalization projects, but only 
to the extent that the sentiment legitimating devolved governance refashioned these colonies into 
a second-order totality, Greater Britain.  But Žižek is more interested in how the nation- or 
imperial-state fails to elicit the same “primordial” identifications as more proximate entities than 
in how these are recuperated.  If, as he claims, the transnational movements of a universalizing 
world market undermine the chimerical universality proffered by particular sociopolitical 
institutions, then turning to the specific movements of the world market during the fin de siècle 
might help us to trace the way in which varying tempos of development paradoxically called into 
question the foundational premises of British liberal imperialism through their centripetal force. 
 As both Mike Davis and James Belich have argued, nineteenth-century imperial 
consolidation occurred in periodic waves that belie the evolutionary rhetoric of nineteenth-
century liberal idealism. In Late Victorian Holocausts, Davis outlines how the devastating 
famines of the last third of the nineteenth century depended on “a host of nonlinear social 
factors” and not on simple climate variability (19). For Davis, New Imperialist “colonial 
expansion uncannily syncopated the rhythms of natural disaster and epidemic disease,” as 
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“[e]ach global drought was the green light for an imperialist landrush” (12). Similarly, Belich 
traces a “boom mentality” which dictated the spectacular demographic and economic growth of 
“Anglo” territories (Australasia, Canada, the United States, and South Africa) over the course of 
the long nineteenth century.  As Belich makes clear, “booms” demonstrated a “syncopated” 
tempo of their own, with the heady expectations greeting new settlements quickly dovetailing 
into a bust phase: investors poured capital into budding settlements, which soon became 
oversaturated and “busted”; they were then drawn back into metropolitan markets 
(“recolonized”) as specialized producers in niche goods (wheat, wool, livestock).  If, then, 
telecommunication and transport technologies extended British control more completely over its 
colonial possessions, these were less the driving force of integration themselves than 
supplementary objects that advantageously co-opted independent natural cycles and 
psychological dispositions in order to impose a global market on resistant regional political 
economies.15  
 The contradictions between a rapidly-globalizing world-imperial market and 
constitutional devolution became glaringly apparent in Ireland and South Africa during the 
period spanning the two Anglo-Boer Wars (1880-81, 1899-1902).  Calls for legislative 
independence in both countries had begun independently in the 1870s and 1880s, but were 
resisted by Anglo mining magnates and Anglo-Irish landowners who feared that devolution 
would eradicate their economic privileges.  As the nineteenth century crept toward a close, Irish 
and South African constitutionalists increasingly used the victories and defeats of the other as a 
rallying cry for their own aspirations.  In the case of Irish nationalists, the Boer states’ rebellion 
against England provided an issue through which Irish nationalists were able to disseminate 
separatist propaganda to a popular audience, as well as a physical battleground through which to 
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galvanize their own political “battle.”16 In effect, the Boer War supplied radical nationalists and 
Home Rulers alike a framework for viewing separatism as a morally-mandated political goal, 
and the ensuing uproar over England’s treatment of the Boers enabled John Redmond to reunite 
the Home Rule-oriented Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) for the first time since the Parnell 
divorce scandal.17  On the flip side, Boer politicians and pro-Boer English pointed to Ireland as a 
harbinger of what was to come in South Africa if hostilities continued.  Pro-Boer liberals noted 
that, even if England succeeded in its war aims, they would have “set up a government that is 
Ireland all over again, with what is called a loyal district, and outside of that an enormous 
territory…saturated with sullen disaffection” (John Morley, The Times, 6 September 1899).18 
 Olive Schreiner and Bernard Shaw were particularly active in this debate, though not 
always on the same side.  Shaw supported Irish Home Rule but scandalously came out in favor 
of British imperialism in his pamphlet Fabianism and the Empire (1901), in large part because 
he believed that Boer abuses of black Africans necessitated a more despotic form of government 
than was needed in Ireland.  In contrast, Schreiner supported both the IPP’s legislative tactics, 
modeling her own program for a South African Progressive Party in The Political Situation 
(1895) on the IPP’s political strategy, and the Boer cause, contributing regular journal articles to 
British and South African periodicals lauding the noble qualities of the Boer.19 But both authors 
acknowledged that Ireland and South Africa were two focal points of imperial constitutionalism 
and that their condition contained significant parallels: sizeable non-British ethnicities (the native 
Irish and Boers),20 a small Anglo minority who controlled key industries, and an economy in a 
drastic state of flux.  The problem facing both in their analyses of their respective countries was 
how to reimagine constitutionalism in such a way that it could account for the turbulent 
economic rhythms drawing together the British world-system without recourse to an idealistic 
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narrative of mutual sentiment that was belied by the militaristic rhetoric of British, Boer, and 
Irish alike.  This answer, as it happens, was much the same for both Schreiner and Shaw: rather 
than attempt to build a more “natural” political structure that would elicit the failed primordial 
identifications Žižek outlines, Shaw and Schreiner both embraced the impersonal formalism of 
constitutions and their associated state institutions as a way of regulating clashing sentiments 
into a dynamic totality. 
  
Shaw, the State, and the Rejection of the Politics of Sentiment 
 Given the recent critical interest in literature and the state, it is somewhat surprising that 
Bernard Shaw has not garnered significant critical attention in recent years.21 Shaw and the 
Fabians were one of the first, and most insistent, theorizers of the welfare state; and even if their 
writings on statecraft are often confused, contradictory, or downright insensible, their sheer 
volume and their influence on later Labour legislation holds a relevance for present-day 
scholarship.  One reason for this neglect may be how the Fabians talked about the state.  As 
liberal-socialists, the Fabians described a state that was halfway in-between global capitalism 
and a nation-state.  Their analyses were indebted to Marx’s writings on the international labor 
movement and often appealed to global capitalism as their target object, but the discussions 
themselves usually revolved around English legislation and the march to nation-centered 
socialism.  Consumer economics, filtered through the insights of the marginalist revolution, lent 
the Fabians a global frame, but their concrete platform revolved around local governance: the 
English state and, increasingly, municipal elections.  What has not been remarked upon in the 
scholarship on Fabianism and the state, however, is the degree to which Irish landlordism and 
Home Rule affected how the Fabians reconciled local governance with transnational 
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capitalism.22 If Fabian statism has been difficult to contextualize within existing paradigms of 
literature and the state, this may be because the Fabian state is in actuality a devolved one, with 
complaints against cosmopolitan stockholding and international consumerism being funneled 
through a more local set of figures – the Anglo-Irish landlord foremost among them. 
In his 1896 article “Socialism for Millionaires,” Shaw attempted to explain his opposition 
to stockholding by comparing it to the widely unpopular Anglo-Irish landlord.  Demonized by 
Irish nationalists as a spendthrift who had illegitimately seized Irish land, the Anglo-Irish 
landlord presented an easy shorthand for idleness, dissipation, and an unfair economic 
dispensation: 
the typical modern proprietor is not an Irish squire but a cosmopolitan 
shareholder; and the shareholder is an absentee as a matter of course.  If his 
property is all the matter managed for that, he himself is all the more completely 
reduced to the condition of a mere parasite upon it; and he is just as likely as the 
Irish absentee to become a center of demoralization to his family connections. 
(394) 
 
Having worked as a land agent’s clerk for three years in Dublin before emigrating to 
London, Shaw was intimately familiar with the specifics of landlordism.  Indeed, when Shaw, 
Sidney Webb, Graham Wallas, William Clarke, Sydney Olivier, and Annie Besant published the 
first manifesto of the Fabian Society, Fabian Essays in Socialism, part of the reason for the 
collection’s success was that Shaw and Webb managed to find a shared vocabulary in ground 
rent that lent the volume a coherence the essays themselves did not necessarily possess.  As 
Shaw recounted in the May 1889 issue of the socialist journal To-Day, despite the group’s 
socialist sympathies, there was little consensus on how socialism worked in theory or practice: 
“F.Y. Edgeworth as a Jevonian, and Sidney Webb as a Stuart Millite, fought the Marxian value 
theory tooth and nail; whilst Belfort Bax and I, in a spirit of transcendent Marxism, held the fort 
recklessly, and laughed at Jevons and Mills.  The rest kept an open mind and skirmished on 
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either side as they felt moved” (“Bluffing,” 129).  Describing the Fabian Society as an idealized 
public sphere defined more by its methods of argumentation and common object of interest than 
by a dogmatic platform, Shaw anticipates later Marxists critiques of the Fabians that indict them 
for relying on the forms of liberalism (consensual politics, bourgeois morality, and evolutionary 
progress) while parroting the language of socialism.23 But what ultimately molded Marxist, 
Millite-liberal, and Jevonian-economist methodologies into a semi-coherent position on British 
socialism articulable within liberal conventions was a tacit agreement about how landlordism 
manufactured socioeconomic inequalities.  In contrast to industrial production, where the 
particulars of value were vigorously disputed, landlordism presented a clear moral parable: 
landlords profited solely by virtue of their ownership over the land, and for this reason it was a 
socialist state’s duty to tax ground rent and redistribute it to more productive members of society.  
Webb, as was most often the case, formulated the theoretical basis for the Fabian perspective on 
rent, drawing his conclusions from Mill’s later radical writings, but it was Shaw who popularized 
them through his voluminous writings on economics and socialism, including his submissions to 
the Fabian Essays, his journalism in The Pall Mall Gazette, To Day, and The Clarion, and his 
work on dozens of Fabian election manifestos and topical pamphlets.  As Shaw’s biographer 
Michael Holroyd puts it, “Webb’s arguments began to command an audience” only after “Shaw 
had become his loudspeaker” (Bernard Shaw, 102). 
 Webb and Shaw’s partnership has been the subject of much study, and my aim here is not 
to retread familiar ground concerning Shaw’s aestheticization of Fabian social policy.24  Rather, 
my interest in the Fabians’ thoughts on landlordism concerns the imaginative role this institution 
– and, in particular, its progressive constitutionalist variant – played in constructing an aesthetic 
form capable of differentiating “parasitical” from healthy occupations, as well as how this form 
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in turn galvanized (socialist) liberalism at a moment of economic depression.  That Shaw hailed 
from Ireland was of no small importance in this regard.  Indeed, as Shaw’s knowing allusion to 
“Irish squires” indicates, landlordism was a more central element of political discourse in Ireland 
than anywhere else in the British Empire.  Terry Eagleton and Marjorie Howes have observed 
that, in the absence of urban industry in Ireland, modernity was localized in the countryside, with 
the result that land and agriculture assumed a more predominant place in Irish political debates 
than in English ones during the fin de siècle (Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger; Howes, 
Colonial Crossings). Under the leadership of the Land League (and, later, the Nationalist 
League), Irish nationalists had used tenant rights in the 1880s and 1890s to rally popular support 
for Home Rule.  Tenant evictions were a particularly sore point, as most tenants believed rented 
land to be the rightful property of the native Irish, landlords acting more as custodians than 
property-owners; but the confluence of rising expectations among the tenantry and the global 
agricultural depression of the late nineteenth century more directly fuelled agrarian unrest.25 
Declaring a “Land War” against Anglo-Irish landlords for the high rents they charged and for 
what was perceived by nationalists to be their illegitimate control of the land, the Land League 
wove demands for economic self-determination (i.e., the right to decide what land to farm and 
how much to pay for it) with calls for an Irish parliament and political self-governance.26  
Though the League was more successful with respect to its dealings on behalf of Irish 
tenants than in the parliamentary realm – it convinced, for instance, the British authorities to pass 
a series of Land Acts making it possible for tenants to purchase their land through loans from the 
British government – the debates the Land War sparked over landlordism and Home Rule raised 
serious questions about the application of liberal self-governance in Ireland.  On the one hand, 
the tactics adopted by the Land League during the Land War – rent negotiations, boycotts, and 
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threats of violence (rarely carried out) – seemed to undermine liberal market principles such as 
competition, the law of contract, and individual choice.  On the other hand, there was nothing 
technically illegal about negotiating rent or boycotting, and this parodic use of liberal legal and 
economic principles could just as easily signify Irish nationalists’ successful tutelage in British 
liberalism, and thus their right to self-government (Laird, Subversive Law in Ireland, 32-36).  
Indeed, as historians such as F.S.L. Lyons have shown, the way in which the IPP latched onto the 
Land War as a means for mobilizing support for Home Rule can be seen as a conservative 
appropriation of radical populist energies within the stable structure of liberal governance.  The 
Land War, as Lyons explains, “gave notice that the Protestant Ascendancy was no longer 
immutable and invulnerable… Angrily and nervously some of them began to reconsider their 
position and to cast about for an alternative stay and prop” (Ireland Since the Famine, 137).  
Home Rule provided this prop: discarding Union with Britain and the exploitative system of 
landlordism, the IPP and the Land League sought to rearticulate Irish grievances against British 
rule within a liberal political form wherein enlightened Anglo-Irish politicians like Charles 
Stewart Parnell and Isaac Butt could constrain the “unbridled (mob) passion” of Irish nationalism 
with the “impeccable (national) self-control” of Home Rule constitutionalism (Valente, Myth of 
Manliness, 43). 
 Shaw’s own ambivalences about Irish Home Rule take clearest shape in what could be 
termed his “post-Big House” play, John Bull’s Other Island (1904).  As I observed earlier, Big 
House novels experienced a brief renaissance in the closing years of the nineteenth century, with 
major works by Somerville and Ross (The Real Charlotte), George Moore (A Drama in Muslin), 
and Anthony Trollope (The Landleaguers) documenting landlordism’s apparent collapse as a 
viable socioeconomic order.27 Though these novels shared a sense that Anglo-Irish neofeudal 
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estate management was on the retreat, most attempted to reimagine Anglo-Irish landlordism 
within a modern economic lexicon.  In contrast, Shaw’s play appears eager on the surface to 
abandon landlordism: its focus on a town whose landlord has been bankrupted by the new Land 
Acts seems to support his belief that Home Rule was “an inevitable order of social growth” that 
would usher in a post-Big House era (“A Crib,” 23).  But Shaw also insisted that devolution was 
only an intermediate step on the path to a British-led “Federation of the World,” and this 
continued investment in an Anglo-Irish imperial connection transforms the play’s post-landlord 
outlook into a parodic repurposing of Big House social relations not far removed from Trollope 
and Somerville and Ross’s more conservative fictions (Fabianism and the Empire, 24). 
Like Butts, Parnell, and other Anglo-Irish Home Rulists, Shaw both critiqued the Union 
and expressed a desire for British-style liberal governance on a global scale.28 John Bull’s Other 
Island interrogates the tension inherent in this position by layering a narrative of post-landlord 
modernization over the generic conventions of the Big House novel.  The play revolves around 
two self-identified “Liberal” civil engineers, the English Tom Broadbent and the Irish Larry 
Doyle, who travel from their London offices to Larry’s native Rosscullen in order to foreclose on 
the property of the former Anglo-Irish landlord, Nick Lestrange.  Lestrange has lost his land 
through a combination of his own sumptuous living habits – a common failing attributed to 
absentee landowners in nineteenth-century Anglo-Irish literature – and the series of Land Acts 
which ended the Land War by supplying loans to Irish tenants to buy farmland.  For Broadbent 
and Doyle, Lestrange’s bankruptcy provides an ideal opportunity to buy up Rosscullen’s land for 
their syndicate and transform the town into a tourist resort for English visitors, thus transitioning 
it from a neofeudal agrarian society to a modern, “efficient” consumerist paradise.  
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However, while Lestrange’s marginalization would seem to indicate we have entered into 
a post-Big House, post-Anglo-Irish era, Shaw juxtaposes this modernization narrative with a 
marriage plot between Broadbent and Doyle’s former sweetheart, Nora Reilly, that resurrects one 
of the most conventional tropes of the Big House novel.  Sentimentally gushing over “the 
melancholy of the Keltic race,” Broadbent becomes infatuated with Nora at first sight – as he 
does with all of Rosscullen, including its Home Rulist politics, picturesque ruins, and “patriotic” 
citizens – and convinces her to marry him despite her own reluctance (129).  Shaw here replays a 
scene that Big House novels compulsively returned to over the course of the nineteenth century: 
an English or Anglo-Irish lord marries an Irish woman, their sentimental bond thereby erasing 
national, class, and gender inequalities and guaranteeing the legitimacy of the lord’s control of 
his estate (Corbett 53). So pervasive was this romance narrative that, in addition to novels like 
Maria Edgeworth’s The Absentee (1812) and Sydney Owenson’s The Wild Irish Girl (1806), 
which aestheticized Big House culture through their marriage plots, Ireland and England 
themselves were habitually referred to in common parlance in gendered terms, the “John Bull” of 
the play’s title and the “Erin” of Irish lore designating England and Ireland respectively (see 
figure 5).  “Union,” in this regard, served as an ideologically-loaded term collapsing the political 
unification of England and Ireland with notions of gender complementarity, in the process 
naturalizing imperialism and an ethnically-stratified feudal division of labor between feminized 
Irish tenants and masculinized English/Anglo-Irish lords.29 
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Figure 5: J. G. Thomson, 'The Kissing and Hissing Game,' as Played at St. Stephen's 
Green.  William Gladstone Embraces Erin, the iconic embodiment of Ireland.  The 
masculine Gladstone and feminine Erin deploy a common gendered image of the two 
countries' Union. 
  
Shaw emphasizes that Broadbent’s affection for Nora is a displacement, in semi-
allegorical mode, of his political investments in Irish Home Rule.  While wooing Nora, 
Broadbent refers each of her individual traits to metonymic stand-ins for the Irish nation, 
mediating his attraction to her individual person through a nationally-gendered set of tropes (e.g., 
“all the harps of Ireland are in your voice”) (151).  In doing so, he neglects Nora’s individual 
character in favor of her typicality as Irishwoman.  When explaining his affection for the Irish to 
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Doyle at the beginning of the play, Broadbent employs the same romantically-charged lexicon to 
talk about Irish aspirations for Home Rule, this time to collapse any sense of distinction between 
England and Ireland: speaking of the Irish [Parliamentary] Party, he praises it for showing “the 
genuine old English character and spirit” in “its independence, its determination, its defiance of 
bad Governments, its sympathy with oppressed nationalities all the world over!” (130) 
Significantly, Broadbent combines two distinct sentimental traditions in his revisionist reading of 
the IPP as “more English than the English.”  One the one hand, his enthusiasm for devolution 
echoes Greater British theorists who argued that sentiment would replace a top-down system of 
imperial institutions with a lateral network of emotional bonds.  He describes Ireland as an elder 
settler colony “peopled just as England was…its breed…crossed by just the same invaders” – 
thus aligning Ireland with English liberalism by tracing a homogenous racial ancestry back to 
pre-modern times – and cements its claims to Home Rule by appealing to the humanitarian 
sympathy that joins Ireland together with “oppressed nationalities” in a project of universal 
enlightenment (130).  On the other hand, this ethical humanitarianism – a hallmark of Liberal 
policy that first emerged during Gladstone’s support for the IPP and Irish Home Rule (Biagini) – 
was highly indebted to a patronizing chivalric rhetoric of providing “protection against 
oppression and wrong” that was often used to justify military operations across the Empire: for 
instance, in liberal imperialists’ insistence that the Anglo-Boer War was morally necessary in 
order to mitigate, in the words of one Daily Mail article, “Boer barbarity towards loyal coloured 
subjects” (Lord Alfred Milner, quoted in Pakenham 120; “The Native Question,” 5).  Broadbent 
invokes the ambiguous distinction between these two sentimental traditions when he qualifies his 
support for Irish Home Rule by adding, as if in an afterthought, “under English guidance” (131).  
This passing observation sutures together Greater British ideals of imperial devolution, where 
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youthful responsible governments would reinvigorate liberalism, with older beliefs in a British 
“civilizing mission” by regarding their sentimental rhetorical forms as equivalent.  “English 
guidance” comes to mark, at the same time as it obscures, the gap separating Anglo-led 
devolution (such as occurred in Australia, New Zealand, or Canada) from Celtic devolution, 
whose supplemental humanitarianism, as Valente observes, advocated a continuing 
subordination of Celtic/colonial political immaturity to English imperial authority (Valente, The 
Myth of Manliness, 8-11). 
As soon becomes apparent in the play, Shaw remains skeptical about sentimentalism’s 
ability to fulfill the political role asked of it by Big House fiction.  Where earlier works from 
Edgeworth and Owenson had attributed to romantic sentiment the capacity to bridge any number 
of antithetical divisions – England/Ireland, man/woman, upper/lower class, capitalism/feudalism 
– the absurdity of Broadbent’s sentimentalism undermines the consensus-generating claims of 
this emotion and suggests that disinterested economic structures tie together unlike objects better 
than do romanticized political discourses.  Despite Broadbent’s admiration for all things Irish, 
his sympathy for Irish political aspirations fails to elicit any fellow-feeling from Rosscullen’s 
residents, who are more prone to “laugh at him for being a fool like the rest” than to express any 
emotional solidarity with English liberalism (135).30 In this, Broadbent appears to be the victim 
of the “mass, self-enforced withdrawal of affect” Valente traces to the Land War’s collective 
boycotts, which ushered in the post-Big House dispensation Shaw documents in John Bull’s 
Other Island (The Myth of Manliness, 44).  Parnell voiced this project of affective withdrawal 
quite bluntly before a group of Land League followers at Ennis in the autumn of 1880: 
When a man takes a farm from which another has been evicted [known as “land-
grabbing”], you must show him on the roadside when you meet him, you must 
show him in the streets of the town, you must show him at the shop-counter, you 
must show him in the fair and at the marketplace, and even in the house of 
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worship, by leaving him severely alone, by putting him into a sort of moral 
coventry, by isolating him from the rest of his kind as if he were a leper of old, 
you must show him your detestation of the crime he has committed, and you may 
depend upon it if the population of a county in Ireland carry on this doctrine, that 
there will be no man so full of avarice, so lost to shame, as to dare the public 
opinion of all right-thinking men within the county and to transgress your 
unwritten code of law. (Cited in Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell, 134) 
 
As Parnell makes clear, what was being boycotted was not simply a single good or a set of 
goods.  Rather, an entire set of social and economic relations was being withdrawn from a single, 
isolated individual: whether in the “streets of the town,” or at the “shop-counter,” “marketplace,” 
or even “house of worship,” the boycotted individual was cut off from affective communities 
that were vital to his survival.  By doing so, the Land League effectively undermined the 
neofeudal fiction that landowner/tenant relations were solidified through mutual sentiment rather 
than a series of unequal economic transactions. 
In contrast, Larry Doyle holds up his occupation as a civil engineer as one whose 
“international” mission is to “join countries” through state institutions in a deeper, more 
authentic manner than sentiment.  Doyle is not completely opposed to nationalism per se – 
though disdainful of those, like his father, who elevate nationalism to their highest priority, he 
acknowledges that British imperialism has “gorged on [the] flesh” of Irish tenants – but he does 
fear that emotion-laden investments in national separatism obscure particular class-, religious-, 
and ethnic-based hierarchies that contribute to material inequalities even while aping egalitarian 
language (165).  For example, during a debate with his father, Corny’s friend Mat Haffigan, and 
other small landowners who have recently acquired properties through the Land Acts, Doyle 
describes them as an intensified version of Anglo-Irish landlordism, profiting off the labor of 
Patsy Farrell in the same manner as Lestrange had: “Nick Lestrange,” insists Doyle, “would not 
have been tempted as hard by a hundred pounds as you’d be by five shillings… Nick was too 
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high above Patsy Farrell to be jealous of him; but you, that are only one step above him, would 
rather die than let him come up that step” (164).  Doyle’s solution to this continued inequality is 
to pass a law that would “prevent any of you from giving Patsy less than a pound a week,” as 
well as to establish the Catholic Church as the official religion of Ireland so that the state could 
limit the amount of tithes it demanded from its parishioners (165).  For Doyle, the state exists as 
a paragon of what he and Broadbent call their “gospel of efficiency” (200).  Unlike sentiment, 
which blends individuals together in an affective community while foreclosing material 
disparities from its framework, the state, according to Doyle, can “efficiently” – i.e., non-
sentimentally – rectify capitalism’s worst excesses.  In making this distinction between 
nationalist sentiment and state “efficiency,” Doyle voices what Robbins and Fluet have shown to 
be a guiding trope of the emergence of the welfare state: its capacity to shatter the emotional 
bonds uniting particularized groups and establish in their place a collective, anti-social standard 
of universal care (Robbins, Upward Mobility and the Common Good; Fluet, “Hit Man 
Modernism,” “Immaterial Labors.”).   
Where Home Rulists like Corny Doyle and Mat Haffigan envision devolution as a 
guarantor of their class’s commercial and political interests, Doyle regards it as the imposition of 
an a English-style liberal state that would pave the way for Fabianesque socialism in Ireland.  
Indeed, in his contribution to Fabian Essays in Socialism, “The Transition to Social 
Democracy,” Shaw perversely suggests that the English liberal state was already a socialist one, 
insofar as legislation such as the Factory Acts (1844-66) and the Income Tax (1842) marked its 
commitment to an embryonic project of state welfare (184-5).  But more so than Shaw’s attempt 
to collapse liberalism and socialism into each other – a guiding concern of much of his fiction 
and criticism31 – what is unique about John Bull’s Other Island’s oddly socialist-liberal statism is 
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that it enables Shaw to finesse the problems raised by Broadbent’s enthusiasm for Irish Home 
Rule – does devolution foretell the creation of a sentimental Greater Britain, or, rather, a 
paternalistic reappropriation of English imperialism? – by projecting these ambiguities onto the 
state itself.  In other words, the English liberal state form is characterized by Shaw as itself a 
paternalistic institution imposing socialism from above; but in this case, the disinterestedness he 
associates with a-sentimental “efficiency” embeds “English guidance” within state forms 
themselves, as an expression of their inner logic, rather than via a supplemental discourse of 
sentimental attachment. 
 
The Marginal Recuperation of Sentiment in John Bull’s Other Island 
It is important, in this respect, that Doyle still adopts an “international” perspective as the 
proper one through which to view statist efficiency.  If the Fabians were to exploit the negative 
imagery surrounding Anglo-Irish absentee landlordism in order to distinguish a “parasitic” form 
of capitalism for the state to abolish through progressive taxation policies, they had to rationalize 
why an archaic mode of production rooted in pre-capitalist, feudal, and primarily local forms of 
labor could simultaneously serve contradictory ends: as an impediment to socialist growth; as the 
inefficient, sentimental-laden, and backward-looking estate represented in Big House fiction; and 
as the unacknowledged template for advanced, “cosmopolitan” finance capitalism.  Indeed, 
though much of Doyle’s discussions revolve around poverty and land ownership in Ireland, he 
makes it clear that Ireland’s exploitative labor practices have repercussions far beyond its 
national borders.  Specifically, Shaw, via Doyle, identifies in individualistic consumption the 
medium through which inequalities become transmitted across national frontiers, as well as the 
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sphere in which an otherwise productive capitalism becomes infected by parasitic classes “not 
dependent on their own industry” (Olivier 116).   
Somewhat surprisingly, given Shaw’s almost religious faith in the value of labor and his 
ethically-loaded distinction between producers and “idle” rentiers,32 Doyle despises Mat 
Haffigan for his inefficient overworking of farmland.  As Doyle sneeringly remarks, as a tenant 
under Lestrange, Haffigan and his brother “made a farm out of a patch of stones on the 
hillside…making two blades of wheat grow where one grew before” (157).  Lestrange, in 
response, priced the land according to Haffigan’s “inefficient” overworking, and as the land 
gradually becomes more profitable he evicts Haffigan and rents it at a higher price.  Doyle 
blames Haffigan for being willing to pay (in the form of rent) for a barren piece of farmland as 
the cause of his poverty, since this both undervalued the work he was performing on the land and 
overvalued the land itself.  But the vehement nature of his response has less to do with a personal 
distaste for Haffigan himself – after all, such proximate emotions are the exact phenomena which 
“efficient” statism is designed to supersede – than it does with the ramifications Haffigan’s naïve 
transaction with Lestrange has for the value of English labor.  As Doyle explains, it was by using 
Haffigan’s over-industriousness and “Patsy’s poverty to undersell England in the markets of the 
world that we drove England to ruin Ireland” (165).  Because Irish laborers like Haffigan and 
Patsy will “undersell” their labor to idle landlords, they lower the price English workers can 
demand for their labors without destroying their employers’ profits.  Within this scenario, an 
international market for goods and labor generalizes individual acts of consumption (i.e. 
employers’ “purchasing” of labor) into circuits for the creation and transmission of value by 
taking the single lowest “selling” price as the site with respect to which all other valuations are 
compared.  Furthermore, by subtly collapsing Haffigan and Patsy into typical examples of Irish 
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“underselling,” Shaw suggests that these individualistic transactions between landlord and tenant 
exert greater influence over other countries’ working classes, who become sucked down into 
Irish levels of bare subsistence, than one’s fellow countrymen, who tend to hold similar ideas 
about employment and value. 
Shaw here rehashes a debate over the nature of value that captivated English socialism in 
the latter years of the nineteenth century.  According to Marxist economics, the physical act of 
labor endowed commodities with value, after which capitalists took advantage of the gap 
between the amount of wages workers needed to survive and the amount of value they had 
instilled into the commodities they produced for him – the commodities’ “surplus value” – to 
generate more capital (Capital, Part III).  However, with the advent of marginalist economics in 
Britain, socialist circles in general – and the Fabians in particular – began to move away from the 
labor theory of value Marx had inherited from Smith and Ricardo and to turn toward consumerist 
models of value advocated by William Stanley Jevons, among others.33 In short, “marginalist 
economics” refers to a mathematical-oriented departure from classical political economy that 
argued that “cultivation at the margin” – that is, by the value attributed to the cheapest or most 
efficiently made product – dictated what consumers would pay for any given good: for example, 
even if one bushel of wheat harvested by modern technologies requires half the labor of one 
harvested without such machines, the wheat would still sell for the same price, as the consumer 
would not differentiate between them based on invested labor but on their equivalent utility.  
After some wrangling among Shaw, the Reverend Phillip H. Wicksteed (the first 
Englishman to synthesize Jevons’s work with socialist ideals), and H.M. Hyndman (the leader of 
the Social Democratic Federation) in the pages of To-day and the Pall Mall Gazette, Shaw 
proclaimed himself a “convert” to Jevons’s marginal theory of value and began to insist that 
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purchasers produce inequalities by treating all products as equivalent regardless of the sort of 
labor involved in making them, the “law of indifference” dictating that “no man will give fifteen 
shillings for an article which he can get for eight and sixpence” (“Bluffing,” 131). Two important 
repercussions followed from this shift in focus from production to consumption, both of which 
speak to Shaw’s attempts to transform a post-landlord, pro-Home Rule Irish state into a liberal-
socialist center for the “efficient” redistribution of parasitic wealth.  The first, as we have seen, is 
that in Shaw’s work laborers accede to an international position not through political-
revolutionary solidarity as an international proletariat (as Marx would have it), but instead 
through their mutual participation in a “cosmopolitan” market subject to suprapersonal economic 
“laws.”  These laws level off regional specializations, gaps in purchasing power, and varying 
levels of consumerist demand by treating the individual consumption of marginally-produced 
commodities as the origin for all value across the globe.   By parasitically living off of the labor 
of their tenants, then, landlords fashioned Irish labor into the epitome of “cultivation at the 
margins.”   
In contrast, the state, as Shaw makes clear in Fabianism and the Empire (1900), rectifies 
the asymmetries channeled through individualistic consumerism by instituting an “effective 
organization” of “democratic” and “bureaucratic” governmental models managed by a liberal-
imperial state and its knowledgeable civil service.34 Since, for Shaw, colonial populations in 
Africa and India had already demonstrated their inability to manage capitalist forms – “The 
democratic institutions that mean freedom in Australia and Canada would mean slavery in India 
and the Sudan” – liberal institutions were more likely to throw these regions into chaos than 
integrate them more firmly into British political modernity (15). “Efficient” governance, then, 
designated for him an ideal coordination of incommensurate political logics that would transform 
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uneven social spaces into a smooth-functioning “Imperial federation” – the first step toward a 
socialist “Federation of the World” (24).35  
But in the case of Ireland, ambiguity attended its semiperipheral place in the British 
world-system.  It was a site where capitalism and liberalism functioned together, but only “at the 
margin,” within a “metrocolonial” territory existing both inside and outside Britain itself; but it 
was also a potential site for a devolved, but still imperial, Irish parliament.  This ambiguity 
meant that Ireland, unlike other colonies, required an “efficient” layering of paternalistic English 
guidance and responsible self-government.  Otherwise, Ireland’s increasing integration within 
world markets – a sign of its budding political modernity and liberalism – would undermine 
English production and make Ireland’s penurious and hierarchically-rigid socioeconomic 
structure into the paradigmatic model around which more advanced nations would mold their 
own institutions.  Shaw thus viewed English imperialism as a liberal project charged with 
mitigating the negative consequences following from economic globalization by doubling the 
world market within a political framework, one whose “efficient” mechanisms could 
compensate, in a sort of economic “civilizing mission,” for Irish farmers’ inability to properly 
value their labor. 
However, Shaw’s passion for marginalist economics entailed a second consequence that 
threatened to subvert the state’s ability to efficiently manage incommensurable political logics.  
As Regenia Gagnier notes in The Insatiability of Human Wants, marginal utility theory discarded 
notions of value “comparable across persons” and established in its place an “individual, 
subjective, [and] psychological” understanding of value in which consumers’ needs and desires, 
internal to their mental outlook, varied between persons, and were opaque to outside observers 
(4).  In the play’s final scene the “mad” Father Keegan sums up Broadbent and Doyle’s 
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“efficiency” as chimerical in its claims to rationality and profitability.  He foresees the venture 
going bankrupt, with Doyle and Broadbent “efficiently” buying up the property afterwards “for a 
few shillings on the pound,” and proposes that the real reason for Broadbent’s victories is his 
“English sentiment,” which miraculously transforms setbacks into advances (201).  As Keegan 
explains, Broadbent most notably excels when his words and sentiments contradict his ultimate 
goal.  He “inefficiently…admir[es] the thoughts of great men” (i.e. Irishmen), prompting the 
more grounded Irish to misunderstand him and laugh at him (201).  But because the Irish see him 
as bumbling and comical, they fail to notice that Broadbent’s actions “efficiently serv[e] the 
cupidity of base money hunters” and not the “great men” he sentimentalizes, causing them to 
unknowingly become ever more tightly tied to his business schemes (201).  Keegan’s point is not 
that Broadbent is a dissembler: during their first meeting, Keegan informs Broadbent that though 
“there was a time, in my ignorant youth, when I would have called you a hypocrite,” that is no 
longer the case (182).  Instead, he articulates the central paradox around which Shaw attempts to 
erect his defense of the English liberal state: since all economic transactions, according to 
Shaw’s marginalist philosophy, are facilitated by individual, subjective preferences, sentiments 
dictate what each person will consume, even as the laws of the market insure that, regardless of 
what these sentiments may be, they will ultimately serve “the cupidity of base money hunters.”   
The fact that Broadbent “admir[es] the thoughts of great men” – i.e., the nationalists in the Irish 
Party and English liberals like Gladstone36 – makes little difference.  Within the context of 
consumerist economics, his pro-Irish sentimentality operates only on a formal level, distinct from 
any particular content.  It does not matter whether his sentiments are pro- or anti-Irish, or pro- or 
anti-liberal, just so long as they induce him to ascribe value to a given object and so set the laws 
of economics into motion. The result is a version of what Lauren Berlant calls “consumer 
 115	  
citizenship,” which associates “aesthetic recognition and redemption” through the consumption 
of sentimental narratives with fundamental changes in global inequalities, but which in fact tends 
to reinforce existing inequalities (The Female Complaint, 20).     
Shaw anticipates this point in John Bull’s Other Island, but from a laudatory rather than a 
censorious position.  Exasperated at Broadbent’s sentimentalizing of the Irish, Doyle attempts to 
demystify his attachment to Nora by noting that her “aristocratic” appearance is really just that of 
“the woman who eats wisely but too little,” i.e. an effect of her poverty (160).  Doyle, for his 
part, sees his own near proposal to a waitress in Whitechapel as a side-effect of his having grown 
up Irish, where he never witnessed “Englishwomen who wolf down from three to five meat 
meals a day” (160).  Doyle here reintroduces the economic realities underlying the 
sentimentalization of national types: the exotic appeal Nora holds for Broadbent, and the English 
waitress for Doyle, stem from Nora and Doyle’s poverty, which transforms her into an ethereal, 
beautiful sublimation of starvation and him into a bumbling romantic. Shaw emphasizes that 
these sentiments are decidedly not reciprocal: Nora believes Broadbent to be either drunk or 
ungentlemanly when he first professes his affection for her and seemingly only agrees to marry 
him because she despairs of Doyle ever proposing to her.  But the fact that Shaw caricatures 
these romanticizations as false sentiment matters little: while Broadbent’s illusions about Nora 
and Irish nationalism gain him the (secret) ridicule of Rosscullen’s citizens, they also fashion the 
individuated attachments to Ireland that fuel Broadbent’s business and political dealings.  In a 
circular logic that establishes the cultural particularities produced by economic disparities as the 
cause for those same disparities, here sizeable economic gaps between individuals are coded as 
beneficial: by being alien in both class and nationality, Nora and Doyle’s English waitresses 
appear as exotic outlets for money and investment (in the form of marriage).  And like Berlant’s 
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“consumer citizen,” Broadbent refuses to let structural inequalities penetrate his sentimental 
sphere, condemning Doyle as “disgusting” for suggesting an economic element to his affection 
(160).  Broadbent hopes to isolate economic motivations from his sentiments by rejecting 
Doyle’s critique as “disgustingly” unemotional.  But sentiment, by its very failure to deliver on 
its promise of reciprocal emotional recognition and abetted by its impermeability to a more 
authentic economistic explanation, nevertheless internalizes emotion within the act of 
individualistic consumption.  Since Nora does not return Broadbent’s feelings, his sentiment’s 
only lasting impact is felt through the objects he consumes: Nora, Rosscullen, and Irish 
patriotism. 
But if sentiment actually increases economic inequalities by encouraging the consumerist 
transactions Shaw viewed as the source of value distinctions, these inequalities also 
paradoxically form the foundation upon which Shaw’s English-style liberal state distinguishes 
between “parasitic” rentiers and their more productive counterparts.   Even though, in keeping 
with Shaw’s focus on the post-landlord dispensation instituted by the Land Acts, Lestrange 
himself never appears in the play, Broadbent and Doyle’s syndicate operates as a thinly-veiled 
metaphor for the generalization of the absentee landlord’s “parasitic” position within 
“cosmopolitan stockholding” that Shaw traces in “Socialism for Millionaires.” The subtle 
homoerotic undertones to Broadbent and Doyle’s relationship – Shaw describes their rooms as 
“bachelor” lodgings “no woman would ever tolerate” – and Doyle’s willingness to substitute 
Broadbent’s desire for Nora for his own former desires effectively meld the two into a corporate 
personality.37 Indeed, Shaw implies that this partnership will reinstate many of landlordism’s key 
features: absentee ownership, steep disparities in wealth, and the spectacular consumptions of the 
“idlers” who “will bring money from England to Ireland”  (201).  But as opposed to landlordism, 
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which isolated these phenomena within Ireland, Doyle and Broadbent’s cosmopolitan syndicate 
does so without respect for national borders.  
It is far from accidental that the syndicate, when viewed in this light, begins to look 
suspiciously like the Fabians’ model for an “efficient” state staffed by an enlightened 
bureaucracy.  Indeed, the opposition between sentiment and statist efficiency in John Bull’s 
Other Island operates as a virtual, rather than an actual, divergence: sentiment is not, as Big 
House narratives and Parnellite boycotts would have it, a collective emotion holding social and 
national groups together in a generalized sphere of public emotion; instead, it is an individuating 
emotion whose most authentic expression takes place in economic transactions.  The path to 
socialist equality for Shaw, therefore, did not entail the disciplining of sentiments into correct, 
egalitarian forms – national, international, or otherwise – but instead a retroactive redistribution 
of “parasitical” wealth into more “efficient” outlets after it had already been collected, 
transforming it into a “common or social wealth…used, as revenues raised by taxation are now 
used, for public purposes” (“Economic,” 27).  Landlordism – and its reincarnation in the 
syndicate’s “cosmopolitan stockholders” – thus rendered visible the purely exploitative, “idle” 
wealth that could not be easily disentangled from the “productive” aspects of other capitalist 
enterprises.  For this reason, landlordism acted as both the type for parasitism and as the vehicle 
for its rectification through the progressive taxation policies of a paternalistic, English-style 
liberal state – or, according to Shaw’s idiosyncratic take, Home Rule. 
 
Schreiner’s Sympathetic Constitutionalism 
 To the extent that a critical consensus has emerged about a figure whose work mixes 
distinct genres, political programs, and intellectual interests as much as does Olive Schreiner’s, 
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scholars have tended to emphasize her New Woman feminism, her progressive – or ambivalent, 
depending on the critic – racial politics, and her contradictory class position as a middle-class 
woman writer.38  But none of these studies so much as mentions one of the intellectual 
touchstones of Schreiner’s fiction and nonfictional writings: her participation in, and 
impassioned defense of, Cape constitutionalism at a moment when it seemed in danger of being 
eradicated by British mining capital and Boer separatism.  Schreiner’s passion for the liberal 
precepts she believed to be cemented within the Cape’s devolved constitution was a guiding 
thematic in the formal elements of her work throughout her career; but her explicit engagement 
with constitutionalism on a political level began soon after she returned to the Cape from Britain 
in 1889.  Upon arrival, she quickly became involved with Cecil Rhodes, the infamous mining 
magnate whose De Beers corporation controlled most of the diamond fields in South Africa and 
Rhodesia and who at that time was also Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.  Rhodes exerted a 
tremendous personal fascination for her – the two were even rumored to be engaged at one point 
– but Schreiner increasingly became disillusioned with his repressive policies toward black 
Africans and his willingness to circumvent the Cape’s constitutional legalities when it suited him 
(First and Scott 225-35).  Throwing her support behind liberals such as James Rose Innes, J. W. 
Sauer, and, to a lesser extent, John X. Merriman,39 Schreiner charged Rhodes and his fellow 
“Monopolists” with “the demoralisation of our institutions, and the retrogression [of] our 
legislation” (The Political Situation, 54).  Under the cover of “Anglicizing Africa,” Rhodes and 
his followers were perpetrating “evils” and “injustices” under the name of “British rule” that 
were antithetical to what Schreiner viewed as the most lasting product of English imperialism in 
southern Africa: the “fragile constitutional integrity of the Cape parliament,” which was the most 
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visible institutional legacy of a strain of Anglo liberalism in the Cape (The Political Situation, 
46; Dubow 130).40 
By 1895, Schreiner had so far split with Rhodes that she co-authored a pamphlet with her 
new husband, Samuel Cron Cronwright-Schreiner, condemning Rhodes’ political alliance with 
the Afrikaner Bond (the primary Afrikaner political party in the Cape) as a “Retrogressive 
Movement” spearheaded by “alien Monopolists” and the most conservative elements of the 
Bond.  Entitled The Political Situation, this tract bemoaned the backward direction in which the 
Cape’s liberal governmental institutions seemed to be moving: 
While in all civilised countries where representative institutions prevail the 
tendency is to move without intermission in the direction of a broadened electoral 
base, so that in several of the English colonies to-day we find manhood suffrage, 
or one man one vote, or adult suffrage; and while even the most backward of 
European countries are rapidly tending year by year towards these same 
conditions – we, I believe alone among civilised people have deliberately, during 
the last few years, narrowed our basis, and undone the progressive work of the 
last generation. (10-11) 
 
Schreiner is here referring to the Franchise Act of 1892, which aimed to limit the “native vote” 
by raising the monetary qualification from £25 to £75.  In addition, Schreiner worried about the 
ambiguous legality surrounding the annexation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland – Rhodes’s 
treaties with these countries were dubious at best – which in her mind did nothing to “increase 
the wealth of the men and the women of the Cape Colony” (55).  Instead, it appeared that a small 
group of “speculators” had “obtain[ed] complete control over the political machinery…of the 
Cape Colony” and were perverting its institutions for “increasing their [own] wealth” (37). 
 By characterizing the Cape’s representative government as being “undone,” “regressing” 
when it should have been evolving, Schreiner invokes the same imagery of stunted development 
that we saw in the Fabians’ discussions of “parasitism”; and, like Shaw, she suggests that the 
forces impeding modernization take clearest shape in local governmental institutions charged 
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with importing English liberalism to the colonies.  But where Shaw employs a fairly static model 
of English and Irish national asymmetries – albeit ones produced by very real differences in 
forms of labor, diet, and relative wealth – to differentiate an idealized “parasitic” rentierism from 
a state-managed, redistributive form of “productive” capitalism, Schreiner’s investigation of 
colonial constitutionalism is much more nuanced in its approach to the temporal dynamics 
underlying “retrogressive” class formations.  In The Political Situation, she refuses to 
essentialize either Boer conservatism or English imperialism as unadulterated “parasites” on 
South Africa, preferring instead to see each group as being subject to a too-rapid process of 
acculturation that has not yet had time to organically synchronize their sentiments.  For 
Schreiner, the Afrikaner Bond, despite its “retrogressive” policies, is in fact an organization 
fostering an embryonic form of English liberal constitutionalism: “It banded together, and 
aroused to a healthy interest in the State, a large body of men who, hitherto unorganized and 
isolated, had not taken that share in the government of the State which their numbers would have 
justified” (23).41  But, while “for 200 years,” Boer and English “progress…has been slow” but 
“healthy” and “deeply rooted…because of its gradual and natural development,” Schreiner 
believed that the sudden intensity with which the mining boom thrust together foreign English 
industrialists like Rhodes and Boer conservatives led to an association of “convenience” rather 
than a “union of affection” (28, 43).  In other words, if the Rhodes-Bond alliance seemed to be 
undermining the steady evolution of liberal constitutionalism in South Africa, this was less an 
instance of the degeneration of English liberalism within an African environment – a common 
assumption voiced by such thinkers as Jan Smuts to rationalize English imperialism and to quell 
demands for self-government (Mamdani 3-34) – than a debilitating mixture of monopolists who, 
though well-versed in the progressive nature of English liberalism, owed their primary allegiance 
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to England and so cared little for local South African institutions, and Afrikaners whose 
“childlike simplicity” had not yet acceded to a full understanding of liberalism and its project of 
universal equality (42).  The problem, as Schreiner saw it, was that by intermingling uneven 
levels of development one risked generalizing in an entire nation anachronistic legislation that 
would never have occurred in either an advanced “civilization,” to whom such measures would 
be “repugnant to his own common sense and shrew modern outlook,” or a less developed ethnic 
institution like the Bond, which would have been unable to put such policies into practice on 
account of its undeveloped “weakness” (42).  It was, rather, the layering of these two political 
formations on top of each other that enabled the degeneration of constitutional governance in the 
Cape. 
 Schreiner’s analysis of Cape constitutionalism thus acts as a cautionary parable about the 
syncopated imperial expansionism Davis and Belich trace to the late nineteenth century.  By 
outlining the potential for “regression” inherent in forcefully integrating a more “primitive” 
people directly into British economic institutions through hyper-intensive mining capitalism, 
Schreiner suggests that, while regional disparities in development may enable imperial 
expansion, they risk replicating these asymmetries within local institutions.  But though 
Schreiner utilizes many of the same tropes Shaw does in his ambivalent rehabilitation of Anglo-
Irishness, the assimilation into British markets she experienced was in many respects the exact 
inverse of that which Shaw documented in John Bull’s Other Island.  Where Ireland’s extreme 
poverty demonstrated its inability to sustain a prodigal landowning class – and its need, in 
Shaw’s eyes, to be incorporated more directly into English consumerist markets – South Africa 
underwent perhaps the single most intense boom of any British territory in the late nineteenth 
century, with money and goods flooding into the country in hopes of extracting huge profits from 
 122	  
the diamond and gold mining industries (Feinstein 90-112; Worger).  South Africa’s valuable 
mineral resources became synonymous in the late Victorian imagination with spectacular wealth, 
colonial adventuring, and muscular imperialism. 
The aesthetic consequences attendant upon South Africa and Ireland’s divergent 
economies coalesce most clearly in Schreiner’s well-documented intellectual debt to Herbert 
Spencer’s First Principles (1862), an optimistic defense of the unavoidable, beneficent evolution 
of the “social organism.”42 As Douglas Mao explains, Spencer’s philosophy, “at once dazzlingly 
ambitious and magnificently reductive,” proposed that “all processes in the universe conform to 
the rule that systems proceed from unorganized homogeneity to organized diversity” (Fateful 
Beauty, 36).  For Spencer, a libertarian defender of laissez-faire capitalism, a powerful 
interventionist state of the sort Shaw and the Fabians advocated was not only unnecessary, but 
potentially disruptive.  Schreiner’s Spencerian vision of, as she put it, a “humanity intimately in 
its nature a solidarity and a whole with all its parts reacting to each other” signals in large part 
her alienation from metropolitan centers of intellectual and cultural life: Spencer’s organismic 
philosophy supplied a way of embedding herself and her South African environment within a 
British culture from which they seemed to be both intellectually and geographically distant 
(From Man to Man, 188-9).  But Spencer’s holist philosophy also recapitulated for Schreiner the 
foundational premises of Greater British constitutionalism within an evolutionary paradigm.  
Although he was critical of imperial federation, fearing that it “would…have the effect of 
encouraging aggressive action on the part of the colonies, with a still more active appropriation 
of territories than is at present going on,” Spencer’s work nevertheless replicated Greater British 
images of linked, devolved nation-states organically joined together in a mutual project of global 
enlightenment (Spencer to D. Duncan, 20 June 1893).  “In time to come,” he argues in The 
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Principles of Sociology, “a federation of the highest nations, exercising supreme authority 
(already foreshadowed by occasional agreements among ‘the Powers’), may, by forbidding wars 
between any of its constituent nations, put an end to the rebarbarization which is continually 
undoing civilization” (600).  Moreover, Spencer’s unwavering faith in humanity’s evolutionary 
progress rearticulated constitutionalism within an optimistic register highly amenable to the 
buoyant economic expectations greeting South Africa’s mining boom.  If Schreiner was much 
more complaisant about humanity’s “gradual and natural development” into ever-higher forms of 
“civilization” than was Shaw, this had as much to do with her vision of South Africa as “a 
country of vast resources” whose “temperate, stimulating climate…favours the health and energy 
of Europeans” and endows them, quite effortlessly, with “precious stones and minerals of all 
kinds” (The Political Situation, 27).  That is to say, though the specific form in which political 
liberalism operated in South Africa troubled Schreiner, the project of economic modernization 
that endangered liberal proceduralism testified to the progressive developmental tendencies 
contained within the South African nation and its natural environment. 
In her overt political statements on constitutional politics, however, Schreiner proved 
unable to reconcile her Spencerian holism with the sentimentalizing register in which she sought 
to obviate the political difficulties generated by mining capitalism.  In An English-South-
African’s View of the Situation, a follow-up tract to The Political Situation written on the eve of 
the Anglo-Boer War, Schreiner proposed that English-South Africans could mediate the 
“childlike simplicity” of the Boers to “affectionate” Englishmen through their own sympathy 
toward both peoples.  “We, English South-Africans of to-day, who are truly South African” 
attests Schreiner in An English South-African’s View of the Situation, 
loving the land of our birth, and men inhabiting it, yet bound by intense and loving ties, 
not only of intellectual affinity, but of personal passion, to the homeland from which our 
 124	  
parents came, and where the richest formative years of our life were passed, we stand to-
day mid-way between these two great sections of South African folk, the old who have 
been here long and the new who have only come; between the homeland of our fathers 
and the love-land of our birth, and it would seem as though, through no advantage of 
wisdom or intellectual knowledge on our part, but simply as the result of the accident of 
our position and our double affections, that we are fitted to perform a certain function at 
the present day, to stand, as it were as mediators and interpreters between those our 
position compels us to sympathize with and to understand them, as they may not, 
perhaps, be able to understand each other. (73-4, my emphases) 
 
Much like the melodramatic sentiments of Shaw’s John Bull’s Other Island, which evidenced a 
causality distinct from their bearers’ conscious intentions, the sympathy Schreiner detects in 
Boers and Englishmen for each other fails to coalesce into a pragmatic coalition: the vague 
referents and uncertain motivational energy of these affects cloud important differences between 
the sociopolitical position of Boers and English.  That is to say, what, exactly, is one 
sympathizing with when one expresses affection for another group of people?  Their physical 
health?  Their economic wellbeing?  Their cultural achievements and social institutions?  Or, as 
Sara Ahmed contends, is one merely participating in a rhetorical strategy that labels myriad 
emotional states as equivalent without regard for the concrete differences in their wants and 
needs (Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, 22-6)? Within this scenario, Schreiner claims that in 
place of a natural, centuries-long sympathetic understanding between Boer and Briton – one 
which the mining boom had made impossible – English-South Africans could form a prosthetic 
affective bridge mediating unintelligible emotional investments across this regional and ethnic 
divide.   
But despite Schreiner’s best efforts to rehabilitate English-South Africans as a class of 
transnational mediators – that is, as a class who could counterbalance the rapid pace of 
modernization and imperial consolidation in South Africa with an organic sentimental link to 
Boer and Briton alike – the circular logic contained in this passage calls attention to the 
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rhetorical sleight-of-hand she performs.  Anglo-Boer animosities, Schreiner constantly reiterates, 
result from no fundamental difference between “freedom-loving,” embryonic Boer liberals and 
the English, but instead represent the civilizational adolescence of the Boers, whom she 
describes as seventeenth-century Englishmen just learning how to govern their “gallant little 
Republic” (27).  Schreiner explains the very problem she set out to elucidate in the first place – 
the incommensurability of sentiment between “childlike” and adult nations – through recourse to 
emotion as a solution to national differences.  That is, Schreiner’s Spencerian reading of Greater 
Britain as a multi-part organism whose diverse parts were coordinated by mutual sentiment 
effaces her complementary argument that, far from being a discrete, unique component of a 
larger sociopolitical organism, Boers were the same as the English, just more “childlike.”  At the 
heart of this contradiction is an uncertainty about how national political and economic 
asymmetries should be coded: do they embody national particularities within a single relational 
system/organism, or do they instead indicate differing levels of development whose layering can 
turn disturbingly parasitic?43 
 
Recursive Sentiment and the Administration of Affect in Story of an African Farm 
Though in her political writings Schreiner is ultimately unable to rehabilitate liberal 
constitutionalism through a sentimental register, a more nuanced account of sentiment emerges 
from her fiction, in which the tensions between her Spencerian holism and her developmentalist 
analysis of “retrogression” are more effectively resolved.  Indeed, despite the fact that 
Schreiner’s fictional works confront Anglo liberalism far less directly than her nonfiction, its 
formal features play out the same representational dilemma that motivates her work on South 
African constitutionalism: how can one establish a mediatory position for English-South 
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Africans that preserves liberalism as a universal frame of reference and yet still accounts for the 
emergence of “retrogressive” social formations?   
Bearing this context in mind, I want to turn to Schreiner’s Story of An African Farm to 
investigate how its debates over labor, art, and “sex parasitism” use the parable to articulate a 
sentimental coordination of diverse developmental lines into a single, universal project.  As even 
a quick reading will reveal, Story of an African Farm is preoccupied with doublings and failed 
pairings.  The first half of the novel contains a cynical satire on colonial prejudices, while the 
second features several disconnected allegories and polemical arguments about religious doubt, 
the value of labor, feminism, and philosophical truth. This two-part structure immediately raises 
the question of whether the novel is a seamless analysis of a core group of themes through two 
different generic approaches or a subversion of its readers’ expectations regarding novelistic 
continuity and coherence.  This ambiguity also plays out in the plot: Lyndall, Em, and Waldo, 
the three Anglo children who populate the unnamed farm of the novel’s title,44 each try 
(unsuccessfully) to position themselves within wider communities whose brutish social mores 
alienate the sensitive youths.  In the first half of the novel, the arrival of the conman Bonaparte 
Blenkins reveals the oppressive – and asymmetrical – disciplinary institutions present in the 
home and estranges the children from the emotional security and fulfillment offered by the 
hegemonic narrative of family.  Blenkins usurps Waldo’s father’s occupation as overseer, 
insinuating himself into the good graces of Tant’ Sannie (Lyndall and Em’s stepmother), and 
then takes it upon himself to punish the (to him) rebellious children, locking Lyndall in her room, 
destroying Waldo’s sheep-shearing machine, and beating Waldo for reading J.S. Mill’s Political 
Economy.  In the novel’s second part, Blenkins has been exiled from the farm for flirting with 
Tant’ Sannie’s niece, and the narrative shifts to a more detailed consideration of Lyndall and 
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Waldo’s inner thoughts and feelings and their incongruity with colonial values.  Once again, the 
narrative shapes itself around a series of non-complementary pairs: Waldo leaves the farm 
hoping to find meaningful work and intellectual companionship, only to find that the townsfolk’s 
petty self-interest is completely antithetical to his existential soul-searching; Em becomes 
engaged to an Englishman, Gregory Rose, who subsequently becomes infatuated with Lyndall 
and vacillates between the two sisters; and Lyndall declares her equality with men by refusing to 
marry an unnamed “stranger” with whom she has had a romantic liaison and choosing to have 
their child on her own. 
We find here the same twinned narrative structure that Schreiner employs in her political 
pamphleteering.  Christopher GoGwilt argues that such doubling undermines the 
Bildungsroman’s universal narrative by splitting it into three different stories: namely, Lyndall, 
Em, and Waldo’s respective “spiritual awakenings (115).  GoGwilt thus reveals an isomorphism 
between the novel’s multiple protagonists, the inability of its Bildungsroman frame to provide a 
single universal narrative of enlightenment, and the story’s colonial setting.  But I want to add to 
GoGwilt’s analysis a sense of how this disggregation is indebted to Schreiner’s liberal 
constitutionalism and its rhetoric of localized devolution.   
This commitment becomes crystallized in Schreiner’s treatment of Blenkins in the 
novel’s first section.  Though Blenkins has most commonly been read as an object of outright 
satire, the specific ruses he develops to conciliate Tant’ Sannie’s distrust of strangers invokes the 
same ambiguities that Schreiner was attempting to elucidate in her political writings on 
constitutionalism. When he first arrives at the farm, Blenkins invents a fantastical genealogy for 
himself in which he is related to both Napoleon Bonaparte and the Anglo-Irish Duke of 
Wellington, and the sheer improbability of this mixture is matched only by the contradictory 
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ideological programs to which he applies this ancestry.  On the one hand, Blenkins identifies 
himself as an Irishman so as to claim solidarity with the Boer Tant’ Sannie as mutual victims of 
English imperialist aggression.  On the other hand, Blenkins’s avowed relation to the Duke of 
Wellington also associates him with one of the greatest moments in British imperial militarism, 
and most of his stories concern the supposed Duke of Wellington’s nephew and how Blenkins 
displayed more courage and muscular might than this close relative of one of the most famous 
military figures in British history.  (His favorite story describes his saving of the Duke of 
Wellington’s nephew from a horde of bears in Russia.)  Even though Blenkins is eager to 
dissociate himself from Englishness and its abuses, he nevertheless wants to claim a part in the 
imperial glory of British militarism and its cult of masculinity, and he therefore seizes on the 
Anglo-Irish Duke of Wellington as the medium through which he can perform this double feat of 
victimized dissent and muscular self-possession.45  
Blenkins’s absurd genealogy resonates deeply with the problems facing colonial 
constitutionalism, especially the humanitarian constitutionalism championed by Schreiner. 
England, as the imperial metropole and the source of liberalism, was at once a site of 
identification and the potential instigator of violence against local communities who, like the 
Boers, were partly dissociated from the claims of imperial citizenship.  By labeling himself an 
Irishman, Blenkins supplies a mimetic solution to this dilemma that was heavily associated in the 
late nineteenth century with the Irish Sinn Féin movement’s aping of English militarism: styling 
themselves as more “manly” than the English, Sinn Féin nationalists were able simultaneously to 
assert their own potency for self-rule and national-imperial military aggression through an 
English model and to construct a sentimental rhetoric of victimization based on martial 
martyrdom.  However, as seductive as this message is to Tant’ Sannie, Schreiner’s agonized 
 129	  
descriptions of the violence perpetrated by Blenkins towards Waldo and Lyndall repudiates his 
militarism as a viable model of devolved authority.  Minutely detailing the pain of the lash 
falling onto Waldo’s back and the “wild, fitful terror” it invokes, Schreiner calls attention to the 
senseless violence inherent in any militarized system of authority and instead proposes, as in her 
political writings, that the capacity to sentimentalize other people’s virtues and pain constitutes a 
more lasting and authentic basis for political community than the brute force associated with 
imperialism and monopoly capitalism (125).  Indeed, to the extent that the novel’s multiple 
narrative threads become interwoven into a unitary “universal history,” this occurs through the 
children’s sentimental regard for each other’s plight, rather than through a final subsumption of 
their individual concerns (marriage, feminism, art, labor) into a single narrative frame.  Unable to 
imagine how she could assist Waldo in his “day of bitterest need,” Lyndall can only “look at 
[him] and wonder” at the pathos contained in his “agony,” “pityingly” regretting the pain 
consequent upon life’s “little battles” but certain that “when the hour comes to lean hard…all 
souls are alone” (102). 
In contrast to Schreiner’s political writings, Story of an African Farm embeds its analysis 
of sentimental liberalism within a series of Spencerian-inflected parables that complicate the 
spatialized model of affective mediation she deploys in The Political Situation and An English-
South African’s View of the Situation.  Starting with the opening chapter of its second part, the 
novel transitions from an investigation of the limitations of muscular imperialism to a looser 
narrative structure revolving around several disconnected parables and abstract philosophical 
discussions.  As Schreiner explained to Ernest Rhys, allegory enabled her to “condense” her 
thoughts “with no loss, but a great gain to clearness” (quoted in Rive, Letters, 136).  Unlike 
“argumentative prose,” in which “it is easy clearly to express abstract thoughts,” “whatever 
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emotions those thoughts awaken I have not found myself able to express except in [allegory]” 
(Woman and Labour, 16).  The first and perhaps the most famous of these allegories is the 
“Times and Seasons” interlude that bridges the novel’s first and second parts.  Here, Schreiner 
narrates a soul’s journey from ignorant youth to knowledgeable adulthood, explicitly comparing 
the soul’s spiritual time to the physical development of a living being: “The soul’s life has 
seasons of its own; periods not found in any calendar, times that years and months will not scan, 
but which are as deftly and sharply cut off from one another as the smoothly-arranged years 
which the earth’s motion yields us” (137).  Moreover, she generalizes this soul’s journey by 
referring to its growth within a first-person plural form of address, synthesizing an agonized and 
isolated personal trajectory with a Spencerian ideal of organic community wherein singular 
experience slides into a collective social position harmoniously: 
This thing we call existence; is it not a something which has its roots far down 
below in the dark, and its branches stretching out into the immensity above, which 
we among the branches cannot see?  Not a chance jumble; a living thing, a One.  
The thought gives us inner satisfaction, we cannot tell why. (153) 
 
In part, Schreiner’s comparison of the soul to a living organism reflects a contemporary 
predilection, popularized largely by Spencer, for representing the social polity as an organic 
body. But what is most noteworthy about her allegorical reading of the soul’s evolution is how it 
employs the emotional intensity she attributes to allegory to achieve the exact opposite result 
implied by her Spencerian holism.  Initially an amorphous bundle of desire – “and oh, we want 
it, we want – we do not know what” – this collective soul soon starts to differentiate its emotions 
from those of the “old wise people” (138-9).  “They” (the referent is just as vague as the 
collective “we” of the soul) censure the anguish that the soul feels when it hears a preacher speak 
of God’s wrath, and the soul subsequently begins to revolt against “their” religion.  What the 
soul loses in inherited knowledge, however, it makes up for in sentiment: “You never shed a tear 
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or create a beautiful image, or quiver with emotion, but you pay for it at the practical, calculating 
end of your nature.  You have just so much force: when the one channel runs over the other runs 
dry” (151).  Schreiner is able to make these distinctions between a hostile “they” and a 
benevolent “we” precisely by abandoning the exterior social forms of knowledge and religion 
and retreating inward to sentiments whose phenomenological horizon is that of the individual, 
not the collective.  But this move inward is not necessarily one of unqualified dissent.  As 
numerous critics have argued, the imperial romance – the most popular and prevalent genre of 
South African fiction during this era (e.g., by H. Rider Haggard and John Buchan) – used 
entrepreneurial individualism as an alibi for British appropriations of colonial wealth, typically 
by eliminating from their narratives the systemic elements of imperialism and by justifying 
transfers of wealth in terms of choices by individuals, the ideological sine qua non of liberal 
capitalism.46 If individualism was a potent rhetorical figure in fin-de-siècle South Africa, then, 
this had much to do with its ability to differentiate individual agents from certain modes of 
collective association – imperialism, knowledge, religion – and to bind them into alternative, 
more local, but nevertheless privileged communities: entrepreneurs and liberals with a continued 
connection to communities from which they had partially disengaged themselves. This, in sum, 
is what I have been calling an aesthetic of devolution. 
Significantly, Schreiner’s parable-form uses individualism’s complex interplay of 
identification and dissociation to craft a Spencerian social organism out of failed, asymmetrical 
sentiments that are more reminiscent of John Bull’s Other Island than the reciprocal sympathy 
permeating her political writings.  In Story of an African Farm’s other major parable, the fable of 
the hunter, a “French-looking” stranger glimpses a wooden post that Waldo has decorated with 
carvings and proceeds to narrativize the anguished feelings that went into its production (156).  
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The hunter, the stranger explains, sets out in search of “a vast white bird,” Truth, and spends his 
entire life trying to reach it (160).  However, his quest ends without the realization of his goal: he 
finds only one feather from the bird and dies cut off from the rest of his people.  The moral of the 
tale is that striving toward Truth will blaze a path that can be followed by the rest of humankind 
only in later generations – any comfort has to be found in the value of the labor itself and not in 
sympathetic support, since the hunter cuts himself off through his advanced pursuits. “But they 
will mount [the mountain in search of Truth],” reflects the hunter, “and on my work; they will 
climb, and by my stair!  They will find her [Truth], and through me!  And no man liveth to 
himself, and no man dieth to himself” (168).  Note how different this scenario is from 
Schreiner’s spatial model of Anglo-Boer sympathy in A South African’s View of the Situation: 
where in the latter piece Schreiner suggests that physical and intellectual proximity can bridge 
emotional disparities, in Story of an African Farm Schreiner’s holism forecloses sympathetic 
attachment from the hunter’s experiences.  That is, his status as an intellectual avant-garde 
implicitly joined to the rest of humanity through the shared pursuit of Truth indicates continuity 
with the rest of his community, but the uneven pace at which they progress toward that Truth – 
the hunter foraging ahead, the rest following in his wake – codes sentiment as anterior to 
philosophical development.  Nature, Truth, the mind: all of these are described by Schreiner as 
holistic phenomena transcending the individual and molding humanity into a single object, but 
sentiment – the limited, surface manifestation of commonality – is represented instead as a 
chimerical medium of association that obscures the more lasting links between individuals and 
communities at different stages of (intellectual) modernization. 
However, as was the case with Shaw, sentiment maintains a more central role in 
Schreiner’s work than the absence of collective sympathy in this passage would lead us to 
 133	  
believe.  Even as she abandons the consolations associated with sentimental citizenship, 
Schreiner displaces the rhetoric of sentiment onto the elaborate recognition scene played out 
between Waldo and the stranger.  Rather than being a straightforward moment of mutual 
pleasure in intellectual and spiritual affinities, the scene duplicates the uneven tempo of 
modernization characterizing European and South African development by slowly bringing 
unlike feelings into harmony through their common basis in sentimentality.  Distraught at his 
alienation from the monotony of farm life, Waldo’s “huge, unwieldy figure…hurt[s]” the 
stranger with “something between pity and sympathy” (158).  Translating the inchoate feelings 
Waldo has poured into his sculpture into a parable, the stranger alleviates his own injured 
sensibility by reassuring Waldo that his nearly unbearable emotional pain is socially productive, 
an inconvenience necessary for intellectual development.47  We find here a recursive use of 
sentiment, in which the stranger’s initial ease, his blasé “tast[ing of] joys mental and physical,” is 
disrupted by Waldo’s spiritual agony and can only return after he has eased Waldo’s unrest 
through a parable that doubles his angst within a fictional narrative.  Waldo, for his part, 
progresses through a similarly recursive pattern. “The suspense [of experience] fills [him] with 
[a] pain” that is mitigated by learning he is not alone in feeling alienated from the world, that this 
is a disposition held by all spiritual revolutionaries (172).  But, even if this knowledge 
momentarily relieves his discomfort, the affinity he cherishes with the hunter of the tale is 
premised upon them both rejecting sympathetic social bonds.  As Schreiner puts it elsewhere in 
the book, on a personal level their labor appears to be “a striving and an ending in nothing,” a 
striving whose significance is noticed by the rest of humanity only after their deaths (107). 
Waldo and the stranger’s sentiments never coalesce into an alternative counterpublic of 
dissent, one in which their collective scorn for colonial prejudices would be reinforced by like-
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minded individuals.48 In fact, the specific trajectory of their recursive emotions actively militates 
against this, since the stranger returns to his complacent hedonism by convincing Waldo of the 
social necessity for his suffering.  Their sentiments do, however, work in tandem, productively 
supplementing each other, and it is this synchronization to which I want to call attention.  If, as 
we have seen, Schreiner’s recourse to a spatialized model of sentiment in her political writings 
faltered in the face of her developmentalist rhetoric, the stranger’s storytelling translates this 
deficiency into a boon.  Through the complex interplay between his and Waldo’s divergent but 
compatible sympathies, the telling of the parable itself schools their emotions into productive 
outlets.  Thus, even though Schreiner depicts the stranger as a “civilized” European whose tastes 
and refinements are utterly inconceivable to Waldo’s “unskilled” mind, his parable of the hunter 
manages to rescue Waldo’s inability to sympathize with his fellow colonials as a trope for 
modernization in general.  In other words, colonial “striving” to reach the more “advanced” 
civilizational level inhabited by Europeans – “How did you know it?” Waldo plaintively 
beseeches the stranger after he has finished his tale (169) – provides an allegorical image of the 
evolution of the social organism as a whole that can then be universalized within the abstract 
terminology of the parable form – voiced, of course, from the more knowledgeable, self-assured, 
and patronizingly sympathetic vantage-point of the stranger.  Furthermore, the allegorizing 
language of the parable, Waldo’s isolated existence in the Karoo, and the negotiations of 
sentiment that elicit this narrative valorize the liberal precepts of which Shaw made so much: the 
bourgeois individual and the inherent worth of his/her industrious labor.  
Schreiner’s thus fiction succeeds where her political writings failed.  By dramatizing in 
Waldo and the stranger’s exchange a devolved modernity splintered between European 
enlightenment and a modernizing colonial hinterland, Schreiner suggests that Greater Britain 
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functions as a Spencerian social organism to the extent that its constituent, devolved parts fulfill 
specialized roles essential to the growth of “civilization” as a whole; and these roles are 
themselves dependent on each region’s level of development, and their asymmetries must be 
managed through the incongruent sentiments they produce. 
 
Mothering Devolution 
To conclude, I want to look briefly at one last instance of Schreiner’s devolutionary 
rhetoric that renders this sentimental administration in slightly more concrete language.  Over the 
course of the second section, as Lyndall’s thoughts on the dangers of “sex parasitism” seem to 
work out the anxieties expressed by Waldo and Em over labor and marriage within a gendered 
discourse of masculine and feminine development, Lyndall’s narrative gradually begins to 
assimilate Em’s and Waldo’s.  As this takes place, the distinctions Schreiner has gradually been 
exploring in the earlier stages of the novel – an uneven Spencerian social organism made up of 
evolved and primitive parts, the inward retreat to emotional alienation, and the syncopating 
activity of the parable form – suddenly collapse into a single figure: the Anglo-South African 
mother.  Thus, after discovering she is pregnant, Lyndall diagnoses what the child’s father 
believes is his love for her as an index of his own will to power: “you love me because you 
cannot bear to be resisted, and want to master me” (238).  Lyndall is not necessarily averse to 
being “mastered” – after all, she hopes to find something “before which [she] can kneel down” 
(279).49 But she is wary that romantic sentiment stunts female development by sacrificing 
women’s adversarial disposition – the isolated “striving” that fuels modernization – in return for 
the emotional consolations of marriage.  “You call into activity one part of my nature,” Lyndall 
explains. “[T]here is a higher part you know nothing of, that you never touch.  If I married you, 
 136	  
afterwards it would arise and assert itself, and I should hate you always, as I do now sometimes” 
(237).  For Lyndall, striving toward a superior form of civilization involves a pseudo-Darwinian 
struggle between partners whose positions are always in a sense asymmetrical, whether as 
reflected in one person’s desire to master someone greater than himself or in the other person’s 
hatred for the parasitical leisure attendant upon marriage.  In a sense Lyndall extrapolates the 
implications encoded within Waldo’s encounter with his stranger – that an intellectual avant-
garde cultivates an antagonist affective stance toward the world around him – and generalizes 
this insight across two monolithic gender blocs. 
But instead of exerting their inchoate dissatisfactions toward nature in a sort of Hegalian 
synthesis of externalized culture and reappropriated Truth, men and women, Lyndall suggests, 
direct their labors against each other – to the detriment of both. “You are our goods, our 
merchandise, our material for operating on; we buy you, we sell you, we act the wily Jew with 
you…” (192).  In other words, men and women evolve under hyper-imperial capitalism by 
reifying each other into static, raw material for commodification, each undermining the other’s 
claim to a developmentalist historical trajectory through this objectification.  Such a claim 
resonates with contemporary scholarship on the African “postcolony” that stresses how the 
abuses of the postcolonial state can be traced to imperialism’s nonconsensual model of 
governance, which treated Africans as objects to be acted upon by brute “power” rather than as 
co-participants in an administration of collective welfare (Mbembe, On the Postcolony; 
Comaroff and Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony; Mamdani).  As opposed to Indian 
and Irish instantiations of the colonial state that treated subject populations as adolescent pupils 
slowly advancing toward liberal self-governance,50 “Africa” was more often understood as a 
negative signifier designating an “absolute otherness” unable to participate in the project of 
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modernity (Mmebme 2).51 Within this discourse, African subjects could only become “modern” 
through the objectifying violence of state power, which transformed them into a surplus of 
docile, “modern” bodies open to the state’s control.   
Yet Schreiner’s optimism about constitutional liberalism – in particular, its ability to 
coordinate incommensurable lines of development into a mutually-progressing whole – leads her 
to the exact inverse conclusions as those articulated by critics of the postcolony. Where Achille 
Mbembe, Jean and John L. Comaroff, and Mahmood Mamdani all fear the tendency of an 
authoritarian state apparatus to bolster its collective modernization project at the expense of 
analogous efforts by its own citizens, Lyndall paradoxically argues that it is the disenfranchised 
who objectify their more cultured brethren.  Since they “are not able to expend [their power] in 
tunneling mountains, nor healing diseases, nor making laws, nor money, nor on any extraneous 
object,” women foreclose men’s evolution by fashioning them into finished images of idealized 
modernity, sought-after “merchandise” that has been fetishized into the sole exemplum of value 
(192, my italics).  The parallelism between the modernization efforts expounded in the first half 
of the sentence and the legal-commercial language that ends the passage exemplifies the 
connection between developmentalism and liberal self-governance in Schreiner’s thought: one 
develops precisely by participating in the social, legal, and economic forms of civil society.  
When isolation cuts women off from these outlets, male development also suffers, since men are 
frozen into static pieces of “merchandise” for female labor. 
Thus Schreiner’s version of the New Woman ideal of marriage as a co-equal partnership 
employed calls for marital devolution as a means of both clearing a space for feminine 
independence and preserving masculine accomplishments (the two being, within this lexicon, 
virtually inseparable).52 But even more important, Schreiner suggests that women’s 
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manufacturing of men can be recuperated as a progressive force if translated from the 
economistic language of reification to an organic one of enculturating mothering.  As Lyndall 
explains to Waldo, “the woman who does women’s work [i.e., child-rearing] needs a many-
sided, multiform culture … We bear the world, and we make it” (193).  Here, Schreiner 
reappropriates the language of labor and production (“we make the world”) from political 
economy and applies it instead to the domestic sphere.  By doing so, she jettisons commercial 
exchanges’ objectifying transactions and instead represents masculine and feminine 
modernization as cultural projects overseen by a benevolent mother figure who “makes” her 
children by educating them.53  Like Waldo’s agonized “striving,” mothers’ strenuous labor (“We 
bear the world”) borrows from a sentimentalized register of pain and sympathy only to 
subordinate that emotional rhetoric to depersonalized notions of culture, education, and “the 
world”-as-social organism.  That is, Schreiner literalizes Spencer’s claim that societies act “like” 
a social organism: by physically giving birth to the individual men and women who constitute 
the social organism, mothers, according to Schreiner, serve as a sort of non-governmental civil 
service guiding their children into the most efficient possible dispensation in civil society.  Most 
significant, because mothers in this framework function as mediators par excellence, giving life 
and knowledge to both men and women, their “catholicity of sympathy” allows them to 
coordinate male and female development so as to productively supplement each other, thus 
circumventing the difficulties normally presented by male and female attempts to commodify the 
other in the service of their own developmental aspirations. 
As numerous critics have noted, the male characters in Story of an African Farm are 
almost exclusively English and/or European: the father of Lyndall’s child, Waldo’s “French-
looking” stranger, and Gregory Rose all hail from “civilized” regions of England and the 
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Continent (GoGwilt; Chrisman, Rereading the Imperial Romance). Less commented upon, 
though, is the fact that mothers in Schreiner’s fiction are just as emphatically Anglo-South 
African in nationality.  In Story of an African Farm, discussions of gender politics and child care 
revolve around Lyndall and Em as actual and potential mothers, while Tant’ Sannie’s childless 
throughout most of the novel points to an inability on Schreiner’s part to imagine Boer women as 
providing the same enculturating education as English women.54 It is this connection with 
motherhood that enables Schreiner in her nonfiction to locate Anglo-South African 
constitutionalism as a necessary mediator between British capitalism and more “primitive” social 
forms which could rehabilitate British civilization.  “Who can say,” wonders Schreiner in From 
Man to Man, “that, in destroying the child of nature with his perhaps simpler organization and 
untried nerves, we are not destroying that of which humanity may yet in æons to come have need 
to keep the race upon the earth” (206)?  As with most fin de siècle writers, there was little 
question for Schreiner that these social practices could still be found among “native African 
women in their primitive society,” where “woman [is] often the only builder” (Woman and 
Labor, 5, 41).  Schreiner attributes this same rustic, labor-oriented condition present in black 
Africans to Boer women as well, who “after two thousand years [appear] not wholly to have 
forgotten [their] ancestral tactics” (Woman and Labour, 93).  By utilizing African and Boer 
women’s toils as a metaphor for motherhood’s creative work, Schreiner establishes a formal 
similitude between physical labor and maternal education.  At the same time, though, as with 
Waldo’s stranger’s appropriation of his angst as a trope for universal modernization, this 
correlation is only formal: manual and intellectual occupations may both involve labor, with the 
first providing an image through which to understand the effort involved in the second, but 
Schreiner makes it clear that imaginative exercises take place among civilized Europeans, with 
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their “refined, discriminative” tastes, and not among black Africans and their “animal appetites” 
(194).   
But according to Schreiner, this translation is exactly what Anglo-South African mothers 
provide for the British world-system: as overdetermined tropes for constitutional devolution, 
mothers cultivate the best properties of each “devolved” line of development – whether these be 
male and female, European and African, or imperial and national – and mediate them through the 
abstracting language of constitutionalism.  In this way, they coordinate incommensurable 
political and economic circumstances into an orchestrated global totality.  What both Schreiner 
and Shaw demonstrate in their fictional and nonfictional investigations of colonialism is that the 
procedural peculiarities of local constitutional governance evacuate the content of particular 
sentiments even as they exploit the structural effects of those sentiments through alternative 
disciplinary instruments (e.g., the liberal-socialist redistributive state and domestic education).  
In doing so, they envision capitalist modernity as split into multiple lines with varying 
developmental tempos, with its only unifying feature a common formal language of egalitarian 
self-government. 
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1 The ambivalence felt by many of these figures toward Irish Home Rule is too extensive to go 
into in any detail here.  For example, Lady Gregory began her life as a “soft” Unionist (a support 
of British rule in Ireland) before later turning Republican (a supporter of Irish independence).   
 
2 For more on Doyle’s understanding of imperialism as “chivalry” and Kipling’s imperial 
jingoism, see Paula M. Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and 
the Boer War. 
 
3 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest; 
Joseph Valente, Dracula’s Crypt: Bram Stoker, Irishness, and the Question of Blood; and Roy 
Foster, “Parnell and His People: The Ascendancy and Home Rule,” in Paddy and Mr. Punch, 62-
77. 
 
4 Joseph Cleary details the pitfalls of modernization theory in Outrageous Fortune: Culture and 
Capital in Modern Ireland, 14-46.  David Lloyd has probably been the most instrumental figure 
in championing the use of postcolonial frames to interpret Irish literature, but his work is notable 
for its focus on the linguistic politics of Irish nationalism and marginalized subcultures, which it 
could be argued postcolonialism is more amenable to than proceduralist constitutionalism.  See 
for example, Anomalous States: Irish Writing and the Post-Colonial Moment and Irish Times: 
Temporalities of Modernity.  Roy Foster provides an excellent overview of historians’ (largely 
unsuccessful) attempts to categorize Charles Stewart Parnell, the Anglo-Irish leader of the Home 
Rule movement, in “Interpretations of Parnell: The Importance of Locale,” in Paddy and Mr. 
Punch: Connections in English and Irish History, 40-61. 
In the South African context, less attention has been paid to constitutionalism than in 
Irish studies, particularly among literary critics, but important new work on Cape loyalism by 
Alan Lester (Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and 
Britain) and A. Thompson (“The Languages of Loyalism in Southern Africa, c.1870-1939”) has 
begun to shed light on South African investments in British institutions.  Saul Dubow presents 
the most thorough analysis to date of South African constitutionalism in A Commonwealth of 
Knowledge, 121-57. 
 
5 The term “state of exception” comes from Agamben’s work on the development and 
normalization of extra-legal space in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Homo 
Sacer; State of Exception). 
 
6 I take here a long perspective on the Irish Land War.  Although the official Land War lasted 
from 1879-1882, the minimal gains that the Land War won for Irish tenant-farmers led to the 
resumption of land agitation under the 1886-1891 Plan of Campaign, which featured the boycott 
as its primary means of mass political engagement. 
 
7 Fears of racial degeneration were bound up with the large number of recruits found to be unfit 
for service during the Boer War.  According to then Surgeon-General Sir William Taylor, there 
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were signs of a “growing deterioration of the physique of the working classes”; General Sir 
Frederick Maurice claimed that more than three out of every five men wishing to enlist were 
either turned away on medical grounds or failed to last two years in the army (“Where to Get 
Men”; “National Health: A Soldier’s Study”). 
 
8 See, for instances, Arata, Fictions of Loss in the Victorian Fin de Siècle and Brantlinger on the 
“imperial Gothic” in Rule of Darkness. 
 
9 Seeley, The Expansion of England; Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain. 
 
10 As Seeley put it, liberal governance was “a leading characteristic of England over [the] 
continental countries” with which it was in competition (Seeley 7).  Similarly, Froude insisted 
that “One free people cannot govern another.  The inhabitants of a province retain the instincts 
which they brought with them.  They can ill bear that their kindred at home shall have rights and 
liberties from which they are excluded” (Froude 12). 
 
11 Dilke supposed that “no possible series of events can prevent the English race itself in 1970 
numbering 300 millions of being…Italy, Spain, France, Russia, become pygmies by the side of 
such a people” (Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries During 1866 
and 1867, 546). 
 
12 Froude borrows the term “Oceana” from James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana 
(1656). 
 
13 The schooling of sentiment, often through fiction, has occupied a central place in narratives 
about the rise of capitalism in eighteenth-century Britain (Deirdre Lynch, The Economy of 
Character; Barbara Benedict, Framing Feeling).  In a sense, we could think of Greater 
Britainism as extending the emotional principles that Adam Smith and Anthony Ashley Cooper, 
earl of Shaftesbury, had hoped would govern newly-commercialized social relations in Britain to 
an imperial setting. 
 
14 Žižek is leaning heavily on Hegel’s Elements of a Philosophy of Right in this passage, esp. 
339-53.  Edward Said makes a similar argument about filiation and affiliation The World, the 
Text, and the Critic, 1-30. 
 
15 There is some overlap here with Ernest Bloch’s notion of the non-synchronous synchronous, 
which has been an essential concept for Marxist thinkers seeking to theorize capitalism as a 
singular global modernity (for example, Jameson in A Singular Modernity and Harvey in The 
Limits of Capital).  But Davis and Belich’s work is unique in tracing specific rhythms that 
“synchronize” these discrepant modes of production into an orchestrated totality, rather than 
locating this in an abstract world-system or world market, usually connected by trade, 
imperialism, or neoliberal neocolonialism.  The point of deviation in Davis in particular (the 
more Marxist of the two critics) lies in his intellectual debts to Rosa Luxembourg, whose The 
Accumulation of Capital embodies an alternative strain of Marxist criticism more interested in 
the traumatic integration of alternative subsistence economies into a Europe-based world market 
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than the progressivist historical narrative of the necessary destruction of archaic labor practices 
Marx supplies in Das Capital. 
 
16 Donal P. McCracken, The Irish Pro-Boers, 1877-1902; Elleke Boehmer, Empire, the National, 
and the Postcolonial, 1890-1920: Resistance in Interaction; P.J. Mathews, Revival: The Abbey 
Theatre, Sinn Féin, and the Cooperative Movement. 
 
17 Charles Stewart Parnell, the longtime head of the IPP, was revealed to have been engaged in a 
years-long affair with Katherine (Kitty) O’Shea when her husband sued for divorce in December 
1889.  Upon learning of the affair, the Catholic clergy and Gladstone repudiated Parnell, causing 
a rift in the IPP between Parnell supporters and anti-Parnellites that would cripple the party for 
the next decade. 
 
18 W.T. Stead’s Stop the War Committee echoed Morley in its promotional literature, insisting 
“WE DO NOT WANT ANOTHER IRELAND IN SOUTH AFRICA."  From a more 
conservative angle, J.A. Froude also believed in South Africa the “history of Ireland is repeating 
itself – as if Ireland was not enough” (68). 
 
19 These writings were collected posthumously in Thoughts on South Africa (1923). 
 
20 Of course, even for progressives, devolving governance to the black majority of South Africa 
was usually seen as unconscionable. (Though Schreiner, as one of the few exceptions to this rule, 
resigned from the South African Women’s Suffrage League when it refused to make black 
enfranchisement part of its platform.)  Indeed, the series of frontier wars that the British 
embarked on in southern Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century tightened rather than 
loosened imperial control over black Africans. 
 
21 In The Dream Life of Citizens: Late Victorian Novels and the Fantasy of the State, Zarena 
Aslami does discuss the writings of Shaw’s Fabian compatriot Sidney Webb, whose thinking 
heavily influenced Shaw’s own (11-4, 92-4).  Aslami’s study participates in a widespread turn 
toward the state in Victorian literature, as seen for example in Lauren Goodlad, Victorian 
Literature and the Victorian State: Character and Governance in a Liberal Society, and Laura 
Berry, The Child, the State, and the Victorian Novel.  Other recent studies of the state and 
literature include Robbins, Upward Mobility; Michael Szalay, New Deal Modernism; Michael 
Rubenstein, Public Works: Infrastructure, Irish Modernism, and the Postcolonial; John Marx, 
Geopolitics and the Anglophone Novel, 1890-2011, and Matthew Hart and Jim Hansen, eds., 
Contemporary Literature and the State. 
 
22 Carl Levy articulates what has become the consensus view on Fabians and the state in 
“Historiography and the New Class”: Fabian socialists “combine[d] an appeal for ‘social service’ 
with schemes that substituted for traditional elites and capitalist entrepreneurs a stratum of 
managers and experts” (275).  More recent work on Fabianism, e.g. Mark Bevir’s The Making of 
British Socialism and James Alexander’s Shaw’s Controversial Socialism, has stressed how the 
Fabians finessed liberal individualism and representative democratic institutions within what was 
supposedly a Marxist-collectivist theory of the state. 
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23 Eric Hobsbawm, for example, argues that the Fabians had “quite failed” to notice that “an 
element of Socialist reform and non-laisser [sic?] faire ideology” could be reconciled to 
liberalism sans socialism, demonstrating a “striking lack of political sense” in their political 
endeavors (“The Fabians Reconsidered,” 253, 251).  Hobsbawn and other scholars skeptical of 
Fabianism’s grandiose claims to success (e.g., A. M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English 
Politics, 1884-1918) were responding to a version of Fabian history first popularized by Edward 
Pease’s History of the Fabian Society and extended in Henry Pelling’s Origins of the Labour 
Party, 1880-1990, which argued that Fabian permeation of the Liberal Party eventually led to the 
construction of the modern Labour Party and its socialist platform. 
 
24 See especially Holyrod, Bernard Shaw. 
 
25 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: A New Economic History, 255-64.  The global agricultural 
depression was in large part caused by the creation in the latter half of the nineteenth century of 
the first truly “global” commodity market: the grain market (Pomeranz and Topik, The World 
That Trade Created, 175-214). 
 
26 Foster details the adoption of the Land War by IPP in Modern Ireland, 373-99. 
 
27 McCormack notes that the term Big House became the dominant term for Anglo-Irish estates 
in this period (“Setting and Ideology”). 
 
28 Compare Shaw’s statements on Home Rule to those of the Anglo-Irish nationalist Erskine 
Childers: “Home Rule is an indispensible preliminary to the closer union of the various parts of 
the empire” (The Framework of Home Rule, 148). 
 
29 On the gendering of English imperialism in Ireland, see Elizabeth Cullingford, Ireland’s 
Others: Gender and Ethnicity in Irish Literature and Popular Culture, 37-56. 
 
30 It is rarely commented upon in scholarship on John Bull’s Other Island just how much 
laughter is associated with Broadbent (normally at his expense): Doyle, Nora, and Father Keegan 
all either laugh at Broadbent or marvel at his ability to induce cynical laughter in others.  In his 
“Preface for Politicians,” Shaw calls special attention to this aspect of Broadbent’s character: 
“Writing the play for an Irish audience, I thought it would be good for them to be shewn very 
clearly that the loudest laugh they could raise at the expense of the absurdist Englishman was not 
really a laugh on their side; that he would succeed where they would fail; that he could inspire 
strong affection and loyalty in an Irishman who knew the world and was moved only to dislike, 
mistrust, and even exasperation by his own countrymen; that his power of taking himself 
seriously, and his insensibility to anything funny in danger and destruction, was the first 
condition of economy and concentration of force, sustained purpose, and rational conduct” (vi). 
 
31 Alexander provides a thorough analysis of the tensions between liberalism and socialism in 
Shaw’s nonfiction.  For a broader investigation of Shaw’s nonfiction that places his socialism 
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and liberalism into dialogue with feminism and Irish nationalism, see Gareth Griifth, Socialism 
and Superior Brains. 
 
32 On the religious element to Shaw’s Fabian socialism, see Stuart E. Baker, Shaw’s Remarkable 
Religion. 
 
33 Though the marginalist movement was most heavily associated in Britain with Jevons, Carl 
Menger (founder of the Austrian School of economics) and Marie-Esprit-Léon Walrus also 
developed marginalist economic theories of economics around the same time as Jevons (Regenia 
Gagnier, The Insatiability of Human Wants, 1-18). 
 
34 Shaw was particularly invested in the reorganization of the consular service through the use of 
specially-designed trade schools and a new, more practical exam structure (Fabianism and the 
Empire, 7-13). 
 
35 In this respect, Shaw’s “efficiency” differed from German and American corporatist business 
models.  German and American corporatism were normally noted for the efficient “uniformity” 
guiding their manufacturing, which helped multiple business activities to work in tandem.  Shaw, 
in contrast, believed that a mixed global space that needed multiple conjoined political models in 
order to function optimally. 
 
36 In addition to his affirmative remarks about “that great Englishman Gladstone,” Broadbent’s 
affection for the Liberal politician can be seen in the “impressive portrait” hanging on his and 
Doyle’s office wall (124, 120). 
 
37 The secondary literature on the legal fiction of corporations as persons is vast.  For one astute 
reading that traces corporate personhood to the operations of the Bildungsroman genre in the 
postcolonial world, see Joseph Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc., 86-139.  Cullingford also notes 
the homoerotic undertones to Doyle and Broadbent’s relationship, but she sees this as an index of 
their co-participation in the colonial project rather than as a reinvention of Anglo-Irish 
socioeconomic forms (38-42). 
 
38 For example, in her pioneering study of Schreiner’s fiction in Imperial Leather, “Olive 
Schreiner: The Limits of Colonial Feminism,” Anne McClintock labels Schreiner as a “colonial 
feminist” who developed a radical critique of British patriarchy through her experiences in South 
Africa, but whose “elision [of black African women] creates an abiding paradox, for it fractures 
[her] monism and her yearning for a universal feminism” (273).  In a slightly more utopian 
reading, Carolyn Burdett argues that “Schreiner’s colonial status meant that she increasingly 
understood, and sought to represents, the connections between the emancipatory claims being 
made by middle-class women in the ‘dominant’ West, and the impact on peoples elsewhere of 
the dominance” – particularly her adaptation of “the language of evolutionary biology….into a 
language of social life…fundamentally unfixed and very much contested” (6).  Similarly, Laura 
Chrisman suggests that Schreiner’s experience of the mining industry in South Africa led her to 
“refuse the conceptual boundaries that allow metropolitan readers to remain at a safe distance 
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from the violent expansionism of Rhodesian monopoly capitalism” (Rereading the Imperial 
Romance, 141). 
 
39 Schreiner was concerned about Merriman’s misogyny, which prompted him to describe her 
collection of short stories, Dreams, as “short rhapsodies by a very clever woman who would be 
happier if she believed what the rest of her sex believe” (Lewsen, ed., Correspondence 1890-
1898, 29).  Initially she hoped that, regardless of his antiquated views with regard to women, he 
would defend liberal policies against Rhodes; however, she quickly became disillusioned with 
Merriman and focused most of her efforts on influencing Rose Innes and Sauer (First and Scott 
202-206). 
 
40 The most thorough analysis of Cape constitutionalism’s trouble relationship with British 
imperialism is Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge, 121-57. 
 
41 There is also a distinct racial component to Schreiner’s thinking about the Boers.  According 
to her, the Boers, like the English, were “a colony of Teutonic folk” whose supposed liberalism 
sprung at least in part from a myth of common Germanic origins.  Conservative pro-Boers also 
tended to characterize the Boers as hereditarily predisposed to English politics.  For example, 
Froude claims in Oceana that “The two races [English and Boer] were drawing together, and, if 
the treaties of 1852 had not been broken, South Africa would have by this time been reunited, 
and the Dutch farmers would have been loyal subjects of the Crown…The Boer is a born 
Conservative, and the Fee States, if let well enough alone, would have naturally rejoined their 
kindred” (44). 
 
42 Some of the numerous treatments of Schreiner’s intellectual debt to Spencer can be found in 
Mark Sanders, Complicities: The Intellectual and Apartheid; Carol L. Barash, “Virile 
Womanhood: Olive Schreiner’s Narratives of a Master Race”; and Margaret Lenta, “Racism, 
Sexism, and Olive Schreiner’s Fiction.”  Schreiner fictionalizes her youthful encounter with 
Spencer’s First Principles in Story of an African Farm, where Waldo receives a book from his 
stranger that, though unnamed, is clearly Spencer’s famous treatise. 
 
43 Schreiner’s texts in a sense anticipate theorists of underdevelopment who have shown there to 
be a spatial component to industrial development.  According to Samir Amin, a nation’s attempts 
to modernize can be constrained by its peripheral role in the world-system, since these countries 
are forced to rely on foreign loans (resulting in huge deficits) that impede growth of the 
industrial sector.  At the same time, Schreiner’s organicism makes its plea for a more efficient 
development trajectory in terms of its benefit to the system as a whole, rather than on the basis of 
the inequitable allocation of wealth among countries. 
 
44 Waldo is the son of the “German” overseer, but is constantly linked to English culture through 
his political and intellectual interests (e.g., Mill and Spencer). 
 
45 Among the many studies to draw a correlation between ideas of masculinity and empire are 
Joseph Kestner, Masculinities in British Adventure Fiction, 1880-1915; Radhika Mohanram, 
Imperial White: Race, Diaspora, and the British Empire; Joseph Sramek, “‘Face Him Like a 
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Briton’: Tiger Hunting, Imperialism, and British Masculinity in Colonial India, 1800-1875”; 
Anne M. Windholz, “An Emigrant and a Gentleman: Imperial Masculinity, British Magaziners, 
and the Colony That Got Away”; and David Alderson, Mansex Fine: Religion, Manliness and 
Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century British Culture. 
   
46 Some of the numerous studies that investigate the relationship between the imperial romance, 
liberal individualism, and the mystification of imperialism include Nicholas Daly, Modernism, 
Romance and the Fin de Siècle; Francis O’Gorman, “Speculative Fictions and the Fortunes of H. 
Rider Haggard”; McClintock; and Chrisman, Rereading the Imperial Romance.  
 
47 The child of Nonconformist missionaries, Schreiner’s valorization of Waldo’s suffering is 
clearly indebted to the representational strategies of the sentimental slave narratives favored by 
abolitionist Nonconformists.  At the same time, as John Kucich observes, Schreiner’s texts often 
transform victimhood into agency, a characteristic often lacking from abolitionist texts (Imperial 
Masochism, 86-135). 
 
48 In this, Schreiner’s novel differs from the communities of pacifists, vegetarians, and 
spiritualists who gathered together into counterpublics of anticolonial dissent in London during 
the late-nineteenth century (Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities). 
 
49 As a number of critics have noted, Schreiner displayed a masochist disposition similar to that 
voiced here by Lyndall in both her personal life and her fiction.  John Kucich provides a concise 
summary of the criticism that second-wave feminists leveled against the masochism pervading 
Schreiner and other late-century feminists’ fiction: “Second-wave feminists were repelled by a 
number of seemingly perverse constraints some “New Woman” writers placed on themselves: a 
rigid code of sexual self-denial, often presented as a politicized gesture; a programmatic 
defeatism, which transformed disappointment with women’s social prospects into postures of 
saintly martyrdom; and an idealization of self-sacrifice (particularly maternal self-sacrifice), 
which has been viewed either as a concession to eugenics or a residue of mid-Victorian gender 
ideology” (87).  The scholars who Kucich is summarizing include Elaine Showalter (A Literature 
of Their Own), Sheila Rowbotham (Women, Resistance and Revolution), Gail Cunningham (The 
New Woman and the Victorian Novel), and Patricia Stubbs (Women and Fiction). 
 
50 For example, in Provincializing Europe Dipesh Chakrabarty claims that European imperialists 
held out a lure to subject peoples that they could one day become modern but constantly deferred 
that promise into an unreachable future, exiling colonized peoples to the eternal limbo of the 
“not-yet” modern. 
 
51 On the absolute alterity ascribed to Africa by European thinkers, see also V. Y. Mudimbe, The 
Invention of Africa. 
 
52 For a more complete analysis of the role that “equal” marriage played in New Woman thought, 
see Sally Ledger, The New Woman, and Angelique Richardson, Love and Eugenics in the Late 
Nineteenth Century.  In addition to Schreiner, Sarah Grand and Mona Caird are the two New 
Woman writers most frequently credited with rethinking the bounds of the marriage contract. 
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53 This may answer in part the difficulty in reading Story of an African Farm according to the 
generic codes of the bildungsroman.  The novel’s problem with stunted or doubled narratives of 
bildung (Esty, Unseasonable Youth; GoGwilt) testifies to its refusal to endow teleology in a 
developmental narrative of self-actualization. Instead, it suggests that mothers nurture 
individuals’ growth to maturity, thereby providing a supplemental discourse of development 
outside of the narrative of individualistic self-possession. 
 
54 Similarly, in From Man to Man Bertie never bears children while being kept as a mistress in 
London, but Rebekah is so overwhelmingly maternal that she not only raises her own children 
but also her husband’s illegitimate child with a servant of theirs (apparently without any input 
from her biological mother!). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
ENVIOUS PROFESSIONALISM: LITERARY INTERNATIONALISM, ANGLO 
CITIZENSHIP, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN NOVEL BETWEEN THE WARS 
 
 
 Where the last chapter investigated literary dialogues with colonial constitutionalism, this 
chapter unfolds a literary-historical genealogy of professionalism, citizenship, and the welfare 
state.  As a point of departure, we might observe that literature and professionalism are uneasy 
bedfellows.  Since the early years of modernism, writers as diverse as Conrad, Joyce, and Woolf 
have all identified professional craftsmanship as a central component of their work.1 But even if, 
as Roland Barthes has argued, professional “[l]abour replaces genius as a value” in modernist 
literature, the relatively small audience for modernist writing generated anxiety among these 
writers over the influence their works possessed (Writing Degree Zero, 63).  Compared to the 
mass-market appeal of an Arnold Bennett, literature with artistic pretensions often passed 
unheralded, little read, and certainly not monetarily rewarded.  As modernist writers sought to 
distinguish their mode of professional writing from more popular figures like Bennett, they 
stressed how, to quote Virginia Woolf, their “way of telling the truth” was more true to life but 
also “bound to reach us in a chaotic condition” not amenable to popular taste (“Mr. Bennet and 
Mrs. Brown,” 22).  One of the constant refrains of modernist literature, then, is a partially 
disavowed envy for the wider audience available to more recognizably “professional” writers 
and a countervailing assertion of their own superior craftsmanship.  This turbulent mixture can 
be seen in anywhere from The Secret Agent, where Conrad worries over the greater reach of 
vulgar newspapers vis-à-vis his own experimental fiction, to Joyce’s support for a socialist state 
that, he believed, would fund his writing despite its small audience.  Wealth, influence, and 
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material comfort appeared to be the sacrifices demanded by the modernist craft, sacrifices which 
could only be recovered in a utopian political project (socialism) or through the resentful 
language of envy. 
 This unsteady balance of professional aspiration and envious yearning was even more of 
a problem for modernist-era South African authors whose investment in professionalism was 
much more ambivalent than was that of their metropolitan counterparts.  As was apparent to 
many Anglo-South Africans, professionalism was intimately wedded to both the emerging 
welfare state and global capitalism.  On the one hand, in the interwar period a modernized, state-
funded university system had begun training professionals en masse, professionals who were 
then given employment within the welfare state’s growing civil service sector (Perkin 155-70).  
On the other hand, professionalism educated workers in a uniform set of vocational principles 
that allowed businesses to communicate more effortlessly in and across national borders, and 
which also encouraged workers to associate themselves less with national and class identities 
than with international professional communities (Perkin 9-17).  Hostile to any transnational 
institutions that might replicate empire’s fading structure, Anglo-South African writers like 
William Plomer and Sarah Gertrude Millin greeted professionalism with a mixture of 
fascination, disdain, and, most of all, envious emulation.  But in doing so, they also reveal the 
ways in which envy was an essential ingredient to transnational professionalism – how, that is, 
envy’s ambivalent attachments to objects enabled it to connect professionalism with both 
nationalizing welfare states and a budding global economy.  This chapter therefore turns to 
interwar Anglo-South African fiction in order to show how it provided a laboratory for working 
out an envious brand of professionalism that could image national citizenship within a 
transnational economy. 
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Geopolitically, perhaps the definitive characteristic of the interwar period was the 
consolidation and gradual turning-inward of the sovereign nation-state.  Whether instituted under 
the rubric of national self-determination, economic protectionism, or an organic national culture, 
nation-states slowly retreated from the highly globalized economy of the pre-Great War world 
and from the “Great Game” of inter-imperial competition and statecraft, directing their energies 
instead toward strengthening their physical and ideological control over the populations inside 
their own borders.2  Corresponding to this shift, though without being fully reducible to it or 
determinative of it, was a transition from what Giovanni Arrighi calls the “cosmopolitan 
imperial” economic organization of the “long” nineteenth century world-system (1780-1914) to 
the “corporate-national” one of the “long” twentieth-century world-system (circa 1880-present) 
(224-6).  In the nineteenth century large territorial empires (the British, French, Ottoman, 
Russian, and, later, German) expanded their economic reach through military interventions in 
and formalized political rule over distant countries in Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific, 
securing trading rights and opportunities for investment in local industries; in the twentieth 
century capitalism was driven more by the maximization of profits through multi-part 
corporations that could both handle the manufacturing, distribution, and selling of their products 
all by themselves and cultivate mass consumer markets for these goods.  By the end of the 
Second World War, this development would be cemented by the emergence of the Keynesian 
welfare state – which helped to stimulate a mass consumer market based on medium-term 
growth – and the Bretton Woods system of monetary management, which tied currency 
exchange rates to the U. S. dollar and ensured that trade would not be subject to protectionist 
policies from individual nation-states or imperial/commercial trading blocs. 
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 However familiar this historical narrative has become, it is important to remember that 
the passage from empire to a post-imperial world-system was quite fraught both politically and 
ideologically.  Far from a foreordained step toward the “end of History,” the interwar period 
might more properly be understood as what Antonio Gramsci terms “the interregnum”: “The old 
is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid 
symptoms” (Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 276).  During the 1930s in particular, early 
progenitors of the welfare state were just beginning to take shape across Europe, the United 
States, and the British dominions: in the form of pro-state intervention treatises like Keynes’s 
General Theory, the socialist reformism championed by Britain’s Labour Party, and exercises in 
centralized state planning like the New Deal and its Works Progress Administration.3  But praise 
for these measures was balanced by those who, like Ayn Rand, saw the national-collectivist 
policies of welfare statism as endangering the autonomy of the individual, the sine qua none of 
laissez-faire capitalism, or who, like Samuel Chamberlain and Daniel Moffet, saw national 
retrenchment as a rejection of the Enlightenment project of civilization that had underpinned 
imperialism in its many guises.4  Even committed liberals like Keynes feared that a sovereign, 
unchecked state would eradicate the individualism of its citizens by reproducing the abuses of 
imperialism in the domestic sphere, a misgiving that led him to advocate a government 
composed of semi-autonomous bodies loosely connected to a centralized bureaucracy.5 
 More important, attention to the shift from competing global empires to “corporate-
national” consumerism illuminates how the post-World War II world-system exhibits the same 
spectral, discontinuous temporality that Derrida theorizes in Specters of Marx.  Given the 
unsteady juxtaposition of national autonomy, global consumerism, and professional corporatism 
they experienced, postwar writers were faced with a series of challenging questions.  What 
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narrative tropes and stylizations of the subject were necessary to reconcile the immanent, 
organicist versions of national culture that had supported the rise of national self-determination 
with a hauntingly present global economy that continued to cut across national borders? How 
could a model of rationalized technocratic management be indigenous to the peripheral territories 
just beginning to struggle out from under the imperial shadow and at the same time a lingering 
remnant of colonialism?  And from what locations, and through what genealogical lines of 
emergence, did imaginative resolutions to these dilemmas first take shape? 
 Among British territories, the ideology of professionalism helped to mediate between 
conflicting movements toward democracy and elitism, nationalism and globalization, and 
centralized authority and peripheral autonomy.  As Saul Dubow argues, because professionalism 
was viewed as a politically-neutral form of technocratic management, it sublimated the imperial 
civilizing mission into a decentered project of universal modernity.  Thus pro-Empire nostalgists 
could claim professionalism as “the acceptable face of the imperial connection” while distancing 
themselves from the empire’s retreating political edifice (A Commonwealth of Knowledge, 165, 
201).6  But unlike the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which 
vociferously claimed their British heritage, or the Anglo-Irish, who increasingly clung to their 
British descendant as a means of antagonistically consolidating their withering sociocultural 
standing in Ireland, Anglo-South Africans faced an intractable Afrikaner nationalism that was 
suspicious of any hint of lingering imperial influence.  Even among Anglo-South Africans there 
was disagreement as to what constituted an “African” form of professionalism or how a 
specifically Anglo professional community was distinct from a closet return to imperialism.  
During the interwar period, for example, South Africa’s three most accomplished writers– 
Plomer, Campbell, and Sarah Gertrude Millin – all frequented the edges of the British 
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Bloomsbury Circle in person (Plomer and Campbell) or through their correspondence (Millin).  
But while Plomer idealized Bloomsbury as a “grand” world of “ideas and talent,” Campbell 
attacked the Group as effete bisexuals whose literary experiments privileged ultra-liberal, 
professionalized modes of disputation above empirical truths (“Far happier with a complicated 
lie/ Than with a simple truth that hits the eye”): Millin in turn chastised Plomer and Campbell’s 
work as inauthentically nationalist, merely “a branch of a well-defined overseas group” (The 
Georgiad, IV.112-3; “South African Magazine,” 8). 
 At the same time, South African uneasiness over professionalism is less an index of the 
country’s resistance to modernity than to the turbulent emotions that welfare-state 
professionalism called into being.  Foremost among those emotions, as I show, is envy.  As 
Carolyn Steedman dramatizes to spectacular effect in her memoir of her South London 
childhood, Landscape for a Good Woman, the welfare state both elicited yearnings for the 
material signifiers of the “good life” – the commodities that drove mass consumerism – and 
stepped in to intervene in lower-class lives that failed to achieve the “good life” on their own.  
The result, emblematized by Stedman’s own mother, was a pervasive envious disposition among 
lower-class workers that could only conceive of one’s connection to the state as one of 
deprivation – as an intimate affiliation with objects and institutions that nevertheless remained 
noticeably absent in one’s everyday life.7 
 Investigating South African novels and social criticism from the interwar years, I trace 
how Anglo-South African authors crafted an envious perspective toward British-based 
professional institutions. Appealing to their country’s perceived economic deficiencies, envy    
enabled writers like Plomer and Millin to represent professional institutions as distant, external to 
their selves, but as nevertheless exerting a profound force in South Africa.  Turning first to the 
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furor surrounding Campbell and Plomer’s short-lived magazine Voorslag and Plomer’s 
controversial novel Turbott Wolfe, I show how Plomer in particular deployed a series of 
modernist stereotypes about the destructive power of black African sexuality and the overly-rigid 
social forms of industrial modernity in order to develop an anti-presentist ontology of 
professionalism.  For Plomer, an African professionalism is a phantasmatic objected confined to 
fantasy, an irretrievable past, or an unrecognizable future, but which still exerts a force on the 
present through its productive of envy.  The second half of the chapter then pursues the 
migration of this image from marginal avant-garde circles to a central position in political 
debates over post-imperial economic communities.  As South Africans argued over whether or 
not to join the British-based trading bloc known as the “sterling area” or “sterling bloc,” the 
popular Anglophilic writer Sarah Gertrude Millin struggled to articulate an envious mode of 
South African citizenship wherein participation in foreign, Anglo institutions, far from 
undermining South African autonomy, were in fact constitutive of a newly-valorized South 
African identity.  In doing so, Millin harnessed Plomer’s ontology of professionalism to a more 
conservative political program of Anglo-South African citizenship.  Her writing thus reveals how 
the welfare state’s emotional vocabulary was co-produced in tension with global regimes of 
“flexible” economic citizenship that would not be fully articulated until the final decades of the 
twentieth century. 
  
Envy, European Modernity, and the Voorslag Controversy 
 Interwar discussions of South African professionalism were permeated by the rhetoric of 
envy.  Agricultural depressions had made increasingly visible the plight of “poor white” 
Afrikaners, whose scanty education and poor living environments resembled black Africans’ 
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circumstances more than their fellow-European English.  In the view of most Anglo-South 
Africans, Afrikaners appeared as “the poor, uneducated railway worker, the ignorant 
policeman…vacant lower-class beings.  A stigma of poverty and ignorance was attached to the 
whole group” (Salomon 117).  This economic divide was deepened as many Afrikaners moved 
from the country to the city, where they found the professional and civil service positions 
available there already filled by Anglo-South Africans or English-speaking immigrants.  In 
response, Afrikaner politicians railed against Anglo control of the education system and 
professions, pointing to the disadvantage Afrikaners possessed in “having to speak a foreign 
language – English – like a conquered race” in order to gain entrance to the professions 
(Salomon 106).  For Afrikaners, urban professionalism appeared as an Anglo-European enclave 
more tightly connected to international business, scientific, and educational institutions than to 
the needs of South African citizens.  Moreover, the language of technocratic universality 
espoused by professional institutions belied the centrality of English to their operations, a fact 
which seemed to reinscribe the geography of empire within them (John Marx, The Modernist 
Novel and the Decline of Empire, 1-24).  Afrikaners feared becoming what the Rev. Marchland 
famously described as “hewers of wood and drawers of water” to incoming European 
immigrants, and seethed at how what they believed to be their rightful wealth was absconded by 
international, British-based professional networks (quoted in Giliomee 319). 
 In his seminal study “Structures of Feeling,” Raymond Williams notes the difficulty 
inherent in reading “meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt” as opposed to 
“formally held and systematic beliefs” (Marxism and Literature, 132).  Since these “structures of 
feeling” define “a social experience which is still in process,” they are habitually “not yet 
recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating” (132).  While 
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Williams’s main concern in his essay is to differentiate between the sedimented ideologies 
codified in institutions and the more fluid affective and experiential relationships embedded in 
everyday life, we might extend his thoughts on the dominant cultural tendency to subjectivize 
affect in order to reflect on the unevenness of this process with respect to particular emotions.  
For example, as we saw in the last chapter, imperial apologists embraced sentiment precisely for 
providing an affective foundation for the supra-institutional community of British nations into 
which they hoped the empire would evolve.  Far from isolating its bearer from social life, 
sentiment might more properly be thought of as an “aesthetic technology of belonging” 
cultivating a voluntarist ideal of affective community.8 Like other emotions associated with 
sociality and belonging,9 sentiment declares its own rhetoric of intersubjective association – as 
inner-motivated, organic, and humanistic – to be more authentic than the objectifying class 
relations thrust upon individuals from outside of themselves by impersonal socioeconomic 
institutions.10 
 In contrast, envy has traditionally been almost exclusively couched within the 
individuating terms Williams debunks in his analysis of “structures of feeling.”  As Sianne Ngai 
explains,  
we tend to perceive envy as designating a passive condition of the subject rather 
than the means by which the subject recognizes and responds to an objective 
relation … [This] suggests that the dominant cultural attitude toward this affect 
converts its fundamentally other-regarding orientation into an egocentric one, 
stripping it of its polemicism and rendering it merely a reflection of deficient and 
possibly histrionic selfhood. (129)   
 
For Ngai, then, a politically-nuanced treatment of envy would seek to return envy’s “other-
regarding orientation” – that is, its primary concern with another person or group’s possessions, 
attributes, or social esteem – to a central position within both cultural representations and critical 
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discourse.  Doing so involves collapsing the distinction between subjective emotion and 
collective political action through which reactionary theories of ressentiment have discredited 
envious critiques of inequitable social conditions as “private dissatisfactions” free from any 
genuine egalitarian element (Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 202).  But this endeavor also 
entails rethinking how identification, emulation, and collective association operate.  In particular, 
envy troubles the predisposition, especially prevalent in psychoanalytic thought, to regard these 
activities as either synonymous or causal effects of one another.  As Ngai goes on to argue, 
We could also argue that envy enables a strategic way of not identifying which, in 
facilitating and encouraging [the transition from admiration to antagonism], 
preserves a critical agency whose loss is threatened by the full-blown idealization 
of the attribute admired.  In this sense, it could be said that a subject might envy 
and emulate not just as a safeguard against fully identifying herself with the 
quality emulated – say, “femininity” – but precisely in order to convert her 
admiration into polemicism, qua critical force or agency. (161) 
 
Ngai’s championing of envy as a critical tool facilitating limited attachments to the 
material signifiers of satisfaction, though persuasive, raises two questions central to this study.  
First, if the political potency of envy stems from its capacity to disengage individuals from the 
fetishized markers signaling inclusion within a particular group without sacrificing that 
community itself, can we assume (as I take Ngai to assume) that the political effects of its 
critique are of necessity progressive?  Or, to put it another way: if we regard envy as an 
emotional technē whose tactical effects are transferrable across ideological persuasions, how do 
we read envious yearnings that are simultaneously critical of imposed racial, gender, and 
national hierarchies and complicit in the retention of those same hierarchies in another form?  To 
what degree can we approach such compromised political projects without either reducing their 
complex dynamics to the suspect moral code motivating them or idealizing them as 
countercultural solutions to social normativity? 
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Second, what are the actual material effects envy both reacts to and produces?  Ngai’s 
analysis of envy stresses its metacritical interrogation of reified objects but has little to say about 
the actual material disparities inciting envious desires in the first place.  In the context of the 
interwar period, why did envy accrue around certain objects – the economy, race, 
professionalization – rather than others?  Why were these particular phenomena in need of the 
limited disarticulation Ngai finds in envy, and what new allocations of commodities and 
identities resulted from envious attachments to these objects? 
 Perhaps the best place to start such an investigation is by turning to the professional 
literary sphere that was first beginning to emerge in South African in the 1920s and 1930s.  
Professional literary magazines, a sophisticated book review and publicity network, and a local 
market for books all coalesced during this period, forming the rudiments of an indigenous 
literary culture.  Most important for our purposes, contemporaneous debates over what this 
professional literary culture should look like were repeatedly phrased in the language of envy 
and through the object of race.  The parameters of this discussion were set by two distinct 
aesthetic programs jockeying for local and international public support.  On the one hand, 
William Plomer, Roy Campbell, and Laurens van der Post envisioned themselves as an African 
avant-garde come to “lash,” in the words of Campbell’s introductory remarks in the first issue of 
Voorslag [Afrikaans for “Whiplash”], the South African public into taking notice of international 
aesthetic and political movements.11  Though ostensibly apolitical in its content, under the 
editorship of Campbell Voorslag characterized white South Africa as “three hundred years 
behind modern Europe and five hundred years behind modern art and science” and deliberately 
antagonized conservative opinion by publishing provocative pieces with pro-“native” messages 
(63).  So hostile was the reaction to Voorslag that its sponsor, Lewis Reynolds, removed 
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Campbell’s editorial control after only three issues, and without him the magazine quickly fell 
apart.  Campbell for a brief time planned a successor volume, but van der Post and Plomer both 
left South Africa soon after the “Voorslag controversy” erupted, leaving Campbell without his 
two co-collaborators.  Dissatisfied with his work’s reception in his homeland, Campbell soon 
joined van der Post and Plomer in England and completed the group’s physical and aesthetic 
drift toward Europe, where the three found more sympathetic audiences (at least initially) within 
Bloomsbury’s literary circle. 
On the other hand, Sarah Gertrude Millin emerged as the leading voice of a middlebrow 
strain of fiction seeking to document South African society for a growing local and international 
audience.  Millin’s novels were usually sociological in their approach, presenting a detached 
narrator objectively focusing on such representative national spaces as the farmstead, the 
missionary encampment, and the shantytowns springing up around mineral diggings.  Millin was 
not alone in adopting a sociological perspective in her work, and English as well as South 
African writers often responded to demands for detailed accounts of South African life from 
English and American audiences: Francis Brett Young, to name perhaps the most popular writer 
of such novels in England, was widely praised for his (questionable) insights into the “Boer 
mentality,” the Great Trek, and urbanization in They Seek a Country and City of Gold.  But 
Millin was certainly the most prolific and critically-acclaimed social critic among popular and 
middlebrow authors in South Africa, her novels enjoying spectacular sales in the U.S. in 
particular and commendations by General Jan Smuts and J. H. Hofmeyer, South Africa’s leading 
liberal politicians.  As Smuts explained in a congratulatory letter to her after the publication of 
her nonfiction study The South Africans, “South Africa is, and remains, a mystery and this you 
have brought out” (1 October 1926). 
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 Relations between Millin and the Campbell/Plomer/van der Post set during this period 
were tense, to put it mildly.  Campbell did include one of Millin’s short stories in the third issue 
of Voorslag, but privately he and Plomer mocked the “restraint” critics in Britain and the U. S. 
attributed to her work: 
 You praise the firm restraint with which they write – 
 I’m with you there, of course: 
 They use the snaffle and the curb all right, 
 But where’s the bloody horse?     (Campbell, unnamed poem) 
 
Campbell’s point is that restraint in Millin becomes an end in itself: the tools used to control 
Millin’s prose (“the snaffle and the curb”) are well developed as techniques, but her fiction lacks 
any underlying vitality (“the bloody horse”) that would require obstruction.  From the 
perspective of Campbell and Plomer, both of whom possessed a Lawrentian interest in how 
black Africans could infuse a restorative – and at times threatening – energy to European 
civilization through their martial and sexual practices,12 Millin’s “economical” writings failed to 
recognize the promise inherent in South Africa’s racially mixed demography.13 As her 
biographer Martin Rubin observes, despite the important role sexual passion plays in her plots, 
Millin’s novels tend to deal with sex in an abstract, disembodied manner (150).  Indeed, even 
though her anxious descriptions of interracial miscegenation garnered her international success 
as a novelist, Millin’s fiction directed its focus at the social forms reining in excessive emotion, 
rather than the urges inducing transgressions of the color bar, as she was unable to 
“conceive…an abandonment of all restraints” (God’s Stepchildren, 31).   
Millin, for her part, complained that “for all [Voorslag’s] South African flavour” it was 
more “a branch of a well-defined overseas group” than an authentic South African production 
(“South African Magazine,” 8).  Insofar as the Voorslag writers advocated importing European 
avant-garde techniques to South Africa, this was certainly a fair criticism; but it also presented a 
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reductive reading of literary nationalism as in conflict with cosmopolitan experimentalism and, 
more important, identified attitudes toward the color bar as the issue separating these positions.14 
In God’s Stepchildren (1924), her first and most extended treatment of miscegenation, Millin 
satirized European “negrophilia” through the liberal Englishwoman Nora, who pleads that her 
“Coloured” husband Barry “must take me away from here – back to England, where I need not 
see these brown creatures, and think about how they came into the world, or be made to 
remember all the time that my own little baby…” (288).  Millin suggests all English 
“negrophiles” were like Nora: thousands of miles removed from contact with Africa, they could 
safely indulge in anti-normative sexual and aesthetic practices, including interracial marriage and 
anti-realist representational techniques.  But in South Africa, where black Africans and European 
settlers came into contact daily, racial proprieties had to be maintained to prevent the creation of 
a mixed-race community who would carry all of the “vices and failings” of their parent races and 
none of their advantages (251).  Violations of social norms here become hereditary traits passed 
down to one’s descendants: the fact that one would ignore the color bar – for Millin, the most 
fundamental social taboo – retroactively assigns a poor character to oneself and condemns one’s 
children to ethical shortcomings.  By expressing “negrophilistic” views originating in bohemian 
Europe, the Voorslag set, according to her, undermined a tenuous social structure incapable of 
absorbing heterogeneous aesthetic forms and political opinions. 
However, for all the discord between Plomer, Campbell, van der Post, and Millin over the 
correct attitude to adopt toward black Africans, their vocal differences over miscegenation 
obscure the extent to which they shared a common understanding about how blackness 
threatened the constrained social forms of a Eurocentric professional society.  As numerous 
critics have argued, primitivism provided the modernist art and literature that Plomer in 
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particular emulated with a means of critiquing the rationalist, mechanistic, and overly-
conventionalized ethos of Western modernity.15 D. H. Lawrence and the cubists in particular 
valorized African and Native American cultures for their intuitive connection to the deep, 
animalistic intensities covered over by decadent Western institutions.16 (Often, it should be 
noted, with the misogynistic implication that Western culture was overly “feminine” and in need 
of a corrective swing to the “masculine” blood-rites of primitive cultures.17) In his bombastic 
defense of Plomer’s first novel, Turbott Wolfe, in the inaugural issue of Voorslag, Campbell 
explicitly aligns the magazine’s work, and Plomer’s writing in particular, with the primitivism 
inflecting literary and academic production in the interwar period:  
What Mr. Plomer has yet to learn is that we in our mental bondage are almost as 
much the victims of circumstance as the natives in their physical bondage … The 
work done by Sir James Frazer, Freud, Trotter, Le Bon and others has given us a 
very different idea of oruselves [sic] from that entertained by our ancestors, 
namely that the white man having ascended from the apes is automatically 
proceeding, a purely rational creature, by leaps and bounds to a higher plane of 
existence.  We have been revealed to ourselves in a more tragically heroic but less 
comfortable, light: individually we see man as a creature, far more emotional than 
rational, trying to impose the laws of his reason on the more powerful emotions 
and lusts which tow him through life; a creature armed with the weapons for his 
own salvation and destruction but unable to tell which are which: a small and 
desperate figure warring with the titanic shadows of his own heredity, superstition 
and imagination. (42) 
 
Emphasizing the irrational “emotions and lusts” overwhelming attempts to reach “a 
higher plane of existence,” Campbell portrays European cultural and scientific achievements as 
tenuous bulwarks against the excessive energies of the animalistic unconscious.  But he does so 
by racializing the unconscious as an atavistic “native” whose inability to control his own body 
condemns him to “physical bondage” to his emotions and transforms him from a “man” into a 
“creature.”  Indeed, the analogy between “mental” and “physical” bondage becomes solidified 
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through a series of slippages, overdetermined symmetries, and racialized metaphors that 
consolidate a neo-Cartesian dualism of European rationality and African embodiedness even as 
they seek to overcome the opposition between the two.  Structurally, the parallelism between 
“native” enslavement and “superstition and imagination” in both the logic of the argument and 
its rhetorical presentation – “native” bondage is taken to be analogous to the tyranny of 
“superstition and imagination,” with the two images opening and closing the passage – enables 
Campbell to demystify European claims to “the laws of…reason,” but only by thrusting these 
epiphenomena back into the “titanic shadows” of “heredity” that govern the (implicitly black) 
body.  Furthermore, the use of “shadows” to represent this hereditary unconscious and its unruly 
emotions concludes a sequence of highly racialized tropes for the unconscious and its primitive 
urges: enslavement, apishness, darkness.  The result, as Campbell’s juxtaposition of “white” 
rationality with the “shadowy” realm of superstition makes clear, is a scenario in which 
Europeans are coded as “tragically heroic” for their attempts to “impose the laws of [their] 
reason” onto resistant affects; but in which Africans, by contrast, remain exiled from the 
cathartic consolations of tragedy, since their raw emotional energy is precisely the vehicle for the 
ongoing eradication of enlightened cultural forms.  As a thin veneer permeating Western Europe, 
modernity appears in Campbell’s review as an inauthentic social project rigidly constraining 
turbulent animalistic passions – a project whose dialectical confrontation with primitive founts of 
energy pushes it toward a “higher plane of existence” at the same time as it obscures which is 
“destructive” and which “salvation,” powerful emotions or modern rationality. 
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Turbott Wolfe and the Paradoxes of South African Professionalism 
The fact that Campbell finds Plomer deficient in treating his white characters with 
“individual and comparative decency” speaks to Plomer’s refusal to idealize Europeans’ postwar 
loss of faith in industrial modernity and highlights his more progressive stance vis-à-vis black 
Africans’ civilizational aspirations (43).  Still, when Turbott Wolfe was first published by 
Leonard and Virginia Woolf’s Hogarth Press in 1925, its sensationalistic account of Afro-
European miscegenation struck hostile South African reviewers as remarkably similar in its aims 
to those Campbell would elaborate soon afterwards in Voorslag.  As one particularly negative 
review described it, the novel “introduces some strain of actual or potential degeneracy into 
characters he toys with; as if the sight of a sunlit land … had wrenched out of position the 
foundations on which conventionality rests” (“A Nasty Book on a Nasty Subject”).  Like 
Campbell, Plomer was understood to be deconstructing “conventionality” through what the 
reviewer characterizes as the “degeneracy” of black primitivism.  But unlike Campbell, Plomer 
would engage directly with how, and in what form, Africa could develop a modern professional 
culture of its own. 
Turbotte Wolfe, critics agree, is about miscegenation.18 Plomer’s protagonist, the 
eponymous Turbotte Wolfe, says as much: “miscegenation is the only way for Africa to be 
secured for the Africans” (77).  But discussions of miscegenation in the novel have often clouded 
how race and, in particular, racial envy, combine to reveal both the shortcomings and utopian 
potential of the sort of indigenous professionalism Plomer, Campbell, and Millin all desired.  
Indeed, Plomer’s depiction in Turbotte Wolfe of the “Young Africa” organization that propagates 
miscegenation to a hostile South African audience displays a clear debt to emerging black 
African professional movements, most notably the contemporaneous New African movement 
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launched by Pixley ka Isaka Seme and later championed by Solomon T. Plaatje, John 
Langalibalele, and H. I. E. Dhlomo. 19 The New Africans were organized and run by a mission-
educated, petit bourgeois intelligentsia who, tired of waiting for a constantly-deferred 
assimilation into European civilization, turned to African civilizations as a model for an 
alternative professional tradition.  In “The Regeneration of Africa” (1905), a manifesto of sorts 
for the budding movement, Seme called for a “spiritual and humanistic” African renaissance 
based on a widespread “industrial and educational initiative” (408).  In the face of the “influence 
of contact and intercourse, the backward with the advanced,” Seme believed that Africans could 
foment a “new spirit” of modernity among Africans while still demonstrating the “unimpaired 
genius” of African particularity (407-8).  The New African program thus stressed the cross-
fertilization of ideas between Europeans and Africans: professional organizations like the Bantu 
Men’s Social Centre (BMSC) and journals like Bantu Studies and The Critic disseminated 
secular ideals about the institutionalization of literature in the university and professional 
journals, while New African thinkers traced the genesis of such African-based organizations to 
fallen Zulu civilizations.  The central thesis underlying the New African movement, then, was 
that the modern, technocratic forms of intellectual professionalism they were trained in at 
missionary schools were not incompatible with African society (as Campbell believed), but 
rediscoveries of an older, African form of modernity. 
Turbotte Wolfe is at once an investigation into New African professionalism and a 
critique of its founding claims.  As a good Lawrentian, Plomer could not condone New African 
hopes for a fully realized African professionalism; for him, as for Campbell, modernity was an 
“obscene civilization that conquers everything,” a taint radiating outward from Europe to the 
colonies which destroyed indigenous cultures (Turbotte Wolfe, 31).  Africans could not be 
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professionals in the same way as Europeans because to be a professional was to be rationalistic, 
technocratic, and European, and not African.  But this did not mean that professionalism was 
entirely absent from Africa.  Instead, Plomer uses the limited disidentification Ngai finds in envy 
to distance professionalism from his characters without entirely removing it from South Africa.  
Envy, I will be suggesting, relocates professionalism in the novel to a time and place anterior to 
his characters’ immediate environment: in the realm of fantasy, the utopian time of the future, or 
in a glimpse of retrospective recognition that only notices it after it is already gone.  While his 
characters may not “be” professionals in the European sense, they are nevertheless shaped by a 
professionalism that intermittently appears and disappears, one made present to them in flashes 
of envious fantasy and in fleeting, doomed professional societies.  And the epitome of these 
fleeting professional societies is Wolfe’s Young Africa movement. 
Wolfe arrives in South Africa distraught at the “degeneration” of colonial society, which 
appears to him to be mostly made up of small-minded, racist, and effeminate brutes.  After 
discussion with some of the more liberal settlers and Africans – the Rev. Friston, the “Kaffir 
intllectual” Zachary Msomi, and the beautiful Mabel van der Horst – he proceeds to found the 
fledgling “Young Africa” movement who, reminiscent of the New Africans, aim to “regenerate” 
Africa (19).  From the manifesto the group publishes (“Young Africa”), to their connections with 
the native newspaper the Morning Star, to the clear rules and procedures laid down for debate, 
Young Africa demonstrates all the central characteristics of a model professional society.  But in 
contrast to the New Africans, who saw such organizations as indicative of a renewed African 
civilization, Plomer’s Young Africans biologize regeneration within the figure of 
“miscegenation.”  For Wolfe and his compatriots, “miscegenation” between the colonizing 
Europeans and “the hidden force” secreted within black Africa is the only path to laying the “true 
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foundations for the future Coloured World” (65, 77-8).  This tenet is put into practice when 
Mabel marries Zachary, but the marriage quickly unhinges the sanity and principles of the 
group’s other members, mixing utopian potentiality with titillating danger (119).  By the end of 
the novel, Rev. Friston (Mabel’s other suitor) has gone mad, Wolfe has dismissed miscegenation 
as “a nightmare” he was only “glibly…fool[ing] about with,” and the Young Africa movement 
has fallen apart, leaving the reader with an ambivalent juxtaposition of dynamic but destructive 
African sexuality and narcissistic European achievements in such backward-looking disciplines 
as “archæology,” “church architecture,” and “mediæval domestic economy” (the pursuits that 
Wolfe suggests he may embark on after his disillusionment with Africa) (96, 76, 125) (see figure 
6). 
The irony behind this collapse is that even as Plomer shifts his focus away from 
professionalism and toward sexual reproduction, Young Africa becomes more visible as a 
framework that could itself circumvent the difficulties presented to miscegenation by both 
European enervation and African sexuality.  Indeed, though most scholarship on Turbott Wolfe 
emphasizes the interracial sex that caused a veritable literary scandal after its publication, as the 
novel progresses the utopian promise originally contained in the sexual act of miscegenation 
gradually becomes displaced onto Young Africa as the institution that had made such 
propositions possible in the first place.  When Wolfe informs Caleb, his employee and one of the 
members of Young Africa, that he will be leaving Africa for England, their debate over Wolfe’s 
admission of defeat revolves around the status of Young Africa without him, rather than the 
message it propagated:  
“And what is to become of Young Africa?” 
“Young Africa, Caleb,” I said, “was a device of Miss van der Horst’s to 
justify her marriage to Zachary.  But it was also Mr. Friston.” 
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“But why, sir, did you have anything to do with Young Africa if it is only 
what you say?  And why did you encourage me--?” 
“…With Young Africa I allowed myself to be cheated into the idea that 
politics would give me what I sought.  Now, under the barren pear-tree, I see that 
Young Africa was a monstrous farce…” (124-5) 
 
 
Figure 6: Edward Wolfe, Untitled.  Plomer loosely based Turbotte 
Wolfe on Edward Wolfe, a painter whom Plomer had met as a youth 
in South Africa.  The highly sexualized black bodies in Wolfe's 
paintings anticipate Turbotte Wolfe's obsession with black sexuality. 
 170	  
Caleb yearns to view Young Africa as an abstract sociopolitical program exceeding its 
own instrumentalizable message – i.e., as more than the mere “device” that Mabel exploits to 
fulfill her own sexual desires.   However, even as Caleb articulates this longing for a modern, 
professionalized political movement located in the “barren” stretches of southern African, 
Plomer’s narrative immediately cordons off Caleb’s impulse from his immediate material 
environment by subtly shifting from the present to the past tense – “Young Africa…is only what 
you say”; “I see that Young Africa was a monstrous farce” – coding it in a nostalgic register that 
recognizes Young Africa’s promise only after it has already collapsed.  Where Wolfe, Friston, 
Mabel, Zachary, and Caleb initially invest their aspirations for “Eurafrica” in the regenerative 
power of miscegenation, it is the failure of interracial marriage to produce any lasting model for 
collective association that ultimately opens up what Benjamin would call the “messianic” 
promise contained within Young Africa itself (“Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 263).  But 
in a dialectical twist parallel to the one we found in Campbell’s review of the novel, even as 
black sexuality provides the motive force necessary to unhinge “our obscene civilization” and its 
enfeebled conventions, “the almighty violence of Africa” shatters the “regenerated” institutions 
upon which the Young Africans had hoped to establish a new global order (31, 54).  “Even the 
vast fabric of government, the preposterous structure of officialdom,” observes Wolfe, “had been 
set up to conceal or control what could not be ordered: it was denied by the mere existence of 
that which it sought to restrict” (55).  A pure force of destruction that deploys many of the worst 
modernist stereotypes about Africa as the negation of rational enlightenment, miscegenation 
undermines its own institutionalization in civil society by its “mere existence” as that which 
“could not be ordered,” restricting its utopian potential to a past moment “out of joint” with the 
living present (Derrida, Specters of Marx, 1). 
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Turbott Wolfe’s foreclosure of modern professionalism in South Africa can be read in 
two contrasting – but not necessarily incompatible – ways.  The more familiar critical 
interpretation would invoke modernist writers’ fetishization of Africa as the anti-modern 
antithesis to European industrialism.20 But we might also reflect on the ontology of 
professionalism elaborated by Plomer’s novel.  Rather than seeing Young Africa’s collapse as an 
index of its exclusion from modernity, we could note how the organization’s tenuous existence 
within the novel displaces professionalism from the institutional structures built up by groups 
like the New Africans and onto mythic, utopian futures and personal fantasies.  Thus, on the one 
hand Young Africa evidently cannot establish firm, abiding roots in civil society.  Plomer’s 
descriptions of the vulgar Europeans peopling his novel stress how Africa’s brute, apocalyptic 
physicality precludes the ratification of any lasting cultural tradition.  Unable to cultivate Africa 
in Europe’s image, the Fotheringhays (the local minister and his wife) “caress…only the ghosts 
of memory and tradition,” while Wolfe’s neighbor Nordalsgaard’s “conquests were like land 
reclaimed for a time, and afterwards choked with weeds” (55).  But on the other hand, the 
rhythmic alternation encapsulated by Nordalsgaard’s farming – his slow tilling of the land, 
followed by nearly instantaneous ruin – suggests an ephemeral, transient mode of being that 
gradually infects the fantasies of the Young Africans.  Indeed, when Wolfe rejects Young Africa 
as a viable organization, the mad missionary Friston attempts to rehabilitate the movement 
through this same language of oscillation, claiming that by “using [his] nerves instead of [his] 
brains” he has “reached a pitch of understanding” capable of synthesizing “the great compromise 
between white and black; between civilization and barbarism; between the past and the future; 
between brains and bodies; and, as I like to say, between habit and instinct” (114-5).   
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Friston’s vision of ecumenical receptiveness strains to grasp antithetical concepts in a 
single ecstatic epiphany, but his manic shuffling between a series of binaries – black and white, 
mind and body, past and future – implies that he can only approximate such transcendence by 
sublimating his overstimulated “nerves” into a model for interracial communion.21  Young 
Africa, then, does not represent for Friston an empirically present object available to conscious 
manipulation, but instead an unstable palimpsest of immanent bodies and distant space-times 
(“the past and future”) whose unity is communicated to him by subconscious affects.  That is, for 
Friston’s “nervous” materialism, Young Africa need not be manifestly present to shape his 
experience of reality: even isolated in the distant past or the inscrutable future, its ideal of a 
professional, interracial political organization moulds him into a Young African proselyte. 
That being said, the sexual jealousies that motivate these utopian fantasies of collective 
institutional regeneration highlight the equivocal effects attending African professionalism.  In 
the novel’s penultimate chapter, Friston describes to Wolfe scattered, drug-addled dreams that 
despairingly cling to Young Africa as a concrete possibility even after Mabel and Zachary’s 
relationship has discredited the organization in Wolfe’s eyes: “And then there were dreams 
again.  Young Africa.  Eurafrica.  Miscegenation.  What uncomfortable ideas for a missionary.  
And I am a missionary.  Perhaps I shall be a patriarch.  The father of a half-caste nation, the 
father of Young Africa; of Eurafrica” (107).  Folding Young Africa’s institutional organization 
into its polemic assertions concerning biological miscegenation, Friston attempts to rescue the 
fading luster of the movement by locating it in a visionary future cut off from the problems 
posed by the physical act of reproduction.  At the same time, Plomer makes clear that Friston’s 
idealized “half-caste” nation is largely a response to his envy over Zachary’s success with 
Mabel: after Mabel brazenly admits her love for her “Othello,” “the emotional strain” unhinges 
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Friston’s “nerves” and sends him off into a delusional trance glorifying his own virile potency 
and effacing Zachary’s romantic conquest (104-5).  Far from being a moment of singular 
eccentricity, though, Friston’s hallucination is merely the paradigmatic example of a logic of 
envious emulation that orients all of the Young Africans toward collective political action: for 
instance, Wolfe’s envy for “the almighty violence of Africa,” as embodied in “the grace of 
Zachary; the beauty of Nhliziyombi [an African woman he is infatuated with]; and even the 
trustworthiness of Caleb,” encourages him to found Young Africa, while Caleb’s emulation of 
European education – his “illusion that he could talk and write English,” as Wolfe acidly remarks 
– thrusts him into the role of eager disciple (55, 78). 
It is not so much that envy undermines the utopian aspirations of this inter-racial 
professional society, tainting them with its invidious personal resentments, but rather that envy is 
productive of the spectral, shimmering form professionalism adopts in Turbott Wolfe.  As we 
saw in Ngai’s work, envy simultaneously identifies one with a particular community and 
dissociates oneself from the cherished objects or properties valued by that community.  In 
Plomer’s novel, this tension allows the characters to embrace Young Africa in spite of its 
troubling associations with an atavistic, racialized primitivism and an imperializing “structure of 
officialdom.”  As a liminal feeling stretching between both embodied vitalism and conservative 
containments of that (highly sexualized) energy – a feeling which externalizes both bureaucratic 
management and fetishized (black) bodies from the more proximate realm of sentimental 
emotions – envy loosens Plomer’s characters’ investments in these objects by regarding them as 
contingent, phantasmic epiphenomena of a transhistorical Young African professional society at 
the same time as it evades any particular relation to them.   
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In the case of Wolfe’s ambivalent commitment to Young Africa, the multivalent 
attachments provoked by envy can be seen most clearly in his inexplicable expressions of 
negrophilic and negrophobic sentiment.  As Nadine Gordimer recognizes in her introduction to 
the Modern Library reissue of Turbott Wolfe,22 Wolfe “tends, at first, to idolize the blacks in 
apposition to loathing the whites” before “losing [his] balance” in a “suffocating sensation of 
universal black darkness” (xv-xvi).  We might go a step further than Gordimer’s (largely 
affirmative) analysis of the novel and note that, far from just “losing [his] balance,” Wolfe 
descends into outright racism near the end of the novel, confronting Mabel for “go[ing] and 
marry[ing] a nigger” and so “break[ing] the whole thing [Young Africa] up” (111).  If, then, 
Wolfe represents “the new, post-colonial man,” as Gordimer calls him, this recuperation must 
take place largely through a paranoid reading strategy that privileges his late admissions of 
prejudice – “I knew it was she [Mabel] who was right” – over his more explicit racist utterances 
(xvii, 118).  My point is not that Wolfe is revealed to be every bit as narrow-minded as the 
“obscene” European settlers he attacks throughout the novel23; rather, I want to emphasize how 
envy as a mode of political critique is constitutively unable to elaborate a stable progressive 
position in Turbott Wolfe.  Its limited, ambivalent attachments to blackness and European 
civilization disrupt the idealizations that supported liberal, communist, and fascist ideologies in 
the interwar period: consensual democracy, the collective volk, and the noble worker.  By 
locating Young Africa as a spectral entity traversing blackness and (European) modernity,24 
Plomer brackets these objects’ ideological effects without substituting a new positivist object 
around which to orient the characters’ politics.  The result, as Wolfe himself seems to intuit, is a 
schizophrenic cacophony of diverse opinions, prejudices, and epiphanic insights that never pin 
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down what an African professionalism is or whether it is a benefit to society – unsure, even, 
whether or not it really does, or could, exist. 
 
The Sterling Area and South African Citizenship 
If Turbott Wolfe lingers hesitantly over blackness, modernity, and professionalism, 
unsure as to the ethical value or ontological classification of any of these phenomena, by the 
1930s debates over professionalism had migrated from the avant-garde fringes of South African 
society to a more central location in mainstream politics.  Where during the decade following 
World War I professionalism had exerted a unifying force upon Afrikaners and English settlers – 
the sole voices of dissent coming from the anti-modern stylings of neo-Romantic modernist 
literature25 – the economic distress following from the Great Depression of the 1930s brought 
into question the cosmopolitan “universality” of the technocratic brand of professionalism 
disseminated by transnational business, scientific, and literary institutions.  As the British 
government took a more active, interventionist role in the national and global economy under the 
rubric of social “planning,” Afrikaners began to fear that their hard-earned “nationalization” of 
the civil service and parastatal organizations would be overridden by international professional 
networks that were merely a cipher for a renewed British imperialism.26  “The chief objection,” 
as Millin observed in her nonfictional work The South Africans, “was that it [international 
economic institutions] meant a subservience to England …[which] was denounced, with 
passionate derision” (154). 
 Foremost amongst those institutions suspected of impinging on local South African 
autonomy was the global monetary and trading system known as the “sterling area” or “sterling 
bloc.”  As Charles te Water, the South African high commissioner in London, recorded in his 
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diary in October 1931, “The gold standard – depreciated sterling – to remain or not to remain – 
this is the only topic of conversation” (quoted in Drummond 75).  In short, the sterling area was 
an international economic community that insulated its members from the worst of the 
depression by strengthening ties between the fairly stable economies of the Commonwealth 
nations.27 While banking crises in Eastern Europe and the stock market crash in the United States 
sent those currencies pegged to the gold standard on a deflationary spiral, the sterling area 
severed the fixed exchange rate between troubled currencies and those of the Commonwealth, 
protecting them from further market volatilities.28  Because the majority of Commonwealth 
nations’ trade was with other Commonwealth nations,29 the concept behind the sterling area both 
made a certain logical sense and forced reluctant countries to follow Britain’s lead or risk losing 
cherished markets for exports.30  The result, as I. M. Drummond notes, was that the “idea of a 
sterling bloc could easily become entangled with the idea of an Empire bloc” (14). 
 At stake in discussions over whether to abandon the gold standard and join the sterling 
area, then, was less South African economic policy than the definition of and proper orientation 
toward international economic institutions.  To what degree were “international,” “imperial,” and 
“British” mere synonyms for each other?  How could South Africans immerse themselves in a 
British-based economic community without sacrificing national autonomy or tainting their South 
African national identity with an imperial supplement? 
To anticipate the specifics of my argument, I will be proposing that the ontology of 
professionalism developed by Plomer in Turbott Wolfe becomes popularized in middlebrow 
literature of this period in order to reconcile international economic institutions with a plastic, 
transnational ideal of South African citizenship.  Doing so requires shifting our focus away from 
the cosmopolitan avant-garde writers of the Voorslag group and toward popular writers like 
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Sarah Gertrude Millin who were more directly concerned with consolidating a cultured, 
expansive, Anglo national identity in South Africa.  Born to a Lithuanian Jewish family and 
brought to South Africa as an infant, Millin unapologetically presented herself as a South 
African citizen through and through, obsessively following the latest political and business news 
(much of which often found its way into her fictions), writing histories of South Africa and 
biographies of its major liberal politicians (Cecil Rhodes, Jan Smuts, and J. H. Hofmeyer),31 and 
defending South Africa’s retrograde racial politics to her international audience of readers.  In a 
refrain already habitual to Afrikaner nationalists,32 Millin agreed with Katherine Mansfield’s 
assessment that the South Africanness of her fiction could be seen in the way in which it 
“draw[s] upon one’s familiar life,” replacing the “falseness” of “literary society” with a more 
“intensely personal” subject matter (undated letter).  At the same time, however, she also 
“regarded London as [her] cultural mecca” despite being English in adopted language alone 
(Rubin 88).  Millin aggressively befriended many of the leading literary celebrities in London – 
including Mansfield, Arnold Bennett, Vera Britten, Storm Jameson, Rebecca West, and even, for 
a brief time, T. S. Eliot33 – and maintained long communications with them until her increasingly 
illiberal pronouncements on white supremacy alienated even ardent supports like Britten and 
West.34  Millin’s writings would bounce back and forth between these two poles.  Staunchly 
chauvinist, she never completely abandoned a vision of English cultural achievement that cut 
across national borders. 
 Most scholars have approached Millin’s work through the lens of her troublingly racist 
depictions of black Africans, and in particular her almost hysterical denunciations of 
miscegenation as an immoral crime against humanity.35  In fact, Millin’s eugenicist racism is one 
of the few threads that runs throughout nearly her entire oeuvre, from the early God’s 
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Stepchildren (1924) to the late King of the Bastards (1949), fictions that otherwise range from 
sympathetic recuperations of Judaism (The Coming of the Lord) to Christian allegories of 
Hammite ideology (God’s Stepchildren) to sensationalistic murder mysteries (Three Men Die).  
However, too heavy an emphasis on what Coetzee calls the “metaphorics of blood” in Millin’s 
fiction – that is, her belief that an “invisible” blood “flaw” transmits racialized traits across 
generations, only to have them “erupt in the future” and “[throw] off [their] white disguise” – 
can also obscure the specifics of how Millin negotiated between her Anglophilic cultural 
predilections and her national loyalties at particular historical moments, especially during the 
fraught 1930s (“Blood, Taint, Flaw, Degeneration,” 146).36  
In this regard, it is far from accidental that Millin’s novels and nonfictional writings from 
this period repeatedly return to the intimate consequences attendant upon impersonal financial 
and trade mechanisms.  For instance, in Three Men Die (1934) – partly inspired by the trial of 
Daisy de Melker, a woman accused of killing her two husbands and son for the insurance money 
– Julia Taplin’s calculated murders of her first two husbands and her eventual arrest for 
poisoning her son mimic the ebb and flow of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange during the 
controversy over the gold standard and the sterling area.  Julia poisons her first husband, 
Alexander Bishop, in order to marry the wealthier Henry Biddington, with whom she shares a 
passion for the Stock Exchange.  But when Henry’s parsimony proves oppressive even to Julia’s 
own prudent sense of household economy, she gambles on the Exchange herself, losing, despite 
her business acumen, the majority of her inheritance from Alexander through what Millin 
portrays as a tragic divine mandate inciting the “great American collapse” (i.e., the Black 
Monday stock market crash) at precisely the moment that Julia invests her ill-gotten funds (71).  
Millin finally brings her semi-allegorical roman à clef full circle by having Julia discovered and 
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arrested just before South Africa leaves the gold standard and sends “shares…[rising] to 
remarkable heights,” thus linking her necessary exclusion from the national community – as an 
immoral succubus dislocating the ethical and familial conventions of polite society – with 
financial stability (277).  Similarly, in The Sons of Mrs. Aab (1931), which I take up in more 
depth below, the plot revolves around the fraudulent insurance claim taken out by Gideon Aab 
on his handicapped brother’s life, a narrative device Millin exploits to chart the perverse 
interdependencies between English actuaries speculating on South Africa’s mining industry and 
the fictitious, melancholic personhood through which actuarial accounting represents South 
African citizenship.  
If, as I have been arguing, the sterling area became a nodal point for ambivalences over 
the potential global dimensions of professionalized economic institutions, Millin’s writings from 
the 1930s suggest that the foreign, inauthentically “African” nature of the sterling area 
paradoxically provided a circuit through which South African citizenship was stripped of its 
parochial deficiencies and valorized as a newly-legitimated nationality.  For Millin, the sterling 
area could miraculously multiply money and, in doing so, transform those who speculated in it 
into South African “citizens.”  This process was made most explicit in Millin’s 1934 revised 
version of her widely popular “nonfictional” work, The South Africans.  Part social history, part 
political treatise, and part ethnographic fantasy, when The South Africans was first published in 
1927 it finally garnered for Millin the same acclaim in her homeland that she had already 
received in the United States and Britain for fictional works like God’s Stepchildren and Mary 
Glenn.  Millin made only small changes from the first edition of The South Africans to the 
second, mainly updating the historical sections to account for the seven years that had intervened 
between the two publications.  But the one notable exception to her otherwise scanty corrections 
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involves a lengthy and perceptive analysis of South Africa’s gradual decision to abandon the 
gold standard and devalue their currency alongside Britain and the other Commonwealth nations.  
After detailing the parliamentary debates that eventually resulted in South Africa’s admittance 
into the sterling bloc, Millin enthusiastically relates an accounting trick whereby she and other 
knowledgeable South Africans took advantage of the intricacies of devaluation to make a 
substantial profit.  Since “South Africa’s pound stood forty-two percent higher than England’s 
pound,” while after entrance into the sterling bloc “it would equal England’s pound,” many 
South Africans “sent their money to England – there to swell the measure of sterling, thence to 
be returned to South Africa, enhanced by forty-two percent” (156).  That is to say, because South 
Africa’s pound would lose 42 percent of its value vis-à-vis the British pound when South Africa 
tied its currency to Britain’s, by exchanging her South African pounds for British ones prior to 
the transition Millin found herself 42 percent richer when she retransferred the funds back to 
South Africa after devaluation. 
Significantly, Millin explicitly rejects that this tactic was a specialized project undertaken 
by “businessman and speculators” and instead characterizes it as a collective project undertaken 
by “ordinary little citizens.”  In representing the sterling area as a magical fount of money 
through which South Africans grow wealthy without any effort or work on their own part, Millin 
allays fears that it would usurp South African sovereignty by assuring her readers that any losses 
in national power over currency and trade are offset by the increased spending power it 
bestowed.  In order to do so, she suggests that Great Britain’s professionalized financial 
machinery actually created a South African national identity in the first place by routing what 
would otherwise be an incoherent conglomeration of discrete class interests through the 
abstracting medium of money, returning it to South Africa in a newly-appreciated state.  The 
 181	  
“earners, rentiers, pensioners” who “hated to see their money cheapened” and “debtors” who 
could now “[pay] their creditors with delightfully cheap money” rejoice at a miraculous solution 
that can satisfy both of their needs; but the sterling area also benefits both the (primarily 
Afrikaner) farmers who under the gold standard “could not even sell the little their land 
produced” (Britain being the prime market for South African agricultural exports) and the 
(substantially English) mine owners whose stock rose “not forty-odd percent, but a hundred, two 
hundred, six hundred percent” – thus accommodating the Afrikaner-agrarian and Anglo-
industrial factions that Belinda Bozzoli has shown to have been instrumental in forging a united 
South African patriotism (154, 156, 152, 157).37 Indeed, Millin’s “ordinary citizens” become just 
that – ordinary citizens – by virtue of their participation in the international financial network 
that raised South Africa’s fortunes as a country to a new high.  Literally trading local autonomy 
(South African pounds) for robust citizenship (British pounds), currency speculation provides an 
exhilarating, amnesiac rush that makes South Africans “all but [forget] that everything could 
have been like this fifteenth months ago” by equating sectarian investments with a communal 
national wealth encompassing them all (158). 
But in aligning citizenship with financial speculation, Millin introduces an indeterminacy 
into the very referent that she is trying to consolidate.  As she is quick to note, “the virtuous 
conservative folk who abhorred the stock exchange and made a merit of earning their money in 
the sweat of their faces” failed to capitalize on this nation-building surge in ready cash, and as 
often as not lost their money by only “plung[ing]” after “shares [had risen] to a point when it was 
no longer profitable to buy them” (158-9).  Performing the transition Michael Tratner has 
documented from a Victorian discourse of fiscal restraint venerating “saving or accumulation” to 
a modernist one advocating excessive spending to unleash “pent-up demand,”38 Millin’s moral 
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imperative for South Africans to “gamble” on the market distances citizenship from the 
privileged tropes around which it had been deployed during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries: the family (wives “taunted their husbands for their cowardice”), productive 
labor (“for nothing is so worth having as what one has not worked for”), and, increasingly during 
the interwar period, ethnicity (Deficits and Desires, 5; The South Africans, 158-9).  Where earlier 
models of liberalism had represented the citizen as a being abstracted away from the intimate 
labors of the domestic sphere into the universal rationality of public life, Millin’s citizens are 
conglomerations of fantasy, money, and aspiration characterized more by their idleness and 
imagination than bourgeois work ethic.39 At the same time as South Africa’s speculative frenzy 
gestures away from local particularities to a dynamic, circulatory form of citizenship, though, 
Millin’s championing of process over properties – her belief, that is, that speculation, and not 
intimate attachments to family, ethnicity, or work, makes citizens – implies that in order to be a 
South African citizen one must actively participate in the financial networks driving South 
Africa’s boom.  This not only means that South African citizenship will always rely upon a 
supplemental British institution (the sterling area) and will never evolve to autotelic belonging, 
but also that those unwilling or unable to “plunge” into currency speculation or the stock market 
are deficient in their national identity – the “virtuous folk” who refuse to swerve from their 
frugal habits, the poor mineworkers and small-scale farmers unable to fund speculations, the 
black Africans so noticeably absent from this passage.40 Since citizenship is not encoded in or 
around bodies as a static property endowed by the state, The South Africans is able to establish a 
two-tiered national hierarchy between valorized – and valorizing – individuals enmeshed in 
international Anglo economic institutions and marginal social groups whose distance from the 
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centers of high finance blurs the boundaries between rights-bearing citizen and passive subject of 
state power. 
Millin’s notion of “ordinary citizens” is in this regard quite close to what Aihwa Ong has 
theorized under the rubric of “flexible citizenship.”  As Ong argues in a critique of Agamben’s 
biopolitical reading of undocumented workers, asylum seekers, and war refugees, viewing 
citizenship as either a prerogative of the nation-state or as the effect of a “unified human 
condition” risks losing sight of “the validity of other universalizing moral discourses … that pose 
alternative ethical norms of humanity” (22).  In particular, Ong claims that late twentieth century 
neoliberalism ushers in “a detachment of entitlements from political membership and national 
territory, as certain rights and benefits are distributed to bearers of marketable talents and denied 
to those who are judged to lack such capacity or potential” (16).  Like Millin’s ecstatic gamblers 
and dreary misers, Ong suggests that present-day citizenship claims are granulated, differing 
between individuals on the basis of what they do (low-skilled labor, high-end investing) rather 
than who they are (male/female, black/white, native/immigrant).  As “flexible” citizens, 
immigrants and “non-resident” workers are uncomfortably balanced between two separate and 
increasingly disjunctive systems – a rights-giving sovereign territory and an instrumentalizing 
world economy – with their citizenship claims reducible to neither of the two. 
Ong’s regime of “flexible citizenship” – with its emphasis on the receding nation-state 
and globalized capital flows – may seem an odd framework through which to approach the 
insular, nationalist 1930s.  But both Ong and Millin seek to answer the same question, albeit 
from different historical circumstances: what happens when the “national” becomes unhinged 
from the “professional,” whether through incomplete nationalization (South Africa in the 1930s) 
or burgeoning globalization (the post-Cold War neoliberal dispensation)?  How is citizenship 
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articulated when it circulates, like money and bodies, through multiple environments, but is still 
a possession of particular subjects?  The reverberation of “flexible citizenship” across the 
interwar period and the present-day thus signals those moments of “terminal crisis” when global-
imperial citizenship is no longer viable but an equilibrium between sovereign nation-states and 
inter-state commerce not yet solidified (or vice-versa).  Indeed, one of the consequences of 
Millin’s speculative model of citizenship is that money is forced to stand in as a synecdoche for 
South Africans, since the circulation of currency can dramatize their uncertain position between 
professionalized (Anglo) economic institutions and a rooted nation-state.  Traveling to England 
to “swell” before returning “luxuriantly increased,” money both allegorizes South Africa’s 
interwar predicament (an autonomous state whose fortunes are dependent on external trade 
mechanisms) and facilitates the suturing of South Africa together with the sterling area, as the 
wealth created by currency speculation draws South Africa into sterling’s orbit at the same time 
as it produces a vibrant sense of national prestige (158). 
What Millin leaves out of her analysis of the sterling area, though, is the psychosocial 
angst over professionalism that Turbott Wolfe displays to such spectacular effect.  The “flexible” 
nature of Millin’s speculative citizenship makes it every bit as ephemeral and ontologically 
ambiguous as Plomer’s Young Africa – and, one might say, as fleeting as the evanescent 
exchange value of money itself, a value present only in its own consumption.  But Millin’s self-
assured chauvinism and objective descriptions in The South Africans gloss over the ideological 
weight that the sterling area, cosmopolitan professionalism, and nationalism carried in her home 
country, as she traces the sterling area more through its repercussions than in its existential 
properties.  For a sustained engagement with the relative materiality of these objects, we need to 
look instead at how Millin revised Afrikaner nationalism’s ruralist response to the problem of 
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“poor whitism” within an urban, Anglocentric environment in The Sons of Mrs. Aab.  Discarding 
Afrikaners’ fetishization of pastoral indigeneity, Millin proposes an opposing form of 
melancholic citizenship that is buttressed by an emotion familiar to readers of Turbott Wolfe: 
envy. 
 
From Poor Whites to Envious Citizens: Insuring Character in The Sons of Mrs. Aab 
Where the 1920s literary scene had been split between avant-gardism and middlebrow 
writing, the 1930s saw the collapse of avant-gardism and the rise of a professional Afrikaans 
discourse on literature.  Centered primarily in the major Afrikaner universities (University of the 
Witwatersrand, Stellenbosch University), Afrikaner intellectuals like N. P. van Wyk Louw, D. J. 
Opperman, and Gerrit Dekker shared with Millin and her Anglo colleagues a sense that South 
Africa needed to be approached through an international lens.  As Mark Sanders has shown, pre-
apartheid intellectuals like N. P. van Wyk Louw and R. F. A. Hoernlé argued that “the ‘abstract 
principles’ of liberalism have to be thought through ‘with a view to our concrete situation’” as a 
“‘multi-national state,’” one possessing multiple cultural/ethnic groups living in the same space 
(Sanders 66; quotations from Louw, Versamelde prosa I: 504, 506).  Claiming liberalism, 
“humanism and reason” as their “European heritage,” Louw and Hoernlé championed South 
Africa’s “multi-national” constituency for its ability to transcend the parochialism of Europe: 
where European nations remained mired in almost mythic Gemeinschafts41 that nurtured 
individual rights within homogenous ethnic communities, the collection of races and ethnicities 
peopling South Africa forced races/volks42 to transcend their own centripetal insularity and 
articulate “limited claim[s] for specific ‘liberties’” alongside “an absolute claim … for 
unrestricted liberty for ‘all’ men” (Hoernlé, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, 
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viii).  This cosmopolitan injunction, as Sanders explains, holds up South Africa as an exemplary 
site demonstrating “what a globalizing Eurocentrism means locally, in a space where ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ are differently constituted,” revealing to Europe what its future may look like in a 
rapidly modernizing world where distances are increasingly abolished (75-6).43 
Without too rapidly collapsing Millin, Louw, and Hoernlé together,44 the nationalism that 
each attempted to harness in his or her reappraisals of the liberal tradition was largely a 
construction of a complex array of international research networks and comparative analyses that 
placed South African phenomena in dialogue with British, American, and European variants.  
Take for instance the ur-genre of Afrikaner fiction, the plaasroman or “farm novel.”  Bursting on 
the scene in the 1930s in works such as C. M. van den Heever’s Laat Vrugte (Late Fruit, 1939), 
D. F. Malherbe’s Die Muelenaar (The Miller, 1926), and Jochem van Bruggen’s Ampie trilogy 
(1924-1942), plaasromans portrayed Afrikaner settlers’ painful, violence-ridden efforts to 
domesticate the “wild” lands of Africa, usually through a narrative of martyrdom that used labor 
and suffering as ideological tools to legitimate their ownership of the land.45 Stressing how 
Afrikaner farmers’ love for the land provided them with a measure of autochthony that could be 
mobilized in service of a nationalist project, the plaasroman’s turn to the countryside in large 
measure responded to fears over the so-called “poor white” problem visible in urban centers, 
where migrant laborers from overpopulated farms had flooded with little prospect of finding 
remunerative work.46 But while discussions of “poor whitism” stretched back all the way to the 
1880s, it was not until the Carnegie Corporation sponsored a commission to travel from New 
York to South Africa to investigate white poverty that the plaasroman’s ruralist – and highly 
aestheticized – solution to the issue came into perspective. 
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The Carnegie Corporation’s report on The Poor White Problem in South Africa exploded 
the myth that penury was an intractable condition for certain populations inclined to idleness or 
inefficiency and suggested that it was rather a social problem open to professionalized state 
intervention (Giliomee 344-9; Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge, 221-7).  When the 
report was first published in 1932, Louw himself recognized the importance of its rejection of 
“scornful reproaches” toward Afrikaners for a newly emerging intelligentsia eager to shape their 
“volk” into a modern people (“The Carnegie Commission,” n.p.).  In this respect, international 
social science research networks like the one managed by the Carnegie Corporation possessed a 
twofold benefit for Louw and his fellow intellectuals.  On the one hand, they ratified a view of 
South Africa as, in the words of E. G. Malherbe (the primary voice behind the Carnegie 
Commission), a site where “the issues (which are really world issues) are thrown into relief more 
clearly … than in the older countries where they are often obscured by the complexities of 
tradition and deep underlying prejudices which parade under the name of Western Civilization.” 
According to Malherbe, South Africa acted as an “experimental station and laboratory” where 
the same objective perspective elicited by professionalized research was immediately present in 
the object under investigation (the country being free from “deep underlying prejudices”), a 
scenario which allowed these networks to pass through South Africa, generate knowledge in an 
ideal state, and return to their own countries to apply their findings (Educational Adaptations, 
iv).   
On the other hand, the Carnegie report also encouraged Louw, van den Heever, and D. F. 
Malherbe to champion literary works such as the plaasroman for their ability to exert a social 
influence through professionalized literary activity.  For example, in an adaptation of the 
culturalist arguments popularized by German Romanticism, van den Heever’s Die Afrikaanse 
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gedagte (“The Idea of Afrikaans”) proposed an organic theory of nationality [volk] in which the 
farm operated as at one and the same time the site “where the slumbering might of all national 
cultures lie” and an ideal fantasy whose representation and dissemination would inculcate 
Afrikaner workers into self-sufficient, anti-modern forms of agrarian labor, thereby making such 
an organicist nationalism possible (16).47 By locating a pure national culture in the countryside, 
van den Heever and other plaasroman writers foreclosed urban poverty from their narratives, as 
many scholars have noted.48 But in doing so they also applied the detached observational 
techniques of sociology to their own fictional endeavors.  Like the ideal object of social scientific 
analysis described by E. G. Malherbe, the presumed cultural homogeneity of the Afrikaner farm 
made it into both the formative exemplum of Afrikanerdom and an object for the 
anthropologizing gaze of South African intellectuals.  Blurring cultural purity with the 
preinterpretive completeness that Mary Poovey has shown to be one of the defining conditions of 
the “modern fact,” the author of the plaasroman remained both a detached observer wedded to 
international standards of aesthetic value and a professional reformer whose fictions were a form 
of educative interventionism that, to quote Louw, “justif[ied] the existence of our folk” to 
Afrikaners themselves and to an international audience of fellow professional literary scholars 
(Poovey 1-28; Versamelde prosa I:164).49 
My purpose in making this digression through Afrikaner cultural history is to emphasize 
how Millin’s Anglocentric vision of South African nationalism differs from Afrikaner 
chauvinisms not so much in its sociological orientation or its appreciation of international 
economic institutions, but rather in its identification of South African citizenship with the 
procedural forms of transnational finance and not the rooted objects of sociological analysis.50  
For Louw, literary representations invest their referent with a stable “separateness” [apartheid], 
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while international research networks like the Carnegie Corporation cultivate a distanced mode 
of spectatorship that enables intellectuals to grasp phenomena in their transcendental 
“separateness,” as both “complete” facts and (racially) “pure” examples (“Carnegie 
Commission,” n.p.).  For Millin, in contrast, citizenship is a fluid, contingent identity that, like 
money, actively circulates through supranational financial institutions.  Citizenship is neither the 
sterling area nor the “virtuous, conservative folk” who “sweat” to build their fortunes but the 
“swelling” produced at their intersection.  Thus the act of speculating itself seems to be the only 
cognate available to Millin to describe a mode of citizenship that is not fully present to itself, a 
subject position defined more by the dialectical effects produced by the collision of South 
African nationalism with the global economy than by a coherent ontological identity. 
Millin expands upon the ambiguous materiality of speculative citizenship in her own 
treatment of poor whitism in the 1934 novel The Sons of Mrs. Aab.  Written in the wake of the 
1931-33 depression and the post-sterling boom in finance and the mining industry, Millin’s text 
turns its attention to the urban poor who failed to capitalize on the boom and were excluded from 
the contemporary plaasromans: the indigent miners barely making ends meet in ramshackle 
mining communities on the outskirts of Johannesburg.  In the mining town of Sheba, everyone 
covets something unachievable: a massive diamond that would lift them out of poverty, a 
mysterious stranger to rescue them from spinsterhood, or a miraculous to ill health and disease.  
As the novel progresses, this pervasive envy increasingly becomes associated with the fraudulent 
insurance contract that Gideon Aab takes out on his brother’s life.  A poor and luckless digger 
saddled with caring for his aging mother (Caroline) and handicapped brother (Hercules), 
Gideon’s insurance contract acts as both the formalization of envy and its negation: it promises 
him the riches he and the other miners envy, but only in a future moment allegorically associated 
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with the contract itself.  Equally important for our own purposes, Gideon’s insurance contract is 
issued by the British-based Anglo-African Life Assurance Corporation, enabling Millin to 
reflect, as in The South Africans, on how transnational professional institutions help shape South 
African citizenship.  Only here, in focusing on a mining community distant from Johannesburg’s 
financial hubs, Millin asks how desiring a new, more valuable identity might produce a similarly 
speculative sense of South African citizenship. 
The novel’s plot revolves around Gideon Aab and his fraudulent insurance claim.  
Gideon’s decision to submit a fraudulent claim is borne out of a lifetime of frustration, over the 
course of which he has been repeatedly asked by his mother to “sacrifice” himself for his brother 
in a literal, almost metaphysical sense: Gideon’s meager earnings pay for his brother’s room and 
board (since his disability prevents him from caring for himself), his mother’s affections and 
inheritance are diverted away from his care and toward Hercules’s, and his bodily health 
deteriorates as he unsuccessfully labors toward an uncertain future when the discovery of a prize 
diamond might allow him to escape the shanty-town of Sheba.  In staking his expectations on 
Hercules’s death rather than “luck” at mining, Gideon seeks to reverse the sacrificial logic 
enshrined in Caroline Aab’s love for Hercules – that because Hercules is a virtual non-entity, a 
blank slate possessing none of the vices of the rest of humankind, he is “better than us,” worthy 
of sacrificing “anything – anybody – for,” including her other son – and make Hercules’s 
debilities into the medium for Gideon’s own upward mobility (80).  Instead of sacrificing his 
own welfare in a futile attempt to “make another human being of [Hercules],” Hercules’s death 
would finally return all of the investment that Gideon and Caroline had wasted on him for years 
(73). 
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At the same time, beneath Gideon’s personal misfortunes lies a deeper structural impasse 
endemic to the South African mining community as a whole.  As the local drunk and one-time 
gentleman George Redmarsh explains to the insurance agent who sells Gideon the policy for his 
brother’s life, “What use is insurance to people like us? … If we’re in luck we can make more in 
a day than your policy’d be worth to us in thirty years.  And if we’re not in luck we can’t keep 
ourselves in mealie-pap, let alone insurance companies” (11).  While Redmarsh mocks the agent 
for thinking that miners might possess the necessary resources (e.g., excess money and a steady 
income) to speculate on the insurance market, his most damning critique of insurance is that it 
merely duplicates the aleatory nature of mining on a more abstract plane.  Why, after all, should 
miners “gamble” on insurance when their livelihood depends upon a similar wager: that they will 
discover a precious diamond before starving to death on the diggings (122)?  Indeed, if, as I 
argue in my introduction, the mine and the plantation are the two prototypical spaces of a 
semiperiphery translating high value-added activities into low-cost, highly industrious systems of 
labor and local labor into capitalist value, then the mine indigenizes the global system of 
speculation conjured by such mechanisms as insurance and currency exchange within the 
everyday realities of labor itself.  Freed from the mediating institutions and ideologies (health 
care, education, social security) that Randy Martin argues blunt and obscure risk for First World 
subjects – enabling them, paradoxically, to “take risks,” since they are no longer “at risk” – 
miners like Gideon experience the fluctuations of the world market in both their immediate 
wages (as their income is determined by the market value brokers will pay for diamonds) and 
their lack of job security (since their income is directly tied to unearthing commodities, and not 
indirectly tied to high value-adding services) (Martin 41, 61). 
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In placing an insurance claim on his brother’s life, then, Gideon raises a question that will 
overdetermine his own notions of value and personhood as well as Millin’s nascent theory of 
South African citizenship: how can individual subjects be generalized into a corporate “national 
citizenry” when the particular mechanisms averaging their “luck” and “sacrifices” are intimately 
intertwined with the abjections of the mining industry, as its obverse and enabling twin?   
As Michael Szalay observes in the context of the United States, the “various security 
practices” that undergirded welfare legislation in the 1930s – “from the private insurance 
company to the WPA [Works Progress Administration] – … affiliated individuals with manifold 
population groups, heuristic constructs all,” through the abstracting “econometrics” of statistics 
(14).  Like the United States (1935), South Africa (1928) implemented its first countrywide 
insurance program of social security much later than Britain (1911),51 but private insurance 
corporations like Old Mutual had been active in the country since the 1840s and had been 
especially profitable during the mining booms of the late nineteenth century, providing 
guarantees on anything from machinery to land.  However, as Millin makes clear, the 
spectacularly discrepant fortunes generated by the mining industry made aggregative calculations 
of citizenship almost unthinkable in South Africa.  For example, Gideon regularly reflects that 
John Tomory, a now-successful engineer with whom he went to school, “was no better, no more 
deserving, than he: he only hadn’t a brother Hercules” (83).  Gideon here voices a critique of 
laissez-faire capitalism that has been instrumental in developing the imaginative framework of 
the welfare state and its project of the “common good” (Robbins, Upward Mobility).  As a man 
of talent and intelligence, Gideon believes himself to be entitled to substantial rewards from an 
economic system valuing entrepreneurial initiative and diligent labor.  But on account of his 
adverse circumstances, Gideon can paradoxically receive just compensation only from a 
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parastatal institution (insurance) that would alleviate his burden by effacing his individuality and 
bundling John and him together as an aggregate subject whose profits would be redistributed 
among its constituents.  For Gideon, the logic behind this passage from (meritorious) 
individuality to collective welfare is disrupted by the inhumanity of Hercules.  A “something 
unnatural … neither a human being nor an animal, but a sort of distasteful half-way creature,” 
Hercules comes to stand in (as both cause and metonym) for Gideon’s outrageously bad “luck” 
in the novel, such that John Tomory recognizes that “There was no comparison between him and 
the people of Sheba … For one man to measure himself against another they had to stand on a 
level” (79, 284-5).  
Yet if an aggregative rendering of national citizenship is an impossibility within South 
African mining communities, Gideon’s nearly fetishistic insurance policy envisions a competing, 
alienated, financialized mode of citizenship founded upon the very abjection that seemed to 
foreclose national citizenship in the first place.  Indeed, one of the guiding concerns of the novel 
is how, to what extent, and through what epistemological lens Gideon or his mother Caroline 
could “make another human being of [Hercules]” (73).  Caroline for her part places her faith in 
science, extolling the ability of advanced medical technologies in Europe to cure the unspecified 
degeneracy eating away at Hercules’s mind and body.  According to Millin’s eugenicist 
philosophy, Caroline’s “sexual abandonments” with Hercules’s father – her unnatural, excessive 
love for the beauty of a man from another race (an Afrikaner) and class (he is a “poor white” 
working on her father’s wealthy estate) – “resulted in the begetting of so many dead children, 
and Hercules” (30, 65).  Millin here echoes numerous interwar medical tracts and pieces of 
legislation that drew a connection between lack of sexual control and feeble-mindedness (C. F. 
K. Murray’s “The Care of the Feeble-Minded”; J. T. Dunston, “The Mental Disorders Act”), as 
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well as studies on intelligence testing that linked mental disease to racial degeneracy (C. T. 
Loram, The Education of the South African Native; E. G. Malherbe, Educational and Social 
Research in South Africa).  But while Caroline’s “melting passion” and Hercules’s ensuing 
“Mongol” physique can be traced to the racialized scientific discourses then in vogue in South 
Africa, the very factualness that hereditarian mental disability assumes in the novel prevents it 
from being an object open to scientific intervention (27, 49).  As Hercules’s physician Dr. 
Gillingham explains to Gideon, “she [Caroline] might as well expect a cut-off limb to grow 
again” as hope that European doctors could “cure” Hercules (73).  Science can chart Hercules’s 
physical and mental abjection, even narrate its historical antecedents, but its reach ends at the 
descriptive.  As a discourse solely interested in the materiality of the body, scientific reason can 
only baulk at how far Hercules’s body falls short of the normative standards of humanity: its lack 
of “stamina,” as Dr. Gillingham puts it,” its passive tendency to let “everything happen to [it],” 
its orientation toward “death” rather than life (72). 
In contrast, Hercules’s insurance policy monetizes his deficiencies into a statistical 
measure of positive worth, assigning a numerical value for Hercules’s life only after it has been 
lost and in direct proportion to that loss.  In an analysis of the intersections between slavery, 
finance capitalism, and insurance, Ian Baucom notes that the “genius of insurance, the secret of 
its contribution to finance capitalism, is its insistence that the real test of something’s value 
comes not at the moment it is made or exchanged but at the moment it is lost or destroyed” 
(Specters of the Atlantic, 95).  When formulating his scheme, Gideon imagines Hercules as an 
exemplum of the “melancholic” personhood that Baucom finds in insured slaves, who are only 
endowed with value as an abstract, speculative “what would have been” and not as an immediate 
property of their selves.  “If, indeed,” Gideon reflects, “Hercules who, as Dr. Gillingham always 
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said, had so little chance to struggle far through life, if, indeed, Hercules could be insured and 
repay him in death what he had cost him in life!” (97).  Hesitantly progressing through his 
syllogistic argument, Gideon defers naming his plot through a series of awkward clauses, almost 
as if to replicate on the level of his syntax the anti-presentist modality of insurance, in which 
value can only be confirmed in the future when the object has been lost.  Furthermore, by twice 
repeating the conditional “if, indeed,” Gideon collapses Hercules’s disability, with its 
connotations of subhuman lack and impending death, into the policy claim by paralleling them in 
the sentence’s structure.  Reversing Gideon’s line of thought, we might say that Gideon only 
learns Hercules’s “cost” after he has failed “to struggle through life” through the prosthetic form 
of the insurance policy, which transforms the utterly abject (Hercules’s person) into substantive 
value. 
Despite Millin’s close interweaving of value, speculation, and personhood, though, the 
monetary value of a person does not designate citizenship for that person in The Sons of Mrs. 
Aab.  Amidst growing concern that Gideon will abandon her and Hercules to join Bernard Carey 
in his missionary work, in the final pages of the novel Caroline shoots herself and Hercules to 
prevent him from being committed to an institution.  But Gideon’s hopes of finally receiving his 
thousand-pound disbursement are dashed by the legal coda that ends the novel.  Written by an 
unnamed barrister, the opinion finds the contract null and void in spite of an “incontestability 
clause” permitting fraudulent claims, since “On the other side [of the contract], there was nothing 
– merely a name representing no person who desired, or was capable of desiring, to contract with 
anybody.  One of the two essential minds was thus absent.  No contract could, accordingly, 
result” (339).  In other words, insurance’s retroactive temporality (its privileging of the “what 
would have been” over the “is”) precludes Hercules from gambling on his own life (since he 
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was, at the time, less than a full Freudian “desiring” subject).  The ideal insured subject, 
valueless in life but speculatively inflated on paper, Hercules points out the enabling 
contradiction contained within Millin’s speculative citizenry: that “miraculously” “swelling” the 
South African pound and gold shares through devaluation also involved the increased abjection 
of those cut off from international finance and stock-trading, the urban poor, black Africans, and 
mentally ill whose citizenship rights had been restricted in the first decades of the twentieth 
century through governmental legislation restricting the franchise and state violence against 
worker demands.52   
In contrast, Gideon presents all of the formal markers of participatory citizenship: he 
works in the diggings, both as a self-employed miner and as a contracted worker for John 
Tomory; he joins the South African infantry during the Great War; and he enters into legal 
contract (albeit under false pretenses) with the Anglo-African Life Assurance Corporation.53  But 
all of these activities are made possible by Gideon’s jealous certainty that Hercules’s death will 
bring him the money necessary to close the seemingly unbridgeable gap separating him from the 
successful, educated, professional society emblematized by John Tomory.  As Gideon observes 
while reflecting on his life with Caroline and Hercules, “What he felt now was not his real life.  
His real life was this expectation he had lived with for four years” (178).  These “expectations” 
are not a realist guarantee of a future event but rather a speculative fiction designed to counter 
the unbearable poverty foreordaining Gideon’s life.  Indeed, Gideon learns early in life that his 
lack of professional knowledge damns him to Sheba’s diggings: even when he happens to chance 
upon a valuable diamond and escapes to Kimberley, his inexperience at any particular profession 
(besides digging) forces him to return to Sheba soon afterwards.   
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In this respect, Gideon’s “real life” is an affective one – he “feels” that his expectations 
are real, while his immediate – and limiting – environment is a false one.  His speculative 
citizenship is therefore haunted by two contradictory but nevertheless mutually enabling 
characteristics: on the one hand, the excessiveness of his envy toward those who, like John 
Tomory, achieve professional distinction without being “sacrificed” to Hercules’s all-consuming 
deficiencies demonstrates the desirous disposition that the Anglo-African Life Assurance 
Corporation equates with full citizenship; on the other hand, the sedimentation of that envy 
within a single particular object (the insurance claim) directs it outside of himself to a distant 
(Anglo) economic institution in which he cannot act – since agency is ceded to the Anglo-
African Life Assurance Corporation to “swell” the claim’s worth, while the claim itself is a mere 
object of legal fiction – but toward which he can feel.  If Gideon’s decision to embrace his 
“expectations” as his real life allows him to transcend an environment of utter abjection, it also 
ensures that that environment will always only be an abject object acted upon by distant 
economic actuarial institutions that transmute physical deprivation into a (fictitious) monetary 
value. 
The importance of the distinction Millin draws between the mining community’s 
essential connection to loss and ill fortune and a value-inflating distant horizon cannot be 
overstated.  Gideon’s envious attachment to Hercules’s insurance claim is mimicked by almost 
every other character in the story, uniting them in an atmosphere of collective desire: the other 
diggers dream about a future “luck” (i.e., diamond) that could lift them out of Sheba; Caroline’s 
faith in European science locates the defining forms of human personhood abroad; and even Dr. 
Gillingham hopes Gideon will flee to Europe if he ever “has any luck again” (73).   
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But perhaps nowhere is this dynamic more explicitly staged than in Gideon’s short-lived 
wife Fanny’s love for George Redmarsh, a one-time drunk who returns to South Africa an 
English gentleman.  A comparatively minor character in The Sons of Mrs. Aab, Fanny’s fantasy 
of a romantic détente with Redmarsh seems to interrupt the novel’s momentum, deferring for a 
short time the consequences of Gideon’s fraudulent activities.  However, to reduce Fanny’s story 
to a simple narrative interlude would be to miss the formal continuity between Gideon’s dreams 
of future wealth and Fanny’s externalization of her unfulfilled love onto an “unnamed 
metropolis”: “She saw herself walking beside him in a large town.  She saw, that is to say, 
someone she called herself, whom no one else would have recognized as herself, walking with 
someone she called George Redmarsh whom George Redmarsh would not have recognized as 
George Redmarsh, in some metropolis unidentifiable” (181, 150).  The almost Steinian 
repetitions of “herself” and “George Redmarsh” suggest Fanny’s inability to articulate her and 
Redmarsh’s physical bodies onto the glittering promise of the (implicitly European) metropolis, 
a disembodying doubling encapsulated in the city’s own indeterminacy.  Completely antithetical 
to South Africa, the abstract, fictitious value conferred by the metropolis is so caught up in the 
dialectic of (abject) matter and (disembodied) speculation that Fanny cannot even conceive of 
her and Redmarsh’s bodies as recognizable bodies in her fantasy.  But while “ordinary citizens” 
like Fanny remain physically and geographically exiled from the splendors of the metropolis, 
they can still penetrate this magical horizon of modernity through (financial) speculation – 
through the very fantasies that place them within the “metropolis unidentifiable.”  By traveling 
through the spectacle that, for South Africans, is the metropolis, they can return to South Africa 
transfigured, but still persisting in the metropolis ephemerally, spectrally – and, most of all, 
emotionally. 
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For Millin, then, as for Plomer, envy is not simply the auto-critical emotion Ngai finds it 
to be.  If for Ngai envy “enables a strategic way of not identifying which, in facilitating and 
encouraging [the transition from admiration to antagonism], preserves a critical agency whose 
loss is threatened by the full-blown idealization of the attribute admired,” for Millin and Plomer 
envy conversely allows subjects to identify with less-than-idealized objects (161).  The 
professional networks through which Millin and Plomer’s characters direct their envious 
complaints become an acceptable feature of South African life precisely because envy distances 
them spatially, ideologically, and affectively from South Africa.  By casting transnational 
professional institutions as objects with a dubious ontology within South Africa – one that is 
more “speculative” than substantive, distant rather than proximate – Anglo-South African writers 
were able to jettison fears surrounding undue European influence and neo-imperial control.  
Envy accrues to professional institutions, suggest Millin and Plomer, because those institutions 
are not indigenous to South Africa, and can only be instantiated within South Africa through 
speculative fantasies that, paradoxically, point out the lack of professionalism within the country.  
But, as Millin shows, by directing South Africans’ emotions towards British-based professional 
institutions, collective fantasies of the wealth and prestige professionalism could provide South 
Africa molds the (white) peoples of South Africa into a collective group of national “citizens.”  
Envy thus produces, rather than critiques, an expansive notion of South African citizenship 
spanning speculative British economic networks and the abject conditions of South African life. 
Millin’s novels and nonfiction in particular might be said to occupy an unstable position 
between two distinct moments in the history of economic thought.  On the one hand, her 
externalization of financial institutions onto spatially and emotionally distant locales 
differentiates her work from late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century “panic” novels that, like 
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those of her close friend and correspondent Theodore Dreiser, sought “to quarantine the 
infectious hysteria of feminist mobs” by teaching individuals how to regulate “mass emotions” 
uncomfortably close to the stock market (Zimmerman 3, 5).  On the other hand, her focus on the 
material deprivations with which financial institutions work in dialectical concert retains a closer 
grip on concrete phenomena than the “autonomous” affects that Brian Massumi claims structure 
“the late capitalist system”: amorphous affects more readily observable in the workings of the 
stock market than in individuals (much less crowds), and which cannot be retroactively traced 
back to a theory of the subject (45).  Millin’s work stands poised between these two philosophies 
of economics, struggling to imagine an economic world-system alienated from individual 
subjects but not yet stabilized in a national welfare state through a system of Keynesian 
equilibrium economics.  The next chapter pursues this genealogy in the Ireland and Britain of the 
1930s, asking how the externalization of economic institutions from everyday life contributed to 
new representations of history, as well as what role Irish gothic narrative conventions played in 
the formulation of Keynesian equilibrium economics. 
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1 For a thorough explanation of the specific images and techniques Conrad, Wolf, and Joyce used 
to cultivate an air of professional craftsmanship, see John Marx, The Modernist Novel and the 
Decline of Empire. 
  
2 The most extended analysis of this process in the literary realm is Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island. 
 
3 On the explosion of social planning initiatives during the interwar period in Britain, see Richard 
Overy, The Twilight Years: The Paradox of Britain Between the Wars, 50-92. 
 
4 See, for example, Samuel Chamberlain and Daniel Moffet, This Realm, This England…, and 
Ayn Rand, Anthem. 
 
5 In this regard, see Raymond Williams’s analysis of the Keynesian Art Council in The Politics 
of Modernism, 141-50. 
 
6 In Dubow’s words, professionalism became the “means of diffusing the transcendent values of 
a supposedly benevolent Empire devoted to universal truth and shared brotherhood” (A 
Commonwealth of Knowledge, 201). 
 
7 Steedman’s work is a touchstone in many studies on affect and the welfare state, especially 
Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American 
Culture, and Bruce Robbins, Upward Mobility and the Common Good: Toward a Literary 
History of the Welfare State. 
 
8 I take the term “aesthetic technology of belonging” from Berlant’s introduction to Compassion: 
The Culture and Politics of an Emotion, 5. 
 
9 Some of the more notable works in a substantial body of scholarship on “social” affects are 
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions; Berlant, ed., 
Compassion; Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness; and Eric Hayot, The Hypothetical 
Mandarin: Sympathy, Modernity, and Chinese Pain. 
 
10 For critiques of sentiment that view it as complicit with the same institutional hierarchies that 
it aims to elide, see Kathleen Woodward, Statistical Panic: Cultural Politics and Poetics of the 
Emotions; Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion; Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to 
Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship; and Janet Staiger, Ann Cvetkovich, and Ann 
Reynolds, eds., Political Emotions. 
 
11 Though van der Post was a member of the group, as “Afrikaans editor” he contributed little to 
the magazine’s extant issues, being mostly conceived of as a force for future expansions.  For 
this reason, I focus my discussion on Campbell and Plomer. 
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12 In the “The Crown” and other essays, D. H. Lawrence elaborated the notion of a highly-
sexualized “blood-consciousness” that acted in parallel and opposition to “mental-
consciousness.”  For Lawrence, non-European peoples (especially Native Americans) were more 
in touch with their “blood-consciousness” than Europeans, while Europeans had lost almost all 
touch with their “blood-consciousness.”  The most systematic explication of Lawrence’s 
cosmology can be found in Frank Kermode, D. H. Lawrence. 
 
13 Numerous reviewers at the time praised Millin for the “economy” of her prose.  For example, 
writing in the New York Tribune Hershel Brickell noted how “With striking economy and what 
appears to be no particular effort, she manages to catch and hold the reader’s sympathy,” and 
anonymous reviewer in the Manchester Guardian observed that her “style is definite and 
economical: she exhibits the moods and circumstances of her characters in a series of flashes 
suggesting the kinema” (4 August 1929; 30 August 1929). 
 
14 In contrast, Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that there is “no conflict between local 
partialities and a universal morality – between being part of the place you [are] and a part of a 
broader human community,” since one’s ethical commitments are “multiple and overlapping” 
(Cosmopolitanism, xviii).  Like Martha Nussbaum’s fantasy of a cosmopolitan subject caught up 
in a “series of concentric circles,” Appiah’s is a liberal-humanist philosophy that focuses on the 
spheres in which the individual subject acts and thinks, rather than the more materialist global 
cultural and economic networks with which this essay is concerned (Nussbaum, “Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism,” 3).  For the purposes of clarity, I will use “cosmopolitan” to refer to 
individual writers’ supranational commitments and “global” or “transnational” when designating 
supranational institutions. 
 
15 Campbell, though just as outspoken in his radical political assertions (both anti-racist and, 
later, fascist) as Plomer, was fairly conservative in his poetic form.  Reviewers in Britain were 
undecided on how to regard such traditional poetry vis-à-vis the products of modernism, some, 
like Francis Carey Slater, seeing Campbell’s verse as an energetic corrective to the 
“formlessness” of modern poetry, with its “weakness and a lack of true originality,” while others 
echoes Hamish Miles in finding Campbell’s verse as merely “the full-throttled mode of twenty, 
thirty years ago” (Slater, Preface, Centenary Book of South African Verse, xii; Miles 423).  For a 
full discussion of the reception of Campbell’s poetry, see Andrew van der Vlies, South African 
Textual Cultures: Black, White, Read All Over, 49-58. 
 
16 See Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives, and Andrzej 
Gasiorek, "War, 'Primitivism,' and the Future of 'the West': Reflections on D. H. Lawrence and 
Wyndham Lewis." 
 
17 I use “Western” here to designate Western European cultures because this was the term most 
prevalently used by European writers and artists during the 1920s to differentiate Europe from 
the African and Native American cultures that they emulated (a trend popularized by Oswald 
Spengler’s Decline of the West [1918-1922] and later adopted by Henri Massis in “Defence of 
the West” [1926]).  I shift to “European” below to describe the same general geographic location 
when discussion South African writings about Europe, since in South Africa the operative binary 
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at the time (and through much of the twentieth century) was Africa/Europe rather than 
East/West. 
 
18 See, for example, Peter Blair, “That ‘Ugly Word’: Miscegenation and the Novel in 
Preapartheid South Africa”; Michael Chapman, Southern African Literatures; Gareth Cornwell, 
“The Early South African Novel of Race”; and David Rabkin, “Race and Fiction: God’s Step-
children and Turbott Wolfe.” 
 
19 The most substantive analysis of the New African movement can be found in Tim Couzens, 
The New African: A Study of the Life and Work of H. I. E. Dhlomo. 
 
20 For two of the earlier examples of this type of interpretation, see V. Y. Mudimbe, The Idea of 
Africa, and Abdul JanMohammed, Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics of Literature in Colonial 
Africa. 
 
21 On the “innervation” produced by new technologies that forced modernists to rethink the 
bounds of public experience, see Justus Nieland, Feeling Modern: The Eccentricities of Public 
Life. 
 
22 Turbott Wolfe had been out of print for 20 years before the Modern Library’s reissue 2003 
helped to rekindle interest in Plomer’s career, particularly his South African fictions.  The 
reinvigorated interest in Plomer’s writings can be seen in Van der Vlies’s recent work on Plomer 
in South African Textual Cultures and works-in-progress by Laura Winkiel and John K. Young. 
 
23 In contrast to Blair, who sees Wolfe’s renunciation of miscegenation as the novel’s “undoing 
[of] its own indictment of antimiscegenation prejudice,” I view his later racist statements as an 
ironic reflection by Plomer about Wolfe’s inability to think through miscegenation on rational 
terms.  
 
24 I should note that I am in no way endorsing Plomer’s equation of modernity with Europe.  
Indeed, my analysis of Plomer’s dialectical image of professionalism is intended to highlight 
how certain of the dominant tropes of modernity were in fact produced across the networks of 
the capitalist world-system.  For a further discussion of how a world-systems perspective on 
literature presupposes a “single modernity” model of global space, see the discussion of 
Jameson, Lazarus, and Nicholas Brown in my introduction. 
 
25 On the unifying force professionalism played in South African politics during the 1920s, see 
Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge, 158-202.  The label “anti-modern Romantic” fits 
Campbell, who idealized the martial aspects of French, Spanish, and African peasant cultures, 
more than the urbane Plomer.  Still, Plomer’s early Lawrentian leanings embrace an anti-modern 
primitivism that puts Turbott Wolfe firmly in this category, even if his later English and Japanese 
writings depart from it. 
 
26 For an excellent overview of Afrikaner nationalism in this period, see Hermann Giliomee, The 
Afrikaners: Biography of a People, 355-402.  As Giliomee explains, the South African 
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government’s language policy was the primary arena in which Afrikaner nationalism was 
articulated: the National Party (the ethnic Afrikaner political party) demanded bilingual training 
for civil servants, compulsory teaching of Afrikaans as well as English in schools, and official 
recognition of the Afrikaans language (granted in 1925). 
 
27 Although Canada and Hong Kong remained on the gold standard and Iraq, Portugal, and the 
Nordic countries joined the sterling area despite not being part of the empire, the empire and the 
sterling area were inextricably intertwined in most minds.  As Peter J. Henshaw puts it, 
“Membership of the area signified a commitment to sustain a world-wide monetary and trading 
system that was the economic counterpart to and underpinning of the British empire and 
commonwealth” (197). 
 
28 Barry Eichengreen traces the origin of the Great Depression to the flaws of the gold standard 
in Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, arguing that the 
gold standard transmitted contractions in a number of countries (the United States, Germany, 
Austria) across the globe.  For this reason, according to Eichengreen, those countries which 
abandoned the gold standard the earliest (particularly those who left gold for sterling) recovered 
from the depression quicker than those who remained on the gold standard well in the 1930s 
(e.g., the United States and central Europe).  In The End of Globalization: Lessons from the 
Great Depression, Harold James proposes an alternative explanation for why the sterling area 
was an effective economic policy: since most countries reacted to the depression by withdrawing 
from the global mechanisms and institutions that kept the international economy intact, the 
countries that retained serviceable international circuits of trade and investment (such as those of 
the sterling area) faced less of a drop-off in productivity than their counterparts. 
 
29 Though Britain did not export products to its current and former colonies on anywhere near the 
level that it imported from them, British financial investments in Commonwealth industries 
ensured that it had a vested interest in maintaining favorable trade and financial relations with 
the rest of the Commonwealth (P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000).  
For a comprehensive discussion of how British markets for food in particular stimulated 
Commonwealth and American industries, see Belich, Replenishing the Earth. 
 
30 Since sterling’s value was over 40% lower than gold’s, it encouraged exports from the sterling 
area (as the gold-backed currencies for which these would be paid would carry a greater value 
vis-à-vis sterling) and discouraged imports (which would only be received a fraction of what 
they could obtain outside of the sterling area).  The result was a sort of neo-mercantilism that 
protected Commonwealth markets and generated a favorable balance of trade between the 
sterling area and the rest of the world. 
 
31 Millin’s short biographical sketch of Hofmeyer was circulated through numerous South 
African and British newspapers in the 1920s.  In contrast, her works on Rhodes and Smuts were 
much more substantial affairs: her two-volume biography of Smuts was released in 1936, while 
her large one-volume biography of Rhodes was published concurrently with Plomer’s more 
critical study in 1933.  
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32 As J. M. Coetzee glosses it in his Jerusalem Prize acceptance speech, Afrikaner nationalists’ 
“love [for] South Africa has consistently been directed toward the land” and its formative 
influence on Afrikaner character rather than the various peoples of South Africa (“Jerusalem 
Prize Acceptance Speech,” 97). 
 
33 Millin seems to have split with Eliot over objections to what she perceived as the anti-
Semitism of The Waste Land.  She was also introduced to Lawrence, but – unsurprisingly, given 
her aversion to the Voorslag group’s Lawrentian aesthetic – they found each other fairly 
unpalatable. 
 
34 Vera Britten was perhaps the most frank in her explanations to Millin about why she was 
breaking off their friendship: “You may…recall that in my reply to your last letter after George 
and I visited South Africa, I questioned whether it was really wise for us to meet in light of our 
totally different views on racial questions, which seem so difficult to avoid in conversation.  
Once they arise, they inevitably arouse controversy, with devastating effects on one’s work.  So I 
suggest, dear Sarah, that we remain on each other’s Christmas lists for the sake of Auld Land 
Syne, but avoid meeting until racial politics become less acute” (14 June 1962).   
 
35 See Blair, “That ‘Ugly Word’”; Coetzee, “Blood, Taint, Flaw, Degeneration: The Novels of 
Sarah Gertrude Millin”; and Michael Green, “Blood and Politics/Morality tales for the 
Immorality Act: Sarah Gertrude Millin in Literary and Social History.” 
 
36 Though Coetzee associates Millin’s racial imaginary with “the form of race-consciousness 
exalted by National Socialism,” Millin in fact wrote tirelessly against Nazi propaganda in both 
her essays and fiction (“Blood, Taint, Flaw, Degeneration,” 141, 165).  This is not to discount the 
troubling continuity between Millin’s white supremacism and Nazi ideology, but rather to note 
that Millin’s exposure to eugenic thought would have come from respected Anglo 
anthropologists like Harold B. Fantham and J. E. Duerden (both of whom taught in South Africa) 
rather than the German eugenicists who influenced Afrikaner social theory.  See Saul Dubow, 
Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, 120-65, and Paul Rich, “Race, Science, and the 
Legitimation of White Supremacy in South Africa, 1902-1940,” for a more complete analysis of 
the intellectual debates surrounding eugenics in South Africa. 
 
37 See Bozzoli, The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa 
1890-1933. 
 
38 Tratner is quoting from Keynes’s biographer Robert Skidelsky, “The Revolt Against the 
Victorians,” 6.  Keynes introduced the concept of “pent-up demand” in his General Theory.  I 
take up Keynesian economics in greater detail in chapter 4. 
 
39 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
 
40 Millin’s only mention of black Africans is as laborers, not speculators: “More and more 
people and goods came to Johannesburg; more white miners by the thousand, more black miners 
by the ten thousand” (158).  Given the parallelism in the sentence between “people” and “white 
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miners” and “goods” and “black miners,” Millin makes it unclear whether the black miners 
traveling to Johannesburg should be included under the category of actively migrating “people” 
or passively circulated “goods.” 
 
41 Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished between Gemeinschaft (“community”) and Gesellschaft 
(“society”) in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft [Community and Civil Society] (1887).  The 
corporatist verbiage present in Germanic works like Tönnies’s was instrumental to Afrikaner 
political thought as it sought to distance itself from British liberalism. 
 
42 Although the meaning of race and volk is similar – biological ideas of race having been 
produced in dialogue with the concept of volk – the two terms have slightly different 
connotations. Volk possesses the sense of a common culture being upheld by a racial or ethnic 
group, while the term race (especially when approached from a biological angle) lacks any 
necessary connection with culture.  (Though biological racism was often used as a rationalization 
for regarding black culture as inherently more primitive than white European cultures.) 
 
43 I am glossing over numerous distinctions between the Louw and Hoernlé in order to note their 
commonalities.  For Hoernlé, segregation was necessary to prevent white domination: “the 
concrete historical setting in which the classical doctrine of liberalism was evolved, did not 
include the setting of a multi-racial society, such as we have here in South Africa, in which, 
moreover, one racial group, and this one a minority group, is, and is determine to remain, the 
dominant group…Hence, I hold that liberal ideals have to be reexamined and re-thought in their 
application to a society of this type” (South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, vii-ix).  
For Louw, in contrast, segregation was means of preserving an essentialized Afrikaner culture’s 
right to exist [bestaansreg].  See Sanders 57-92. 
 
44 In a sense, their internationalisms move in diametrically opposite directions. Millin proposes 
that citizenship is founded upon a supplemental community of international finance, while the 
Louw and Hoernlé view South Africa’s racial demography as holding a transcendental solution 
to European globalization. 
 
45 For various articulations of this reading, see Coetzee, White Writing, esp. chapters 3 and 4; 
Rita Barnard, Apartheid and Beyond: South Africa and the Politics of Place, esp. 15-38; Jennifer 
Wenzel, “The Pastoral Promise and the Political Imperative: The Plaasroman Tradition in an Era 
of Land Reform”; and Christopher Warnes, “‘Everyone is Guilty’: Complicitous Critique and the 
Plaasroman Tradition in Etienne van Heerden’s Toorberg (Ancestral Voices)”. 
 
46 Much of this rural poverty was caused by the Roman-Dutch law governing Afrikaner 
inheritance, which split properties between all descendents – a huge problem in an agricultural 
economy that needed wide swaths of land to be profitable (Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography 
of a People, 321; Feinstein 22-46). 
 
47 On the culturalist assumptions of German nationalism and their application in colonial and 
postcolonial societies, see Cheah, Spectral Nationality. 
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48 See, for example, Coetzee, White Writing, and Warnes, “‘Everyone is Guilty.’” 
 
49 For Poovey, though, the preinterpretive data of the fact is only one half of the “modern fact.”  
At the same time, facts, for Poovey, were paradoxically inextricable from the theories which 
gave voice to them (1-28).  As Mark Wollaeger observes, this made the modern fact a 
particularly useful tool for propaganda like the writings of Louw and Malherbe, which “amplify 
[the fact’s] rhetorical appeal even while insisting on [its] value-free neutrality” (22). 
 
50 This distinguishes Millin from the anthropological perspective that has been so influential in 
modernist studies in the past decade or so, as exemplified by the work of Torgovnick and Esty. 
 
51 Of course, in both these cases, minority coverage was restricted.  Black Africans were not 
covered by social security until 1944 in South Africa, and even then white compensation was 7.5 
times that allocated to blacks. 
 
52 Most memorably in the government’s crushing of the 1922 “Rand Rebellion” miners’ strike 
that killed 81 miners, injured over 650, and ended in 853 workers being charged with everything 
from murder to treason. 
 
53 Voting would seem to be one citizenship right that Gideon does not engage in.  Indeed, in 
keeping with her view of citizenship as determined by foreign financial institutions, Millin never 
even introduces voting (with its connotations of national exceptionalism and transformative 
democracy) as a suitable channel for her characters’ aspirations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TOWARD A DEPRESSIONARY THEORY OF HISTORY: BOWEN’S COURT, THE 
GENERAL THEORY, AND GOTHIC EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 
Gothic decadence, professional cultivation: on the surface, these two narrative forms 
could not be further apart.  From its heyday in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century, to the 
“imperial Gothic” fictions of the 1880s and 1890s, to present-day adaptations of the genre across 
a range of media, the gothic has represented a history of ongoing dispossession (of traditional 
rights, property, and national sovereignty), social and bodily disintegration, and gradual national 
and racial degeneration.  In contrast, narratives of professional development have treated what 
we might think of as the observe side of gothic violence, championing modernity’s eradication of 
superstition and aristocratic privilege and its replacing of them with a (theoretically) egalitarian 
universalism.  Indeed, the inverse tropes characterizing gothic and professional narratives – slow, 
violent degeneration versus rapid, self-sustaining progress – highlight the incompatible, even 
rivalrous, philosophies of history underwriting these genres.  To use Walter Mignolo’s evocative 
term, the feminine, racial, and colonial subjects who people gothic fictions embody the “darker 
side of modernity,” those figures who either had to be superseded for modernity to become the 
hegemonic mode of social and economic life across the globe or who were the disavowed 
victims of modernity’s systemic inequalities, and who therefore could not be included in 
professionalism’s narrative of progress (The Darker Side of Western Modernity). 
During the 1930s, however, something odd happened to this opposition.  While the 
distinction between a regressive gothic temporality and a progressive professional one did not 
disappear, many writers began combining gothic and professional tropes in their work in order to 
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construct a more cyclical, contingent representation of time.  This mixture was particularly 
pervasive in Irish literature, where alternating ebbs and tides of individuals, cultures, and classes 
were explored in texts ranging from Joyce’s juxtaposition of linguistic degeneration and renewal 
in Finnegans Wake, to the downward mobility of an ailing middle class in Beckett’s Murphy, to 
the circular logic of Anglo-Irish decline and renaissance in the works of Elizabeth Bowen and 
Molly Keane.  Each of these texts contain an explicitly gothic narrative of decline: the sexual 
misconduct of HCE that tears his family apart (for a time) in Finnegans Wake (Joyce sets the 
majority of his novel in Chapelizod, a clear allusion to Sheridan Le Fanu’s gothic tale The House 
by the Churchyard); the irreverent degeneration of Irish mythology from heroic lore into the 
grounds for a prosaic middle-class culture in Murphy1; and the overtly gothic Big House estates 
that hide a history of violence against servants and women in Bowen’s The Last September 
(1929) and Keane’s The Rising Tide (1937) and Two Days in Aragon (1941).  But these are 
balanced by an optimistic (sometimes fantastic) faith in a countervailing narrative of ascension: 
HCE’s rebirth at the “end” of Finnegan’s Wake, Beckett’s translation of gothic degeneration into 
a medium for a gradual paring away into blissful non-being, Keane’s phantasmatic images of a 
restored Big House in Two Days in Aragon, and Bowen’s rescuing of Lois Farquar from the 
doomed Big House through her training abroad as a professional artist. 
The gothic tenor of these tales is far from surprising.  As I outlined in the introduction, 
the gothic form has a long historical association with Irish literature in general, and Anglo-Irish 
literature in particular.  But the oscillation between an optimistic reading of the progressive 
march of history and a pessimistic interpretation of its current downward trajectory was not 
unique to either Ireland or literature.  In light of the global depression that wracked Europe 
during the 1930s, many economists also began to formulate theories of technological innovation, 
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monetary policy, and employment that wove together progressive and regressive motifs, as for 
example in Joseph Schumpeter’s adaptation of the Marxian concept of “creative destruction” to 
explain the economic stagnation besetting the ’30s (Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy).  
Similarly, the mass unemployment that affected many of Britain’s traditionally strong industries 
(shipbuilding, mining, textiles) encouraged the British economist John Maynard Keynes to 
rethink the dynamics of the trade cycle and the government’s response to it.  Detailing a policy 
of equilibrium economics in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), 
Keynes suggested that the government had to prevent violent swings in economic cycles by 
doing its best to bring investors and consumers’ emotions into a healthy middle ground of 
rational expectations.  This, Keynes believed, would put a halt to the downward trajectory much 
of the world-economy was experiencing and provide a corrective swing to a stable growth 
managed by knowledgeable professionals. 
This chapter is concerned with the intersection of gothic and professional forms of 
history we find in both literary works like Keane and Bowen’s fiction and nonfictional writings 
and in economic treatises like Keynes’s General Theory.  Both of these sets of texts grapple with 
what we might call the contradictions of “depressionary history”: the periodic decline of a class 
or economic system and its future renaissance in a confident narrative of professional ascent.  By 
“depressionary history,” I mean to indicate not just the history of “The Depression” – the 
economic crisis of the 1930s, or severe economic crisis in general – but also the understanding of 
history underlying any momentary setback that is relativized within a larger narrative of slump 
and boom.  More specifically, I am interested in showing how the gothic narrative devices that 
had dominated Anglo-Irish literature for over a century contributed to a narrative of oscillating 
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equilibrium that was instrumental both in reinventing Anglo-Ireland as a viable class and in 
rehabilitating capitalist economics after the Great Depression. 
In this regard, it is essential that we differentiate the concept of depression from its close 
rival, “crisis.”  Marxist criticism in particular has relied on a rhetoric of crisis as a way of 
interrogating failures in the ideological and material substructures of Western capitalism, seeing 
in such crises a glimpse of the eventual supercession of capitalism – or, at the very least, of a 
utopian longing to transcend the contradictions inherent in a capitalist division of labor.  Present-
day critics such as David Harvey, Fredric Jameson, and Antonio Negri have all theorized “the 
crisis” as both a disturbing disruption of modernity and a potential passage to a more equitable 
system of economic distribution, and in this regard they follow Marxist writers of the ’30s who, 
like Christopher Caudwell, saw economic crises as symptoms of a terminal “illness” internal to 
the workings of capitalism, and for whom such crises hearkened to a new mode of production 
whose first incarnation (the Soviet Union) was just starting to emerge.2 What separates 
“depression” from “crisis” is depression’s insistence that moments of economic downturn are 
just that – momentary deviations from a fundamentally progressive capitalism that, however 
disastrous on the surface, will eventually return to a normal, healthy state of growth.  Jani 
Scandura explains that “depressive modernity…does not refer to a separate or oppositional 
modernity; instead, it might best be seen as modernity at a standstill” (11).  According to a logic 
of depression, the massive industrial stagnation that took place across the world in the 1930s did 
not herald either the beginnings of a new socioeconomic dispensation, whether fascist or 
communist, or the terminal decline of Western capitalism; rather, it signaled a baffling period of 
exceptional stasis in capitalist progress that would sooner or later resume its dynamic tempo. 
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 Central to the construction of this historical imagination was a certain epistemological 
configuration in which affect, economics, and history were welded together in order to 
rationalize short-term fluctuations in personal health, class stability, and global capitalist 
modernity.  The 1930s were the first time in which the term “depression” was used without a 
modifier in both the field of economics and the field of psychology, and this etymological 
coincidence was far from accidental: in both popular discourses and in scholarly works on 
economics and psychology, affective and economic depression were understood to have a 
symbiotic relationship with each other, in which losses in consumer confidence could induce 
economic slumps and economic slumps could cause melancholic disorders (Scandura 4).  
Despite this apparent symmetry, though, the relationship between economic depression and 
affective depression was quite complex in its particulars.  In the early twentieth century, affective 
depression, or melancholia, as Jonathan Flatley defines it in his reading of Walter Benjamin, “is 
no longer a personal problem requiring cure or catharsis, but is evidence of the historicity of 
one’s subjectivity, indeed the very substance of that historicity…As such, melancholia forms the 
site in which the social origins of our emotional lives can be mapped out…” (3).3 Affective 
depression, in other words, appeals to past social structures that are no longer immediately 
present to its former constituents, but to which these individuals have a continuing attachment.  
For classes like the Anglo-Irish, or Keynes’s own liberal-professional class faction, for whom the 
(economic) depression was a catastrophic blow to their socioeconomic position, this melancholic 
attachment suggested the need to construct models of history that could envision the persistence 
of socioeconomic structures beyond their apparent extinction – indeed, that could paradoxically 
see superseded class hierarchies within new social organizations that seemed to marginalize such 
hierarchies as archaic precursors. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I trace how two particular writers, Elizabeth Bowen and 
John Maynard Keynes, used fluctuations between violent gothic emotionality and stoic 
professionalism to rehabilitate the Anglo-Irish and British liberal capitalism within cyclical 
narratives of rise and fall.  Both Bowen’s family history, Bowen’s Court (1942), and Keynes’s 
General Theory suggest that the oscillation of collective affects between hyper-emotionality and 
restraint led to a corresponding back and forth in the social sphere: between neo-feudal 
institution-building and professional management (Bowen), or between economic depression and 
full employment.  Unlike the melancholic attitude Flatley diagnoses in modernist literature, 
Bowen and Keynes were able to claim a living place for fading and endangered socioeconomic 
structures – the Anglo-Irish landowning class and the three-tiered capitalist class system – by 
proposing that emotion itself molded particular class configurations, and that past social systems 
could be reborn simply by reorienting classes’ emotions in the right direction.  The first half of 
this chapter focuses on Bowen’s Court, showing how the Anglo-Irish’s transnational position – 
their transversal of Irish-agrarian and British-industrial economies – enabled Bowen to 
characterize fluctuations in the Ascendancy’s class position as internal to their emotions.  The 
second half of the chapter then turns to Keynes’s General Theory in order to show how his 
notion of “animal spirits” partook of the same philosophy of history as Bowen’s family narrative.  
For each, the language of gothic emotionality provides a way of reading decline as contingent, 
transient, and easily rectifiable through professional management. 
 
The Consolations of Professionalism 
 Bowen published her first work of fiction, Encounters, in London in 1923, during the 
heyday of modernism.  Though she was Anglo-Irish by birth, her well-received fiction admitted 
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her to several exclusive English literary circles, including the Bloomsbury Group and the Oxford 
set of Maurice Bowra, Isaiah Berlin, and Cyril Connolly.  Because of her experimental 
techniques and her London residence, scholars initially read Bowen’s work as exhibiting a 
feminine strain of late modernism (Lassner, Elizabeth Bowen; Lee, Elizabeth Bowen).  However, 
the critical focus has recently shifted toward Bowen’s Irish heritage.  For all that she lived and 
moved in the London literary scene, Bowen always considered herself Irish, and her regular use 
of Irish settings testifies to their formative role in shaping her social and literary sensibilities.  In 
particular, Bowen’s Court has become a touchstone for scholars contesting or hoping to establish 
her Irish literary and intellectual heritage.4 Written between the summer of 1939 and December 
1941, Bowen’s Court departs in important ways from Bowen’s experimental fiction, eschewing 
the convoluted syntax and elliptical narrative frames of the latter in favor of a realistic, linear 
depiction of Big House life.  Built primarily in the eighteenth century, these Georgian mansions 
had by Bowen’s time become emblems of Protestant hegemony.  But house burnings during the 
Irish War of Independence created doubts in many minds about how long Anglo-Ireland could 
endure.  Bowen’s Court escaped destruction, but Bowen and her mother permanently emigrated 
to England when Bowen was twelve, and the ensuing exile reinforced her fears that her gentry 
class was in permanent decline. “[The] Protestant Ascendancy…had become…a ghost only” 
(430). 
Credited by many as a uniquely systematic theorization of the Big House,5 Bowen’s 
Court follows Bowen’s ancestors from their initial settlement in Farahy, County Cork, through 
the turn of the twentieth century.  In the process, Bowen posits a close analogy between her 
family members’ innermost thoughts and feelings and the evolution of Anglo-Irish society as a 
whole.  Referring somewhat tongue-in-cheek to her forebears with pseudo-monarchical titles 
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(John II, Henry V, etc.), she endows their personalities with a typicality reminiscent of that given 
to the “Elizabethan” or “Victorian” era.  Significantly, Big Houses themselves are seen to mold 
this analogical relationship by shaping similar psyches among distant people through their 
architectural peculiarities.  “A Bowen, in the first place, made Bowen’s Court,” writes Bowen. 
“Since then, with a rather alarming sureness, Bowen’s Court has made all the succeeding 
Bowens” (32).  As with Bowen’s Court, so with all Big Houses: “I know of no [such] house (no 
house that has not changed hands) in which, while the present seems to be there forever, the past 
is not pervadingly felt” (19).  The Big House thus distills Anglo-Irish history into the 
representative figure of a single family. 
Clearly indebted to earlier fictional portrayals of the Big House, Bowen’s Court 
nevertheless displays great deal skepticism about the Irish gothic tradition as related through 
Maria Edgeworth, Charles Maturin, Sheridan Le Fanu, and Bram Stoker.6 As we have seen, early 
Big House narratives replaced political with aesthetic rationales for Ascendancy rule.  By 
describing country life in ideal terms, they stressed how neo-feudal social forms could weld 
landlords and tenants into an organic community.  For example, in Edgeworth’s Absentee (1812), 
an early progenitor of the Big House form, the young Lord Columbre abandons his parents’ 
hedonistic London life and returns to his Irish estate, Clonbrony, as a responsible landlord.  In a 
reversal of causality, his tenants’ happiness after his arrival legitimates his prior ownership of 
Clonbrony and effaces the long history of dispossession underlying his rule.  In addition, by 
locating modern consumerism in London, Edgeworth insulates Clonbrony from modern 
capitalist labor and champions rural Ireland’s feudal status.   
But like any aesthetic production, a Big House novel never completely resolves the 
ideological contradictions it sets out to manage, and misgivings over landlords’ leadership 
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failures on the national level introduce a gothic strain to these works.  As Vera Kreilkamp 
explains, Big House novels represent the Anglo-Irish gentry as a dying class even as they 
reproduce its ideological justifications, by drawing on such stock tropes as a decaying house, a 
degenerate aristocratic line, and a deracinated landowning class (20-25).  Hereditary lines and 
impregnable mansions encode decline as solipsistic and suggest that neo-feudalism collapsed 
from internal debility, not through English policy or tenant unrest.7 The gothic undercurrent to 
Big House novels encouraged the view, endorsed by later writers like W.B. Yeats, Edith 
Somerville and Martin Ross, and Molly Keane, that the violent emotions instilled by country 
solitude explained the increasingly-constrained social position of this class. 
 Bowen certainly was not averse to admitting gothic elements into her fiction, and Margot 
Gayle Backus, W.J. McCormack, and Neil Corcoran persuasively place her novels in a tradition 
of “Irish Protestant Gothic.”8 But the trajectory of the gothic fit poorly with her hopes for an 
Anglo-Irish renaissance.  In an article written for Sean O’Faolain’s journal The Bell in 1940, 
Bowen proposed that broadening the demographic base of Big House social forms could 
renovate the culture they supported into a modern institution.  The Big House "idea," she writes, 
was at first rigid and narrow – but it could extend itself, and it must if the big 
house is to play an alive part in the alive Ireland of today.  What is fine about the 
social idea is that it means the subjugation of the personal to the impersonal.  In 
the interest of good manners and good behaviour people learn to subdue their own 
feelings. (“The Big House,” 29) 
 
In keeping with her optimistic – one might say fantastical – belief in the long-term viability of 
Big House culture, Bowen distances her family history from gothic tropes while acknowledging 
their conventional presence in Big House literature. “There is no ghost in this house” (28), she 
insists enigmatically, not more than 10 pages before tracing the origin of Bowen’s Court to 
Colonel Henry Bowen, the first Bowen to settle in Ireland, and his demonic appearance before 
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his God-fearing third wife and their children.  A confirmed atheist, he was reputed to have 
materialized before her and spewed vulgar, anti-Christian invectives at her as he did so.  Bowen 
emphasizes that Colonel Bowen was still alive at the time of the Apparition (an oddity that 
earned him a place in Richard Baxter’s Worlds of Spirits, a study of early modern witchcraft) and 
that it took place in Wales, not in Ireland, where the children of his second marriage would 
become the Bowens of Bowen’s Court.  “I cannot but be glad,” reflects Bowen, “that we County 
Cork Bowens descended from the second marriage, not from the haunted third” (48).  By 
locating the Apparition among a defunct line, Bowen jettisons many tropes common to gothic 
histories and free herself to associate the Bowen family’s evolution with the professional 
soldiering of the living Henry Bowen. 
In contrast to accounts that defend the Anglo-Irish as a benevolent, if decaying, 
aristocracy,9 Bowen emphasizes that her family’s lands were attained through professional 
aptitude, even if it was deployed in a flawed cause.  While the many differences between 
hereditary elitism and professionalized egalitarianism encapsulate antithetical positions on social 
mobility, access to education, and state interventionism, Bowen consistently focuses on their 
affective discrepancies.  Where under a hereditary class system one’s emotions are invested in 
proximate personal, familial, and class ties, professional society rests on “looser, half-formed 
relationships” to impersonal bureaucratic structures and an abiding belief in the “common good” 
of collective welfare.10 In this regard, professionalism entails a sort of anti-social sociality that 
places pleasure in one’s work and commitment to distant persons above immediate, personal 
demands.11 Thus, when recounting how Colonel Bowen earned the land on which Bowen’s 
Court would be built through military service, Bowen stresses that he demonstrated no deep 
emotional attachment to either of the parties for which he fought during the English Civil War: 
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running afoul of the king’s party while in Ireland, he simply took up with Parliament’s army.  As 
Bowen puts it: “I doubt whether Henry Bowen ever cared much for either King or Parliament: he 
may hardly have distinguished between the two” (39).  According to Bowen, Cromwell’s arrival 
in Ireland changed the Civil War from “a barons’ war” fought “with fierceness and with 
virtuosity” to a “very businesslike” conflict (61).  For his fellow officers Colonel Bowen holds 
no special affection – his hawks were “the only creatures, perhaps, with which he was intimate” 
– but his abilities as a “useful fight” entitle him to substantial compensation (67).  Secretive, anti-
social, and atheistic, he lives in self-imposed isolation from the rest of the Cromwellian army but 
prospers nevertheless because of his professional demeanor. 
 Bowen traces the peculiarities of her family’s history and the history of their Anglo-Irish 
class from Henry.  She uncovers a drive to professionalization in several ancestors, from Henry 
III’s “vocational” devotion to the construction of Bowen’s Court, to Henry V’s disinterested 
pursuit of road-building, to Robert Cole Bowen’s “business”-oriented management of the 
family’s estate, and finally to her father’s dual commitment to the life of a solicitor and Bowen’s 
Court’s landlord (167; 289; 316; 375).  In the process, Bowen uses her family as a template to 
analyze the rise and fall of professional management among the Anglo-Irish gentry as a whole.  
Early Bowens’ dreams of fantastic wealth, far from a family failing, reflect the self-centeredness 
of their class in its infancy; Henry III’s construction of Bowen’s Court stems from their embrace 
of rational tactics of organization and national leadership during the mid- to late eighteenth 
century; and Bowen’s father’s descent into mental illness symbolizes the failure of elite 
managerialism and the slow decline that it inaugurated for Anglo-Ireland (129, 158, 248). 
Bowen’s family can act as a stand-in for the Ascendancy as a whole because “isolation is innate” 
to this group, which embraced “abstract ideas,” discarded “the bonds of sex and class and 
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nationality,” and pursued individual accomplishment instead of a collective mission (20, 173, 
125).  Thus each Bowen’s personal idiosyncrasies reflect the lack of communal structures tying 
together the Anglo-Irish, their drift into isolated estates from which class-wide generalizations 
can be made only on the basis of representative readings of individual figures. 
However, isolation had resonances beyond the local ones Bowen gives it.  Jonathan Cape 
found Bowen’s Court too pro-Irish and “subversive” to print in light of disputes over Ireland’s 
protectionist economic policies and its wartime neutrality.  Cape’s hostility to “isolation,” 
“independence,” “secrecy,” and the “hope” for “an undivided Ireland” may sound excessive 
now, but these were loaded terms that implied sympathy for Sinn Féin and its ethic of “ourselves 
alone” in the late 1930s.12 In “Eire,” a contemporaneous piece in The New Statesman, Bowen 
describes the “abnormal isolation” imposed by the declaration of neutrality as Ireland’s “first 
independent act,” echoing Sinn Féin’s belief that Ireland must develop outside English influence 
(31-2).  But on account of her English audience, Bowen eschewed the nativism of most Sinn 
Féin-influenced ideas and suggested instead that autonomy would help disinterested professional 
institutions flourish.  The need to “look to herself only for necessities” would erode “the idea of 
privilege” and class antagonism and erect in their place impersonal bureaucratic organizations: 
parish councils, the Local Security Force, rationing services, and agricultural societies (34-5).  
Bowen’s Ireland looks suspiciously like England in this reading, with wartime rationing, 
gasoline shortages, health epidemics, and industrial production all managed by an enlightened 
government and its civil service.  Most important, professionalized institutions would heal the 
bitter divisions and violent emotional attachments familiar to Ireland’s recent history and to 
gothic fiction alike and replace them with what she calls in The Bell “the subjugation of the 
personal to the impersonal” (29). 
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But Bowen’s idealistic narrative of professional development falters when in the face of 
Anglo-Ireland’s tragic rise and fall as a socially and politically relevant class.  After the 1800 
Acts of Union, she remarks, the Anglo-Irish, who considered their class “on the decline,” 
succumbed to “Gothic feeling” and retreated “back upon a tract of clouds and of obsessions that 
could each, from its nature, only be solitary” (258-9).  Yet the failure of the Anglo-Irish 
leadership facilitated the emergence en masse of a professional class.  For now, according to 
Bowen, physical separation gave way to psychological and social barriers – a state of affairs that 
she attributes to the rise of “democracy” (258).  Gothic and professional histories appear to 
supplement each other as Bowen vacillates between belief in professionalized, egalitarian 
progress and regret that Anglo-Ireland was abandoning its responsibilities as a social elite.  The 
two historical narratives are bound together by their concern with emotion, whether of the 
tragically expressive gothic variety or the subdued professional sort.  Ultimately, gothic and 
professional traits rectify each others’ deficiencies but cannot sublate the contradictions into a 
stable set of social structures.  Why this is the case, and how Bowen attempted to resolve this 
dialectic through a cyclical historical narrative, becomes more clear if we turn to Anglo-Ireland’s 
position in the British world-system. 
 
Caught Between Two Economies: The Anglo-Irish in Global Perspective 
 The first step in approaching Bowen’s Court’s convoluted temporal framework is to 
explain how narratives of gothic decline and professional development relate to economic and 
cultural modernization.  Though professionalism has long been associated with modernization 
and in particular with discipline-forming specialization, the gothic has typically been viewed as 
treating spaces outside or at the margins of modernity (Backus 15).13 But in the context of a 
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capitalist world-system, gothic narratives seem to participate in modernity.  Indeed, Moretti's 
"Dialectic of Fear” suggests that the gothic actually expresses, rather than retreats from, the 
dynamics of modernity, arguing that Frankenstein and Dracula reflect “the terror of a split 
[capitalist] society” that nineteenth-century industrial capitalism had produced between 
capitalists and workers.14 Following Moretti, Stephen Shapiro relates Gothic fiction to the 
capitalist separation of laborers "from any means of production (agricultural, crafts-oriented) that 
might sustain them outside of or in tension with a system that produces commodities only for 
their profit-generating potential,” especially when a new distribution of power within the “core-
zone” (i.e. Euro-America) generated new means of accumulation and unexpected capital flight 
(“Transvaal, Transylvania: Dracula’s World-System,” 30).  For Shapiro, gothic fictions surge in 
popularity during transitional moments, giving them an internal generic periodicity with which to 
chart imaginative responses to changes in global capitalism. 
 But Anglo-Ireland’s unique position in the world economy led to the dominance of gothic 
conventions in Anglo-Irish fiction from the nineteenth well into the twentieth century.15 As we 
have already seen, transnational networks of financial and commercial exchange make possible 
transitions between systemic “cycles of accumulation,” since they allow different economic 
systems to communicate and, eventually, to translate their capital from one organizational logic 
to the next (Arrighi, 1-27; Shapiro 30-35).  And as we have also seen, the Anglo-Irish did not 
merely participate in these networks – they lived in them as a condition of their very existence as 
a class.  After the Acts of Union, Irish agriculture began to split into two spheres: a subsistence 
sector maintained by the Catholic masses, and an export sector catering to British demand.16 Like 
elites in other plantation house economies (the American South, the Caribbean, the system of 
Spanish haciendas), Ascendancy landlords thrived on transnational networks of exchange, 
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selling agricultural commodities produced in a racialized, neo-feudal system of labor to fund 
lavish expenditures in metropolitan consumer economies. 17 Within this scenario, capital flight 
and alienation from agricultural modes of production did not constitute a momentary phase but 
were the very raisons d’être of the Ascendancy’s socioeconomic position.  Absenteeism became 
a hotly debated subject in the nineteenth century precisely because the spectacular consumption 
of British luxury items in London made visible Anglo-Ireland’s liminal status in two separate 
economic systems.  Though defenders like Yeats and Somerville and Ross stressed the feudal 
aspects of landlordism,18 the revenue generated from these estates was spent almost exclusively 
on British luxury goods: clothing, furniture, and carriages. But as George Moore makes plain in 
his late-nineteenth century novel A Drama in Muslin (1886), nonabsentees spent their incomes 
on the same dresses, books, and social activities, only in Dublin shops instead of through 
London-based merchants.  Indeed, since Irish industrial manufacturing was minimal before the 
twentieth century, the sole outlets for Anglo-Irish wealth during these years were Britain’s 
consumer markets.19 Thus the Anglo-Irish were caught between a “split society” of Irish workers 
and British markets, an agricultural economy and an industrial-consumerist one. 
 In the late 1930s, when Bowen was writing Bowen’s Court, the world-system was in the 
final stages of a half-century long reorientation.  Increased competition and the consequent 
waning profitability of traditional small family firms favored German and American-style 
corporations that handled their own distribution and sales along with production, leading 
capitalists to abandon mining, shipbuilding, and textile production for corporate businesses 
(Arrighi 277-308).  The greatly expanded ranks of professional managers needed to run these 
multi-tiered businesses "laid the foundation for a global class of specialists linked more securely 
to their overseas colleagues than to their home countries” (Marx 22).  But this specialist class 
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also threatened to displaced colonial class structures once seen as “mirror images – sometimes 
reflected, sometimes refracted, sometimes distorted – of the traditional, individualistic, unequal 
society that it was widely believed existed in the metropolis” (Cannadine, Ornamentalism, xix).20 
Professional corporatism, rather than neofeudal agricultural production, became the central 
economic framework tying together the world-system. 
 The move toward corporatized professionalism hit the Anglo-Irish hard, especially when 
the Irish government reduced international trade through protectionist tariffs in the hopes of 
mitigating American and British hegemony and freeing a space for local industries to grow in 
(O’Hearn 113-19).  Ireland was not alone in erecting barriers to outside trade during the 1930s, 
the Great Depression having made many nations wary of globalization.21 Nevertheless, Éamon 
de Valera’s goal of a “self-sufficient” Ireland attacked the networks on which Anglo-Ireland’s 
wealth and elevated social status had depended, and this goal – along with an aggressive policy 
of Catholicization and Gaelicization, including new statutes against contraception (1935) and 
divorce (1937) that Yeats and Samuel Beckett famously lampooned22 – encouraged roughly one-
third of the Anglo-Irish living in the South of Ireland to emigrate during the interwar period (T. 
Brown 130-34). 
 The emigrants to Britain often took advantage of their internationalist outlook to find new 
roles in the world economy that were similarly transnational in focus.  For example, a number of 
Anglo-Irish writers found the international orientation of British intellectual life amenable to 
their tastes.  Louis MacNeice and Cecil Day Lewis, to name only the two most famous, settled at 
an early age in England and established high reputations in professional literary circles.23 
Relocated to England and educated at Downe House, Bowen associated herself with the 
Bloomsbury Group, which by the 1930s had outgrown its early family-like solidarity and 
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functioned as a cosmopolitan fellowship of professional intellectuals with shared cultural views 
and artistic styles.24 Nor was professionalization confined to literary figures: Day Lewis’s father 
brought the family to England with the aim of climbing higher in the Anglican ranks than the 
dwindling Protestant population of Ireland would allow, and Iris Murdoch’s family crossed the 
Irish Sea in order for her father to continue his career as a military bureaucrat.25 
 Despite sharing a transnational perspective, gothic and professional narratives offer very 
different orientations and make nearly opposite legitimation claims.  Gothic fiction thrives on the 
disjunction between profit-generating enterprises and alternative subsistence economies: in 
traditional Big House novels the Ascendancy’s connection to a global capitalist economy 
undermines neo-feudal rhetoric by representing the ideology it supports as degenerative.  On the 
other hand, professionalism assumes as a matter of course an advanced capitalist economy 
capable of organizing large corporate businesses and adequate training facilities for their 
employees.  While the gothic is connected to transnational forces exclusively through exchanges 
of money and commodities and remains locally rooted in ideology, professionalism fashions a 
cosmopolitan class out of isolated individuals having in common only their education, career, 
and socioeconomic position.  From the vantage of professionalism’s commitments to abstract 
institutions and occupational accomplishments, the gothic’s obsession with neo-feudal social 
structures seems archaic, while for the gothic the loss of local authority and social solidarity 
appears just as troubling. 
 Bowen differentiates these competing genres in Bowen’s Court on the basis of their 
participation in distinct affective economies.  Raymond Williams shows how “structures of 
feeling” organize social experience for particular classes in lieu of advanced institutions, for 
instance during the “rise of a class” or a “mutation within a class” (Marxism and Literature, 
 225	  
134).  The Anglo-Irish were more stable as a class than Williams’s examples, but their position 
between two class systems meant that affect could supply a connection to contradictory social 
structures.  In letters and reviews Bowen characterizes herself as a member of a “non-group 
group” joined by “vague affinities” to more noticeable “coteries” (a euphemistic term, in 
Bowen’s writing, for upper-class assemblages), claiming simultaneous membership in an 
(Anglo-)Irish gentry and a rising class of professionally-oriented Britons (letter to William 
Plomer, 6 May 1948; “Orlando,” 131).  With greater nuance Bowen’s Court equates loose 
groupings with a tendency to value affective social formations over ideas.  The Bowens inherited 
“the received ideas of their class,” but “character – ruling passion, innate predisposition – stays a 
long way below the level of ‘ideas’ – such a long way that often no connection exists.  Where 
ideas were concerned, the Bowens tended to show themselves fractious and changeable – they 
did not really care much for them” (277).  Two points stand out among these observations: first, 
the family history does not strictly conform either to the gothic’s regressive narrative or to 
professionalism’s evolutionary one but traverses drastically different forms (or “ideas”) that 
reflect a constant submerged presence; second, affect (“ruling passion, innate predisposition”) is 
the “deep” undercurrent that can explain the changeable surface of “ideas” throughout Bowen’s 
narrative and whose faintness makes it a long-lasting response to structural social impasses.26  
While the British and native Irish possessed clear ideological platforms – the empire and laissez-
faire free trade for the one, Home Rule and tenants’ rights for the other – the absence of a 
guiding idea differentiates Bowen's Anglo-Irish from these two potentially antagonistic classes.  
With no innate ideas, the Anglo-Irish are free to declare themselves at one moment “Irish in 
being,” at another “no more than England’s creatures” (129, 223).  But, underlying these shifting 
loyalties, the “style” with which the Anglo-Irish lived, the way that they felt and responded to 
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transient ideas, remained constant over generations of Anglo-Irish rule: “Like Flaubert’s ideal 
book about nothing, it [the Anglo-Irish Big House] sustains itself on itself by the inner force of 
its style” (21).  
 To explain why her family, like the Anglo-Irish generally, failed to live up to their 
professional aspirations, Bowen employs the gothic tropes that for most of her history she 
carefully avoids.  She reports a recurring “fantasy” about a treasure buried in their in-laws’ estate 
at Kilbolane that was rightfully theirs and that threw the Bowen finances into disarray on account 
of the court costs and lawyers’ fees incurred to wrest control of it (100).  Bowen here uses an 
economy of hysteria to diagnose both the successes and the failures of an export-oriented, neo-
feudal transnationalism.  As a gothic fantasy of wealth literally buried in the soil, the “Kilbolane 
obsession” reflects what Bowen elsewhere in the book calls the “inherent wrong” of Irish 
landlordism – that is, the wealth and privilege gained from dispossessing the “old” Irish – but it 
does so at a level of affect-induced powerlessness (353).  Here the need to convert landed assets 
into money overcomes any rational control on the Bowens’ part.  The neo-feudal myth that the 
Anglo-Irish have a contractual right to their property under British law and that profitable estate 
management legitimates ownership is unmasked as a desire for hard cash and the British luxury 
items it can purchase.  Hysteria, then, marks the location where Anglo-Ireland traverses multiple 
economic systems. 
 At the same time, Bowen acknowledges one advantage that hysteria has over professional 
decorum.  Because the Ascendency had dispossessed the native Irish, “to enjoy prosperity one 
had to exclude feeling, or keep it within prescribed bounds” to cope with the injustice of Anglo-
Irish affluence (248).  But the heightened feeling that hysteria lent the Ascendancy enabled its 
proponents to begin to share sentiments with each other and with the native Irish.  To mitigate 
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the hysterical element of their feelings, the Anglo-Irish turned from “exploitation” to 
“development,” showing “at least a wish to organize, to better things and to rule” (158).  For 
Bowen, the classic example of this movement is Grattan’s Parliament, the short-lived Irish 
Parliament (1782-1800) that represented the high point of accountability for the Anglo-Irish.  
Their active leadership in forming “responsible” institutions fostered a collective sense of 
themselves as a race and a class and established an alibi for Anglo-Ireland’s transnational 
position: 27 while continuing to monetarize agricultural produce for British luxury items, they 
cast themselves as mediators between British modernity and “traditional” Ireland by importing 
modern political institutions from Britain and using them to develop Irish autonomy.28  By 
representing this connection as an even exchange of wealth for institutional paradigms, Bowen 
locates institution building as a fortuitous byproduct of a hysterical affective economy and as a 
legitimating ground of Anglo-Irish hegemony. 
 Professionalism abandons the collectivist mentality underpinning the gothic, imagining 
instead a group of accomplished individuals released from emotional ties to nation, class, and 
family.  Though sharing with Bowen’s gothic discourse an interest in institutions, 
professionalism values institutions’ abstract standards as a way to limit local ties.  When 
recounting a conflict between her father and her grandfather over her father’s desire to study law, 
Bowen suggests how incompatible these two frames are, despite the verbiage common to both: 
“Robert [her grandfather] felt – and in this he was not unreasonable – that one cannot have two 
professions.  Fate had selected Henry’s [her father] profession for him: he was to be Henry Cole 
Bowen of Bowen’s Court, landowner” (375).  To Robert, Henry’s choice to pursue a career in 
addition to landlord was a ”betrayal” of his hereditary “role” for “accomplishment” in law (375).  
Bowen emphasizes the semantic gap between “role” and “accomplishment,” with the first 
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indicating holistically personal and public life and the second limiting one to “lonely reflection” 
about occupational issues (375).  The argument between Robert and Henry over “role” versus 
“accomplishment” is presented as a choice between two modes of being wholly dependent on 
affective orientation, not on global processes in relation to which they are merely passive 
respondents.  In effect, Bowen domesticates British professionalism to Irish circumstances: the 
professional modes of affective disposition that form the guiding operational logic of British 
capitalism in the 1930’s have been available in Ireland in one shape or another since the 
seventeenth century.  Of course, such a perspective leads one to ask why proto-professionalism 
never emerged into a full-fledged professional society.  This problem, I suggest, is in essence the 
obverse of the gothic historical form that Bowen tries to avoid in her narrative.  By internalizing 
gothic and professional narratives to Anglo-Ireland via their affective economies, Bowen plays 
them off against each other, so that the failings of one cause a corrective swing to the other.  In 
doing so, she constructs a historical form capable of relativizing Anglo-Irish setbacks within a 
cyclical longue durée. 
 
Affect and Periodic History 
Both Bowen’s Court and world-systems theory regard history as conforming to a cyclical 
pattern.  However, Bowen’s desire to reimagine her class in the terms dictated by Ireland’s 
isolationist economic policy led her to attribute periodic repetitions to developments internal to 
Anglo-Irish life, not to the global capitalist processes that world-systems theory investigates.  As 
Arrighi explains in The Long Twentieth Century, systemic cycles occur because capitalism 
alternates between two basic models, “cosmopolitan imperial” and “corporate national,” neither 
of which can expand indefinitely without being supplemented by the other.  The deficiencies of 
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the “cosmopolitan imperial” frame – an inability to properly coordinate exchange on a mass 
level, as seen in the failure of small-firm capitalism and the ideological limits of neo-feudalism – 
are overcome by “corporate nationalism’s” larger business model, while “cosmopolitan 
imperialism” guards against increasing atomization in national and professional spaces.  But the 
dialectical progression between these models worked less easily for the Anglo-Irish, who were 
wedged between discrepant economic systems in a spatial, rather than a temporal, manner.  
Indeed, since Irish protectionism was dismantling transnational networks during Bowen’s time, 
she found herself having to rationalize her class’s socioeconomic role, and its oscillating social 
ethics, without alluding to extra-Irish affairs or global transitions.  Affect, for its part, provided 
the medium through which she could to do so. 
Bowen constructs her chapters around seven periods of Anglo-Irish history: the 
Cromwellian conquest and the early Bowen settlers, the first generations of Bowens born in 
Ireland, the era of Grattan’s Parliament; the first decades of the Union, the years leading up to 
the Great Famine and its aftermath, the Irish Land War, and the present day.29 The narrative 
frame oscillates regularly: the Cromwellian conquest, Grattan’s Parliament, the Famine, and the 
present day demonstrate tendencies toward proto-professional development, while the other 
chapters follow a gothic narrative of class and familial decline.  In her afterword to Bowen’s 
Court, Bowen attests that this rhythm was a self-conscious choice: because the “aspect of their 
[the Bowens’] behaviour that interests me the most” was the “involuntary, or spontaneous” 
workings of emotion, she could describe “the pattern they unconsciously went to make” only by 
“suggest[ing] a compulsion they did not know of by a series of breaks, contrasts, and 
juxtapositions” (452).  Bowen attributes apparent discontinuities to the turbulent nature of 
affects, which can slide between different relative states.  Because emotions possess internal 
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regularity and elude conscious control, they enable her to explain historical reversals without 
sacrificing Anglo-Irish self-possession.  Far from being passive respondents to economic 
realities, the Ascendancy dictated its own cyclical history. 
To explain the consistent rhythm of gothic decline and professional development, Bowen 
presents each affective economy as having inherent deficiencies balanced by the other.  For 
example, she emphasizes how each wave of professionalism comes about after, and partly as a 
result of, a moment of obsession, serving as a corrective to mass hysteria.  Both “step-down[s] in 
power” [i.e. gothicized declines] carried with them a “romantic phase” that destroyed the Anglo-
Irish’s previous class solidarity and replaced it with a “dire period of Personal Life” (399, 359).  
Unable to cope with the obsessions troubling their class position, the Anglo-Irish retreat into 
individualistic occupations to manage their agitations.  While professionalism does not entail a 
complete withdrawal from affect, it does allow Bowen’s ancestors to displace debilitating 
emotions toward house and road-building, technocratic management of their estates, or legal 
studies.  Like “only children,” the Anglo-Irish “are sterner in their refusal to suffer, in their 
refusal, even, to feel at all” (419);30 but the only way that Bowen’s ancestors can mitigate their 
tensions is to disperse them throughout the institutional structures they erected during periods of 
class solidarity and neo-feudal governance, in effect disciplining their emotions by transferring 
them from personal expressions to impersonal institutional systems.31 
 But professionalism cannot persist indefinitely.  Insofar as the Anglo-Irish retreat into 
individuated professionalism, they lose coherence as a recognizable social class, abandoning 
both the political power and the institutional infrastructure associated with their position.  At the 
same time, as professional-style management restores the gentry to their fortunes, class sentiment 
and a desire to function as a political leader once again begin to fuse the Anglo-Irish into a 
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collectivity.  When “human feeling” heightens, “latent energy” develops their childish attributes 
into adult responsibility, and “the Anglo-Irish [become] aware of themselves as a race” (158).  
The change in valence from childlike professionalism to responsible engagement with adult 
institutions shows just how reversible Bowen’s terminology is.  While isolated individualism 
(and its association with childhood) is offered as the palliative for gothic decadence, Bowen also 
views collective adulthood as a corrective measure for the hedonistic pursuit of wealth and 
pleasure.32 Indeed, by ignoring their sociopolitical role as benevolent landlords, the Anglo-Irish 
gentry abandon not only the neo-feudal ideology underpinning their ownership of the land but 
also the institution-building necessary for the self-sufficient development envisioned by both de 
Valera and Bowen.  Ironically, this leads Bowen back to where she began: professionalism’s 
inability to foster a social ethic induces a return to feeling and to collective institutional 
association, the latter made possible, in turn, by the managerial proficiencies that the Anglo-Irish 
acquired through professional advancement.  In this regard Bowen’s narrative oscillates between 
collective institutional structures and individual professionalism, each of which supplies the 
inadequacies of the other but also lays the foundation for its later reemergence. 
 For Bowen, the eventual rehabilitation of the Anglo-Irish gentry depends on the 
dialectical movement between neo-feudal institution building and individualistic 
professionalism, and in particular on the resistance of this movement to any attempt to sublate its 
alternating stages into a new mode of production.  In contrast to many classic accounts of British 
class history, which have stressed the gradual movement from agricultural to industrial modes of 
production, and from amateur entrepreneurialism to professional corporatism, Bowen insists that 
the Anglo-Irish gentry always evidenced a proto-professional element.  But she also suggests that 
it never evolved into a full-fledged “professional society” because of Anglo-Ireland’s connection 
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to multiple economic systems.  By translating their transnational position into a historical 
account, Bowen constructs a prehistory for the institutional autonomy and individualistic 
professionalism that together seemed to spell irreversible decline for the Anglo-Irish, a 
prehistory internalizing such threatening developments as expressions of Anglo-Irish 
emotionality.  The key point is that Bowen’s institutional prehistory operates through an 
extended metaphor comparing Irish socioeconomic circumstances – the emergence of national, 
Anglo-Irish-led institutions and proto-professional individualism – to transnational ties between 
Ireland and Britain.  Just as Anglo-Ireland swung back and forth between moments of collective 
action and individualism, so too did the economic system in which the Anglo-Irish precariously 
balanced: the Cromwellian invasion and the Acts of Union strengthened links between Britain 
and Ireland, while Grattan’s Parliament and the Land War pulled them apart.  (The parallel 
associates Grattan’s Parliament with later Irish separatism – a dubious claim in light of Anglo-
Irish loyalties.)  In turn, this dynamic sets up a strict isomorphism between proto-professional 
labor and Irish isolationism, and Anglo-Irish political structures such as Grattan’s Parliament 
establish a clear national precedent for the autonomous institutionalism that replaced 
transnational imperial networks in the 1930s.  Ultimately, Bowen proposes that these two modes 
of organization cannot coexist: professionalism tears apart the class unity of the Anglo-Irish, 
while Anglo-Irish collectivism is frighteningly self-destructive, subject to hysteria and in-
fighting.  But her insistence that Anglo-Irish affects explain the cyclical oscillations transfers the 
responsibility for this turbulence from an ominous global market to a national context in which 
the Anglo-Irish can continue to mediate between Irish agricultural production and neo-British 
consumerism. 
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No longer buoyed by British support for their hegemony, but also no longer bound as 
tightly to Britain, Bowen translates the contradictions of Anglo-Ireland’s transnational position 
into a historical narrative that internalizes these features within an analysis of the affective 
foundations for periodic booms and declines in Anglo-Irish social and political ascendancy.  By 
delineating an internally consistent field that treats Anglo-Ireland’s history rather than its 
overlapping material connections to Britain or Ireland, Bowen focuses on collective emotions 
and their role in producing and maintaining institutional infrastructure.  In this manner, she 
locates class-wide, generational fluctuations in temperament, providing a powerful image for 
short-term oscillations within Anglo-Ireland’s relative standing.  Contradictions emanating from 
Anglo-Ireland’s transnational position become in Bowen’s narrative paradoxes internal to group 
affects, and this shift in perspective refashions Anglo-Ireland’s historical role in terms of Irish 
autonomy. Bowen envisions Anglo-Ireland not as some alien class for whom Irish self-
sufficiency foretells imminent decline but as an autonomous community whose independence 
parallels that of the young Irish Free State.  According to Bowen, the ups and downs of Anglo-
Irish social, economic, and political power have little to do with global flows of commodities and 
finance capital.  Instead, the symmetry between Anglo-Ireland’s post-independence decline and 
its collective fantasy-induced withdrawal from social leadership is accidental, a failure on Anglo-
Ireland’s part to reconcile professional management adequately with collective institution-
formation. 
 In developing this historical imaginary, Bowen shows a fascination with cyclical time 
that many of her modernist predecessors shared.  But where figures like Yeats and T. S. Eliot 
used mythic cycles to endow early twentieth-century life with a cultural continuity,33 Bowen 
suggests that it was the more proximate workings of affect that caused Anglo-Irish history to 
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move in a repetitive manner.  Bowen’s text is closer in this regard to those of her Bloomsbury 
associates, who valued individualism and personal ties more than monumental cultural forms.  
Yet Bowen departs from Bloomsbury aesthetics by assigning a central value to collective action 
and impersonal social structures.  While many in the Bloomsbury set had begun to engage with a 
collectivist sensibility prior to World War II, their projects tended to represent national 
communities as bound together by a common culture.34 Given Anglo-Ireland’s tenuous position 
as a transnational class, Bowen could not take for granted the same isomorphism between nation, 
culture, and geographic locale as other modernists, and so she presented her class as united by 
the concrete institutions they established and the common emotional dispositions these fostered.   
At the same time, Bowen’s cyclical history does provide us with an insight into the 
emotional dynamics that made possible the historical imaginary of Keynesian equilibrium 
economics.  In contrast to the culture-centric histories of Yeats and Eliot, Keynes’ General 
Theory sought to explain short-term fluctuations in employment as an immediate consequence of 
collective emotions.  Rather than appeal to mythic structures that molded human destiny from 
outside of history, Keynes proposed that economic cycles exist as the clearest indicator of a 
collective affective temperament that can both destroy modern classes and build them up again.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I sketch how Keynesian economics represent an abstract 
recapitulation of the cyclical history developed by Bowen in Bowen’s Court.  Though not 
directly indebted to Bowen’s Court, Keynes’s General Theory reflects a pervasive internalization 
among British writers of the gothic Irish historiography that Bowen amply demonstrates. 
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On the Whims of “Animal Spirits”: The Irrational Survival of Liberalism in The General 
Theory 
 
 In 1945, just as World War II was ending and the postwar welfare state was on the verge 
of emerging, Evelyn Waugh and Henry Green each published novels centered around declining 
country estates.  Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited narrates the fall of the Catholic Marchmain 
family as seen from the eyes of Charles Ryder, a classmate of the Marchmains’ son Sebastian 
Flyte and a budding landscape painter.  Over the course of the novel, Ryder watches the 
aristocratic family decay around him and gradually come to be replaced, during the War, by what 
Ryder calls the Hoopers of the world: efficient middle-class professionals who lack the poetry 
that Ryder finds in the Marchmains.  In both its gothic imagery and juxtaposition of aristocratic 
and Catholic decline with rising professionalism, Waugh’s novel is clearly indebted to Irish Big 
House novels like Edgeworth’s Castle Rackrent and Bowen’s own The Last September (1929) 
that characterized the country estate as a dilapidated locale condemned to decline and 
obsolescence, less the bearer of a conservative Burkean tradition than an archaic remnant out of 
step with capitalist modernity.   As Ryder observers in a moment of retrospection, “Englishmen 
seemed … to salute their achievements at the moments of their extinction … The financial slump 
of the period, which left many painters without employment, served to enhance my success [at 
selling paintings of country estates], which was, indeed, itself a symptom of the decline” (227). 
Similarly, Green’s Loving manages to rescue the country estate novel by moving it to 
Ireland, where Irish neutrality during the War opened the possibility of a last gasp of neo-feudal 
hierarchy.  As Charlie Raunce, the grasping butler, explains to Kate Armstrong, another servant, 
if one returned to Britain one risked “[being] called up in the Army when you land on the other 
side” and subsequently forced into its professionalized hierarchies (98).  Much like in Bowen’s 
Court, England becomes a synecdoche for professionalism and Ireland for feudalism, and the 
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intercourse between the two (in Loving, the transfer of an entire English household across the 
Irish Sea to Ireland) the grounds for a reinvention of the conventions of the country estate novel.  
But as in Brideshead Revisited, there is little doubt that this is a mere interlude before the 
triumph of professionalism: when the Tennants leave the estate, chaos erupts among the servants, 
and the first glimpses of what rule “under the masses” may be like is shown in blistering 
severity.  By the close of the novel, we intuit that the aristocracy has been doomed by the War, 
and all that is left of the country estate is, on the one hand, a series of small, sheltered enclaves 
degenerating into gothic decadence, and, on the other, fictions like Green’s and Waugh’s that 
preserve aristocratic culture in an ideal image. 
 I mention Waugh and Green’s novels because they are indicative of the extent to which a 
historiography of gothic decline and rising professional expertise had already become enshrined 
in England by the end of World War II, as well as the degree to which these relied upon the Irish 
Gothic’s settings (Loving) and tropes (the decaying house, Catholicism).  And, as numerous 
critics have noted, the transition from the interwar period’s debates over fascism, communism, 
and liberalism to the postwar consensus over the professional-managed welfare state was in large 
part made possible by the conceptual apparatus supplied by the work of John Maynard Keynes, 
in particular his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.35  In this respect, it is 
significant that both The General Theory and Waugh and Green’s novels deploy images of steep 
decline and ambiguous ascent: the fading aristocracy and deepening unemployment versus the 
professional middle-class and a future surge in employment.  Indeed, we might say that if Waugh 
and Green’s novels overtly display their debt to an Irish historiographic tradition of intermingled 
decline and ascent, Keynes’s text provides an early example of this combination that abstracts 
away from the specifics themes of Anglo-Irish historiography to develop this historical dynamic 
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into a truly “general theory.”  And while I will not be arguing that Keynes explicitly borrowed 
from Bowen and Anglo-Irish fiction, I do want to suggest that Keynes absorbed on an intuitive 
level a cyclical theory of history that was dependent on a parallel understanding of (gothicized) 
economic history, one which would in the War years become explicitly identified with Ireland. 
Central to Keynes’s General Theory was the thesis that, if the economy entered periodic 
depressions such as it did in the 1930s, this indicated less of a failure on the part of economists to 
correctly understand rational economic mechanisms than it did the permeability of 
socioeconomic institutions to irrational social affects.  In contrast to classical economists like 
Arthur Pigou and Keynes’ mentor, Alfred Marshall, whom Keynes believed to have mistaken 
optimal economic conditions as a universal state of affairs, Keynes insisted that he could explain 
the worldwide depression of the 1930s and the mass unemployment that it brought about in 
Britain as something other than an unavoidable fluctuation in prices: “Thus writers in the 
classical tradition, overlooking the special assumption underlying their theory, have been driven 
inevitably to the conclusion, perfectly logical on their assumption, that apparent unemployment 
(apart from the admitted exceptions) must be due at bottom to a refusal by the unemployed 
factors to accept a reward which corresponds to their marginal productivity” (16).  In order 
explain Pgou and Marshall’s errors, he proposed that depressions were, at their most 
fundamental level, expressions of swings in group affects that, while opaque on the level of these 
collectivities themselves, could be observed by knowledgeable economists in the effects that 
they produced within financial and corporate institutions: “It is the return of confidence, to speak 
in ordinary language, which is so insusceptible to control in an economy of individualistic 
capitalism.  This is the aspect of the slump which bankers and business men have been right in 
emphasizing, and which economists who have put their faith in a “purely monetary” remedy 
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have underestimated” (317).  This model of cyclical economics managed to represent depression 
as a short-term anomaly that would soon be corrected through an upsurge in positive affects.  As 
opposed to the long-historical scales of mythopoetic cycles like Yeats’s Vision or Oswald 
Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918-1922), affect-induced cycles suggested that downturns 
within socioeconomic institutions could be rectified within the space of months, years, or at 
worst a generation – not centuries. 
In “Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State,” one of his most theoretically nuanced 
articles, the Marxist critic Antonio Negri argues that the lasting impact and true novelty of 
Keynes’ work was less its break with classical economics than its recognition of what Negri 
terms “social capital.”  “Social capital,” for Negri, denotes “the interiorization of the political 
element within the economy” – that is, the recognition that class divisions, the demands of labor, 
and generalized antipathy against capitalist modes of production could all impact upon the state 
of the economy (34).  According to Negri, Keynes parted ways with classical economists’ 
insistence that fluctuations in the economy were entirely the result of pricing mechanisms 
internal to the market – a naïve view in light of the Russian Revolution and the 1929 U.S. Stock 
Market collapse – and acknowledged that sociopolitical circumstances could – and did – 
influence the trajectory of the economy (Negri 30-38).  Given the nature of the General Theory 
as precisely that, a general theory constructed so as to be independent from any specific context, 
Keynes spends little time in elaborating on how specific sociopolitical scenarios could affect 
trends in pricing and employment.36  But unlike classical economists like Pigou and Marshall or 
high modernists like Yeats, Keynes insisted that the deep, theoretical principles that he had 
uncovered in his General Theory were neither disembodied mechanisms relatively autonomous 
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from civil society nor transhistorical spiritual realities that overdetermined the cultural and 
political lives of individuals.   
Instead, Keynes introduces social factors to his theory under the curious heading of 
“animal spirits,” a term that he borrows from early modern philosophy.37 “[A] large proportion 
of our positive activities,” writes Keynes, “depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a 
mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic.  Most, probably, of our 
decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many 
days to come, can only be taken as a result of animals spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action 
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities” (161).  Part of Keynes’ polemic here is against classical 
economists who believe that economic decisions can be reduced to a calculus of hedonistic self-
interest – Keynes repeatedly stresses his wariness in regard to the utility of mathematical 
formulas, and his use of qualifiers such as “probably” invests his own language with a parallel 
uncertainty38 – but even more important is his argument that “spontaneous urges” dictate 
decisions within the economic realm.  If this is the case, then economic analyses must be open to 
investigating the sociopolitical contexts that shape human emotion in minute and often 
unobservable ways: not just how the interest rate affects investment, but also how governments, 
wars, and the media affect investor confidence. 
Keynes’ characterization of the individual investor as prone to “spontaneous urges” 
echoes the Freudian-inflected psychologism of Bloomsburys like Leonard Woolf, Virginia 
Woolf, and Clive Bell, complete with its assumed “sovereignty of the civilised individual” and 
its trepidation over the subconscious libidinal forced lurking just underneath civilized facades 
(Williams, “The Significance of Bloomsbury,” 62).39 In this regard, Keynes would seem open to 
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the criticism that Eve Sedgwick directs at psychoanalytic theories of affect: namely, that they 
collapse a multitude of affective states into a homogenous “libido” that cannot conceive of 
“finitely many (n>2) values” (108).  Such is certainly true of Keynes’ “animal spirits,” which act 
as an opaque fount of irrational urges that cannot be attributed to any visible cause.  But, in the 
case of Keynesian economics as a whole, the relationship between Freudian-influenced “animal 
spirits” and empirically observable expressions of affect is much more complex.  In “My Early 
Beliefs,” an essay present before the Memoir Club in 1938,40 Keynes observed that “Though one 
must ever remember Paley’s dictum that ‘although we speak of communities as of sentient 
beings and ascribe to them happiness and misery, nothing exists or feels but individuals,’ yet we 
carried the individualism of our individuals too far” (96).  I am less interested in Keynes’ 
renunciation of individualism than I am in the non-coincidence between individual feelings and 
their asymmetrical expression in collective institutions.41 Michael Szalay has argued that the 
1930’s and 1940’s witnessed the rise of a widespread resistance to reading collective economic 
and governmental institutions as personifications of individual agents, a position that he traces to 
the work of Keynes, Ayn Rand, William Carlos Williams, and Wallace Stevens (New Deal 
Modernism).  As such, we need to recognize that the affects which Keynes observed in economic 
institutions, though the product of a unitary fount of “animal spirits,” each evidenced a distinct 
phenomenology and set of effects separate from their sources in individual irrationalism.  While 
individuals may be subject to inchoate urges, their expression in collective institutions takes on a 
determinate form. 
Take for example Keynes’ analysis of the depression that befell the U.S. after the October 
1929 stock market, one of the few historical events that Keynes deals with in any depth in his 
General Theory.  According to Keynes, the source of the U.S. depression can be found in the 
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way in which “animal spirits” affected investor confidence in the years prior to and after the 
stock market’s collapse.  In the years leading up to the 1929 crash, investor confidence exceeded 
what was rationally foreseeable, creating a situation in which “speculative excitement” led to 
new investment “on so enormous a scale in the aggregate that the prospective yield of further 
addition was, coolly considered, falling rapidly” (323).  (In layman’s terms, the excitement 
surrounding investments caused a massive influx of capital which, in its turn, saturated the 
market and engendered a smaller proportional profit for each particular investment.)  This 
scenario was exacerbated by the parallel loss of confidence felt by investors after the crash, a 
state of affairs that Keynes viewed as continuing in the U.S. up to the moment of his writing (as 
opposed to Britain, where at least consumer industries had recovered).  In this account, “animal 
spirits” operate as a sort of “fudge-factor” that accounts for why an entire class of people 
(investors) can behave irrationally on a large enough scale to send the economy into periodic 
booms and slumps.  It is not simply that investors act irrationally that interests Keynes: such 
conduct could easily be accounted for through mathematical formulas that allowed for a certain 
deviation in rational conduct (and Keynes was nothing if not skeptical of econometric formulas).  
More important is the fact that recognizable groups like investors (or employees, for that matter) 
act irrationally in a uniform matter, and that this uniform irrationalism can be detected most 
clearly in economic institutions like the stock market.  Where one individual irrational act is a 
mere blip in the data, whole-scale irrationalism can disrupt the normal functioning of the 
economy for good or ill, and for this reason its effects are more visible in fluctuations within the 
economy than in the inscrutable emotions of individual actors.  Keynes here displaces specific, 
discrete affects – speculative excitement, loss of confidence – from the specific groups who 
experience those emotions and onto a series of prosthetic financial and industrial institutions. 
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Keynes was not alone in seeking to explain group behavior through an analysis of 
irrationalism.  The modernist period was replete with attempts to elucidate mass psychology 
from the perspective of atavistic drives, and these projects gained significantly in popularity 
when used as tools to explain the successes of fascism in the 1930s, as for instance in the work of 
William Reich (The Mass Psychology of Fascism [1933]).42 However, his work differed from 
that of scholars such as Reich in its insistence that mass irrationalism is a product of modern 
capitalism and not the atavistic regression of a barbaric working-class mass that can often be 
found in studies of mass psychology.43 In place of atavistic drives, Keynes builds his theory of 
economic irrationalism and its affective foundations around the notion of individuals’ 
“propensity to consume.”  Keynes defines the “propensity to consume” as the “relationship 
between the community’s income and what it can be expected to spend on consumption,” which 
in its turn “will depend on the psychological characteristic of the community” (28).44 By 
invoking this “propensity to consume” alongside investor confidence as unanalyzable variables 
present in all capitalist economies, Keynes proposes that group psychology – and the affective 
“animal spirits” that underlie it – governs the amount of wealth generated by a society and, 
consequently, what the level of employment will be.45  That is, the more that consumers’ “animal 
spirits” can induce them to buy, and the more that investors’ “animal spirits” can induce them to 
invest, the more capital employers will have to devote to workers’ wages (General Theory, 30-
1).  The key to mitigating the mass unemployment of the ’30s therefore hinged on the capacity of 
economic institutions and the professionals who managed them to elicit positive affects and to 
raise the community’s “propensity to consume.” 
In this regard, Keynes’ affect-centered General Theory echoes Bowen’s Court’s 
optimistic belief in a return to past class configurations.  Though Keynes carefully eschews any 
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mention of upper, middle, or working classes in the General Theory – terms which would have 
connoted Marxist leanings within the political climate of the 1930’s – his prevalent use of 
“employment,” “investors,” and “consumers” implicitly recreates a three-tiered model of class 
within the work.46 Indeed, so close is Keynes’ model of class to contemporary Marxist models 
that we can easily map his terms onto Marxist descriptions of capitalism without much loss of 
meaning: “investors” clearly indicates the same bourgeois capitalists whom Marx analyzes at 
great length, the upper class of aristocratic landowners and upper-middle class industrial 
magnates47; “consumers,” in contrast, designates those for whom their earnings are sufficient that 
they can be spent on luxury items, i.e. the middle classes; and “employment,” which for Keynes 
signifies industrial employment within a factory setting, functions as a shorthand for the working 
class.48 As unstable as these class groupings may have seemed during the 1930s under the 
combined pressure of mass unemployment, corporatization and professionalization, and 
transformations within the British world-system’s transnational networks, Keynes nonetheless 
persisted in attributing a certain conservative equilibrium to the affects that dictated the relative 
strength, roles, and economic security of these classes.  “Fluctuations may start briskly,” Keynes 
argues, “but seem to wear themselves out before they have proceeded to great extremes, and an 
intermediate situation which is neither desperate or satisfactory is our normal lot” (249-50).  
Moreover, “since these facts do not follow out of logical necessity, one must suppose that the 
environment and the psychological propensities of the modern world must be of such a character 
as to produce these results” (250).  For Keynes, affects are inherently inclined to swing back and 
forth between extremes before settling into a healthy middle, which helps to ensure that any 
drastic fluctuation – such as the worldwide depression of the 1930s – will be rectified through 
the defining characteristics of collective affect.  Nor should such corrections be confused with 
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institutional mechanisms internal to the market, as classical economics would have it49: Keynes 
is quite explicit that it is the “psychological propensities” of human beings, rather than 
autonomous market mechanisms, which cause fluctuations in the economy. 
In championing the return of this “intermediate state,” Keynes uses the affect-based 
model of the General Theory to rationalize the existence of auto-corrective, short-term 
socioeconomic cycles, a use to which we have already seen affect being put in Bowen’s Court.  
As Jennifer Wicke explains in “Mrs. Dalloway Goes to Market,” Keynesian economic theory 
attempted to make sense of the confusion of modern consumerist markets and the uncertain 
future that they produced.50 The main obstacle to accurate foresight was, in Keynes’ view, the 
cyclical oscillation of boom and bust generated by swings in emotional states.51 But if the source 
of economic cycles, affect, was impenetrable to critical analysis and incompatible with definite 
future predictions, the fact that Keynes ties affect closely to the trade cycle suggests that 
emotions exhibit a regularity in their “spontaneous” expression that can be found more readily in 
economic indicators than in psychological analysis.  Despite the fact that the trade cycle can be 
traced to oscillations in investor and consumer emotions that are totally independent of economic 
realities, Keynes does not dismiss the empirical observations of classical economists that trade 
cycles demonstrate “a regularity of time-sequence and of duration” (313).  Instead, he discards 
the steady confidence that classical economists placed in the smooth operation of the trade cycle 
and adopts in its place a view of trade cycles as “subject to sudden and violent changes” on 
account of their origin in irrational affects.  On the one hand, this affective foundation suggests a 
debt to gothicized hysteria of the sort we saw in Bowen’s work: excitable, violent emotions 
topple the stable socioeconomic institutions (here, capitalism) that make collective association 
possible.  On the other hand, it also provides a medium through which Keynes can hypothesize a 
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return to pre-depression levels of employment and investment.  Since affects evidence a 
regularity in their institutional effects – confidence leads to greater investment and employment, 
panic to depression and unemployment – Keynes can argue that a return to a past affective 
arrangement will bring about a return to a previous moment of institutional and class 
organization, thus maintaining some sense of constancy over discrete periods of time.  In 
particular, the equilibrium between affects, investment, and employment that Keynesian 
economics strives to define ensures that an identical affect will be greeted by identical roles for 
the working, middle, and upper classes.  And the short duration and “sudden and violent” 
fluctuations of affects imply that such cyclical returns to past moments of class configuration can 
take place within correspondingly short, year to decade long swings. 
It is this departure from a linear, Marxist-based model of class to one stressing cyclical 
continuity and the reemergence of class systems which most clearly aligns The General Theory 
with the philosophy of history underlying Bowen’s historical imaginary.  And just as in Bowen’s 
Court Bowen insisted that professionalism’s emotional decorum could mitigate gothic hysteria 
and revive the fortunes of the Anglo-Irish, Keynes also embraced a more technocratic version of 
professionalism for its ability to rescue middle-class liberalism – centered, for him, in the Liberal 
Party – from its apparent decline.  According to Keynes, the Liberal Party could recover from its 
its “extinction” as a mass political party and reinvent itself as a professional elite of “technical 
knowledge” and “ideas” (“Am I a Liberal?” 186-7).  Eschewing both the class-based politics of 
the Labour Party52 and the lack of “intellectual [and] spiritual edification” proffered by the 
Tories, Keynes proposed that Liberals could serve as a managerial technocracy who would 
regulate affect-induced economic cycles through their disinterested professional activity.53 
Indeed, if affects could only be viewed in their prosthetic institutional expressions, then 
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professional, disinterested management would seem to be the only way to affect affects, and to 
this end the presence of a group able to disengage themselves from the immediate tug of 
emotional investments was an indispensible necessity.  Keynes saw this policy of permeation as 
the best way to revive an Eton- and Cambridge-educated intelligentsia that, between the failure 
of the Liberal Party as a viable political option and the imminent end of the imperial civil 
service, appeared to be in a state of unavoidable decline.54 
Keynes’ vision of an elite-educated, upper-class technocracy would ultimately not 
survive World War II: the postwar welfare state was known more among its critics for its 
banality and dreary uniformity than for the sort of enclassed oligarchy that Keynes advocated for 
in his work.55 But his theoretical writings do give us an insight into the gothic historical form that 
made possible a depressionary history premised on emotional equilibrium, as well as into the 
abstraction of this gothic form away from its central place in Irish historiography and toward a 
“general” theory of economic life.  After World War II, equilibrium economics would gradually 
lose the connection to gothic emotionality secreted in Keynes’s notion of “animal spirits,” 
moving instead toward the certainty of mathematical formulations.  But the underlying concept 
that the economy was constituted by violent cycles that needed to be held in check would persist 
well into latter decades of the twentieth century, testifying to the enduring power of the 
depressionary history elaborated in both Bowen’s Court and the General Theory. 
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1 On the satirical use to which Irish mythology is put in Murphy, see Patrick Bixby, Samuel 
Beckett and the Postcolonial Novel. 
 
2 See especially Christopher Caudwell, Studies in a Dying Culture and Further Studies in a 
Dying Culture.  For sustained analyses of capitalism as a system in “crisis,” see David Harvey, 
The Limits to Capital, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. 
 
3 Flatley is drawing on The Arcades Project, in particular the section “N: On the theory of 
knowledge, on the knowledge of history.” 
 
4 The most thorough examination of the relationship between Bowen’s Court and Bowen’s 
Anglo-Irish nationality can be found in Foster, “Prints on the Scene.”  Though Foster emphasizes 
the element of fantasy that enters into Bowen’s family history, he notes its Irish provenance to 
defend her against those who would see her as inauthentically Irish. 
 
5 Critics who treat Bowen’s Court as a theoretical reflection on the Anglo-Irish condition include 
Vera Kreilkamp, The Anglo-Irish Novel and the Big House, 141-73; Moynahan 76-8; Kiberd 
364-80; and Corcoran, Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return, 21-30. 
 
6 Bowen often expressed a critical interest in this tradition.  Her thoughts on the gothic can be 
found in introductions to Le Fanu’s Uncle Silas and The House by the Church-Yard. 
 
7 Kiberd draws this connection in Inventing Ireland, 69-82, 364-80. 
 
8 See Margot Gayle Backus, The Gothic Family Romance: Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice, and 
the Anglo-Irish Colonial Order; and W. J. McCormack, Dissolute Characters: Irish Literary 
History Through Balzac, Sheridan Le Fanu, Yeats and Bowen. The term Protestant Gothic 
comes from Terry Eagleton, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger, 149. 
 
9 Yeats was the most well-known and influential figure to hold this view. Deane traces the 
impact of Yeats’s representations had on later generations in “The Literary Myths of the 
Revival,” in Celtic Revivals. 
 
10 Robbins, Upward Mobility and the Common Good, 4. 
 
11 Lisa Fluet details the anti-sociality of professionalism in “Immaterial Labors.” 
 
12 John Hayward to Frank Morley (June 1942), quoted in Heather Jordan, How Will the Heart 
Endure?: Elizabeth Bowen and the Landscape of War, 114. 
 
13 For various articulations of this view, see Judith Halberstam, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and 
the Technology of Monsters; Anne Williams, Art of Darkness: A Poetics of Gothic; and Maggie 
Kilgour, The Rise of the Gothic Novel.  For studies that trace the rise of professionalism to the 
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early modernist period, see Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society; Marx, The Modernist Novel 
and the Decline of Empire; David Trotter, Paranoid Modernism: Literary Experiment, 
Psychosis, and the Professionalization of English Society; Fluet, “Hit-Man Modernism”; and 
Amanda Anderson and Joseph Valente, eds., Disciplinarity at the Fin de Siècle. 
 
14 For another astute reading of gothic narratives as attempts to grapple with new developments 
in capitalism, see Jennifer Wicke, “Vampiric Typewriting: Dracula and Its Media.”  For a more 
local analysis of Stoker’s tale that attributes its narratives oddities to the “metrocolonial” 
condition Stoker inhabited as an Anglo-Irishman, see Valente, Dracula’s Crypt. 
 
15 For a quantitative analysis of gothic popularity in 1790-1810 and 1870-1900 see Moretti, 
Graphs, Maps, Trees, 12-20. 
 
16 Cormac Ó Gráda, Ireland: A New Economic History 1780-1939; Denis O’Hearn, The Atlantic 
Economy: Britain, the US, and Ireland; James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler 
Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939, 445. 
 
17 For a sustained analysis of “plantation modernism,” see Amy Clukey, “Plantation Modernism: 
Irish, Caribbean, and U.S. Fiction 1890-1950.” 
 
18 Kreilkamp 16-20 provides an excellent history of Anglo-Irish feudal mythology. 
 
19 Both Eagleton (Heathcliff and the Great Hunger) and Marjorie Howes (Colonial Crossings: 
Figures in Irish Literary History) argue that an appreciable urban industry did not exist in 
Ireland until the twentieth century, with the result that modernity was often localized in the 
countryside rather than in the city.  
 
20 On the role played by corporate hierarchies in developing a professional class see Perkin 17-
26. 
 
21 For a sustained analysis of the rise of protectionism across Europe and the United States see 
Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons From the Great Depression. 
 
22 Yeats attacked the statute against divorce in a speech before the Irish Seanad on June 11, 1925 
and condemned the Censorship Bill in “Censorship in Ireland.”  Beckett’s objections to the same 
measures appear in “Censorship in the Saorstat” and in his satirical novella First Love.  Patrick 
Bixby provides a thorough overview of Beckett’s hostility towards this legislation in Samuel 
Beckett and the Postcolonial Novel, 8-19.  For a survey of Anglo-Irish dissent over the governing 
of the Irish Free State, see Terence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 91-125. 
 
23 The best accounts of MacNeice and Day Lewis’s involvement in the so-called Auden coterie 
are Valentine Cunningham, British Writers of the Thirties, 12-35, and Samuel Hynes, The Auden 
Generation: Literature and Politics in England in the 1930s. 
 
24 John Xiros Cooper, Modernism and the Culture of Market Society, 246. 
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25 Peter Stanford, C Day-Lewis: A Life; Peter J. Conradi, Iris: The Life of Iris Murdoch. 
 
26 For an assessment of how faint emotions attempt to work through social impasses, see Ngai, 
esp. 1-37. 
 
27 For Bowen, “responsibility” is one of the keywords that indicate her neo-Burkean 
conservatism.  She uses it frequently in such pieces as “Eire,” “Ireland Makes Irish,” “How They 
Live in Ireland: Conquest by Cheque-Book,” and Bowen’s Court. 
 
28 In Bowen’s Court Bowen cites “the new wish in the new Irish to see Ireland autonomous” 
(160). 
 
29 Bowen’s Court has ten chapters: one introductory, one on how Colonel Henry Bowen earned 
his Irish estate (which could easily be combined with the subsequent chapter on John Bowen I as 
an account of “early settlers”), one on Bowen’s Court’s construction, and seven on these 
historical periods. 
 
30 For an extended analysis of the role that only children play in Bowen’s fiction, see Elizabeth 
Cullingford, “‘Something Else’: Gendering Onlinness in Elizabeth Bowen’s Early Fiction.” 
 
31 On the difficulty of transferring affects from the personal to the institutional, as well as the role 
of distance in constituting particular affects, see Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, 
Media and Politics; Robbins, Upward Mobility; and Robbins, “Blaming the System.” 
 
32 Jed Esty also associates Bowen’s ambivalent attitudes toward childhood with Ireland’s 
contradictory place in British imperial capitalism in Unseasonable Youth 179-94. 
 
33 Eliot’s most articulate explanation of cultural continuity appears in “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent.”  Nicholas Allen documents how cultural cycles provided Yeats with a sense 
of stability in his Vision in Modernism, Ireland, and Civil War, 66-88. 
 
34 See Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island. 
 
35 See, for example, Alan Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State.” 
 
36 In this regard, Keynes embodies what Arjo Klamer terms a “modernist” theory of economics 
in its preference for abstract accounts over detailed studies of historical and institutions processes 
(“Modernism in Economics”). 
 
37 E.g. Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1632) and René Descartes Traité de 
l’Homme (1664), both of whom had borrowed the term from ancient philosophy (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 178n3).  Though most popular in the early modern period, the term “animal spirits” was 
still in frequent popular usage in the 1870’s. 
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38 “It is the great fault of symbolical pseudo-mathematical methods of formalising a system of 
economic analysis…that they expressly assume strict independence between the factors involved 
and lose all their cogency and authority if this hypothesis is disallowed” (General Theory, 297).  
Keynes details the specifics of trying to substitute mathematical models of limited certainty for 
inherent unanalyzable phenomena in his Treatise on Probablility, which, as Jennifer Wicke notes 
of Keynes’ work generally, is skeptical of realist or rationalist representations of the market 
(“Mrs. Dalloway Goes to Market: Woolf, Keynes, and Modern Markets”). 
 
39 Christine Froula argues that Freud’s thoughts on civilization were indispensible to the 
Habermasian-style arena of dissent that dominated the Bloombury Group’s own theorization of 
civilization (Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury Avant-Garde). 
 
40 Though not strictly speaking a division of Bloomsbury, the Memoir Club counted among its 
members most of the artists and intellectuals who had been associated with Bloomsbury in the 
first decades of the century, including Leonard and Virginia Woolf, Keynes, Lytton Strachey, 
Desmond McCarthy, and Clive and Vanessa Bell. 
 
41 For an analysis of Keynes’s move away from individualism, see Jed Esty’s work on Keynesian 
economics and the “national object” in A Shrinking Island, 166-82. 
 
42 The connection between emotion and mass psychology has been especially prevalent in 
critical discussion of the emergence of popular cinema in the first half of the twentieth century.  
For a representative study, see Michael Tratner, Crowd Scenes: Movies and Mass Politics. 
 
43 In Strange Country, Seamus Deane notes how elitist writers with fascist inclinations like Yeats 
(and Wyndham Lewis could also be included here) represented the working class as an unruly 
mass whose atavistic emotions needed to be controlled lest they tear about the rational public 
sphere.   
 
44 As Tratner explains, the Keynesian turn departed from Victorian political economy in its 
emphasis on the beneficial consequences of spending versus saving (Deficits and Desires 3-7). 
 
45 As Esty observes, Keynes was more interested in communal wealth than individual profit: 
“The General Theory proposes a return to more stable and fixed relationships between capital 
and plant, between enterprise and investor.  By slowing down the velocity of exchange in  
modern stocks and bonds, Keynes wants to create an investment system that is based more on 
communal wealth than on individual profit” (171). 
 
46 For an explanation of the three-tier model of class, see David Cannadine, The Rise and Fall of 
Class in Britain. 
 
47 Nicola Humble documents the convergence of these two classes in The Feminine Middlebrow, 
57-108. 
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48 Negri is particularly adamant that “employment” is a cipher for proletariat in “Keynes and the 
Capitalist Theory of the State.” 
 
49 Pigou argues this point in Industrial Fluctuations (1927), which claims that the fluctuations of 
commodity prices and of the expectations of profits cause “wave-like swings in the mind of the 
business world between errors of optimism and errors of pessimism” (397). 
 
50 Amariglio and Ruccio, in their “postmodernist” reading of Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, 
note how uncertainty about the future is mitigated in Keynes’ work through the construction of a 
discursive set of economic conventions (Keynes, Knowledge, and Uncertainty). 
 
51 There is a whole literature on Keynes and probability that deals with his differentiation 
between those things which we can and cannot predict with certainty.  I do not have the space 
here to go into this topic at any length, but for some of the more thorough and insightful analyses 
of Keynesian probability, see B. W. Bateman, “Keynes’s Changing Conception of Probability”; 
T. Lawson, “Uncertainty and Economic Analysis”; and R. M. O’Donnell, Keynes, Philosophy, 
and Economics. 
 
52 Keynes claimed that, not being “one of the working class” himself, the Labour Party held no 
place for him (“Am I a Liberal?” 185).  Though the Labour Party certainly disagreed with 
Keynes’s belief that it was a class-bound party, this view nevertheless prevented him from 
embracing the Labour Party during the ’20s and ’30s. 
 
53 The resemblance to the Fabian policy of “permeation” is far from coincidental.  Keynes’s 
defense of a professional elite brought his theories quite close to those of the Fabians, as did his 
interests in liberalism and the welfare state.  For a useful comparison of the economic thinking of 
the Fabian Society and the Bloomsbury Group, see Adam Trexler, “Economic Ideas and British 
Literature, 1900-1930.” 
 
54 On the end of Liberalism after World War I and its aesthetic consequences, see Vincent 
Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism.  On Keynes’s connections to Eton and 
Cambridge, see Pierre Mini, Keynes, Bloomsbury and the General Theory.   
 
55 The so-called Angry Young Men of the 1950s (John Osborne, Kingsley Amis, and Alan 
Sillitoe, among others) were perhaps the most vocal critics among British writers of the 
limitations of the postwar welfare state (Peter Kalliney, Cities of Affluence and Anger). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
FROM THE PLAASROMAN TO NEOMODERNISM: J. M. COETZEE AND FORMALIST 
HISTORY 
 
 
In 1991, during the first years of the post-Cold War new world order and the final years 
of apartheid, the South African writer J. M. Coetzee presented a lecture in Graz, Austria, entitled 
“What Is a Classic?”  Alluding to T. S. Eliot’s 1944 lecture of the same title,1 Coetzee’s speech 
sets out to answer what appears to be a fairly straightforward question: how, and why, does a 
classic “speak” to its admirers?  How can we explain the way in which artistic objects seem to 
transport their audiences beyond themselves, through a species of aesthetic ecstasy, to a time and 
place not their own?   
Over the course of the talk, Coetzee reflects movingly on his first exposure to Bach’s 
Well-Tempered Clavier, recalling how “As long as the music lasted, I was frozen, I dared not 
breathe.  I was being spoken to by music as music had never spoken to me before” (9).  Feeling 
the first twinges of artistic consciousness, Coetzee experiences what he calls “a moment of 
revelation…of the greatest significance in my life: for the first time I was undergoing the impact 
of the classic” (10).  For Coetzee, there are two different critical lenses through which this 
moment can be read:  
The question that I put to myself, somewhat crudely, is this: is there some non-
vacuous sense in which I can say that the spirit of Bach was speaking to me across 
the ages, across the seas, putting before me certain ideals; or was what was really 
going on at that moment that I was symbolically electing high European culture, 
and commands of the codes of that culture, as a route that would take me out of 
my class position in white South African society and ultimately out of what I must 
have felt, in terms however obscured or mystified, as an historical dead end…? 
(11).   
 253	  
 
The problem facing Coetzee is that neither of these alternatives is altogether palatable.  
On the one hand, the transcendental reading captures the rapture he felt upon first hearing Bach, 
but also associates him with a discredited Eliotic project of conservative nation- and culture-
building.  On the other hand, the “socio-cultural” debunking of art’s transcendental qualities 
demystifies his ecstatic consumption of the Well-Tempered Clavier as mere economic self-
interest (8).  Much like Bowen’s reading of Anglo-Irish decadence as a felix culpa laying the 
foundation for their future renaissance, Coetzee acknowledges that the reinvention of a dying 
class (white South Africa) may be a motivating force behind his response to Bach.  But he 
remains reluctant to either divorce himself from this class-consolidating process or to naively 
defend art as a preserve free from social or political content.  Poetic ecstasy may be a cipher for 
class distinction, as Pierre Bourdieu has long argued,2 but does this mean that such transports are 
by definition “false”?  Is a “socio-cultural” methodology possible that could read ecstatic 
transcendence as something other than false consciousness?  That could, for instance, read 
ecstatic transcendence as delineating something like a transhistorical sociology, one in which 
ecstasy identified and consolidated particular social groups across time and space? 
As with all of Coetzee’s writings, the lecture’s self-reflexivity lends an added dimension 
to these questions.  In order to dramatize the impasse between “socio-cultural” analysis and 
ecstatic transports, Coetzee calls attention to the parallel between his own encounter with Bach 
and Eliot’s response to Virgil and Dante in his own “What Is a Classic?” lecture.  Like Coetzee, 
Eliot “leave[s] the door open to the suggestion that Virgil was being used by an agency greater 
than himself for a purpose of which he could not have been aware”: namely, a “Western 
Christian civilization” that transcends texts’ moment of production and allows them to “bear the 
weight of having read into it a meaning for Eliot’s own age” (5).  Here, the poetic ecstasy 
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Coetzee felt toward Bach is formalized within a modernist ideal of culture.  According to Eliot, 
because culture creates timeless, mythic forms that draw together an otherwise incoherent 
amalgamation of nations, languages, and classes, it frees one from one’s immediate social 
environment.  As Coetzee stresses, there is a highly self-interested component to this definition 
of culture: by resituating culture “within a specific…brand of internationalism or 
cosmopolitanism,” Eliot can “redefine and resituate nationality in such a way that he…could not 
be sidelined as an American cultural arriviste” (6-7).  In other words, a transcendentalist 
understanding of culture allows Eliot to forge new national and transnational communities 
(English, Western, Christian) even as it encodes those new communities within a conservative, 
patriarchal, and elitist philosophy. 
Coetzee acknowledges that his own ecstatic reaction to Bach may replay Eliot’s 
conservative modernism – that, much like the neoclassical composers who, for Germanic-
nationalist reasons, revived Bach in the early nineteenth century, his ecstasy may be a 
neomodernist appropriation of Eliotic transcendentalism.  But surprisingly, this reverberation 
between Eliot’s modernism and Coetzee’s own aesthetic inclinations actually enables him to 
reconcile poetic ecstasy and “socio-cultural analysis” under the category of professional 
criticism.  The classic, he suggests, “speaks” to him as a professional artist whose vocational 
interests align him with a long line of other artists who, like Eliot, have “tested” the classic and 
found it valuable.  The classic is therefore “social” not in the sense that it joins him to a 
conservative faction of Eurocentric aesthetes; rather, the classic is “social” because it brings him 
into contact with “hundreds of thousands of intelligences before me” that have felt the same 
ecstatic communion with the classic and have fashioned it into a professional criterion for artistic 
merit (18-19).   The feeling of transcendence that was suspect when viewed from the totalizing, 
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European perspective of Eliot becomes rehabilitated, according to Coetzee, when it is understood 
as a limited transhistorical movement joining a professional community together “across the 
ages.”  Listening to Bach carries Coetzee beyond his own time and place, but only insofar as that 
transcendence is itself socio-culturally determined as the product of a distinct class that has 
persisted across a number of different time periods. 
This chapter takes Coetzee’s rehabilitation of modernist ecstasy as its starting point in 
tracing the contours of a late apartheid historiographic project centered on literature, language, 
and historical repetition.  Navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of quasi-religious 
aesthetic autonomy and sociological demystification, Coetzee’s lecture outlines a class of 
professional artists drawn together by the force of certain objects (art, language, modernity) 
rather than through social, geographic, or temporal proximity.  Implicit in this formulation is a 
sense of art and class as mediums for one another, the former shaping a transhistorical class of 
professional intellectuals around itself while the latter translates art into Art, the mundane into 
the classic.  I am more interested in the first half of this movement than the second: that is, with 
how the medium of art enables Coetzee to imagine a class of professional critics who would not 
be bound by the limitations of time and place, but who would still demonstrate a common 
vocation, one that speaks to a discontinuous – but still very present – historical trajectory outside 
the modes of causation familiar to historical studies proper.  But we also need to be attentive to 
the doubling of media that takes place in Coetzee’s lecture: professionals determine what 
artworks are passed down to posterity, while those professionals become a Europeanized 
intelligentsia through their common interest in art.  Art mediates life, while life mediates art. 
The significance of Coetzee’s gestures toward historical analysis becomes apparent when 
we place them within the context of the literary-critical and economic atmosphere of late 
 256	  
apartheid (1970-1994) South Africa.  As I show in the first section of this chapter, Coetzee was 
far from the only writer in 1970s South Africa to seize on modernism as a means of avoiding the 
obstacles presented by “realist” historicisms: Lewis Nkosi, Njabulo Ndebele, André Brink, 
Nadine Gordimer, and Etienne van Heerden, among others, all embraced modernist techniques 
for their ability to circumvent what was to white South Africans the self-evidence of apartheid’s 
social structure and to imagine new, more equitable living arrangements.  Joycean internal 
monologue, Falkernian perspectivism, surrealist poetics, and Beckettian solipsism become tools 
in these writers’ fiction for expanding representation beyond apartheid’s totalizing racial 
epistemology.  However, as Fredric Jameson stresses in A Singular Modernity, to value 
modernism as the “inner dynamic of perpetual innovation, which – like the restless and 
irrepressible expansion of capitalism itself – necessarily pushes ever further beyond its own 
boundaries, into new ‘techniques’ as well as new kinds of content” – to make this critical move, 
even (or perhaps especially) in an ethically-motivated attention to a democratic future, risks 
validating (and normalizing) a teleological understanding of history as endless modernization 
(151). 
But the turn of South African writing toward modernism in the 1970s had less to do with 
an implicit endorsement of the steady tide of capitalist modernization than with the specifics of 
how a global transition from Fordist industrialism to a post-Fordist “language economy” was 
experienced in South Africa.  Emerging in the 1970s as a response to economic stagnation and 
workers’ complaints against the deadening routine of factory labor, the “language economy” 
promised to “free” workers from the factory’s intellectually- and affectively-limiting 
environment by training them for seemingly self-motivated communication work, or what Robert 
Reich has called the “symbolic-analytic services” of “problem-solving” and “strategic brokering” 
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(The Work of Nations, 117).  As Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello argue, these services both 
internalized modernism’s critique of industrial production within the logic of capitalism itself 
through the strategic adaptation of key modernist concepts – freedom, autonomy, individualism – 
and overcame the exhaustion of Fordist mass production by paving the way for a more flexible, 
network-driven, and communicative form of production (The New Spirit of Capitalism).  But 
unlike the European nations Boltanski and Chiapello investigate, in South Africa international 
economic sanctions against the apartheid regime stalled the transition from Fordism to a post-
Fordist language economy, cutting the (white) business community off from the global finance 
and service sectors driving the language economy.  This placed South Africa in a singular 
position: on the one hand, as the final bastion of the institutionalized segregation that Mahmood 
Mamdani associates with European imperialism in Africa,3 the modernist language of liberation 
continued to hold sway in South Africa during the final decades of apartheid, years after it had 
seemed to evaporate in the wake of May 1968;4 on the other hand, that very language clearly 
beckoned to an emerging services-oriented economy that still demonstrated the gendered, 
racialized, and geographic divisions of wealth against which the Communist-inspired 
antiapartheid movement was fighting. 
This paradox, I suggest, is the same one Coetzee is struggling to unravel in his “What Is a 
Classic?” lecture: how can the language of modernism be harnessed to both a transcendent realm 
of aesthetic or political liberation and an instrumental one of situated economic life?  One place 
where we can begin to look for a solution to this conundrum is in Coetzee’s parodic reworkings 
of the Afrikaner plaasroman.  As Coetzee and other South African writers turned away in the 
1970s from political liberalism and toward more radical investigations of representation and 
social convention, they began to treat language and genre less as passive tools for art than as 
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objects with their own histories.  As I show in the following pages, South African neomodernists 
understood the plaasroman as a sort of sedimented history – that is, as a set of formal 
conventions that both represented and consolidated certain racial, social, and economic 
hierarchies.  According to Coetzee in particular, the plaasroman’s central figure was mediation: 
its 1930s variants effaced the mediations the South African farm was performing between 
racialized labor hierarchies and laissez-faire free markets, while its neomodernist 1970s variants 
dramatized their translations between, on the one hand, metropolitan theory and modernist style, 
and, on the other hand, national liberation movements and deadening, poorly-paid labor.  For 
Coetzee, this generic continuity provides the basis for what he calls a “rivalrous” mode of 
history, one in which fiction’s formal operations demonstrate their own, repetitive temporality.  
History, that is, becomes in Coetzee’s plaasroman less a passage from one stage to another than 
a series of mediations repeating across different times (the 1930s/1970s), uniting distant persons, 
like the artwork in his “What Is A Classic?” lecture, into a transhistorical professional 
community of mediators. 
Within this historical imaginary, ecstasy acts at one and the same time as a mediator 
between discrete racial, economic, and aesthetic systems and as a historical tool abstracting away 
from these mediations and illustrating their formal continuities with other types of mediation.  As 
such, I argue that it can be used to construct an alternative genealogy for how post-Fordist 
globalization happened.  Where most theorists consider globalization as a process that began in 
the service sectors of Europe and North America and gradually imposed its logic on other 
nations and industries,5 Coetzee’s formalist history shows how, for certain classes, spaces, and 
even genres, mediation is a continuous raison d’etre.  As I have been arguing throughout this 
study, this sort of mediation is what distinguishes the semiperiphery from core and peripheral 
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notions of modernity.  By contextualizing Coetzee’s fiction and criticism within the global post-
Fordist turn, then, we can construct a representation of South African history in which modernity 
is something always passing through the space of the South African farm, but never present to it.  
 
The Modernist Turn in South African Literature 
To speak of a modernist “turn” in South Africa flirts, perhaps, with overemphasizing 
what was doubtless a relatively small movement in late apartheid literature.  Literary historians 
from Michael Chapman (Southern African Literatures) to Stephen Gray (“Some Problems of 
Writing Historiography”) to Louise Bethlehem (“A Primary Need as Strong as Hunger”) have 
documented how the political urgency to mobilize public opinion against apartheid nurtured 
conventional realist forms such as the documentary and the literature of witness, which together 
constituted the majority of the literary productions (especially among black writers) during the 
apartheid period.  But while neomodernist writings were smaller in number than their realist 
counterparts, the very fact that experimental literature was being produced at all signaled a 
decisive break from the previous three decades of South African literature.  In the wake of Roy 
Campbell and William Plomer’s Voorslag magazine and B. Wallet Vilakazi and H. I. E. 
Dhlomo’s contemporaneous efforts to fashion new meters and rhyme schemes within isiZulu 
poetry, South African fiction was dominated by realist forms – most notably, by the energetic, 
edgy accounts of black urban culture contained in Drum magazine, and by Alan Paton’s liberal 
novels.6 Compared to these stylistically conventional pieces, the 1970s witnessed a veritable 
explosion of experimental literature: André Brink’s A Chain of Voices (1982), with its 
Faulknerian experiments with point of view; Breyten Breytenbach’s surrealist poetics in Lotus 
and In Other Words; Njabulo Ndebele’s translation of Joycean internal monologue into isiZulu; 
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and Coetzee’s adaptation of Beckettian monologue in Dusklands (1974) and In the Heart of the 
Country (1977).7 Furthermore, this experimental turn was even more noteworthy for taking place 
during the height of apartheid, at a time when stylistic novelty was being asked to defer to 
accessibility and political engagement.  If, as Nadine Gordimer observes, writers were 
increasingly regarded as “mouth-pieces” for “ideals” that “demand the sacrifice of everything to 
the struggle put up on the side of free men,” why should so many writers at this exact moment 
veer away from realism (“A Writer’s Freedom,” 106)? 
The case for modernist experimentalism was made most provocatively by Lewis Nkosi, 
who in a 1967 article entitled “Fiction by Black South Africans” scathingly attacked the writings 
of several prominent black South African writers (Richard Rive, Bloke Modisane, Ezaekiel 
Mphahlele, and Alex La Guma) as “journalistic fact parading outrageously as imaginative 
literature” that failed to coalesce into “artistically persuasive works of fiction” (222).  Nkosi 
would temper his aggressive stance as years went by, and his more nuanced account in 
“Postmodernism and Black Writing in South Africa” is perhaps more representative of his goals 
for South African literature.  Using Amos Tutuola’s Palm-Wine Drinkard (1952) as an 
exemplary text, Nkosi observes how Tutuola’s text develops a modernist aesthetic out of the 
animating conditions of its own history and culture, and not through a derivative translation of 
European techniques.  The Palm-Wine Drinkard is “an amalgam of styles and genres, neither 
strictly a novel nor a traditional novel, but a heterogeneous blending of folk-tale, heroic 
adventure, and dilemma tale, moral fable, quest romance, discourses on law, finance, and 
commerce, a perplexing potpourri of symbolic codes and languages cutting across any strict 
generic boundaries and cultures” (85).8 According to Nkosi, in other words, African modernism, 
though not of the modernist moment or directly imitating Joyce and Woolf’s representations of 
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modern subjectivity or the self-conscious bricolage of Eliot’s Waste Land, ventures outside of a 
confining realism whose main referent seems to be political discourse rather than artistic merit.9 
As the 1970s and 1980s wore on, several writers echoed Nkosi’s thoughts on modernism 
and South African literature, though rarely with the same vehemence or stark dismissal of 
realism.  Njabulo Ndebele complained that a sensationalistic focus on the “spectacle” of 
apartheid produced “an art of anticipated surfaces rather than one of processes” and urged writers 
to “rediscover the ordinary” through a renewed focus on the surprising details of popular 
experience (“Turkish Tales,” 45; “Rediscovery of the Ordinary,” 143, 152).  Though more 
guarded about making pronouncements as to what black writers should or should not do, Nadine 
Gordimer also tried to suture her own experimental leanings onto more popular forms of black 
literature by subordinating both realism and experimentalism to a part-Marxist, part-Romantic 
theory of history.10  For Gordimer, the “essential gesture” of writing is its “transformation of 
experience,” a definition that enables her to regard critical realism within a modernist rubric of 
innovation and artistic sensibility without necessarily requiring formal experimentation (“The 
Essential Gesture,” 298).  Where modernists seek “to transform the world by style,” 
demonstrating their “responsibility … to human destiny” by way of an Adornian refusal “to be 
morally useful to the community,” realists “truthfully describe” “the complex, contradictory 
nature of historical evidence” through “the re-establishing of meanings” (296; quoting Sontag, 
“Approaching Artaud,” 15, in the middle quote; 299, 295). 
One might question whether Gordimer simply relocates the infamous division between 
European experimentalism and African realism on a higher level, uniting realism and modernism 
only to emphasize the broader significance of European art, its universal message not answerable 
“to any local cell of humanity” (297).  But while acknowledging the cultural conservatism 
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intermingled here with radical politics – a combination we can also see in Nkosi’s venomous 
dismissal of “the breadline asceticism” of “petty realism” and in Coetzee’s appeal to the canon-
forming “classic” in “What Is a Classic?” – I want to set aside this issue for the moment in order 
to focus on why modernism held such a potent ideological weight for antiapartheid writers 
during this period. 
By far the most important impetus to anti-mimetic representational techniques was South 
Africa’s realist epistemology of racial categorization, which sought to assign racial labels based 
entirely on outward appearance and observable social habits.  Unlike the pre-Civil Rights era 
United States’ system of racial classification, which used the percentage of one’s ancestry to 
determine race, South Africa’s 1950 Population Registration Act appealed to “the judgment of 
society – conventions which have grown up for the hundreds of years we have been here…The 
intention of the legislature was…that the classification of a person should be made according to 
the views held by the members of that community” (House of Assembly Debates [HAD], March 
17, 1967).  The reasons for this more “commonsense,” unscientific definition of race were 
complex, mostly having to do with the inordinate cost that research into citizens’ ancestry would 
entail and misgivings over the racial purity of white lineages, many of whom had interbred with 
black Africans in the early days of settlement when white women were scarce.11 (“Which of the 
honorable members,” questioned one MP, “is prepared to say that he knows of no white person 
in South Africa who has no tinge of non-European blood somewhere?” [HAD, March 17, 1967]).  
What this meant in practice was that “ordinary untrained” census workers were tasked with 
classifying people’s race based on whether they were “generally accepted” as “white,” “native,” 
or “Coloured”: where one lived, one’s religion and customs (e.g. whether one paid lobolo [the 
“bride price”] or not), one’s level of education, and, of course, one’s physical appearance all 
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contributed to what race one “was” (HAD, March 13, 1950; Population Registration Act, Section 
1 [xv]).  Significantly, this classification scheme assumed that visible habits – not just skin color, 
but a whole social environment of customs, education, and labor – made race immediately 
detectable as a category to the “untrained” eye, and that this recognition in turn fixed a person’s 
racial designation into an immutable essence.  In contrast to the invasive medical exams of the 
pre-apartheid period, which had used the pigmentation, shape, and size of genitalia to determine 
race, apartheid classifications assumed that anyone could “see” race.  If race mirrored one’s 
environment, that environment was clear for all to see, resting as it did on the conventions 
binding society together.12 
Apartheid racial classifications were therefore “realist” in the sense that they valued 
empirical, intuitive perceptions as a means for moving seamlessly between multiple levels of 
description, from the body to the community to a formalized epistemology of race.  For 
antiapartheid writers, then, modernist experimentation provided one logical solution to this 
constraining classification system.  For example, Coetzee’s evasive narration in Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983) and Foe (1986) withholds key details en route to establishing an ethic of 
limited knowledge that would outflank apartheid’s totalizing epistemological claims: Michael K 
refuses to disclose its eponymous protagonist’s race (he appears to be a “Cape Coloured”); Foe 
demurs from representing Friday’s speech or disclosing the source to his silence (Has his tongue 
been cut out, as Cruso suggests?  Is he mute?  Does he “speak” in a nonverbal language?).13 A 
similar strategy can be discerned in André Brink’s A Chain of Voices, where the interweaving of 
the partial viewpoints of the slave-owning van der Merwe family with those of their slaves 
produces an ecological philosophy of sociality in which, in the words of Ma-Rose, “all together 
yet all apart, all different yet all the same; and the separate links may lie but the chain is the 
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truth” (441); or in the work of Black Consciousness writers like Steve Biko and Muthobi 
Mutloatse, who aimed to “kick and push and pull and drag literature into the form we prefer” in 
order to free themselves from the mental slavery imposed on them by white characterizations of 
black Africans, pro-apartheid and liberal alike (Mutloase 5). 
Implicit in these experimentations with form was a dialectic of provocation and punitive 
response between writers and the state censors who struggled to enclose fictional representations 
within the social imaginary of apartheid.  The series of censorship bills that culminated in the 
1975 South African Publications Act had banned texts that were deemed to be “indecent or 
obscene or offensive to public morals” – in effect, novels, journalism, and images that depicted 
interracial sex, acts of terrorism against the South African state, or critiques of apartheid (Van 
Rooyen 7).  The result, among creative writers, was a polarization between those who openly 
courted the wrath of the censors (the Black Consciousness writers, protest fiction, Brink’s 
Looking on Darkness14), viewing provocation as the most direct route to social change, and those 
who, in Coetzee’s words, cultivated a language of “euphemism” that sought to speak against 
apartheid within the vocabulary dictated by the South African censors (Giving Offense, 35).15 As 
the 1970s wore on, the limitations of this scenario became quite apparent: either one courted the 
political capital following from censorship, in which case one ceded to the apartheid censor the 
authority to deem what was and was not engaged literature; or one tried to outpace the censor by 
admitting censorship’s sovereignty over the common meanings of language and developing 
instead a language of euphemistic indirection.  At the same time, as Coetzee observes, 
censorship implies that “real assaults have taken place, not only on moral norms and indeed on 
norms of human conduct, but on the limits of representation itself, or at least the idea that 
representation must have limits” (Giving Offense, 30).  In his analysis, neomodernist 
 265	  
experimentalism acts as censorship’s obverse twin, broadening the scope of representations even 
as censorship tries to encase them within a rigid set of moralized parameters.  By disrupting the 
very logic on which censorship is grounded, modernism offers an escape from the double-bind of 
provocation and evasion overdetermining apartheid-era writing: the expansion of representation 
beyond the narrow realism of apartheid legal discourse clears a space for new “fictions of 
[human] dignity” to emerge without becoming embroiled in a circular cycle of protest and 
punishment (14). 
We are very close here to the form of qualified transcendence that Coetzee champions in 
his “What Is a Classic?” lecture, one in which the anti-presentist modality of art – its ability to 
reverberate across time and to intuit everyday phenomena rendered invisible by realist 
techniques of perception and representation – is harnessed to a historically-rooted sociopolitical 
project.  But while this understanding of formal innovation has informed many defenses of the 
“late modernist” aesthetics of Coetzee in particular,16 it does so by reproducing terms long 
associated with a more conservative strain of modernism: art’s “freedom” from a fallen world of 
rationalized labor and instrumental reason (modern industrialism, apartheid), its ability to 
transcend the limitations of history and language through the creation of new forms, and its 
ability to forge new national and transnational communities through the force of mythopoesis.  
As Jameson notes in A Singular Modernity, these very attributes allowed modernist formalism to 
be institutionalized “as a specifically North American cultural imperialism” within the U.S. 
academy and art world (167-8).17 The question this leaves us with, then, is to what extent this 
cultural conservatism is accidental to South African neomodernism, a lingering remnant of an 
older modernist vocabulary, and to what extent it is fundamental to the claims being made on 
behalf of democracy, racial solidarity, and economic equality by antiapartheid writers? 
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This intersection of political radicalism and cultural conservatism is especially apparent 
in Anglo-South African writers’ retellings of their first exposure to modernism.18 English-
language schooling in apartheid-era South Africa was still heavily based on a British imperial 
curriculum that emphasized early modern, Romantic, and Victorian over modernist writing.  
Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Dickens, and George Eliot were the key figures in secondary literary 
education, while the Leavisite university curriculum found a place for Lawrence and T. S. Eliot’s 
philosophical aesthetics but not for the linguistic experimentations of a Joyce or Woolf.19  As 
Derek Attridge observes, “the pleasure I took in Joyce’s works…stemmed in large part from 
their resistance to the literary model I had been schooled in” (Joyce Effects, 4).  Coetzee’s early 
admiration for Ezra Pound echoes Attridge’s sense that modernism resisted contemporary critical 
orthodoxies rather than constituting them (as it did, for example, in the postwar American 
academy).20 At the same time, his detached third-person narration of this admiration in his 
autobiography Youth ironizes his juvenile belief in the anti-establishment radicalism of 
conservative writers like Pound and Eliot: “His passion for Pound is shared by only one of his 
friends…Eliot and Pound have lived lives of sorrow and sometimes of ignominy…Like Pound 
and Eliot, he must be prepared to endure all that life has stored up for him, even if that means 
exile, obscure labour, and obloquy” (20).  Clearly parodying Stephen Dedalus’s heroic self-
image at the close of Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (“I will try to express myself 
in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defense the 
only arms I allow myself to use, silence, exile, and cunning”), Youth suggests that the 
disengaged, abstracting qualities of modernism – those same aspects which enabled it to be 
disaggregated from its early twentieth century social context and ensconced as depoliticized 
“individual expression” in the Cold War United States – also provided a means for South African 
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artists to negate apartheid’s deadening social and intellectual environment.  As Europe does in 
Joyce’s Portrait, Attridge and Coetzee’s modernist pantheon supplies a defamiliarizing set of 
stylistic techniques whose claim to transcendence seems to derive as much from their dissonance 
with postwar South Africa as from any inherently transcendental quality.  But with regard to 
form itself, this difference is indistinguishable: whether one is an arch conservative like Eliot or 
an antiapartheid writer like Coetzee, neomodernist practices employ the same abstracting lexicon 
present in modernist conservatism. 
That the resonance between antiapartheid politics and modernist abstraction was most 
directly articulated by Anglo-South Africans is certainly not accidental.  The quote with which I 
began this chapter hypothesized that apartheid was a “dead end” for white (“liberal,” we might 
add) South Africans like Coetzee, and that Eliotic modernism supplied a way out of this 
historical impasse.  We can now specify this attraction to a greater degree: modernism’s 
formalist abstraction enabled Anglo-South African writers to venture outside a constraining 
environment of simultaneous privilege and dissent.  As Coetzee remarks, to young colonials “the 
high culture of the metropolis may arrive in the form of powerful experiences which cannot, 
however, be embedded in their lives in any obvious way, and which seem therefore to have their 
existence in some transcendent realm” (“What is a Classic?” 7).  The point here is not simply 
that European culture has been christened High Culture for so long that it has stagnated into an 
abstract universal.  Rather, Coetzee’s reflections suggest that Anglo-South Africans’ social, 
economic, and cultural distance from Europe fashions all responses to European culture products 
into abstract feelings, and that disenfranchised aesthetes can escape from reified social groups by 
“resituating nationality within a specific…brand of internationalism,” as Eliot does (7).  Indeed, 
the utopian element Attridge and Coetzee find in formalism seizes on and reverses this cultural 
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transmission from metropole to periphery: just as Eliot, Pound, and Joyce draw antiapartheid 
Anglo writers into a professional academic community, so too might neomodernist formalism 
produce new communities of its own, communities which would escape the deadlock of 
privileged complicity and potential marginalization in a democratic South Africa. 
However, as Coetzee and Attridge’s debts to an Anglo-South African education system 
and access to metropolitan literature imply, the belief that new communities could be forged 
through formalist aesthetics was a highly class-bound phenomenon.  Why, we might ask, should 
formalism emerge as a rallying cry in this particular site (the South African semiperiphery) and 
among this particular class (Anglo-educated white South Africans)?  What was formalism’s 
social effectivity in these contexts?  I pursue these questions in the following two sections by 
turning to Coetzee’s most overtly modernist novel: In the Heart of the Country. 
 
The Neomodernist Politics of Ecstasy: J. M. Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country 
 Before we can say with any certainty what ideological work formalism performed for 
Anglo-educated South Africans, we first need to specify what neomodernism entailed in practice.  
Coetzee’s early career is an ideal site to do so for several reasons.  In the first place, no South 
African writer has been more tightly associated with modernist aesthetics than J. M. Coetzee.  
David Attwell, Derek Attridge, and Neil Lazarus have all labeled him with some variation on the 
moniker “late modernist” (often on the basis of his critical interest in Samuel Beckett, Franz 
Kafka, and Robert Musil); while Coetzee’s early fiction (Dusklands, In the Heart of the Country) 
openly parades its debts to a modernist-inflected French existentialism.  According to Attridge, 
for example, Coetzee “does not merely employ but extends and revitalizes modernist practices, 
and in doing so develops a mode of writing that allows the attentive reader to live through the 
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pressures and possibilities, and also the limits, of political engagement” (J. M. Coetzee and the 
Ethics of Reading, 6).  At the same time, if the label “late modernist” conjures up images of 
colonial belatedness, Coetzee often deploys modernist techniques with an eye toward recent 
academic, intellectual, and economic trends. (A fact that, in turn, may account for his popularity 
in the American academy.)  Foucault, Lacan, and Barthes all make thinly-veiled appearances in 
his novels: literally undertaking an “archaeology of knowledge,” the Magistrate in Waiting for 
the Barbarians excavates indecipherable barbarians hieroglyphs for his amateur amusement; in 
In the Heart of the Country, Magda’s father’s explicitly allegorizes the Lacanian “law of the 
father” through his patriarchal demands and confining grammatical norms; and Coetzee’s (often 
female) narrators revel in self-referential language games, concretizing the “pleasure of the text” 
into sexual urges. 
 Many critics have noted Coetzee’s interest in poststructural linguistics, from Teresa 
Dovey’s The Novels of J.M. Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories (the first monograph published on 
Coetzee) to Attridge and Michael Marais’s more recent work on his writings.21 But the 
professional literary, academic, and business communities with which these concerns have 
associated him have rarely been discussed in detail.  Coetzee’s first exposure to poststructuralist 
philosophy came as a graduate student and English professor in the U.S. academy, where he 
specialized in the generative-transformational linguistics popularized by Noam Chomsky.  With 
work ranging from analyses of the “middle voice” to grammatical tenses in Kafka,22 his criticism 
honed in on linguistic rules as one way of thinking through inequitable social hierarchies.  His 
most extensive engagement with this topic was his doctoral thesis at the University of Texas-
Austin, which employed a computer-generated stylistic analysis of Beckett’s fiction. 
Significantly, this project combined Coetzee’s prior job as a computer programmer with his new 
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profession.  “There seemed to be something in the air,” recalls Coetzee, “a possibility that 
linguistics, mathematics, and textual analysis might be brought together in some vague way” 
(Doubling the Point, 26).  Whether or not this promise was ever realized is debatable, but it does 
point to Coetzee’s familiarity with a Euro-American economy in which language was playing an 
increasing central role.  On the one hand, the computing industry valued proficiency in 
communication and the ability to perform what Robert Reich has called “symbolic-analytic 
services” – the “immaterial labors” of “problem-solving” and “strategic brokering” (Empire, 
291).  On the other hand, left-wing academics were also turning to language in order to contest 
the way in which computing technologies enabled employers to trim their workforces, in 
particular via a finance capitalism that divorced profits from production.  Deleuze and Guattari, 
the Italian post-operaismos (Christian Marazzi, Paolo Virno, “Bifo,” and Antonio Negri), 
Barthes, and even, in a more abstract vein, Derrida all characterized language as, to quote 
Berardi, “the primary tool for the production of value.”23 
 If modernism is a key interlocutor for Coetzee, then, it is one that he articulates with and 
through a post-Fordist move away from industrialism and toward language.  Under post-
Fordism, and particularly among academics devoted to the linguistic turn, linguistic 
experimentation and proficiency were no longer simply avenues to cultural production, as they 
had been in the modernist period, but now were understood to be capable of explaining social 
life – history, anthropology, sociology, and, of course, capitalism.  The Coetzee we see in this 
context differs markedly from the one habitually presented to us in academic criticism: the 
rarefied, existentialist theorist of the human condition, the Coetzee whose imbrication with 
economics is usually limited to an Adornian critique of literature’s resistance to instrumental 
reason.24 Instead, Coetzee’s professional attachments to both computing services and the 
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academic “linguistic turn” allow us to see how central modernist tropes and technical devices 
functioned within a “globalizing” capitalist world-system.  How, for example, did formalist 
interrogations of the medium look when they were placed against the abstractions of computer 
programming?  Or against poststructuralist philosophy, with its long line of modernist 
aficionados, from Derrida to Cixous?  Moreover, since Coetzee deployed these neomodernist 
techniques against a South African backdrop in his fiction, we might ask how the passage from 
metropolitan universities to peripheral settings transformed such linguistic projects, as well as 
what insight these changes might hold as to how globalization was understood structurally and 
historically in South Africa. 
 In the Heart of the Country (1976), Coetzee’s second novel, is particularly well-suited for 
this task.  We have already seen in chapter 1 that the South African farm teetered between 
metropolitan markets and peripheral production, making the farm novel an ideal site through 
which to trace the collision between discrepant economic systems.  In addition, more than any 
other of his novels, In the Heart of the Country mimics modernist techniques (i.e., the Beckettian 
monologue) and actively resists being drawn into a realist narrative – or, for that matter, into any 
coherent story at all.  Taking place on an unnamed farmstead, Coetzee’s parodic plaasroman is 
composed of 266 short narrative segments whose versions of events continually contradict one 
another.  In tune with Attridge’s belief in the progressive politics of modernism, the novel’s 
narrator, Magda, understands her endless monologue – and its hallucinatory imaginings and 
narrative contradictions – as a “rebellion” against her domineering father, a thinly-veiled 
allegory for the Lacanian “law of the father.”  A spinster with seemingly no contact with the 
outside world, Magda’s resistance to her father is sparked by his “affair” with his black foreman 
Hendrik’s wife Anna. (It remains unclear, based on Magda’s narration, whether this affair 
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actually happens or is just a fantasy of her father’s.)  To Magda, her father’s violation of the legal 
statutes and social taboos against interracial sex “corrupt[s] my speech,” robbing words of their 
sacralized meanings and substituting for them a “private language” of self-serving desire (38-9).  
In response, she murders her father (or imagines herself doing so) several times over, literally 
“killing” the language of her (fore)father(s) by multiplying it into a heterogeneous 
conglomeration of fantasies, distorted accounts, and philosophical meanderings.   
One way to interpret Magda’s narrative would be to draw a causal connection between 
the novel’s plural structure and democratic pluralism: after the “death of the father” – master 
discourses, language, patriarchy, authoritarian governance, or what have you – new 
representational techniques are able to emerge that are more attuned to “minor” literatures and 
cultures.25 But Coetzee is actually quite guarded about the possibilities that her monologue 
presents for a revolutionary transformation of South African hegemony.  As Magda tries to 
imagine a new, more equitable living arrangement with Hendrik and Anna, she repeatedly finds 
herself unable to do so through the words and concepts available to either English or Afrikaans.  
As she explains, “the language that should pass between myself and [Hendrik and Anna] was 
subverted by my father and cannot be recovered… I was born into a language of hierarchy, of 
distance and perspective.  It was my father-tongue” (106).  It is important to note that the 
language “passing” between these characters in the original Ravan Press edition of the novel is 
Afrikaans, which contains a much more formalized system of address than does English.26 In 
Afrikaans, “intimate” pronouns like those Magda’s father speaks to Anna – “Ons” (we), “ons 
twee” (We two), “ek and jy and hier and nou” (I and you and here and now) – were reserved for 
one’s social superiors in the public marketplace (33/38).  Children, workers, and black Africans 
were instead required to address their elders and employers in the third person as “die baas” (the 
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boss) or “die mies” (the miss).27 As Magda quickly realizes, the distancing and objectifying 
syntax of Afrikaans is not amenable to her subversive linguistic project.  Despite the assaults she 
conducts in English upon her paternal language, Hendrik and Anna insist on using the formal 
“die mies” to address her for most of the novel; and when they finally deign to adopt the intimate 
“jy” (you), it is to condemn her as “jou pa se dogter” (your father’s daughter) (97/106).  
Moreover, given that the entire narrative possesses an ambiguous ontological status – somewhere 
between a partial historical account and groundless fantasy – we also cannot say for certain that 
Hendrik and Anna’s use of intimate pronouns toward Magda signals their ascension as the farm’s 
legitimate, indigenous owners and Magda’s (perhaps well-deserved) marginalization.  Our 
enclosure within Magda’s voice suggests that any violence perpetrated against her – linguistic or 
otherwise – may be as much an index of Magda’s masochist fantasies of victimization as it is of 
genuine social transformation.28 
To underscore this uncertainty, the novel ends with a surrealist visit from flying machine-
gods who quote Hegel and Simone Weil to Madga in a “universal language” that sounds 
suspiciously like Spanish, before returning to the farmstead, where Magda’s father is suddenly 
and inexplicably alive once again, leaving us to wonder how much of the preceding action 
actually took place.  “How can I say,” wonders Magda, “that these are not the eyes of the law 
that stare from behind my eyes, or that the mind of the law does not occupy my skull, leaving me 
only enough intellection to utter these doubting words, if it is I uttering them, and see their 
fallaciousness?” (92) Fearing that when all is said and done she is in fact “her father’s daughter,” 
Magda’s flying machine-gods seem one last attempt on her part to overcome linguistic 
hierarchies within language itself.  If, that is, the progressive potential of linguistic 
experimentation encounters its limit in language’s grammatical norms, a language of “pure 
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meanings” or “universal meanings” would circumvent this difficulty by tying language directly 
to meaning (137).  Furthermore, the juxtaposition of Hegel, Spanish, and flying machines that, 
looking “like narrow silver pencils with two pairs of rigid wings, a long pair in front and a short 
pair behind,” resemble nothing so much as fighter jets, points to a specifically Communist ideal 
of “universal meaning” (138).  In the years during which Coetzee wrote In the Heart of the 
Country, South Africa was engaged in a lengthy border war with then-South-West Africa (now 
Namibia) and Angola, the two of whom received weapons, tactical support, and troops from 
Communist Cuba.  Antiapartheid militancy and utopian universality thus converge through the 
transcendental properties a Communist-inflected “Spanish [of]…universal meanings” (137).  The 
egalitarian liberation championed by antiapartheid Communism is transformed into an object of 
(utopian) language itself, where Magda would be freed from Afrikaans’s restrictive conventions 
to a realm where “things are their own names,” unencumbered by their historical lineage or 
semantic dissonances (White Writing, 9). 
Magda’s attraction to the flying machine-gods articulates the same species of ecstatic 
transcendentalism that Coetzee voices in his “What Is a Classic?” lecture.  If her dazzling 
technical displays founder against language’s grammatical rules, Magda imagines that she could 
herself be a superior medium bridging black and white, self and other, and art and politics 
through its internal harmonies.  She expresses a desire to be “the medium, the median…neither 
master nor slave, neither parent nor child, but the bridge between, so that in me the contraries 
should be reconciled” (145). Like the insects, animals, flowers, and corpses that revel in the 
“ecstasy of their pure being,” Magda fantasizes that she could refine her mediatory nature to the 
point where no residual static would be left to language, allowing like and unlike to 
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communicate as seamlessly as mute objects “ecsta[ticly]…communicating with [themselves]” 
(53). 
Raymond Williams has shown that the modernist valuation of the artistic medium 
functioned along very similar lines: when early twentieth-century immigration to large urban 
centers produced multilingual environments in which artists lacked a common language or 
national tradition, language became more evident as a medium that could itself forge an artistic 
community around its specific properties (The Politics of Modernism, 37-48).  But Coetzee 
translates these (largely urban) practices into the ruralist framework of the plaasroman, where 
the farm’s alleged isolation from Europe, the city, and capitalism can function as a symbol for 
Magda’s social isolation from the farm’s servants, her inability to communicate with them in an 
equitable and reciprocal language.  By discarding words (debased “coins” that “alienate” rather 
than exchange) in favor of a more abstract sense of self-mediation, Magda implies that the 
constitutive occlusions characteristic of the plaasroman genre – its refusal to portray black labor 
or to recognize its own participation in a global capitalist economy – instill a fundamental 
separateness (literally, “apartheid”) to its subject matter (28).  The farm’s isolation thus generates 
the sort of mutual opacity that immigration and multilingualism produced in early twentieth-
century Europe: a radical disconnect between persons, cultures, and languages that reduces the 
efficacy of “chronicle” and elicits instead “lyric” “rapture” as a means to bridge radical 
difference (77, 28). 
Coetzee’s own description of the novel’s episodic form as a literary distillation of filmic 
montage suggests another way to think about modernism, ecstatic mediation, and language in his 
novel. Implying a debt to Sergei Eisenstein, Coetzee points out that In the Heart of the Country 
lacks “the scene-setting and connective tissue that the traditional novel used to find necessary” 
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(Doubling the Point, 59).  “There was a moment in the course of high modernism,” Coetzee 
explains, “when first poets, then novelists, realized how rapidly narration could be carried out: 
films that used montage effectively were connecting short narrative sequences into longer 
narratives much more swiftly and deftly than the nineteenth century novel had thought possible” 
(59).  As David Bordwell and Jacques Aumont have demonstrated,29 Eisenstein’s own theory of 
spectatorship can be considered a kind of ecstasy, one designed to overcome the subject/object 
dichotomy familiar to Western art and philosophy through “union with a transcendental object” 
(Aumont 59).  According to Eisenstein, filmic montage could create an aesthetic experience in 
which the audience would completely identify with the images before them, abandoning their 
distance from the unfolding sequence in an ecstatic burst of collective thought.  As Eisenstein put 
it, "Ecstasy is a sensing and experience of the primordial 'omnipotence' - the element of coming 
into being - the 'plasticness' of existence, from which everything can arise" (Eisenstein on 
Disney, 46).  In the strictest sense, In the Heart of the Country’s episodic structure and Magda’s 
desire to be a medium both seize on Eistensteinian ecstasy as a tool for bridging the barriers 
erected by apartheid: each imagines that the linguistic proprieties, labor hierarchies, and sexual 
taboos separating white and black subjects can be superseded through their immersion in a 
linguistic medium that would dissolve these differences in an ecstatic moment of self-
transcendence. 
But despite its homology with filmic montage, Coetzee’s novel is deeply indebted to the 
poststructuralist “linguistic turn” of the 1970s and 1980s.  Since the linguistic nature of 
Coetzee’s ecstatic transcendentalism will be instrumental to my reading of South African 
semiperipherality, it will be useful to compare Coetzee’s brand of ecstasy to that of another 
South African, the avant-grade artist and filmmaker William Kentridge.  Like Coetzee, 
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Kentridge’s work possesses a special interest in modernist aesthetics (he cites Beckett, 
Eisenstein, and Brecht as significant influences on his films),30 early twentieth century South 
Africa (his films are littered with Bakelite telephones, ribbon typewriters, and counting machines 
[see figures 7 and 8]),31 and neomodernist experimentations with both artistic and filmic 
mediums.32 In Drawings for Projection (1989-2003), a series of nine films Kentridge produced 
by sketching, erasing, and re-sketching short narrative sequences in charcoal drawings, the 
intercutting between Soho Eckstein (a mining magnate), Felix Teitlebaum (Soho’s artistic alter-
ego [see figure 9]), and queues of black mineworkers invites viewers to draw parallels and lines 
of causation among the narratives (see figure 10).  Responding to the films’ internal rhythms, 
viewers experience the indistinction between persons and objects as a sort of ecstatic 
transcendence: as the charcoal sketches morph from bedsheets to an elevator shaft to an entire 
mining complex, these objects’ spatial and temporal separateness dissipates.  This technique 
enables Kentridge to present a series of loaded questions: Who are apartheid’s beneficiaries – the 
black workers stuffed into overcrowded barracks, the mine owners profiting from them, or the 
artists who transform black suffering into art?  Does art incite its viewers to social action and 
critical reflection, or is it merely the observe side of Soho’s profiteering (as implied by Soho and 
Felix’s similar appearances) (see figure 11)?  And how can we conceive of a form of temporality 
that pulls the past into the films’ present, in a giddy palimpsest of archaic mining equipment and 
modern medical technology (see figure 12)?  It also, not coincidentally, encourages its audience 
to abandon preconceived notions about their own ability to make distinctions between their lives 
and the films’ images.  If solid objects (telephones, elevators, beds, mines) and times (the 
1930s/1990s) exhibit a radical interdependence, their viewer finds him- or herself drawn into the 
same deconstructive critique. 
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Figure 7: Image from Mine.  A Bakelite telephone. 
Figure 8: Image from Mine.  Soho Eckstein at his counting machine. 
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Figure 9: Image from Felix in Exile.  Note Soho and Felix's similar 
appearances, as well as their triangulation through Mrs. Eckstein. 
Figure 10: Image from Johannesburg, 2nd Greatest City after Paris.  A 
queue of mine workers. 
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Figure 11: Image from Felix in Exile.  The crowds of political 
protestors disperse, leaving Felix alone with his music. 
Figure 12: Image from History of the Main Complaint.  The old-
fashioned radio (left, on top of monitor) clashes with the modern 
technology in Soho's hospital room. 
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The difference between Kentridge’s films and Coetzee’s novel is the self-reflexivity of 
Magda’s monologue.  To the extent that Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection conform to 
Eisenstein’s belief in montage-as-ecstasy, the films ask the audience to substitute the cinematic 
rhythm and fluid images for their own subjective reflections.  In contrast, Magda is intensely 
self-aware about language’s inherent tendency toward solipsism.  If anything, her monologue 
becomes less and less grounded in South African social history as the narrative moves from her 
father and Anna’s affair to her “conversations” with the flying-machine gods.  The problem, as 
Magda notes, is that if her machines have truly discovered a “universal language,” they will 
more than likely be “flying in an ecstasy of self-absorption” than disseminating that message 
among new disciplines (142).  In direct opposition to the filmic object, language appears to 
transcend its grammatical hierarchies by further subjectivizing itself, weaving its discourse 
inward until it is mediating itself to itself: “I am I” (128).  In the process, Magda’s belief in a 
“universal language” recapitulates one of the foundational Marxist debates over modernist 
literature: Are modern novels mediums to a new, egalitarian mode of production in which they 
cannot themselves participate, as Adorno suggests in “Reconciliation Under Duress”? (The 
“solitary consciousness potentially destroys and transcends itself by revealing itself in works of 
art as the truth common to all men” [166].)  Or do they instead reflect the alienating conditions 
of modern industrial society, mediating a purely subjective universe solely for the sake of 
retreating from historical realities, as Lukács argues in “The Ideology of Modernism”? (“The 
protest expressed by this flight into psychopathology is an abstract gesture; its rejection of reality 
is wholesale and summary, containing no concrete criticism.  It is a gesture, moreover, that is 
destined to lead nowhere.” [150])  
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Language’s reflexivity provides a third answer to this debate.  To adopt the Hegelian 
language spouted by the flying machine-gods, language can act at one and the same time as a 
medium for another (Adorno) and as one for itself (Lukacs).  By styling herself as a “medium” 
between contraries, Magda seems to relegate herself to being “used as a tool” for the coming 
postapartheid order (44).  But by locating that new order in a transcendental language (with 
Magda as its representative), linguistic dexterity becomes both the means and the goal of 
Magda’s scattered imaginings.  In doing so, Magda develops a novel solution to the dilemma of 
the “vanishing mediator” that I outlined in the introduction.  Instead of holding the dialectic 
between metropolitan and colonial economies in stasis, as an endless oscillation between 
globalization and nationalism (as we saw with Bowen in chapter 4), Magda suggests that her 
ecstatic mediations supply a template for a generalizable condition of hyper-mediation.33 Just as 
she can speak about linguistic mediation through language, mediation can self-reflexively 
mediate mediation to the farmers, maids, overseers, and spinsters sparsely populating Coetzee’s 
novel.  And if this position looks back to debates over modernist subjectivism, alienation, and 
autonomy, it also looks forward to an emerging language economy valuing communication and 
linguistic proficiency for their own sakes.  Indeed, Coetzee’s novel stands poised at the precipice 
of a shift from Fordist industrialism to a post-Fordist global economy built on language’s 
“immaterial labors,” a transition that formalizes the semiperiphery’s communicative nature into 
an instrument for seemingly self-motivated communicational work by internalizing modernist 
critiques of industrialism within capitalist economic structures.  The tensions inherent in this 
transition, and the oddly disjointed temporality they seem to entail, are played out in one of the 
central themes pinning the novel together: Madga’s ambivalent relationship with her father. 
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Communities of Mediums, Communities of Ecstasy: From the Plassroman to the Language 
Economy 
 
 The increasingly prominent role linguistic mediation plays in In the Heart of the Country 
sheds light on one of the novel’s most enigmatic developments.  After Hendrik and Anna have 
disappeared from the farm and the flying machine-gods’ voices have retreated to a dull din in 
Magda’s ears, Magda’s father miraculously returns to the narrative without any explanation on 
the part of Magda.  Mute, uncomprehending, and entirely dependent on Magda’s care, this aged 
body is a far cry from the domineering authoritarian Magda describes in the novel’s earlier 
sections.  Where initially Magda had been concerned to declare her distance from her father, now 
he suddenly becomes the locus of a nostalgic commemoration of the 1930s-era plaasroman 
farm: 
…‘Do you remember Jakob and Hendrik and Ou-Anna and Klein-Anna?  
Do you remember that son of Ou-Anna’s who was killed in an accident and 
brought back to the farm to be buried, and how Ou-Anna wanted to throw herself 
into the grave? 
‘Do you remember the years of the great drought, when the sheep all had 
to be sold because there was no grazing within two hundred miles, and how we 
had to struggle to build the farm up again?  Do you remember the great old 
mulberry tree that stood on the other side of the chicken-run, and how one 
summer the trunk cracked down the middle under the weight of all the fruit?  Do 
you remember how the earth around it would be stained purple with the juice of 
fallen berries?  Do you remember…’ 
 
For the first time, the prosaic events underlying Magda’s delirious monologue come into clear 
focus: the physical dangers lurking for servants on the farm (here, displaced onto Ou-Anna’s 
[“Old Anna”] son), the farm’s fecundity, and the economics informing its operations (draughts, 
sheep sales, etc.).  By ventriloquizing her own memories through her father’s (“Do you 
remember…?”), Magda still distances herself from the realist descriptions contained in this 
passage – more apropos, she implies, to her father’s all-encompassing desire than her own 
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narrative techniques.  But she does so almost condescendingly, acknowledging the potent weight 
these objects and events held in her father’s time even while disavowing her own dependence on 
them (“I have uttered my life in my own voice throughout”) (151). 
 What to make of this final détente?  If for most of the novel Magda strains toward a 
transcendental vocabulary of ecstatic mediation that would dissolve the social, cultural, and 
economic barriers separating her from Hendrik and Anna, her final reminiscences suggest that 
lyric ecstasy bridges the differences between herself and her father – gendered, political, and 
generational – more effectively than it does those between her and the farm’s black servants. 
Indeed, as Magda gradually abstracts away from the racialized power dynamics present on the 
farm, she reaches a point at which Hendrik and Anna refuse to follow.  When Magda fails to pay 
them for their work on the farm (being completely ignorant of “colonial economics”), Hendrik 
responds by slaughtering the farm’s sheep, “raping” Magda,34 and abandoning her to survive by 
her own devices.  Where Magda had hoped for goodwill and a sense of community with her 
(former) servants, she receives instead callous mockery for poor farm management, vindictive 
assaults on her body (“sometimes I think it is my humiliation he wants”), and a brute sense of 
material deprivation to counter her airy abstractions (122).  In effect, Hendrik reveals money to 
be the furthest abstraction he is willing to countenance: righting apartheid’s material disparities 
by tearing down the social hierarchies that subordinate black workers is one thing, but 
dissociating completely from material circumstances risks obscuring his and Anna’s labor under 
the rubric of an undifferentiated holism. 
 What Coetzee seems to be doing here, I would like to argue, is calling attention to a class 
of Anglo professionals whose coherence lies less in their historical proximity to each other than 
in their common concern with mediation.  Like the professional artists in “What Is a Classic?”, 
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who form a transhistorical community through their similar labors, Magda and her father both 
serve as mediums ecstatically communicating between incompatible objects, systems, and 
persons.  And even if these labors take vastly different objects, their formal similarity points to a 
continuity between their socioeconomic positions.  After all, as we have seen throughout this 
study, semiperipheral locations like the South African farmstead mediate between incompatible 
economic systems: neofeudal production and laissez-faire trade, metropolitan and colonial 
structures of feeling, and autonomous nation-states and a global economy.  As an 
overdetermined symbol for the 1930s agricultural economy romanticized in the plaasroman, 
then, Magda’s father, like Magda, acts as a medium – specifically, as a medium between the 
global commodity markets upon which South African farms depended for financial stability and 
coercive regimes of labor regulation at odds with free trade principles.  We saw in chapter 3 that 
the tension between South African nationalism and international monetary policy sparked heated 
debates as to whether South Africa should remain on the gold standard or join Britain in the 
sterling bloc.  South Africa’s agricultural economy was at the center of this discussion, and not 
just for ideological purposes.  During this period, estates like Magda’s were struggling to resist 
the encroachments of larger, more profitable estates run by what W. M. Macmillan called 
“cheque-book farmers” – lawyers and agents who secured large quantities of land by foreclosing 
on debts and mortgages (Warning from the West Indies).  In order to stay afloat, these smaller 
farms focused their resources on cultivating products for sale on international (especially British) 
agricultural markets, including sugar, wheat, and especially the merino wool that was highly 
sought after in England (Beinart 59; Feinstein 135-42).  But export production deepened, rather 
than mitigated, the disconnect between South Africa’s racialized labor system and global 
commodity exchange: the wool trade in particular required large swaths of land and cheap black 
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labor, while the absence of a steady market for wool in South Africa increased farmers’ 
dependence on international agricultural markets that were especially volatile in the 1930s 
(Perren 37-51). The result was an economic system in which the location of commodity markets 
outside of South Africa, in the metropolitan markets of Britain, made the achievements of labor 
completely unrecognizable in their local environment – farmers’ profits seemed linked to 
international markets rather than local labor, and the meager wages paid to black workers 
possessed no obvious relationship to the trade cycle. 
In this respect, Hendrik’s insistence that he be paid in money reflects his continuing 
investment in an economic system defined by a radical dissociation between global trade and 
local labor – a gap that Magda’s father traverses through his control over money and 
commodities.  Though not as willfully ignorant of black labor or global capitalism as the earlier 
plaasroman novels it parodies, In the Heart of the Country struggles to place the work being 
done on farms into larger regional, national, or global contexts.  To Magda, the farm’s African 
workers appear as “hewers of wood and drawers of water and shepherds and body-servants” who 
labor “in perpetuity” for no clear purpose, while money and commodities seem to magically 
appear from some unknown realm (“Where am I going to get my hands on money?  Where did 
my father keep it?”; “How am I to explain the economics of my existence?”) (21, 102, 20).  Of 
course, as an academic Coetzee would have been well aware that Marxist historians like 
Frederick Johnstone (Class, Race and Gold), Belinda Bozzoli (The Political Nature of a Ruling 
Class), and Shula Marks (Economy and Society in Preindustrial Africa) were beginning to 
develop a critical methodology capable of explaining South African racial segregation within the 
terms of global capitalism.35 But Coetzee suggests that fiction can instead capture the 
ideological, affective, and material gaps endemic to life on the South African farm – the 
 287	  
productive “silences,” as Coetzee calls them, that suture together economic systems which on 
their own terms can only be regarded as unintelligible (White Writing, 84).  Moving against the 
sociological impulse to comprehensive description, In the Heart of the Country locates mediation 
between these systems in the figure of Madga’s father, whose access to banks, postal institutions, 
and trade connections grants him contact with a money form that can abstract away from local 
racial-industrial hierarchies and into global commodity markets.  If, then, Hendrik’s desire for 
payment seems crass by Magda’s lofty, universalizing platitudes, his commitment to money 
stems in large part from an attraction to the forms symbolizing and mediating a more egalitarian 
space of equitable trade – a space made present to South Africa through money’s abstracting 
form. 
 Approached from this perspective, Magda and her father’s reunion appears less as a 
capitulation to “colonial philosophy” on Madga’s part than as a recognition of the formal 
similarities between their positions (20).  Though couched in a language stressing liberation from 
her father’s authoritarianism, Magda’s lyric ecstasies repeat and intensify his monetary 
mediations, shifting them from the language of economic instrumentality and abstraction to one 
of transcendent union and social equality.  But this is not to say that they escape the economic 
logic of semiperipheral mediation present in her father’s time.  Indeed, Magda’s neomodernist 
reflections on language correspond quite closely to the communication-driven mode of 
production that we have seen Coetzee to be participating in, and which Christian Marazzi has 
termed the post-Fordist “language economy” (Capital and the Affects).  As elaborated by 
Marazzi and fellow Italian post-operaismo (“post-worker”) theorists like Antonio Negri, the 
post-Fordist language economy was a concerted response on the part of capitalists during the 
1970s and 1980s to mitigate rising production costs and shrinking markets for goods.36 The 
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reasons for this stalemate were many, but the most salient included rising wages, the growth of 
the welfare state, and (somewhat paradoxically) neoliberal assaults against the welfare state 
(since these depressed real wages and compressed the state’s social expenditures, in the process 
limiting middle- and lower-class purchasing power).  According to post-operaismo writers, 
capitalists found the solution to this impasse by co-opting workers’ critiques of Fordist 
industrialism into the very logic of capitalism.37 Factory workers had long lamented the lack of 
upward mobility in Fordist production – one could ascend from unskilled to semi-skilled wage 
work, but not to the white collar work characterizing the upper echelons of the corporate 
hierarchy – and had “demand[ed] an education that would provide an alternative to a life 
sentence served on the factory floors” (Marazzi 27).  For advocates of the “language economy,” 
such “reengineering” introduced the possibility of retraining workers for communicational work 
that would identify and respond to consumer demands at an almost instantaneous rate, allowing 
companies to produce less merchandise for more targeted groups.  (One need only think of sites 
like Google and Facebook that store and sell user information to see the mechanics of this 
process at work, as well as the way in which computer technologies have helped make the 
“language economy” possible.) 
 Where Magda’s monologue most clearly intersects with Marazzi’s “language economy” 
is in its use of a neomodernist vocabulary to reject racialized labor hierarchies.  As Luc Boltanski 
and Eve Chiapello have shown, the post-’68 global economy subordinated what they call the 
“artistic critique” – but which we might more properly label as a strain of Romantic modernism – 
to its own purposes.  The modernist critique of capitalism, they explain, “takes the 
dehumanization of the capitalist sphere as its particular target”: “the manifestation of human 
beings in their full authenticity was regarded as difficult to achieve unless they were emancipated 
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from the constraints, limitations, even mutilations inflicted on them by capitalist accumulation in 
particular” (xiii, 419).  Most important for our purposes, these critiques coalesced around a 
specific interpretation of “liberation” as “emancipation from any form of determination liable to 
restrict the self-definition and self-fulfillment of individuals,” one which stressed such central 
modernist tropes as “autonomy,” “uncertainty,” “a multiplicity of identities,” and “freeing 
oneself from any endowment” (433-4).  As post-Fordist production began to take shape in the 
1970s, advertisements and employee training literature shrewdly equated such individual 
liberations with the operations of mass consumerism and flexible labor.  Where in the immediate 
postwar period promises of steady, remunerative work and fantasies of “the good life” had 
buoyed faith in Western capitalism – a combination enshrined in the two-parent nuclear 
household of American lore – in the ’70s and ’80s commodities and labor became valued for 
their capacity to express multiple identities (racial, sexual, regional, etc.) and to expose 
individuals to new experiential horizons.  Flexible labor allowed workers to expand their 
activities in new settings and directions (even, as Boltanski and Chiapello note, it colonized more 
of their intellectual and affective lives), while consumer products either freed time for personal 
pursuits (washing-machines, microwaves, ready-prepared meals) or were those interests (the 
internet, tourism, the entertainment industry). 
 Like the training literature from which Boltanski and Chiapello draw their conclusions, 
Magda’s rambling discourse associates personal, racial, and economic liberation with 
communicational labor and production.  From the novel’s earliest pages, Magda revels in her 
ability within the bounds of language to “expand to infinity just as I can shrivel to the size of an 
ant,” boasting that “Many things I lack, but freedom is not one of them” (55).  As the novel 
wears on and she increasingly struggles to make her own liberation from realist language into a 
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vehicle for Hendrik and Anna’s emancipation from undervalued agricultural and domestic 
occupations, language becomes more and more tightly interwoven with notions of the 
redemptive properties of labor.  Forced to scrub floors, repair the farmhouse, and dispose of her 
father’s body alongside Hendrik and Anna, labor instills a concrete, experiential quality to her 
coalition with the farm’s servants – I have done what you do, I have felt what you felt, I know 
what you know.  But what starts out as excruciating physical labor gradually morphs into an 
allegory for the labor present in language work, with Magda “trundl[ing] wheelbarrows full of 
stones across the veld” in order to spell out messages to her flying machine-gods (144).  Not only 
is language represented here as a newly-valorized subset of labor (complete with the 
emancipatory trajectory labor assumes in Marxist philosophies of history in particular), but 
language’s activities are shown to be in and of themselves freedom from any form of social, 
cultural, or racial determination.  After all, since language’s reflexivity enables it to be treated as 
both a means and an end (as we saw in the last section), linguistic liberations from apartheid’s 
racial industrial hierarchies can all too easily veer into liberations to an emerging language 
economy.  
 But something more interesting is happening here than just the old adage that capitalism 
co-opts all critiques into itself, or that critique is always-already contaminated by its own will to 
power.  If ecstatic mediation seems to unite across time individuals with similar formal 
socioeconomic roles – in “What Is a Classic?”, professional art critics; in In the Heart of the 
Country, Magda and her father’s translations of African labor into the ideology of the language 
economy and laissez-faire trade – we have to treat skeptically Magda’s belief that she can 
ultimately incorporate Hendrik and Anna into this communication-based economy.  Indeed, 
rather than join Magda in her linguistic acrobatics and abstract philosophizing, Hendrik adopts 
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the trappings and demeanor recently vacated by Magda’s father, wearing his old clothes, 
sleeping in his house, having sex with his daughter, and claiming proprietorship over his 
livestock.  His aspirations seem much more fixed on the minutiae of a fading agricultural 
economy – hard money, rooted territoriality, and direct command over others’ bodies – than in 
the disembodied informatics that Magda’s monologue gestures toward.  
In the process, Hendrik dramatizes one of the central aspects of the new language 
economy: its relocation of industrial production onto the periphery.  Today, industrial 
production’s rapid migration away from the United States and Europe and toward developing 
Asian and Latin American countries is viewed almost as a fait accompli, an unfortunate (for 
Americans) corollary to globalization.38 But in late apartheid South Africa the transition from 
industrialism to the language economy was neither as immediately apparent nor as blatantly 
spatialized as it seemed from the First World’s perspective.  Instead, international sanctions had 
cut off South Africa from the economic restructurings found in Europe and the United States, 
leading to two interrelated consequences.39 On the one hand, the apartheid economy and the 
antiapartheid resistance continued to articulate their ideological platforms through the rhetoric of 
Fordist industrialism, as can be seen in the aforementioned rise in Marxist scholarship in 1970s 
South Africa (most of which focused on the mining industry) and in the antiapartheid African 
National Congress’s belief that seizing and nationalizing key industries could fund anticipated 
social projects (e.g., installing sewage and electric facilities in the townships and reserves).40 On 
the other hand, an older utopian discourse of collective emancipation which had lost much of its 
luster after the disappointments of May 1968 and postcolonial disillusionment persisted in South 
Africa throughout the apartheid period.41 As Neil Lazarus recalls, “the disjuncture between the 
politics of time in South Africa and the continent at large” – and, we could add, between South 
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Africa and the global language economy – implied that “our decolonization, when it came, 
would not prove to be the neocolonization that it had been elsewhere; our nationalism really 
would correspond to the ‘all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole 
people’” (“The South African Ideology,” 611).  This combination encouraged antiapartheid 
writers and activists to simultaneously give voice to a modernist critique of Fordism (as 
apartheid’s oppressive economic wing) and to see Fordism as the limit case for economic 
aspirations, the fount of economic opportunity that had been denied to them under apartheid and 
which, like Hendrik, they would soon capture as their own. 
 The point I wish to emphasize is that, even as desires like Magda’s to reconcile black and 
white through lyrical transports of language overcome the specific content of apartheid 
industrialism, they also reinscribe in formal features the dialectic between transcendent global 
markets and retrograde local environments that had been present in her father’s time.  By 
increasingly equating Hendrik with mass production’s forms and functions, Coetzee allegorizes a 
paradigm shift in the world-system that was transplanting industrial production from the core to 
the periphery.  At the same time, he suggests that Magda’s ecstatic language can mediate 
between Hendrik-as-peripheral-industrialist and the disembodied voices constituting the global 
language economy.  This double movement is obscured by how readily one form of 
communication – the linguistic proficiencies valued by the language economy – slides into a 
second form of communication – the translation of peripheral and metropolitan economic 
systems into one another – thereby generalizing mediation as a goal in itself and solidifying it 
within language.  Nevertheless, just as her father’s semiperipheral status had forced him to 
mediate between serf-like African labor and a capitalist market premised on self-possessive 
individualism and equitable exchange, Magda rejects that role by juxtaposing degrading racial 
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hierarchies against language’s liberatory qualities.  In neither case does global modernity become 
a single pervasive system.  Instead, Magda and her father, like the professional critics in “What 
Is a Classic?”, negotiate a shifting set of historically-contingent – and clashing – socioeconomic 
systems: industrialism, the language economy, apartheid, Communism, and so on.  Ecstasy thus 
makes visible a class continuity between Magda and her father by refining away the 
particularities of their historical contexts and highlighting the formal structure of mediation 
itself.  And as such ecstasies echo from generation to generation, they raise one final set of 
questions: What sort of temporality is guiding these mediations?  What would a history of South 
African ecstasy look like? 
 
On Semiperipheral History and the Plaasroman; or, Against Lukács 
 Read as a reflection on contemporary economics and the antiapartheid movement, In the 
Heart of the Country strikes a note of pessimistic resignation.  But it’s also doubtful whether 
Coetzee’s goal in writing the novel was anything so programmatic as a platform for white South 
African participation in the antiapartheid movement.42 Coetzee was writing in the wake of the 
student-led Black Consciousness movement, a radical black intellectual movement that 
dismissed Anglo-South African liberalism for, in the words of Steve Biko, “verbalizing all the 
complaints of the black beautifully” and expecting blacks to merely “echo” what the “Liberal” 
had said (I Write 21; Black Consciousness 57-8).  Influenced by Fanon, W.E.B. Du Bois, and the 
Négritude movement, the Black Consciousness movement was particularly vehement in their 
opposition to the “common-society liberalism” of Alan Paton’s Liberal Party (1953-68), which 
had advocated the gradual extension of citizenship rights to black South Africans through 
sentimental appeals to blacks’ and whites’ common humanity.43 This critique placed white 
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antiapartheid writers in an untenable double-bind: according to the logic of the Black 
Consciousness movement, any liberal demands for racial equality deepened blacks’ dependence 
on white liberals and prevented blacks from becoming “co-architects of a normal society,” but 
saying and doing nothing lent tacit endorsement to apartheid (Biko, I Write, 21).  Stripped of the 
liberal platitudes around which they had defined themselves, many white South African writers 
responded by flocking to the Communist Party (as a radical alternative to liberalism) or by 
engaging in self-critical evaluations that sought to “set our society free of the lies on which it is 
built” (Gordimer, Essential Gesture, 101-2). 
 Coetzee inclined toward the latter of these two options. In a speech at the 1987 Weekly 
Mail book festival entitled “The Novel Today,” he laid out what he saw as literature’s 
foundational vocation.  Fiction, he argued, refuses to “supplement” the “Grand Narrative of 
History” – academic scholarship that treats history as a cumulative catalogue of unfolding events 
and literature as a passive reflection of those events – and instead erects a “rivalrous” mode of 
historical perception (3).  Though remaining vague as to particulars, Coetzee is quite clear about 
what literature’s historical consciousness does not do: “There is a game going on between the 
covers of a book, but it is not always the game you think it is.  No matter what it may appear to 
be doing, the story is not really the game you call Class Conflict or the game called Male 
Domination of any of the other games in the handbook” (3-4).  In thus making his case for 
literature’s historicist sensibility, Coetzee threads his argument between two antithetical 
positions.  On the one hand, he is neither declaring the radical autonomy of the novel nor 
denying that it is a historically-rooted document with social, economic, racial, and gendered 
determinants.  On the other hand, he is suggesting that modernist formalism can develop ways of 
encountering history that are able to approach certain phenomena foreclosed by a linear 
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historicism he associates with both Marxism and liberalism. “I happen to think Lukács’s 
judgment [about modernist decadence] wrong,” Coetzee added in an interview several years 
later, “conditioned by more than a little moralistic prejudice” (Doubling the Point, 202).  In 
contrast to Lukacs’s tight equation of historicism with realism in The Historical Novel and 
Studies in European Realism, Coetzee suggests that turning inwards to the novelistic medium 
itself might open up new vistas for a South African historical imaginary that has too often 
focused exclusively on a linear march from point A to point B: from British imperialism to 
Afrikaner nationalism, from liberalism to radicalism, and from apartheid to democracy.  
 During the ’70s and ’80s, Coetzee’s discomfort with Marxist historicism migrated back 
and forth between his critical and fictional writings.  In In the Heart of the Country, Magda’s 
Hegelian vocabulary rehearses the dominant tropes of a crudely mechanistic form of Marxism – 
dialectical conflict, teleological progress, and historical inevitability – only to evacuate their 
linear trajectory.  “Is the following the key,” wonders Magda: “through the agency of conflict 
with my father I hope to lift myself out of the endless middle of meditation on unattached 
existence into a true agon of crisis and resolution?” (67-8) Certainly the African National 
Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) believed this to be the case.  
According to the official party line circulated in The African Communist and Umsebenzi, black 
emancipation would result “from a series of set piece battles between the apartheid state and the 
ANC/SACP alliance with the latter learning a valuable lesson from each engagement and 
elevating the struggle to a higher plane” (Adams 7).  But even allowing for the ANC and SACP’s 
reductive, anti-theoretical approach to Marxism, which was less than representative of the more 
nuanced methodologies being developed in South African academic circles,44 Coetzee’s novel 
shies away from the “arrow-straight paths” Marxist and liberal historiography associate with “the 
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true time of the world” (39).  For all that Magda strives to transform herself through dialectical 
conflicts with her father and the authoritarian systems he embodies – apartheid, patriarchy, 
capitalism – her solipsistic enclosure within her own monologue prevents her from ascending to 
an elevated plane of self-consciousness.  Instead, the seemingly endless recurrence of the same 
clash with her father congeals into “an eternal present,” making visible mediation as its own 
mode of historical being (126).  (Unlike Marxist theories of history, for which mediation is an 
instrumental tool for further social, cultural, and economic development.) From Magda’s 
perspective, the content of capitalist modernity – whether it be neofeudalism, industrialism, or 
language work – seems less essential than the demand to mediate, forever mediate: to let people, 
objects, even “tears [that are not my tears]…pass through me” (60).45 
 Another way to put this is to suggest that we take seriously the historical imaginary 
sketched by Coetzee in both his “What Is a Classic?” lecture and “The Novel Today.”  As a form 
more amenable to repetitive temporalities – one could cite anything from magical realism’s use 
of popular mythological cycles to the inherited defects obsessed over by naturalist fiction – and 
increasingly self-reflexive about its own mediations from the modernist period on, the novel 
would seem an optimal medium through which to construct a “rivalrous” account of South 
African history based on repetitious mediation.  In this respect, rather than retreating from 
material conditions of production into subjective fantasies of omnipotence – an accusation 
Lukács leveled at modernist mythopoetic projects like Joyce’s Ulysses, Yeats’s Vision, and 
Eliot’s Waste Land46 – Coetzee’s neomodernist novel takes socioeconomic structure as a 
phenomenon that repeats across generations.  Like Bach’s neoclassical and neomodernist 
aficionados, whose mutual object (Bach’s music) and similar formal structure (professional 
criticism) is subtended by radically different socioeconomic contexts – in the first case, the 
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Protestant revivalism and Germanic nationalism that made Bach into a “vehicle” for “a tide of 
communal feeling”; in the second, the shrinking social and economic prospects for Anglophilic 
aesthetes in the United States (Eliot) and South Africa (Coetzee)47 – Magda and her father reveal 
transnational mediation between globalizing and “peripheralizing” economic systems to be a 
formal structure echoing across South African history (“What Is a Classic?” 15).  Their parallel 
experiences within South Africa’s 1930s agricultural economy and its 1970s (post-)Fordist 
variant show that structure itself possesses a history all of its own, a history located in the 
semiperipheral interstices of the world-system. 
As a philosophy of history, this reading of structural repetition ventures outside the well-
worn cliché of capitalist-history-as-perpetual-innovation, the “permanent revolution” that, as 
Marshall Berman observes, entails “a process of continual, restless, open-ended, unbounded 
growth” (95, 98).  But it also raises questions equally germane to socioeconomic analysis as 
those posed by Lukácsian and liberal historicism, but which approach the intertwining of 
economics and literature from a slightly different angle.  Not the least of these is the paradox 
haunting the doubling of mediation across Magda and her father’s generations: If mass 
production through cheap African labor was seen as the solution to South Africa’s backward 
socioeconomic status in the 1930s, what do we make of the injunction in the 1970s to modernize 
yet again toward a global language economy, especially when the benefits of (industrial) 
modernization have failed to reach the country’s black majority? 
 As we have already seen in Coetzee, the Afrikaner plaasroman and English farm novel 
provided an ideal setting for working out this contradiction, in large part because of their close 
connection to the (heavily Afrikaner) 1930s agricultural industry.  The renaissance the 
plaasroman experienced in experimental circles during the ’70s and early ’80s indicates a 
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growing sensitivity to what I have been calling semiperipheral history – the discontinuous 
repetition of socioeconomic forms, functions, and aspirations across discrete historical moments. 
Nearly every major white South African novelist devoted a novel to the South Africa farmstead 
during this period, and oftentimes these were among their most stylistically elaborate texts: 
Gordimer’s The Conservationist (1974), Brink’s Rumours of Rain (1978) and A Chain of Voices 
(1982), Etienne van Heerden’s Toorberg (1986), and Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country 
(1976) and Life & Times of Michael K (1983).48 Certain differences did, of course, exist between 
Gordimer’s and Coetzee’s English fictions and Brink’s and van Heerden’s Afrikaans ones.  
(English novels tend to be more concerned with the economic and political history of the farm, 
whereas Afrikaans ones are more directly interested in the history of Afrikaner settlement and 
migration and the role played by the mythology surrounding the farm in Afrikaner culture.)  But 
both English-speaking and Afrikaner writers agreed that the chauvinistic pieties contained in the 
plaasroman urgently needed parodic debunking, as well as (somewhat counter-intuitively) that 
the plaasroman “may speak more loudly now than [it] did fifty years ago” (Coetzee, “Farm 
Novel and Plaasroman,” 84).  For Coetzee, this is in fact the singularity of the farm novel: “I 
would ask whether it is in the nature of the ghost of the [South African] pastoral ever to be laid to 
rest” (“Farm Novel and Plaasroman,” 83).  Like the murdered body of the anonymous black 
freedom fighter that keeps surfacing in Gordimer’s Conservationist, refusing to stay buried 
beneath the idyllic wetlands and tranquil veld of the South African farm, the farm novel appears 
to return at regular intervals to name the abuses, silences, and repetitions upon which the South 
African nation was founded. 
 South African neomodernism thus assumes that past styles, genres, and texts can become 
mediums for the inarticulate feelings and social aspirations of future generations.  Less nostalgic 
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for a fading pastoralism than attuned to parallels between the 1930s farm and the late apartheid 
era, Coetzee, Gordimer, and Brink’s parodic plaasromans call attention to the degree to which 
black African demands for political rights were increasingly intertwined with a vocabulary of 
economic modernization shared by an earlier Afrikaner nationalism.  In Brink’s A Chain of 
Voices, for example, this rhetorical convergence becomes the narrative’s guiding thread, as the 
slave Galant provokes a small uprising in early nineteenth century South Africa by co-opting the 
language of Afrikaner exceptionalism into his own calls for black emancipation.  Galant’s 
original owner, the crippled landowner Piet van der Merwe, regards the farm Houd-den-Bek 
[literally: “Shut-Your-Trap”] as “a place destined to be mine, ordained by God and my 
forefathers” as a liberation from the British-controlled Cape (34).  As we saw in chapter 3, this 
rationale that isolated farming would allow (or already had made possible) Afrikaners’ 
development into a distinct, self-sufficient nationality had long been a staple of plaasroman 
fiction.  But where Brink departs from generic conventions is in his displacement of this rote 
statement from the internal monologue of the mute Piet to Galant’s own thoughts and speeches, 
which posit a competing divine mandate designating the farm’s untamed “wildness” as “mine,” 
“denied me” by the van der Merwes (46, 59).  Piet and Galant remain blissfully unaware of the 
parallels between their aspirations toward “freedom,” but Brink’s Faulknerian weaving together 
of their subjective, partial accounts with those of the farm’s other inhabitants emphasizes their 
common features: anger against an oppressive usurper (British, Dutch), an indigenizing 
“wildness” that simultaneously weds one to the land and allows for a more authentic 
domestication than that of a feminized British consumerism, and a forward-looking teleology 
equating liberation from a restricting socioeconomic environment (Cape liberalism, Dutch 
farming) with political maturity.  Furthermore, by placing his novel 150 years in the past,49 
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Brink’s formal structure engages in a meta-stylization of such repetitions that develops a wider 
narrative context for Galant’s more local ones.  As Galant echoes Piet’s sanctimonious claims for 
an ethnically-driven modernization – from the British Cape to the Afrikaner Houd-den-Bek, and 
from Dutch slavery to black emancipation – so does the novel’s historical setting imply the 
recurrence of these modernization projects across large time spans: the 1820s Cape Colony 
(where the novel takes place), the 1930s Afrikaner farm (from which it inherits its generic form), 
and the 1970s antiapartheid movement (from which it borrows its political message). 
 However, despite the triumphal tone Piet and Galant each in turn displays, the legal codas 
that begin and end the novel ironize their belief in a definitive transformation from dependent 
primitivism to political and economic modernity.  These texts overlay an abstracting lexicon of 
liberal jurisprudence onto Galant’s failed uprising and so limit both parties’ claims to self-
determination.  As the British High Court acknowledges, according to liberal principles of free 
contract they cannot argue “for slavery in the abstract” (514).  Such a ruling would be anathema 
to English law, which had banned both slavery in England and the slave trade across the empire 
(1807).  But because the Cape Colony possessed a feudal agricultural economy ratified “by the 
laws from the earliest period of its colonization,” which in turn allowed “free Inhabitants…to 
invest a very important part of their means and their welfare in the purchases of slaves,” Galant’s 
rebellion threatens “the good order and well being of the State” (514).  By this logic, both Piet 
and Galant’s appeals to “freedom” imitate liberal rhetoric but lack the economic development 
necessary for genuine autonomy.  The Court’s ruling may ultimately side with the van der 
Merwes and their fellow slaveholders, but it does so only by demystifying their own mythology 
of Dutch self-sufficiency as a disguise for economic backwardness.  Characterizing Galant’s 
“disappointed hopes of freedom” as a form drained of content, an inauthentic glimpse of liberal 
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equality unsuited for the Cape Colony, the Court’s verdict implies that liberalism remains a 
closed horizon for Dutch settlers and black slaves alike (517).  Given the complex 
interpenetration of British, Dutch, and African legal and economic systems, the Court concedes 
that liberal forms are readily available to Piet and Galant, but only as forms.  Feudal agriculture 
is still assumed to be the dominant mode of production on Cape farms, and feudalism and liberal 
“freedom” antithetical concepts.  For this reason, Galant’s rebellion can only be a “treasonous” 
revolt against that form of forms itself, “the State,” and not an expression of his (or Dutch 
farmers’) passage to liberal modernity: “In a Country where slavery exists, a rising of the slaves 
is nothing else than a state of war…for hence States can be, and we know have been, totally 
overthrown” (522, my emphasis). 
 We are now in a much better position to specify exactly how neomodernist 
experimentalism constructs a “rivalrous” historical narrative.  If, as Coetzee argues in his “What 
Is a Classic?” lecture, from South Africa’s perspective metropolitan culture “appears to…exist in 
some transcendent realm,” this stems in large part from the country’s semiperipheral position in 
the world-system (7).  As Brink’s novel makes clear, metropolitan “modernity” remains an 
abstract form in the semiperiphery, present as an aspiration (“freedom”) and overarching legal-
economic framework (liberalism) but not as a concrete mode of production that the 
semiperiphery could ever ultimately inhabit.  Both Afrikaner and black African nationalisms 
seize on particular modernization projects (e.g., plantation agriculture) as routes to cultural and 
political growth, but they remain out of synch with metropolitan “modernity” (laissez-faire 
liberalism, the language economy).  Late apartheid plaasromans thus dramatize what Andre 
Gunder Frank has called “the development of underdevelopment”: the notion that, though 
peripheral economies may “develop” more advanced economic institutions, the structural 
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relations between core and peripheral states ensures that Third World modernization is always a 
belated modernization vis-à-vis that of the First World (“The Development of 
Underdevelopment”).  Afrikaner laws governing slave labor may make possible mass export 
production, but only when they are acknowledged to be archaic anachronisms being unevenly 
incorporated into laissez-faire trade; Galant may find in liberalism rhetorical forms for African 
resistance, but those forms have no effective standing in a feudal slave economy; Hendrik may 
assume control over Magda’s farm and its resources, but only after material production has been 
displaced onto the periphery and a new language economy enshrined in the metropole. 
All of this is to say in more detail the proposition with which I started this chapter: 
modernity is something that passes through the semiperiphery without ever being present to it.  
Nevertheless, because the semiperiphery is the site where metropolitan and peripheral economies 
meet and communicate, global structural relations become more visible there as such than in 
either the metropole or the periphery.  Where “modernity” appears self-evidently as the need to 
develop to new, more advanced economic institutions in both metropole and periphery, the 
semiperiphery’s role in mediating between a series of discrepant economies (feudalism/laissez-
faire trade, industrialism/the language economy) reveals a disavowed formal structure repeating 
within each of these dispensations.  Mediations that are normally covered over by the glittering 
promises of modernity here become visible for all to see, emptying modernity of its substantive 
content and ossifying it into a repetitious structure. 
If the plaasroman became the favored genre for white South African experimentalism, 
then, this was in large part because it presented a formal container that could track the changing 
set of economic systems Anglo-South Africans found themselves mediating.  Neither a 
subjective retreat from history (à la Lukács) nor a medium for social transformation (à la 
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Adorno), the turn to modernism allegorizes formal economic structures through formal fictional 
ones.  After all, as Magda observes, being a medium involves being “refabricated…[as] 
something else”: one can see what the medium has transformed into, the message it now carries, 
but the medium itself remains opaque when it is approached solely in terms of content – say, 
industrialism, or post-Fordism.  By using a conventional generic form to demonstrate the 
structural parallels between 1930s export agriculture and late twentieth century globalization, 
antiapartheid writers substantiate Coetzee’s claim that South African history can best be narrated 
through literature’s formalist mode of historicism.  Where economistic communication is the 
raison d’etre of the semiperiphery, so too can self-reflexive musings on the novelistic medium, 
or mediumhood in general, show the scope and shape of formal continuities across historical 
periods.  And if the language economy’s premium on linguistic dexterity and communicative 
labor make nemodernist plaasromans’ mediations more visible than in past farm novels, this 
self-consciousness is merely an intensification and generalization of what was always true of the 
semiperiphery: there, modernity is experienced as communication, information, and signs, and 
not as a material reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 304	  
NOTES
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Eliot’s lecture took place before the Virgil Society and was published as What Is A Classic? the 
next year. 
 
2 See in particular Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
 
3 Mamdani goes so far as to claim that apartheid is only the last, and therefore the most 
anachronistic, instance of “indirect rule” (7). 
 
4 For an analysis of how leftist politics and theory deemphasized liberation from capitalism and 
the state after 1968, see Simon During, “Refusing Capitalism? Theory and Cultural Studies After 
1968” in Exit Capitalism: Literary Culture, Theory, and Post-Secular Modernity. 
 
5 Joseph Stiglitz’s view is representative: “even when not guilty of hypocrisy, the West has  
driven the globalization agenda, ensuring that it garners a disproportionate share of the benefits, 
at the expense of the developing world” (Globalization and Its Discontents, 7). 
 
6 See chapter 3 for a discussion of Voorslag magazine.  On Vilakazi and Dhlomo, see Attwell, 
Rewriting Modernity, 77-110. 
 
7 To give a sense of just how jarring modernist and postmodernist techniques were in 1970s 
South Africa, Frances Bowers, writing in the Cape Times, believed Coetzee’s Dusklands showed 
“evidence of careless editing” because it narrated two separate deaths scenes for one of its 
characters (5 June 1974).  Nor was Bowers the only reviewer to be confused by this: both of 
Ravan Press’s readers were similarly puzzled by the contradictory deaths, and Ravan Press’s 
director, Peter Randall, urged Coetzee (unsuccessfully) to explain what was going on in the 
scene. 
 
8 I should point out that I am using Nkosi here as exemplary of a trend in South African literary 
criticism, not as a model of South African literary history.  Nkosi favors a linear, 
developmentalist framework for literary historiography: “At the risk of being accused of 
supporting some version of a linear history of development, I think we ought to take seriously 
the idea that black South African writers may not in fact become postmodernist before they have 
brought to completion their modernist agenda” (“Postmodernism and Black Writing in South 
Africa,” 84).  As will become increasingly apparent, I, in contrast, view modernism more as a 
transferable set of aesthetic practices that has served a concrete sociopolitical function in 
multiple time periods.  My interest in Nkosi, then, stems more from the cultural currency 
modernism began to accrue in this period than in his specific version of modernism. 
 
9 Neil Lazarus’s “Modernism and Modernity: T. W. Adorno and Contemporary White South 
African Literature” develops a similar argument about South African neomodernism.  For 
Lazarus, even though South African modernism is temporally and geographically distant from 
European high modernism, it nevertheless conforms to Adorno’s understanding of modernism as 
an oppositional set of aesthetic practices critiquing instrumental reason “in the antinomies of its 
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own formal language” (quoted in Lazarus 143).  Though less polemically stated than in Nkosi, 
we can see here a parallel move away from programmatic political discourse to an emphasis on 
the formalism of Gordimer, Brink, Breytenbach, and Coetzee. 
 
Furthermore, Nkosi and Lazarus’s championing of formalism suggests that South Africa played 
a key role in consolidating an ethics of late modernism in literary criticism.  Nkosi, Lazarus, 
David Attwell, Michael Chapman, and Derek Attridge all use an Adornian notion of modernism 
or “late modernism” to defend an “engaged” experimental literature primarily written by white 
artists (Attwell, J. M. Coetzee: South African and the Politics of Writing; Chapman, “Campbell 
Then and Now: The Case of the Politically Incorrect Poet”; Attridge, “Modernist Form and the 
Ethics of Otherness” in J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading).  Because Western intellectuals 
were highly invested in South Africa at the time most of these studies were written (the 1980s), 
we might hypothesize that the need to write “committed” experimental literature in South Africa 
– and to recuperate experimental writing there as “committed” – provided an essential test case 
through which literary critics were able to shed formalism’s conservative overtones and rebrand 
it within an oppositional register.  
 
10 I realize that treating Gordimer as an experimentalist may seem counter-intuitive given her 
close connection with critical realism (see, for instance, Stephen Clingman’s Lukacsian reading 
of her novels in The Novels of Nadine Gordimer).  But in her 1970s fiction, and especially in her 
Booker Prize-winning The Conservationist, she frequently employs symbol and myth as ways of 
moving outside a more narrow sense of engaged realism. 
 
11 I borrow the notion of a “commonsense” definition of race from Deborah Posel’s analysis of 
the 1950 Population Registration Act in “Race as Common Sense.”  Posel is writing against Saul 
Dubow’s argument that South Africa possessed a pseudo-“scientific” definition of race with ties 
to eugenic discourse.  For Posel, such scientific debates never penetrated into the substance of 
apartheid legislation, even if they did contribute to a general sense of racial hierarchy. 
 
12 This at times reached the tragically absurd. In 1955, a rail worker named Willie Vickerman 
was reclassified as a “native” after living his entire as a “Coloured” because the census worker 
believed that “in Buchuanaland [where Vickerman was born] there are no coloureds” (Posel 23).  
The decision completely turned Vickerman’s life and finances upside down: he lived in a 
neighborhood reserved for Coloureds with his five Coloured children, paid the same taxes as 
other Coloureds, and worked in a job designated for Coloureds, all of which he was no longer 
allowed by law to do. 
 
13 Friday’s silence has long been a controversial topic in criticism on Foe.  The general 
parameters are this debate are best represented by Benita Parry and Gayatri Spivak’s responses to 
the novel.  For Parry, “homages to the mystical properties and prestige of muteness undermine 
the critique of that condition where oppression inflicts and provokes silence” (“Speech and 
Silence in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee,” 158).  In contrast, for Spivak “it is Friday rather than 
Susan who is the emphatic agent of withholding in the text.  For every territorial space that is 
coded by colonialism and every command for the native to yield his ‘voice,’ there is a space of 
withholding, marked by a secret that may not be a secret but cannot be unlocked.  ‘The native,’ 
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whatever that might mean, is not only a victim, but also an agent.  The curious guardian at the 
margin who will not inform” (A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 190). 
 
14 Brink’s Looking on Darkness (1974) was the first novel by an Afrikaans writer to be banned.  
Censors claimed that the novel “harmed race relations by dealing ‘in an improper manner with 
the abuse of non-whites’” (Peter McDonald, The Literature Police: Apartheid Censorship and Its 
Cultural Consequences).  In general, censors banned white South African writings far less 
frequently than black South African ones, in large part because white writers were given some 
leeway for “artistic considerations.”  As Gordimer explains, the censorship system used the 
fiction of “the likely reader” to ban black novels that were “generally of a high quality” on the 
pretense that black novels were more “likely to reach the black masses” than avant-garde white 
writing (“Censors and Unconfessed History,” 254-5). 
 
15 Like Coetzee’s writings in Giving Offense, Gordimer also wrote extensively on censorship.  
See “Censored, Banned, Gagged” (1963), “Speak Out: The Necessity for Protest” (1971), “The 
Unkillable Word” (1980), “Censors and Unconfessed History” (1980).  For a useful survey of 
apartheid censorship and writers’ responses to it, see Peter D. McDonald, The Literature Police. 
 
16 The most influential example of this is Derek Attridge, J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of 
Reading, 1-31. 
 
17 Jameson is leaning on Serge Guilbaut’s How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art, which 
argues that abstract expressionism valorized a depoliticized sense of “individual expression” 
during the Cold War.  At the same time, this very “depoliticization” was itself a highly 
politicized gesture designed to contrast American “freedom” with Soviet social realism.  Aijaz 
Ahmad also characterizes postwar modernism as an effort to “squeeze a particular ideological 
meaning out of each literary text.”  Ahmad continues: “The peculiar blend of formalist 
detachment and deliberate distancing from forms of the prose narrative, with their inescapable 
locations in social life, into reified readings of short lyrics was, so to speak, the objective 
correlate of other kinds of distancing and reification required by the larger culture” (In Theory: 
Classes, Nations, Literatures, 52-3).  
 
18 Black and Afrikaner writers’ autobiographies seldom contain a similar recognition scene, 
perhaps because for black writers political exile meant something very different from modernist 
ideals of cultural exile, while Afrikaans had been isolated from modernism much more than 
writing in English.  Even André Brink, one of the more self-consciously modernist of the 
Sestigers – a dissident group of Afrikaans writers who sought to “modernize” Afrikaans 
literature by importing European avant-garde techniques – speeds over his youthful enchantment 
with Ionesco and Beckett, acknowledging the fascination they held for him but refraining from 
drawing a genealogical connection between their work and his own (A Fork in the Road, 77-7). 
 
19 The most extensive treatment of the history of South African literary schooling can be found in 
David Johnson, Shakespeare and South Africa. 
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20 This sense of modernism’s oppositional status may also stem from the disrepute modernism 
was suffering from during the postwar period.  Britain’s “Angry Young Men” (John Osborne, 
Kingsley Amis, Alan Sillitoe) attacked modernism for its social elitism and anti-realist aesthetic, 
championing in its place social realism and a focus on working-class life (see Alan Sinfield, 
Literature, Politics and Culture in Postwar Britain, 60-85; James English, Comic Transactions: 
Literature, Humor, and the Politics of Community in Twentieth-Century Britain, 128-59; 
Kalliney, Cities of Affluence and Anger, 112-145).  J. Dillon Brown argues that Caribbean 
writers like George Lamming embraced modernism precisely because it was in disrepute, 
finding in modernist difficulty a means for both resisting assimilation into postwar literary 
orthodoxies and claiming affinity with a highly intellectualized aesthetic tradition.  I would 
propose that modernist held a similar appeal to South African writers, who prized both 
modernism’s cultural capital and its outsider status (“Exile and Cunning: The Tactical Difficulty 
of George Lamming”). 
 
21 In addition to Dovey, see Attridge, J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading; Marais,  
“‘Little enough, less than little: nothing': Ethics, Engagement, and Change in the Fiction of J.M. 
Coetzee” and “Accommodating the Other: Derek Attridge on Literature, Ethics, and the Work of 
J. M. Coetzee.” 
 
22 These essays are collected in Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews.  See, in particular, 
“A Note on Writing” and “Time, Tense, and Aspect in Kafka’s ‘The Burrow.’” 
 
23 Many other pro-modernist South Africans had similar connections to Euro-American 
academic circles.  Lewis Nkosi, for example, taught at several American universities (University 
of Wyoming, University of California-Irvine) during his forced exile from South Africa, as did 
many of his fellow exiles. 
 
24 Rita Barnard would seem to be one of the few exceptions to this trend.  Her work on Coetzee 
draws attention to how “the idea of payment and the concomitant ethos of monetary exchange, 
debt, ownership, and the like, is an extraordinarily important motif in Coetzee’s work, even 
though it has in large measure escaped critical notice” (Apartheid and Beyond: South African 
Writers and the Politics of Place, 39). 
 
25 I take the term from Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature.  The idea of 
“minor literature” has been highly influential in theorizing postcolonial literature, having first 
been adapted to a colonial setting in David Lloyd’s Nationalism and Minor Literature: James 
Clarence Mangan and the Emergence of Irish Cultural Nationalism. 
 
26 The history behind the publication of In the Heart of the Country is quite complex.  Coetzee 
initially signed a contract with Ravan to publish an edition of the novel that contained an English 
narrative interspersed with Afrikaans dialogue, but the edition was embargoed while censors 
decided whether it was “undesirable” or not.  During the time that the novel’s status was in 
limbo, Coetzee secured Secker & Warburg to distribute an international edition written solely in 
English.  The South African embargo was eventually lifted and the Ravan edition published, but 
only after the international edition had already been distributed in Britain and the United States.  
 308	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For this reason, the original bilingual edition of the text received less attention than the English-
only version both at the time of its publication and in subsequent criticism.  When quoting the 
novel, I take all Afrikaans quotes from the 1977 Ravan Press edition.  English quotes are taken 
from the later Vintage edition. 
 
27 In an interview with Lawrence Rainey, David Attwell, and Benjamin Madsen, Coetzee 
explicitly draws a connection between grammar and ethics: “Languages certainly do articulate in 
their very grammar a disposition toward the other that is language-specific.  One obvious 
example would be the treatment of address and of the second-person pronoun.  In this sense one 
might say that language embodies an ethics” (“An Interview with J. M. Coetzee,” 849). 
 
28 This is especially true of the scenes in which Hendrik “rapes” Magda.  Though Magda initially 
expresses a fear that Hendrik will “plot” a “deeper invasion and possession…leav[ing] me 
nothing of myself,” she subsequently entreats Hendrik to tell her if she is “doing it right” and if 
she makes him “feel happy” (117, 120).  Magda admits to being “humiliated” by the rapes, and 
even suggests that “it is my humiliation he wants” (122).  But her fascination with the rapes – 
and her almost eager willingness to suffer such humiliations – makes one wonder whether she 
may actively want to be humiliated for her privileged position as a white South African woman. 
 
29 See Aumont, Montage Eisenstein; Bordwell, The Cinema of Eisenstein.  For a perspective the 
links Eisenstein’s thinking on ecstasy to his work as a graphic artist, rather than as a filmmaker, 
see James Goodwin, “Eisenstein, Ecstasy, Joyce, and Hebraism.” 
 
30 E.g., “A reference to Eisenstein does not convey a nostalgic yearning to be in Russia in 1924, 
but rather attempts to chart the connection between Eisenstein’s imagery and the failure of his 
project… In my work that vocabulary and the dramatis personae haven’t changed much, but 
there is no longer the triumphant ending you see in the cinema of Eisenstein” (quoted in 
Cameron et al., William Kentridge, 14-5). 
 
31 “I think…there is a sense of trusting childhood more than adulthood, that provides a reason for 
a lot of the objects that I draw.  These come from the images of those objects that I saw in 
childhood – not necessarily 1950s objects, but maybe 1930s objects that would have been 
illustrated in books I was looking at in the 1950s.” (quoted in Neal Benezra et al., William 
Kentridge, 71) 
 
32 Rosalind Krauss associates Kentridge’s art with a turn away from the “post-medium” 
condition of postmodern art – i.e., its concern with disembodied images – and toward a more 
modernist-style concern with medium specificity.  “Kentridge is not pursuing film as such but is, 
rather, building a new medium on the technical support of a widespread and mostly mass-
cultural cinematic practice, welcoming its condition as a popular rather than a high-art” (“‘The 
Rock’: William Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection,” 14). 
 
33 If the term “hyper-mediation” seems to conjure up images of Baudrillard’s postmodern 
simulacrum, it might be more useful to focus on the contrast between these two forms of “hyper-
mediation.”  After all, Baudrillard is a neo-Platonist who believes the “political economy of 
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signs” cuts subjects off from a more authentic reality (see, e.g., For a Critique of the Political 
Economy of the Sign).  Magda’s solipsistic monologue also distances her from the “real world,” 
but for her hyper-mediation is a liberating gesture that frees her from her own thoughts and 
establishes a more reciprocal connection with other characters.  In other words, Coetzee reverses 
the political valences found in Baudrillard’s work on mediation, valorizing mediation for its 
progressive potential. 
 
34 As I have already intimated, Magda’s fantasies of self-mortification – not to mention the 
uncertain ontological status of her narrative – make it difficult to say whether these rapes are 
“really happening” or only fantasy.  Coetzee returns to rape as a troubling solution to past abuses 
in Disgrace, where David Lurie and his daughter Lucy debate not so much fantasies of 
victimization as whether willing accepting abuse can rectify the apartheid past. 
 
35 After the shock of the National Party’s victory in the 1948 elections and the establishment of 
apartheid legislation, liberal historians excluded class from their studies and focused instead on 
race relations.  For an explanation of how South African historiography shift to a class-based 
notion of race, see Christopher Saunders, The Making of the South African Past.  
 
36 The foundational post-operaismo texts include Marazzi, Capital and the Affects; Franco 
“Bifo” Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy; Paolo Virno, A Grammar of 
the Multitude; and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. 
 
37 This dialectic of innovation and response is one of the key features of operaismo and post- 
operaismo thought.  For post-operaismo thinkers, the working class is the sole engine of history, 
production, and capitalism, while capitalists merely co-opt this productive capacity for their own 
purposes.  At stake in this distinction is a rejection of the Marxian dialectic, in which capital and 
labor, the state and the masses, sublate their difference into a new totality, thus evolving to a new 
mode of production.  Adopting the Spinozan notion of “immanence” (by way of Deleuze), the 
post-operaismos view “transcendentals” (the state, capital, God) as metaphysical fictions 
imposed on the productive “multitude.”  Thus, instead of history being produced from the 
collision between “transcendental” (capital) and “immanent” (labor) forces, post-operaismos 
believe history to be generated solely by the “immanent” “multitude,” whose labors are then 
circumscribed by “transcendental” forms.  For a full exploration of this process, see Hardt and 
Negri, Empire, 69-92.  On Spinoza’s influence on post-operaismo thought, see Negri, Subversive 
Spinoza. 
 
38 See Harvey, The Enigma of Capital. 
 
39 International sanctions mainly consisted of banks and countries divesting their shares in South 
African businesses, rather than trade embargoes.  Thus South Africa continued being able to 
provide mineral and industrial products to the rest of the world but was cut off from modernizing 
their services and technologies sectors (Rodney Davenport and Christopher Saunders, South 
Africa: A Modern History, 535-40). 
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40 As late as 1990, when he was released from prison, Nelson Mandela affirmed that “the 
nationalization of the mines, banks, and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a 
change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable” (quoted in Marais 146). 
 
41 On postcolonial disillusionment in Africa, see Glen Retief, “Homoeroticism and the Failure of 
African Nationalism in Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautyful Ones”; T. Kitenge-Ngoy, “The Novel 
of Postindependence Disillusionment in Central Africa”; and Esty, “Excremental 
Postcolonialism.” 
 
42 Many of his Coetzee’s other fictions express skepticism about the political efficacy of the 
manifesto’s polemical messages.  For example, in The Master of Petersburg Sergey Nechayev 
bests Dostoevsky by provoking him into writing a manifesto denouncing Nechayev and his 
fellow Nihilists.  As Dostoevsky soon discovers, the content of his manifesto is less important 
than the very fact that he has written one about the Nihilists, who use it to popularize their 
movement. 
 
43 For a dissenting view that characterizes Black Consciousness as a competing form of 
liberalism, see Mark Sanders, Complicities: The Intellectual and Apartheid, 159-96.  Regardless 
of whether or not Black Consciousness reinstated some version of liberalism pluralism, Black 
Consciousness thinkers like Biko were unequivocal about this disdain for white liberalism: 
“They have been doing things for blacks, on behalf of blacks, and because of blacks.  When the 
blacks announce that the time has come for them to do things for themselves and all by 
themselves all white liberals shout blue murder!” (Biko, I Write, 25). 
 
44 Monica Popescu, South African Literature Beyond the Cold War, 61; Patrick Bond, 
“Introduction: Two Economies – Or One System of Superexploitation,” 7.  Though literary 
readings of Communism and South African literature have been sparse, Popescu’s book is one 
welcome exception.  Academics influenced by the New Left were especially critical of the 
ANC’s tacit assumption that the Marxian class struggle could be transparently juxtaposed onto 
black and white Africans.  After all, most of the resistance leaders were part of a budding 
bourgeoisie who had been educated at elite black universities like Fort Hare; few shared the 
same socioeconomic background as the impoverished Africans they claimed to represent. 
 
45 For a fuller discussion of how the dialectic is being read differently here than in Marxist 
criticism, see my discussion of Jameson in chapter 1.  As I make clear there, my differences from 
Marxist theories of modernization concern not so much the centrality of the dialectic to 
capitalism as analyses of the dialectic that read it as a solely successivist march through time, 
rather than as an amalgamation of progressive modernization and stable structure. 
 
46 Lukács’s most direct attack on these figures can be found in “The Ideology of Modernism.” 
 
47 Coetzee’s observation that Eliot’s “narrowly academic, Eurocentric education had prepared 
him for little else but life as a mandarin in one of the New England ivory towers” could just as 
easily apply to Coetzee’s own position in an Afrikaner-dominated South Africa, where life as a 
university professor (Coetzee worked in the English department at the University of Cape Town 
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before turning to full-time novel writing) would have appeared to be the only option available to 
an English-speaking white South African with cultural pretensions.  Most of the state-subsided 
publishing industry’s efforts were focused on fostering Afrikaans, rather than English, 
productions.  In contrast, occupational opportunities for South Africans abroad were much more 
common in business and technology, not to mention the tantalizing prospect that London and 
New York’s vast Anglophone publishing networks presented to aspiring writers.  
 
48 Though some black writers did engage with the space of the farm, black Africans’ focus 
tended to be directed at the city rather than the countryside during the apartheid years.  Urban 
meeting spots like the shebeen, American cars, the stylized gangsterism of tsotsi youths, and 
modern fashions were all more interesting and pressing topics for a rapidly urbanizing black 
workforce than the rural reserves they were leaving behind.  In addition, the official apartheid 
line that black Africans were “traditionally” rural, and therefore should be isolated from 
“European” urbanization as much as possible, lent a politicized edge to urban fiction.  Thus 
many of the more politicized black writers from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s (Lewis Nkosi, 
Bloke Modisane, Can Themba, Ezekiel Mphalele) worked closely with Drum magazine, the 
central venue for urban-inflected fictions within the black literary scene.  Even for those writers 
who did portray rural farmlands – Bessie Head, for example – the main emphasis of their fictions 
was on industrial modernization and its impact on impoverished communities, and not on the 
pastoral vision that dominated white farm novels. 
 
49 By placing his novel in the past, Brink was also able to avoid the censorship that had plagued 
many of his other novels.  Topics that were taboo in texts with ostensibly present-day settings, 
such as the racial violence that Gallant and his fellow slaves perpetrate against the Van der 
Merwes, was deemed acceptable when it was displaced onto other time periods or more abstract 
settings. 
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CODA: NEOLIBERALISM, MAGICAL REALISM, AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
WORLD-SYSTEM 
 
 
 My concern in this study has been with a particular class fraction of Anglo-Irish and 
Anglo-South African writers who understood the world-system in affective terms.  In 
confronting this literary tradition, my goal has been less to narrate a comprehensive history of 
these affective representations than to provide an analysis of certain representative moments and 
authors: Olive Schreiner and Bernard Shaw’s sentimental constitutionalism, Sarah Gertrude 
Millin and William Plomer’s envious professionalism, Elizabeth Bowen and J. M. Keynes’s 
affect-driven, cyclical historiography, and J. M. Coetzee’s ecstatic mode of formalist history.  
This approach has been particularly appropriate given the discontinuous historical trajectory 
through which Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African literature have evolved, with key genres 
like the Anglo-Irish Big House novel, the South African plaasroman/farm novel, and the South 
African mine novel disappearing and reappearing at periodic intervals.  But such a discontinuous 
narrative also raises one final question: If semiperipheral literature conforms to a cyclical 
framework of periodic waves, how and where do transitions from one cycle to the next occur?  
What comes after the twentieth-century world-system I have described in this project?  Through 
what literary forms, and in what geographical locations, can we trace its continuities with – and 
divergences from – the post-imperial world-system Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African writing 
negotiated? 
 The 1970s seem a good place to start.  Radical, liberal, and conservative thinkers agree 
that the 1970s ushered in a radically new economic order.  For Daniel Bell, the decade saw the 
“coming of post-industrial society,” a new information-oriented society that would shed 
industrialism’s weighty skin and ensconce in its place a hierarchy of technical elites (The 
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Coming of the Post-Industrial Society).  In contrast, for Giovanni Arrighi the 1970s’ break was 
less about new technologies and services than new forms of social and economic organization.  
According to Arrighi, a “multilayered subcontracting system” began to flourish across the world 
during this period, replacing post-World War II assurances of steady work and a social safety net 
with “informalization” and “flexible” labor (The Long Twentieth Century, 355).  At the same 
time, conservative thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman carried gleeful tidings 
of the end of the welfare state and the rise of a transnational business world unfettered by 
government regulation or burdensome taxation.  Such policies were first put in place in Latin 
American countries and gradually imported to European and American countries during the 
1980s, with their most visible instantiations taking place in Pinochet’s Chile, Thatcher’s Britain, 
and Reagan’s United States.1 
 These phenomena are usually grouped together under the label “neoliberalism,” a 
somewhat ambiguous term that is often employed to simultaneously describe a specific set of 
governmental practices (reductions in entitlement programs, deregulation, minimal government 
interference in the economy, reduced taxes, and reductions to public expenditure on 
infrastructure-building) and a collective disenchantment with the welfare state.  Thus business 
interests and popular unrest converge in neoliberal thought in the amorphous concept of 
“freedom”: a catch-all term that can cover individual “freedom” from “totalitarian” governance, 
a burgeoning ethic of self-reliance, and the “freedom” for businesses to pursue profit without 
regard for social uplift or collective well-being.  The most obvious – and theatricalized – 
expression of neoliberal “freedom” would of course be the present-day Tea Party, which co-opts 
the rhetoric of the American Revolution to hypothesize a connection between personal freedom, 
government tyranny, and the tax codes funding welfare programs.  In the eyes of the Tea Party, 
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all government activity becomes an unwanted imposition: taxation becomes socialism, socialism 
becomes totalitarianism, and the only solution is to do away with the welfare state.  That such a 
project may erode the social services many Tea Partiers themselves utilize, or may contribute to 
income inequalities that the Keynesian welfare state tried to reduce, seems less important than 
the need to assert a form of radical individualism in the face of government collectivism.  
Privatization is the gold standard of neoliberalism; individual entrepreneurs like Ayn Rand’s 
John Galt, its folk heroes; the welfare state, its nemesis. 
 A healthy dose of skepticism should greet any such call to a radical break, especially one 
which, like the Tea Party’s, indulges in the sort of historical allegorizing we have already seen in 
plantation and mine novels.  After all, even neoliberalism does not do away entirely with 
government; instead, it alters the technologies through which government operates, often 
consolidating police powers, military strength, and the surveillance of citizens and illegal 
immigrants at the same time as reducing welfare spending.  It promises the same specter of 
modernization that had motivated such contradictory programs as imperialism, decolonization, 
global capitalism, and the welfare state itself.  Our task as critics, then, is to disentangle the 
affective investments underlying neoliberalism from its specific technologies of governance, 
showing how the intimate emotions developed in popular culture acclimate individuals to the 
neoliberal market – or, in many cases, how these emotions identify the continuities and 
contradictions present in this new phase of modernity, namely, its failure to deliver on its 
promises of universal uplift. 
 Magical realism provides an excellent venue through which to analyze the affects co-
produced alongside neoliberalism.  Though my remarks will be more allusive than 
comprehensive for reasons of space, it is not difficult to see the degree to which magical realism 
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has shadowed the spread of neoliberalism across the globe.  If we look simply at a small 
collection of some of the most influential magical realist novels from the past 40 years – Gabriel 
García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967) and Autumn of the Patriarch (1975), 
Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1980), Ben Okri’s Stars of the Night Curfew (1988) and 
The Famished Road (1991), and Zakes Mda’s Ways of Dying (1995) – we can see how uncannily 
they overlap with the years leading up to and immediately following the implementation of 
neoliberal policies. García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude was one of the heralded 
Latin American “Boom” novels that flooded European and North American publishing houses in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and whose emergence has been closely tied by Latin American critics to 
the fall of dictatorships and the rise of “el consenso neoliberal” (“the neoliberal consensus”) in 
the region;2 Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children was written just after the end of the Indian 
Emergency, when India was just beginning to provide subcontracting for European and 
American businesses; Okri’s fictions take place during the 1970s and 1980s oil boom, which 
introduced neoliberal market policies to Nigeria; and Mda’s Ways of Dying was written 
immediately after the end of apartheid, when the ANC shifted course from their earlier socialist 
platform and embraced a neoliberal economic platform. 
 We can therefore trace neoliberalism’s wave-like migration across the globe through 
magical realist novels, from 1970s Latin America to 1980s India, and from late-1980s Nigeria to 
mid-1990s South Africa.  Like Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country, these novels hollow out 
the promises of developmental rhetoric, revealing how a supposedly “past” moment of 
modernization (e.g., the welfare state) still appears as a desirable object even as newer, more 
“advanced” forms of economic modernization are being touted.  This homology between 
Coetzee’s and magical realism’s critiques of modernization is not accidental: as we have seen, 
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the world-system evolves in a series of interlocking waves, and what is an end to one cycle (the 
Anglo semiperiphery) intersects with newly emerging cycles (e.g., neoliberalism).  Indeed, the 
convergence between modernism and social critique we find in Coetzee has long been regarded 
as a central component of magical realism.  As David Mikics puts it, “The magical realists’ 
project to reveal the intimate interdependence between reality and fantasy is shared by the 
modernists” (372).  Magical realists, Mikics continues, use these modernist techniques to “will a 
transformation of the object of representation” – i.e., to spark social change (372).  But where 
Coetzee focuses this critique inwards, to the conventions and historicity of the plaasroman 
genre, magical realism gestures outward, seeking to explain the puzzling palimpsests of different 
forms of development it witnesses through what Franco Moretti calls “stor[ies] of 
incorporation”: “When the pressure of the world-system…forces your country into a more 
complete – and hence more rigid integration… [a] thousand and one possibilities then really do 
become a thousand and one dead ends: the multiplicity of possible developments, a set route” 
(Modern Epic, 245).  In other words, we can view magical realist novels as swansongs for 
alternative development, testaments to the affective force non-neoliberal modernization 
continued to hold even as the generalization of neoliberalism prevented those other paths from 
being realized. 
 García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude is a multi-generational epic that 
revolves around the exploits of the Buendía family and the fictionalized settlement of Macando, 
an isolated town located in the Latin American interior.  Best known for its juxtaposition of 
magical happenings (flying carpets, levitations, ancient curses) and modern technology 
(pianolas, telescopes, guns), the novel’s most striking aspect, as Moretti observes, is how modern 
technology appears as more magical than the town’s indigenous marvels: magic “belongs to the 
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future: to the West, to the core of the world-system.  Compared with the compass or the 
mechanized pianola – not to speak of ice – flying carpets and spooks are irrelevancies” (Modern 
Epic, 249).  Furthermore, as Moretti also notes, there are two “phases” to the novel.  During the 
first, the possibilities of modern technology “pervade every page of the story”: the items the 
gypsies bring “enrich the life of Macando: [they] make it more varied, more open” (244).  In the 
second phase, however, war reaches Macando, and with it the autocratic dictates of the 
centralized nation-state.  Like other “Boom” writers, García Márquez was highly critical of the 
totalitarian bent to Latin American politics, and so his portrayals of the state are tinged with 
hostility, stressing the senseless violence behind the state’s assassination of all but one of 
Colonel Aureliano Buendía’s children as punishment for his rebellion.  But the war’s end also 
opens Macando to banana developers, drawing it closer to the international markets and laissez-
faire economic programs that would eventually come to be known as neoliberalism.  Macando is 
increasingly caught between these two blocs, forced to either submit to the government’s 
autocratic decisions or to labor as a peripheral satellite economy for American developers. 
In One Hundred Years of Solitude, no decision is possible between neoliberalism’s 
“banana republics” and the dictatorial nation-state.  Both alternatives are equally undesirable, 
and each jars with the heady expectations of the novel’s first phase.  Faced with this impasse, the 
novel’s magical objects and events attempt to rescue the utopian promise contained in each of 
these modernization projects.  By hearkening back to alternative scenarios in which trade with 
traveling gypsies brought magical wonders to Macando, or in which the establishment of a 
cohesive community spawned similar wonders (ghosts, prophecies), García Márquez suggests 
that development could have occurred otherwise, that the dictatorial state and neoliberal 
economics are not the only two endpoints to modernization.  But the novel can only imagine 
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such alternatives in their anterior realm of magic, where modernization retains its alluring 
promise but is cut off from the disenchanted world of modern reality.  The novel brings this point 
home by in effect eating its own tail, concluding with a prophecy that contains the entirety of the 
novel’s narrative, and which ends in the destruction of both Macando and the prophecy’s 
manuscript.  As García Márquez explains in the novel’s final line, “races condemned to one 
hundred years of solitude [do] not have a second opportunity on earth” – the very magicalness of 
this narrative means that it cannot be revisited except in the self-immolating space of the 
narrative itself (422).  Alternative development is a possibility, but one which “actually existing 
modernity” has cordoned off into the fantastical realm of narrative. 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children makes a similar equation between magic and failed 
modernization; only in Rushdie’s case, this missed opportunity is definitively associated with the 
Indian nation-state as it recedes under the pressures of neoliberal globalization.  Saleem Sinai is 
an Indian who is born at the stroke of midnight on August 15, 1947, the day of India’s 
independence.  Saleem is blessed with a preternaturally acute sense of smell and a telepathic 
connection to 1,000 other “midnight’s children”: the children who were born between midnight 
and 1 am on India’s day of independence.  Rushdie parades the openly allegorical nature of the 
children, as Saleem himself claims to be “handcuffed to history” (3).3 Saleem finds echoes 
between India’s history and his own life at every turn, and if even he at times wonders whether 
these resonances are the paranoid imaginings of a deranged narcissist, the way in which he and 
his family recreate the central events of post-independence history provides a compelling case 
for his allegorical function.  The Partition, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, and Bangladesh’s 
secession from Pakistan are all translated into intra-familial squabbles, while the 1,001 children 
 319	  
establish a parliament-style forum, “The Midnight’s Children Conference,” styling themselves as 
a shadow government representing the Indian people. 
As in One Hundred Years of Solitude, the exuberant promise these magical children 
represent gradually falls apart, this time under the twin pressures of free market individualism 
and totalitarian governance.  Cracks begin to form in the Conference when Saleem’s rival, Shiva, 
rejects Saleem’s Communist-inflected collectivism (“Do not permit the endless duality of 
masses-and-classes, capital-and-labour, them and us to come between us”) and replaces it with 
an ethic of self-interested individualism: “No, little rich boy, there is only money-and-poverty, 
and have-and-lack, and right-and-left; there is only me-against-the-world” (292-3).  Class, 
religious, and ethnic differences begin to plague the Conference, leaving them with little sense of 
a collective national mission.  Soon after, in a fictionalization of the sterilization campaign led by 
Sanjay Gandhi during the India Emergency, the children are forced to undergo sterilization 
procedures that also remove their powers.  According to the Indian government, the children 
pose a threat to the state: their very multiplicity endangers the fiction of a unified state, one in 
which a single representative individual would embody the totality of the nation – as in the 
refrain “India is [Prime Minister] Indira [Gandhi] and Indira is India” (483).  Pulled between an 
individualist ethic in which the Conference, like the state, has no meaningful role to play, and a 
totalitarian state that crushes any diversity, Saleem literally “cracks” into 1,001 pieces.  The 
unity-within-diversity that the children and their magical powers had represented, the fantasy of 
a state expansive enough to nurture multiple types of modernity simultaneously, becomes 
disaggregated into a singular state and the “four hundred five hundred six” individuals bursting 
from its seams (533).  By the end of the novel, the magical moment when state and individual 
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advancement were intertwined has passed, and the only available options appear to be either an 
autocratic state or crass self-interest. 
If Rushdie’s novel details the state’s recession as an engine of collective development, 
Ben Okri’s fiction emphasizes the flip side of neoliberal privatization: its illusory, ungrounded 
notions of value.  For example, in “Stars of the Night Curfew” the “powerful” potions marketed 
by a travelling salesman promise fantastic cures to almost any ailment imaginable: “I said that it 
could cure anything from headaches to elephantiasis… [that] it was good for children and old 
people, that it gave more power, more iron, than any existing drug” (104).  In a powerful reading 
of the story, Sarah Lincoln argues that the very magicalness of the potion – an ordinary object 
whose value is “inflated” by believing that it can “act on the world in ways that exceed its 
material substance” – allegorizes the inflationary wealth produced by the Nigerian oil boom 
(“‘Petro-Magic Realism’: Ben Okri’s Inflationary Economy,” 256).  Like the Nigerian economy, 
which expanded at an astounding rate following the discovery of oil, the potion’s value is a 
“fetishistic misrecognition of the social and ecological relations on which the wealth was 
founded” (251).  As crowds gather to see the potion’s healing capabilities, the story’s narrator is 
increasingly disillusioned with an economy that prizes spectacle over substance: “It went on like 
that, one spectacle on top of another, leaving us perplexed by the mindless excess and drained of 
any sense of wonder” (“Stars of the Night Curfew,” 139). The massive building projects that the 
oil boom funded presented just such a spectacle, convincing the Nigerian population that 
“modernity” had arrived even as a small elite gathered most of the oil profits to themselves.  As 
Lincoln explains, “the phantasmagoric organization of political life, [Okri’s text] suggests, has 
been evacuated of the affective quality necessary for genuine political embodiment, turning the 
political body into a serial assemblage of devalued individual actors who are becoming 
 321	  
increasingly extraneous to the health of the whole” (259).  Economic value has been uncoupled 
from collective modernization, reducing modernity to an illusory spectacle rather than an 
enduring set of social and political institutions.  The narrator’s disenchantment with such 
“spectacles” thus appeals to an alternative definition of modernity, one in which a more 
recognizably modernist investment in infrastructural development, and not the fantastical fetish 
of petro dollars, would define what it is to be “modern.” 
For Zakes Mda, as for Okri, neoliberal modernity entails magical, otherworldly 
spectacles.  In Ways of Dying, his first postapartheid novel, Mda pushes the logic of 
neoliberalism’s entrepreneurial ethic to the point of absurdity by imagining a new vocation: the 
“professional mourner.”  In the most basic sense of the concept, Toloki, the “founder of [this] 
noble profession,” is a niche entrepreneur (17).  Seeing a need for organized responses to the 
widespread mortality rocking South Africa – the result of AIDS, undernourishment, and poor 
living conditions – Toloki offers his own theatricalized brand of mourning to funeral processions 
for whatever small change they can afford to pay him.  As Rita Barnard notes, by styling his 
work as a sort of monkish asceticism, Toloki is able to transform his poverty into a culturally 
meaningful activity endowed with a certain social respectability – his malnourishment and 
meager possessions are not indicators of entrepreneurial failure, but are instead the normal 
trappings of a committed ascetic (Apartheid and Beyond, 155).  But in presenting Toloki’s 
occupation in this manner, the novel undermines the neoliberal rhetoric of personal responsibility 
and individual initiative on two levels.  On the one hand, the fact that Toloki views death as the 
best avenue for entrepreneurship implies that South Africa is so materially destitute that death 
and poverty are the only commodities it mass-produces.4 On the other hand, Toloki’s continuing 
poverty suggests that entrepreneurship fails to deliver on its promises of upward mobility and 
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material comfort.  Unwashed, ill-clothed, and effectively homeless, Toloki parodies the forms of 
neoliberal individualism without experiencing any substantive improvement within his daily life. 
What follows is a split between the spectacle of modernity and continuing material 
inequalities eerily reminiscent of Okri’s “Star of the Night Curfew.”  When Toloki brings his 
“homegirl” Noria home to live with him in his dilapidated shack, he plasters glossy magazine 
advertisements onto its walls, metamorphosing its interior into a “Mediterranean-style mansion” 
with expansive bedrooms and cultivated gardens.  As with Okri’s potions, the “magical” nature 
of this episode is found in the gap between Toloki and Noria’s imaginative transformations and 
the continued poverty of their actual surroundings.  By collapsing the distinction between having 
(i.e., the mansion itself) and wanting (i.e., the advertisement for the mansion), Mda blurs the 
boundaries between infrastructural development and affect-laden fantasies, locating in the 
affective realm a utopian potential for material comfort absent from Toloki and Noria’s everyday 
experiences.  Within the fashion magazines consecrated to the “newness” of commodities exists 
an implicit reference to those materials endowed with the protection and sustenance of bare life: 
beneath the “crisp white” “arbour” of Toloki and Noria’s mansion is a stable home not subject to 
the vagaries of transient living; underneath the pools and ponds of their flowing garden is regular 
water and electricity; and delicious cakes, as luxurious as they may be, allude to a sufficiency of 
food that is utterly absent from the more “realist” moments of the novel.  In Ways of Dying as in 
“Star of the Night Curfew,” the tragedy is that these basic necessities can only be recovered in 
Toloki and Noria’s desires, and not in a more “realist” environment.  But these affective 
investments in material security and plenty, over and against neoliberalism and the disembodied 
value of spectacles, gesture toward a more grounded, infrastructure-oriented notion of 
modernization than neoliberal understandings of modernization seem to provide. 
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 Magical realism, then, returns us to the central concerns that this dissertation has shaped 
itself around.  As I have argued throughout, the intimate workings of the emotions are not as far 
removed from the institutional structures of the world-system as we might believe.  The sheer 
variety of economic, social, and political institutions spanning the world-system require a sort of 
calibrating zone that can bring often incompatible persons, objects, and ideologies into contact 
with one another: nationalism and globalization, the welfare state and transnational finance 
capital, or, as in magical realism, neoliberal triumphalism and a desperately needed 
infrastructure-building state.  If magical realism seems to present a more nostalgic, politically 
incendiary set of affects than the ones we have seen in Anglo-Irish and Anglo-South African 
literature, then this may point to a certain exhaustion of the aesthetics of emotion I have traced in 
the preceding pages.  After all, if we have begun to see affect everywhere – in movies, novels, 
paintings, television, advertisements, and so on – maybe it really is nowhere anymore.  In other 
words, affect may not “wane,” as Jameson has famously proposed that it does in the postmodern 
artwork, but may instead become so pervasive and empirically apparent that it can no longer 
perform the work it had in the past.  What Bruce Robbins says of infrastructure could just as 
easily be applied to affect: when working, it remains invisible as a “minimum threshold,” but 
when it breaks its existence becomes clear for all to see (“The Smell of Infrastructure: Notes 
Toward an Archive”).  And affect, as I have argued, is a kind of infrastructure, a formal one 
coordinating between incommensurable economic systems, providing the foundation upon which 
they can be drawn together in a systemic arrangement.  As magical realism generalizes such 
affective mediations in the periphery, this may provide us with the means to chart a twenty-first 
century world-system emerging out of the ashes of the twentieth-century one charted in this 
study, revealing the structural tempos residing underneath everyday emotions. 
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1 For a concise overview of neoliberalism’s emergence, see David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism. 
 
2 For an overview of Latin American critics’ response to neoliberalism, see Brett Levinson, The 
Ends of Literature: The Latin American “Boom” in the Neoliberal Marketplace. 
 
3 The allegorical nature of Midnight’s Children has been exhaustively analyzed.  See Vilashini 
Cooppan, Worlds Within, 41-54; Michael Reder, “Rewriting History and Identity: The Invention 
of Myth, Epic, and Allegory in Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children”; M. Keith Booker, 
“Midnight’s Children, History, and Complexity: Reading Rushdie after the Cold War”; and Todd 
M. Kuchta, “Allegorizing the Emergency: Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children and Benjamin’s 
Theory of Allegory.” 
 
4 In a case of truth being just as strange as fiction, Rosalind Morris relates how funeral insurance 
has become a budding industry in South Africa.  With the country’s high mortality rate and 
widespread poverty, communities have scarcely been able to afford to pay for burials without 
purchasing funeral insurance.  The irony, as Morris observes, is that in buying such insurance 
one is effectively betting against one’s life, profiting more by an early death than a long and 
healthy life.  See Morris, “Rush/Panic/Rush: Speculations on the Value of Life and Death in 
South Africa’s Age of Epidemic.” 
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